Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

The Commission on Judicial Performance filed a formal complaint against Rickey W. Thompson, Justice Court Judge, District 4, Lee County, charging him with judicial misconduct constituting violations of Canons 1, 2A, 2B, 3B(1), 3B(2), 3B(4), 3B(8), 3C(1), and 3C(2) of the Code of Judicial Conduct and constituting willful misconduct in office and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice which brought the judicial office into disrepute in violation of Section 177A of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890, as amended. "We are concerned, and take into consideration, that Judge Thompson has not taken responsibility for his actions, and the likelihood of those actions being repeated in the future is great. Judge Thompson’s willful disregard for his past discipline 'illustrates the magnitude of the [offenses] and indifference to litigants and [the Commission and the Supreme] Court in continuing to engage in [misconduct].'" The Supreme Court agreed with the Commission's recommendation and ordered that Judge Thompson: (1) be removed from office; and (2) be assessed fines and costs of the proceedings. View "Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance v. Thompson" on Justia Law

Leeman filed a private enforcement action under Health and Safety Code 25249.5 (Proposition 65), alleging that t Adams Extract & Spice failed to issue an adequate warning that its product contained a chemical identified on the Governor’s list “of those chemicals known to the state to cause cancer or reproductive toxicity .” A successful plaintiff in such an action is entitled to recover attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure 1021.5. The parties settled shortly before trial, including a stipulated award of $72,500.00 for attorney fees and costs, incurred by Leeman. In confirming the settlement, the court modified the attorney fee amount by reducing it to $35,839.67. The court of appeal reversed. The trial court had the right to reject the settlement agreement in its entirety, and refuse to “approve the settlement” if the court determined that $72,500.00 was unfair or unreasonable, but lacked authority to modify any of the terms of the settlement agreement unilaterally, thus requiring the parties to accept a settlement to which they have not agreed. View "Leeman v. Adams Extract & Spice, LLC" on Justia Law

McVey sued for injuries she sustained after a waitress dropped a tray on her foot. Memorial Hospital of Carbondale treated her. McVey settled the lawsuit for $7,500, then filed a petition to adjudicate liens. The hospital’s lien was $2,891.64. In addition to attorney fees, McVey allegedly incurred litigation costs of $846.66 in securing the settlement. The trial court entered an order recognizing that under the Health Care Services Lien Act (Act) (770 ILCS 23/10), no individual licensed category of health care professional or health care providers may receive more than one-third of the award or settlement, so that the hospital could recover no more than $2,500. The court acknowledged precedent holding, that in order to ensure that a plaintiff receives 30% of the judgment, the computation of the amount available to health care providers should not begin until costs associated with bringing the case and securing payment have been deducted, but refused to deduct attorney fees and costs before calculating the amount available to the hospital. The appellate court reversed and remanded. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, holding that hospitals are not required to contribute to the costs of litigation. View "McVey v. M.L.K. Enters., LLC" on Justia Law

