Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

In 2004, Trzaska became the head of L’Oréal ’s regional patent team. Rules of Professional Conduct (RPC) bar attorneys from filing frivolous or bad-faith patent applications. L’Oréal established quotas for patent applications. Management stated that, if the team failed to meet that quota, “there would be consequences which would negatively impact their careers and/or continued employment.” L’Oréal also adopted an initiative that resulted in fewer invention disclosures submitted to the team for vetting. With competing policies—one requiring a minimum of applications and one effectively reducing the invention disclosures being evaluated— Trzaska’s team did not believe it could meet the quota without filing applications for products that it did not in good faith believe were patentable. Trzaska told management that his team would not do so. L’Oréal offered Trzaska severance packages, with the alternative of “get back to work.” After he rejected both severance packages, L’Oréal fired Trzaska. Trzaska sued for wrongful retaliatory discharge under the Conscientious Employee Protection Act, N.J. Stat. 34:19-1, which protects an employee from retaliatory termination following his refusal to participate in illegal activity at the employer's request, including practices that the employee believes contravene public policy. The district court dismissed. The Third Circuit reversed, stating that the allegations were not “skin deep.” The basis of the claim is not L’Oréal’s violation of the RPCs; it is the instruction that would result in the employees' disregard of their RPC duties and violate a public policy mandate. View "Trzaska v. LOreal USA Inc." on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit found no violation of Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 or abuse of the judicial process in this consolidated appeal involving parties in a putative action. The court held that counsel did not violate Rule 41 in stipulating to the dismissal of the action and counsel had at least a colorable legal argument that the district court’s approval was not needed under Rule 23(e) to voluntarily dismiss the claims of the putative class. Therefore, the district court abused its discretion in finding that counsel acted with an improper purpose under Rule 11 and abused the judicial process by stipulating to the dismissal of the federal action for the purpose of seeking a more favorable forum and avoiding an adverse decision. Consequently, the district court also abused its discretion in imposing sanctions upon plaintiffs' counsel for the purported violation. The court reversed the district court's orders and remanded for further proceedings. View "Castleberry v. USAA" on Justia Law

Murphy was an inmate in the Illinois Vandalia Correctional Center when correctional officers hit him, fracturing his eye socket, and left him in a cell without medical attention. Murphy sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state-law theories. The court reduced a jury award of damages to $307,733.82 and awarded attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. 1988. The Seventh Circuit affirmed with respect to liability, rejecting an argument that state-law sovereign immunity bars the state-law claims. The Illinois doctrine of sovereign immunity does not apply to state-law claims against a state official or employee who has violated statutory or constitutional law. The court reversed and remanded the attorney fee award. Under 42 U.S.C. 1997e(d), the attorney fee award must first be satisfied from up to 25 percent of the damage award, and the district court does not have discretion to reduce that maximum percentage. Murphy then sought attorney fees for the appeal. The Seventh Circuit denied the petition. Murphy’s only success on appeal came on a purely state-law issue affecting damages awarded only under state law; a section 1988(b) award is not appropriate for that work. Plaintiff has already won—in the district court—both damages and a fee award for all of his attorney’s successful efforts thus far under federal law. View "Murphy v. Smith" on Justia Law

The Blatt firm filed a collection lawsuit against Oliva in the first municipal district of the Circuit Court of Cook County. Oliva resided in Cook County. Under the Seventh Circuit’s 1996 “Newsom” decision, interpreting the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) venue provision, debt collectors were allowed to file suit in any of Cook County’s municipal districts if the debtor resided in Cook County or signed the underlying contract there. While the Oliva suit was pending, the Seventh Circuit overruled Newsom, with retroactive effect (Suesz, 2014). Blatt voluntarily dismissed the suit. Oliva sued Blatt for violating the FDCPA as newly interpreted by Suesz. The district court granted Blatt summary judgment, finding that it relied on Newsom in good faith and was immune from liability under the FDCPA’s bona fide error defense, 15 U.S.C. 1692k(c). The Seventh Circuit initially affirmed. On rehearing, en banc, the Seventh Circuit vacated. The holding in Suesz was required by the 2010 Supreme Court decision in Jerman v. Carlisle, that the FDCPA’s statutory safe harbor for bona fide mistakes does not apply to mistakes of law. Under Suesz and Jerman, the defendant cannot avoid liability for a violation based on its reliance on circuit precedent or any other bona fide mistake of law. View "Oliva v. Blatt, Hasenmiller, Leibsker & Moore, LLC" on Justia Law

