Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a law firm, provided legal services to three companies owned and managed by defendants. After defendants failed to pay legal bills, the law firm filed suit and prevailed. The court concluded that the Confession of Judgment entered in Michigan state court had no preclusive effect and therefore did not bar the current suit under principles of res judicata; the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying amendment; the Retention Letter did not incorporate the Promissory Note’s choice-of-law and attorney’s fee clauses; and D.C. law applies to the Retention Letter and does not preclude the law firm from recovering fees incurred while representing itself. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Bode & Grenier, LLP v. Knight" on Justia Law

This appeal stems from an intellectual property dispute between two religious organizations. Plaintiff filed suit alleging that defendant is infringing its registered service marks in violation of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1114, and Florida law. The district court granted judgment for defendant. In the first appeal, the court reversed in part and remanded for reconsideration of whether the parties' marks are likely to be confused. The court was also critical of disparaging comments that the district judge made about the parties. On remand, the court concluded that the district court misapplied several factors in its analysis of likely confusion, incorrectly assessed the Florida Priory’s defense of prior use, relied on historical testimony that the court previously deemed inadmissible, and misinterpreted the court's instructions about consulting facts outside the record. The court declined to order reassignment after balancing the three factors in United States v. Torkington. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "Sovereign Military Hospitaller v. The Florida Priory of the Knights Hospitallers" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Mehusa, her former employer, for unpaid overtime, unpaid wages, and violation of California's Equal Pay Act, Labor Code 1197.5. After plaintiff prevailed on her Equal Pay Act claim and defendant prevailed on plaintiff's overtime and wage claims, the trial court awarded plaintiff her attorney fees and defendant its attorney fees and costs. The trial court offset the attorney fees awards for a net award to plaintiff of $3,709.19. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in ruling that defendant was a prevailing party on plaintiff’s wage claim and awarding defendant attorney fees and costs under section 218.5. The court held in the published portion of this opinion that when there are two fee shifting statutes in separate causes of action, there can be a prevailing party for one cause of action and a different prevailing party for the other cause of action. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Sharif v. Mehusa, Inc." on Justia Law

The Minnesota Board on Judicial Standards brought a formal complaint against Hon. Alan F. Pendleton, Judge of the District Court of the Tenth Judicial District, alleging that Pendleton violated the Code of Judicial Conduct and the Minnesota Constitution. A panel appointed by the Supreme Court concluded that Judge Pendleton violated several sections of the Code of Judicial Conduct and Minn. Const. art. VI, 4 and recommended that the judge be censured and suspended from judicial office without pay for at least six months. Judge Pendleton appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Board proved by clear and convincing evidence that Judge Pendleton failed to reside within his judicial district during his continuation in office and that he made a knowingly false statement regarding his residency in his affidavit of candidacy; (2) Judge Pendleton was not denied due process of law by irregularities in the proceedings before the Board and the panel; and (3) the appropriate judicial discipline is removal from office. View "Inquiry into the Conduct of Hon. Alan F. Pendleton" on Justia Law

The last will and testament of Donald Amundson provided for his entire estate to be distributed to the Donald G. Amundson Trust. The Trust owned farmland jointly with the Kenneth Amundson Trust, which was set up by Donald Amundson's brother. Donald Amundson's Trust declaration directed the Trust assets were to be distributed upon his death to four charities, with the remainder distributed to ten nieces and nephews. Debra Magers and Gladys Gleason were initially appointed as co-personal representatives of the Estate. Magers, Gleason, and Todd Graveline were appointed as co-trustees of the Trust. John Widdel, Jr. represented all parties in relation to the administration of the estate. Magers eventually became sole personal representative and trustee of the Trust and Estate. In August 2013, the beneficiaries of the Estate petitioned for court determination of reasonableness of fees and for settlement and distribution of estate. The petition objected to the fees charged by Magers and Widdel for their services to the Estate and Trust. In September 2014, the district court found Magers had breached her fiduciary duty in several ways, which included paying Widdel large fees without question. The court also found administration of the Estate and Trust was not complicated and Widdel's fees were unreasonable in light of the nature of the work performed. The court ordered Widdel to return attorney's fees in the amount of $95,000. Widdel appealed the district court judgment ordering him to repay $95,000 of the attorney's fees he charged in the administration of the Estate. He argued the district court abused its discretion in finding the attorney's fees were unreasonable, and that the district court abused its discretion by not holding an evidentiary hearing on the issue of substituting his professional corporation as the named party on the judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court, concluding the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding the fees charged by Widdel were unreasonable and in finding Widdel could properly be held personally liable on the judgment. View "Estate of Amundson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants, alleging that they had violated the duty of loyalty owed to her under the Rules of Professional Conduct by pursuing her business partner's interests in the underlying dissolution and copyright actions. Plaintiff alleged that she had an implied attorney-client relationship with each defendant based on her status as a 50 percent owner of Purposeful Press, the company she and her business partner created. The trial court denied defendants' special motion to strike pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (the anti-SLAPP). In this case, plaintiff's claims arise out of defendants’ breach of professional obligations they allegedly owed to plaintiff as the result of an implied attorney-client relationship arising out of defendants’ representation of Purposeful Press. The court concluded that defendants failed to establish that plaintiff's claims arise from protected activity and did not address the second step of the anti-SLAPP analysis. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Sprengel v. Zbylut" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, convicted for sexually assaulting the 13-year-old daughter of his girlfriend, filed a number of civil suits against various federal and state officers and institutions, and some private persons alleging a governmental conspiracy to persecute plaintiff and violation of his constitutional rights. In this case, plaintiff filed eight causes of action against 19 defendants, including District Judge Donald W. Molloy and Magistrate Judge Jeremiah C. Lynch. When plaintiff filed the action, the case was assigned to the same judges who had presided over his earlier case, Judge Molloy and Magistrate Judge Lynch. Principally at issue on appeal is plaintiff's contention that District Judge Molloy and Magistrate Judge Lynch abused their discretion when they declined to recuse themselves from presiding over plaintiff's claims, despite being named as defendants. The court held that the rule of necessity applies where every judge of a tribunal would otherwise be disqualified. Therefore, the rule of necessity permits a district judge to hear a case in which he is named as a defendant where a litigant sues all the judges of the district. Accordingly, Judges Molloy and Lynch did not abuse their discretion when they declined to recuse themselves, though named as defendants in this action. The court affirmed the judgment. View "Glick v. Edwards" on Justia Law