Respondent Timothy O’Meara appealed a superior court order granting summary judgment against him and his law firm, O’Meara Newborn, PLLC, in an action brought by petitioners James and Anita Conant for the equitable recovery of fees paid to O’Meara. Anita Conant was injured in an automobile accident. James Conant retained O’Meara to represent the Conants in a personal injury suit arising out of the accident. He executed a contingent fee agreement providing, in part, “that O’Meara would be paid 33.33% of the gross amount recovered.” Despite knowing that he did not have authority to settle for policy limits, O’Meara informed opposing counsel that he believed the suit was “a policy limits case” and had been instructed “to proceed to trial” if the policy limits were not paid. After expressing concern over O’Meara’s unauthorized demand to settle, James Conant suggested that O’Meara reduce his fee. The parties discussed what O’Meara’s fee should be if the case settled for the policy limits: O’Meara offered to reduce his potential fee from $3.67 million to $3.17 million, which angered James Conant. O'Meara “told the Conants that if they terminated his services, he would sue them for his one-third contingency fee and ‘would win.’” Eventually the parties modified the original fee agreement, initialing handwritten changes indicating that O’Meara’s fee was “to be negotiated.” The dispute over fees continued, and on the day of a scheduled mediation in federal court in Pennsylvania, O’Meara informed the Conants at the courthouse “that he would not proceed with the mediation unless he received at least a $2 million fee.” James Conant felt he had no choice but to sign a memorandum agreeing to that fee. O’Meara negotiated an $11.5 million settlement subject to certain contingencies. After the mediation, the Conants dismissed O’Meara and the case settled for $11.5 million. The Conants and O’Meara agreed that the Conants would pay O’Meara an undisputed fee of $750,000, place $1,250,000 in escrow, and arbitrate the issue of how this amount should be divided.” An arbitration panel awarded O’Meara $837,000 of the escrow. Counsel for the Conants filed a grievance with the Attorney Discipline Office (ADO) alleging ethical violations by O’Meara. The ensuing disciplinary proceeding culminated with an order disbarring him. In appealing the superior court's order disgorging O'Meara of the $837,000 in fees he received at the end of arbitration, O’Meara argued that the trial court erred in: (1) permitting petitioners to relitigate matters determined in the prior arbitration; (2) failing to find the petitioners’ action barred by the statute of limitations; and (3) ordering fee forfeiture. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part: "we cannot say that the trial court’s order to disgorge the entire $837,000 award, as opposed to some lesser amount, constitutes an unsustainable exercise of discretion. [. . .] the fraud on the tribunal doctrine does not apply to the Conants’ claim for forfeiture of the $750,000 they paid O’Meara prior to arbitration. [. . .] the arbitrators 'were only tasked with considering whether O’Meara was entitled to a disputed portion of fees.' We fail to see how fraud on a tribunal can justify avoiding the time-bar of a claim not before that tribunal." The Court reversed the trial court’s award of the $750,000 paid prior to arbitration. The Court affirmed in all other respects. View "Conant v. O'Meara" on Justia Law

YTC Dream Homes, Inc. and other franchisees (collectively, YTC) filed in Lake Superior Court a contract-related action against franchisor DirectBuy, Inc. and related parties (collectively, DirectBuy). YTC filed a motion requesting pro hac vice admission of five out-of-state attorneys to represent YTC in the case. The trial court initially granted YTC’s motion but, upon the objection of DirectBuy, vacated its original order and issued an order denying YTC’s motion, holding that YTC did not overcome the presumption under Lake County Local Rule 5(C) that an attorney not licensed in Indiana is not permitted to practice before it. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Local Rule 5(C) does not create a presumption against pro hac vice admissions. Remanded to the trial court with instructions to determine, within the discretion granted by the Indiana Admission and Discipline Rule 3(2), whether good cause exists for the admission of the attorneys. View "YTC Dream Homes, Inc. v. DirectBuy, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the attorneys who represented their adversaries in litigation over various financial transactions, alleging that the attorneys engaged in illegal conduct when they solicited and received confidential, privileged, and/or proprietary information from plaintiffs' former attorney and used that information in the litigation against plaintiffs. The trial court granted defendants' motion to strike the complaint under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (the anti-SLAP statute). The court affirmed the trial court's conclusion that the complaint arose from protected First Amendment activity; there was insufficient evidence to show defendants' conduct was illegal as a matter of law; and plaintiffs did not show a probability of prevailing on their claims because the statute of limitations had run and the litigation privilege barred plaintiffs' claims. View "Bergstein v. Stroock & Stroock & Lavan" on Justia Law

