Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

A class action complaint alleged that Honeywell engaged in uncompetitive and illegal conduct to increase its market share of round thermostats and to use its dominant market position to overcharge customers. In 2013, the parties reached a settlement and asked the trial court to preliminarily approve it. The court initially declined to do so because it had concerns about the notice proposed to be sent to class members. Those concerns were subsequently addressed to the court’s satisfaction, and on February 4, 2014, the court preliminarily approved the settlement. The notice of settlement was subsequently published and distributed to class members. The long version was distributed and posted on a website, and the short version was published in various print publications. The trial court found that four objectors to the settlement failed to establish they had standing, but rejected one objection on timeliness grounds and rejected the other three on their merits. The court of appeal affirmed, except for the ruling on standing, finding that the court properly approved the distribution of residual settlement funds and awarded class counsel attorney fees that amounted to 37.5 percent of the settlement fund. View "Roos v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc." on Justia Law

The Judicial Standards Commission entered a recommendation that Respondent James T. Hill, a judge of the General Court of Justice, District Court Division, be publicly reprimanded for conduct in violation of the North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct and for conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. 7A-376 for engaging in inappropriate conduct while presiding over divorce proceedings. The Supreme Court concluded that the Commission’s findings of fact were supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence in the record and that the Commission’s findings of fact supported its conclusions of law. Based upon these findings and conclusions, which the Court adopted as its own, the Supreme Court concluded and adjudged that Respondent should be publicly reprimanded. View "In re Judge James T. Hill" on Justia Law

The law firm represented Goesel, a minor, and his parents in a personal-injury suit that settled before trial. The law firm needed judicial approval to finalize the settlement. The contingent-fee agreement entitled the firm to one-third of the gross settlement; all litigation expenses would be covered by the Goesels’ share. The court refused to approve the settlement unless litigation expenses were deducted off the top and one-third of the net settlement was allocated to the firm and rejected the firm’s attempt to count the cost of computerized legal research as a separately compensable expense rather than rolling it into the fee recovery. The Goesels declined to participate in an appeal, so the court appointed an amicus to argue in support of the decision. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Though the court enjoys substantial discretion to safeguard the interests of minors in the settlement of litigation, this discretion is not boundless. Here, the judge criticized aspects of the firm’s contingent-fee agreement that have received the express blessing of Illinois courts. Once these improper reasons are stripped away, the only rationale that remains—that “fairness and right reason” require that the Goesels receive 51% of the gross settlement amount rather than 42%—is insufficient to justify discarding a reasonable contingent-fee agreement. View "Williams, Bax & Saltzman, P.C. v. Boley Int'l (H.K.) Ltd" on Justia Law

Petitioner, an attorney practicing primarily in the Twenty-Third Judicial Circuit (judicial circuit), sought a writ of prohibition to prevent Respondents, the mental hygiene commissioners of the judicial circuit, from appointing legal counsel for alleged protected persons in actions instituted under the West Virginia Guardianship and Conservatorship Act (Act). Specifically, Petitioner asserted that W. Va. Code 44A-2-7(a) mandates that circuit courts, rather than mental hygiene commissioners, make such appointments. The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding that the provisions of section 44A-2-7(a) require the circuit court to appoint legal counsel for the alleged protected persons instituted under the Act, and therefore, Respondents exceeded their legitimate powers by appointing legal counsel for alleged protected persons under section 44A-2-7(a). View "State ex rel. Barrat v. Dalby" on Justia Law