Claimant appealed the district court's fee award after he prevailed against the federal government in a civil asset forfeiture action and became entitled to an award of attorney’s fees under the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 (CAFRA), 28 U.S.C. 2465(b)(1)(A). The court concluded that the district court correctly noted that the the lodestar method, which calculates a fee award by multiplying the market billing rate by the hours reasonably expended, applies to CAFRA awards even when there is a contingency agreement. The court concluded that the fee target has, through its inaction in the district court, waived any right on appeal to present new evidence to challenge the district court’s factual finding of reasonableness; nor can the target challenge the absence of an evidentiary hearing in the district court. The court concluded that the district court erred in several respects: it failed to afford claimant's rate of presumption of reasonableness; the district court entirely ignored the hourly rates discussed in the three declarations from forfeiture experts; the district court erred in finding that forfeiture work resembled criminal defense litigation; the district court erred in finding that the claimed hourly fee should be lowered because much of the work could have been delegated to associates with lower billing rates at a large law firm; and the district court erred by relying on an award almost nine years old in determining the prevailing market hourly rate. Further, the district court erred by reducing the hours claimed by over forty percent where the district court only identified 6.75 hours that it found objectionable. Finally, the district court also erred by reducing the lodestar because of the contingency fee. Accordingly, the court vacated the fee award and remanded for recalculation. View "United States v. Moser" on Justia Law

Relators filed related qui tam actions, alleging that government contractors, including Cisco, committed fraud against the government by means of a kickback and defective pricing schemes in violation of the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. 3729-3733 and the Anti-Kickback Act, 41 U.S.C. 51-52. The government intervened against Cisco, adopted the complaint, and settled the action. The government objected to relators’ claim to a percentage of the settlement on the ground that the relators’ complaint did not plead the conduct that formed the basis of the claims that the government ultimately settled; that the relators’ claims based on an alleged kickback scheme lacked merit; and that the settlement covered a separate defective pricing scheme. The district court awarded relators over eight million dollars. The Eighth Circuit initially affirmed. On rehearing, en banc, the Eighth Circuit vacated and remanded, concluding that the relator may recover only from the proceeds of the settlement of the claim that he brought. The district court’s order did not clearly apply that legal standard or make factual findings necessary to resolve the case under that standard. View "Rille v. United States" on Justia Law

Defendant was accused by his step-daughter of sexual molestation when she was between the ages of 10 and 15 years old. A jury convicted defendant of 15 felonies, including rape, forcible lewd acts upon a child, aggravated sexual assault upon a child by oral copulation, aggravated sexual assault upon a child by sexual penetration, dissuading a witness from reporting a crime, and possession of child pornography. The jury acquitted him of one alleged rape (winter break rape). The court of appeal directed the trial court to enter a verdict of acquittal of an alleged June 2007 rape, for lack of substantial evidence, and ordered retrial on the remaining sexual abuse charges on juror misconduct grounds. The convictions for dissuading a witness and possession of child pornography were unaffected. During retrial, although the alleged Winter Break and June 2007 rapes were not charged, evidence of them was admitted to attack and bolster victim's credibility. The jury found defendant guilty of two counts of forcible lewd touching of a child under age 14 and hung on nine other charges. The court of appeal affirmed, upholding the admission of evidence of the uncharged rapes without informing the jury of the prior acquittals. The court found several instances of prosecutorial misconduct, which it referred to the State Bar. View "People v. Poletti," on Justia Law