Insurance companies allegedly refused to honor claims for payment of blood-clotting-factor products. After they paid the claims in full, the district court dismissed a complaint under the Employees Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) and state law. Following dismissal, both the plaintiffs and defendants sought attorney’s fees and costs. The Third Circuit affirmed denial, but remanded one issue: whether the plaintiffs were entitled to interest on the delayed payment of benefits. On remand, they sought interest of $1.5 to $1.8 million, primarily under the Maryland Code, with $68,000 based on the federal Treasury bill rate. The companies agreed to pay $68,000.00 in interest and the district court dismissed the case. Plaintiffs then sought attorney’s fees and costs of $349,385.15. The district court denied the motion, finding that plaintiffs had failed to achieve “some degree of success on the merits” as required for an award of fees under ERISA. The Third Circuit reversed, holding that the court used an incorrect legal standard to evaluate eligibility for attorney’s fees and misapplied the “Ursic” factors. The “catalyst theory” of recovery is available to the plaintiffs and judicial action is not required under that theory in order to establish some degree of success. View "Templin v. Independence Blue Cross" on Justia Law

The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692, targets “independent debt collectors,” but excludes in-house collectors, including “any officer or employee of . . . any State to the extent that collecting or attempting to collect any debt is in the performance of his official duties.” In Ohio, consumer debts that remain uncollected by a state entity are “certified” to the Attorney General (OAG), which enlists “special counsel” as independent contractors for collections. Actions taken by special counsel are dictated by an agreement, which requires special counsel to comply with FDCPA standards. All collections must be endorsed to the OAG before special counsel is entitled to a fee. Special counsel were orally directed to use OAG letterhead for all collections (including consumer debts, although contrary to Ohio’s code). Plaintiffs filed suit, alleging violation of the FDCPA by use of OAG letterhead. The district court entered summary judgment, holding that special counsel are not “debt collectors” under the FDCPA, and that, even if they were, use of OAG letterhead was not a “false, deceptive or misleading” communication. The Sixth Circuit vacated. A jury could reasonably find that the use of the OAG letterhead by the “special counsel,” in the manner and under the circumstances present here, resulted in letters that were actually confusing to the least sophisticated consumer. View "Gillie v. Law Office of Eric A. Jones, LLC" on Justia Law

Rosemann hired attorney Sigillito after Sigillito falsely informed Rosemann that he was an expert in international investments. In 2007, Rosemann received a $15.6 million buyout from the sale of his family’s company. Sigillito instructed Rosemann to loan $5 million of the buyout to Metis, a Turkish contractor. When Rosemann resisted, Sigillito told him “the loan was guaranteed by [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] contracts and that Sigillito would structure the deal to protect Rosemann and defer taxes.” Rosemann transferred $15.6 million to Sigillito, who wrote a $5 million check to Metis. For that service, Sigillito charged Rosemann $100,000. Sigillito took some money for his own use and loaned $10.8 million to another party in England. Approximately $2.75 million was repaid. In 2009, Metis defaulted and filed for bankruptcy protection in Turkey. Sigillito filed suit against Metis but the suit eventually was dismissed. The loan remains in default. In 2012, Sigillito was convicted of nine counts of wire fraud, four counts of mail fraud, six counts of money laundering, and conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud. He was sentenced to 480 months’ imprisonment. Rosemann sued for legal malpractice. The Eighth Circuit affirmed dismissal because Rosemann failed to name an expert who would testify about the appropriate standard of care. View "Rosemann v. Sigillito" on Justia Law

Hess, an attorney, had worked on a number of medical-malpractice cases before his law firm, Kanoski terminated his employment. Many of these cases settled after Hess’s termination, and Hess was not compensated. He sued under his employment agreement and under the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act, adding claims of tortious interference, wrongful discharge, unjust enrichment, and quantum meruit. In 2011, the district court dismissed each of Hess’s claims. On remand the district court held that Hess was not entitled to compensation for the post-termination settlements. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, based on its interpretation of Hess’s employment contract provisions that Hess would receive bonus pay in the amount of 15 percent of all fees “generated over the base salary (or $5,000 per month),” that the bonus shall increase to 25 percent “on all fees received annually in excess of $750,000.00,” and that that, “where the Corporation retains clients upon Employees [sic] termination that Employee has no proprietary interest in fees to be earned since the Employee is to be fully compensated through his salary and/or bonus for all work done while an Employee of the Corporation.” View "Hess v. Kanoski & Associates" on Justia Law