Mark Lazzo served as legal counsel for Schupbach Investments, L.L.C. in its Chapter 11 bankruptcy case. After confirming a liquidation plan for the debtor, the bankruptcy court entered a final fee order approving certain disputed fee applications Lazzo filed. Creditor Rose Hill Bank and Carl B. Davis, the trustee of the Schupbach Investments Liquidation Trust, appealed the final fee order to the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP). The BAP reversed those portions of the bankruptcy court’s order that: (1) confirmed post facto approval of Lazzo’s employment, and allowed fees incurred prior to approval of his employment; and (2) allowed postconfirmation fees. The Debtor, Lazzo, and his law firm, Mark J. Lazzo, P.A. appealed the BAP’s decision. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Davis v. Schupbach Investments" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Bruce Kaye, the controlling principal of three entities that sold and managed timeshare interests in resort properties in Atlantic County, hired defendant Alan Rosefielde, an attorney admitted to practice law in New York but not in New Jersey, initially as outside counsel, and then as an employee. After defendant had worked closely with plaintiff for approximately four months, the parties entered an agreement providing that, as compensation for his services, defendant would earn an annual salary of $500,000. For approximately two years, defendant served as Chief Operating Officer for several of the timeshare entities, and effectively functioned as their general counsel. In that capacity, defendant committed serious misconduct by acting on his own behalf instead of for his employers benefit, and exposing his employers to potential liability. Based on this misconduct, and dissatisfaction with defendant’s performance, plaintiff terminated defendant’s employment. Kaye, in his individual capacity and as trustee of two trusts, Kaye’s son Jason Kaye, and the business entities that Kaye owned, sued Rosefielde and several other entities. Plaintiffs asserted claims based on Rosefielde’s breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, legal malpractice, unlicensed practice of law, and breach of the duty of loyalty. Following a lengthy bench trial, the trial court found that Rosefielde engaged in egregious conduct constituting a breach of his duty of loyalty, breach of his fiduciary duty, legal malpractice, and civil fraud. The trial court rescinded Rosefielde’s interest in several entities, awarded compensatory damages, punitive damages, and legal fees, and dismissed Rosefielde’s counterclaims. It declined, however, to order the equitable disgorgement of Rosefielde’s salary as a remedy for his breach of the duty of loyalty, on the ground that his breach did not result in damage or loss to the entities that employed him. The Appellate Division affirmed that determination, and the New Jersey Supreme Court granted certification on the issue of equitable disgorgement. “In imposing the remedy of disgorgement, depending on the circumstances, a trial court should apportion the employee’s compensation, rather than ordering a wholesale disgorgement that may be disproportionate to the misconduct at issue. . . . If an agent is paid a salary apportioned to periods of time, or compensation apportioned to the completion of specified items of work, he is entitled to receive the stipulated compensation for periods or items properly completed before his renunciation or discharge. This is true even if, because of unfaithfulness or insubordination, the agent forfeits his compensation for subsequent periods or items.” The judgment of the Appellate Division was reversed with respect to the remedy of equitable disgorgement, and the matter was remanded to the trial court to decide whether plaintiffs were entitled to disgorgement. If so, the trial court should apportion Rosefielde’s compensation, ordering disgorgement only for monthly pay periods in which he committed acts of disloyalty. View "Kaye v. Rosefielde" on Justia Law

Tesco sued NOV for infringement of patents that involve an apparatus and method for handling sections of pipe used for lining a well-bore. NOV filed an answer, counterclaims, a request for attorney’s fees, and motions to compel requesting information about documents to show what occurred during the six months before the on-sale bar date. Ultimately, based on non-production of an original brochure, the court sanctioned Tesco by reversing the burden of proof on validity, setting the burden at a preponderance of evidence. The jury concluded that NOV infringed the relevant claims, found certain of those claims to be not invalid, and found that the brochure was not enabling. During post-trial discovery on the brochure. NOV filed “post-trial summary judgment motions of invalidity” (35 U.S.C. 102(b) and 103) based on what it asserts was disclosed in the brochure. The court granted NOV’s motion for obviousness, relying on an obvious-to-try analysis, set a trial date for the exceptional case counterclaim, and, later, issued an order sua sponte dismissing the case with prejudice under its inherent authority, finding that certain testimony was “contrary to the representations Tesco made to the Court during trial,” stating that the attorneys’ conduct was “entirely out of character ... serious and has had significant and costly ramifications.” The parties, including the attorneys, later entered into a settlement resolving all outstanding issues, and signed releases. The attorneys contend that, despite the settlement, the harm to their reputation from the court’s opinion justified continued jurisdiction. The Federal Circuit dismissed, finding no remaining case or controversy. View "Tesco Corp. v. Nat'l Oilwell Varco, L.P." on Justia Law

Jan Goldsmith was the San Diego City Attorney. League of California Cities was an association of 473 California cities and their public officials, which, among other purposes, advocates to protect and restore local control for cities to provide for the public health, safety, and welfare of their residents. Real Party in Interest, San Diegans for Open Government (SDOG), submitted a request under the Public Records Act to the City of San Diego (the City) seeking "[a]ny and all e-mails sent to or from [Jan Goldsmith's personal e-mail account] . . . that pertain in any way to the official business of the City of San Diego." Among other records, the City asserted an exemption to the disclosure of e-mails between a purported legal assistant for the League and attorney members of the League on the grounds they were not public records because they did not concern city business, or were otherwise privileged. SDOG filed a petition for writ of mandate seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the City and Goldsmith to compel disclosure of the e-mails. In a minute order, the trial court directed the City to provide SDOG with a privilege log identifying the documents not produced, along with the legal objection for not producing the documents. After considering the parties' briefing, the trial court declined to perform an in camera review of certain challenged e-mails. The court found the City failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that the e-mails were privileged or exempt under the Act, and ordered the City to produce the e-mails by a certain date. The League filed the instant petition for a peremptory writ of mandate or prohibition in the first instance, or an alternative writ or order to show cause seeking to vacate that part of the court's order requiring disclosure of the e-mails. The Court of Appeal concluded the term "a party," as used in the Act, was not limited to an actual party to the action. Accordingly, the nonparty here had standing to file the instant petition challenging the trial court's order. The Court further concluded the trial court erred by not conducting an in camera review of the documents as requested by the party asserting the documents were exempt from disclosure. Accordingly, we grant the petition and remand the matter for further proceedings. View "League of Cal. Cities v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

In 2008, Nunez purchased a commercial fishing vessel built in 1944, for $1. Having no fishing or boating expertise, Nunez hired Pennisi to install a refrigeration system and work on the boat’s pumping and electrical systems. The refrigeration system did not work properly; apparently Nunez moved the boat before Pennisi finished work and there was some evidence that the generators were inadequate for the system. Nunez sued Pennisi for the allegedly substandard work. Nunez contends he never read the complaint, but he signed a verification. Pennisi filed a cross-complaint, asserting breach of contract, breach of good faith and fair dealing, and goods and services rendered. The court dismissed claims by Nunez and, after a jury verdict, entered judgment in favor of Pennisi. Subsequently, Pennisi sued Nunez and his attorneys alleging malicious prosecution. The court denied a motion by Nunez under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.162 (anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) to strike the malicious prosecution complaint and awarded $8,315 in attorney fees to Pennisi. The court of appeal reversed in part, finding that some of Pennisi's claims lacked the minimal merit necessary to avoid being stricken as a SLAPP, but that Pennisi’s malicious prosecution action had minimal merit. View "Nunez v. Pennisi" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court’s review centered on whether a non-attorney trustee of a trust could proceed pro se before the water court. Appellant-trustee J. Tucker appealed the water court’s ruling that as trustee of a trust, he was not permitted to proceed because he was representing the interests of others. He also appealed the court’s order granting appellee Town of Minturn’s application for a finding of reasonable diligence in connection with a conditional water right. Appellant’s pro se issue was one of first impression before the Supreme Court, and the Court held that the water court correctly ruled that as a non-attorney trustee, appellant could not proceed pro se on behalf of the trust. In light of that determination, the Court did not address appellant’s other arguments regarding the sufficiency of the verification. View "Tucker v. Town of Minturn" on Justia Law