To vacate an arbitration award on the ground that the award was fraudulently procured, the petitioner must demonstrate the fraud was material to the award. There must be a nexus between the alleged fraud and the decision made by the arbitrators. The petitioner, however, need not demonstrate that the arbitrators would have reached a different result. In this case, Odeon brought a petition to vacate an arbitral award involving claims arising out of the termination of one of its employees. Odeon alleged that the arbitrators engaged in misconduct and acted in manifest disregard of the law, and then sought to amend its petition to assert fraud as an additional ground for vacatur. The Second Circuit held that Odeon failed to establish that the employee's alleged perjury had any impact on the arbitration award. The court also held that the district court applied the wrong legal standard in denying the employee's request for attorneys' fees where New York law provided statutory authority for the fee request. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. View "Odeon Capital Group LLC v. Ackerman" on Justia Law

PPKM sought and obtained a permanent injunction against DHSS after DHSS attempted to revoke PPKM's license to provide abortion services. PPKM's license expired before the district court granted its motion for attorney's fees. The Eighth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding PPKM attorney's fees or its work at all stages of this litigation, and PPKM's recovery in this case was not so technical as to render the award an abuse of discretion. In this case, PPKM was the prevailing party and DHSS offered no additional reason to conclude that PPKM was not entitled to the attorney's fees awarded by the district court. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Planned Parenthood Great Plans v. Dr. Randall Williams" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed the case filed by the Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission against Rudolph Bumgardner, III, Senior Judge of the Court of Appeals and Humes J. Franklin, Jr., Retired Judge of the Twenty-Fifth Judicial Circuit. The Commission asserted the Judge Bumgardner and Judge Franklin violated the Canons of Judicial Conduct as set out in Part 6, Section III of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia and that the violations were “of sufficient gravity to constitute the basis for censure or removal” by the Supreme Court. Upon consideration of the entire record, the Supreme Court held that there was not clear and convincing evidence showing that the judges violated the specified Canons as charged. View "Judicial Inquiry & Review Commission v. Bumgardner" on Justia Law

The South Carolina Supreme Court accepted a declaratory judgment matter in its original jurisdiction to determine if Respondents-Petitioners Quicken Loans, Inc. and Title Source, Inc. engaged in the unauthorized practice of law (UPL). Petitioners-Respondents (collectively "Homeowners"), alleged the residential mortgage refinancing model implemented by Quicken Loans and Title Source in refinancing the Homeowners' mortgage loans constituted UPL. In addition to seeking declaratory relief, Homeowners' complaint also sought class certification and requested class relief. The Supreme Court found the record in this case showed licensed South Carolina attorneys were involved at every critical step of these refinancing transactions, and that requiring more attorney involvement would not effectively further the Court’s stated goal of protecting the public from the dangers of UPL. The Court therefore reject the Special Referee's conclusion that Quicken Loans and Title Source committed UPL. View "Boone v. Quicken Loans" on Justia Law

Seventh Circuit Rules 3(c)(1) and 28(a) require the same jurisdictional information for docketing and briefing. With an exception for pro se submissions, the court screens all filed briefs to ensure that they include all required information about the jurisdiction of both the district court (or agency) and the court of appeals. FRAP 28(b) allows the appellee to omit the jurisdictional statement “unless the appellee is dissatisfied with the appellant’s statement.” In consolidated appeals, the Seventh Circuit found the jurisdictional statements inadequate and stated that the appellee cannot simply assume that the appellant has provided a jurisdictional statement that complies with the rules. The appellee must review the appellant’s jurisdictional statement to see if it is both complete and correct. If the appellant’s statement is not complete, or not correct, the appellee must file a “complete jurisdictional summary.” It is not enough simply to correct the misstatement or omission and “accept” the balance of the appellant’s statement. In one case, the Attorney General stated: “Mr. Baez‐Sanchez’s jurisdictional statement is correct,” saying nothing about completeness, so the brief must be returned to the Department of Justice. The other jurisdictional statement states “Appellants’ jurisdictional statement provides a complete jurisdictional summary.” The court stated: Fine, but what about correctness? View "Bishop v. Air Line Pilots Association, International" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit filed an amended opinion affirming the denial of defendant's motion for summary judgment. The panel held that Infinity's attorney, who sued for violation of a bankruptcy automatic stay, was not entitled to quasi-judicial immunity for acts other than drafting the order at the judge's request—an issue the court need not reach because the order was never filed. View "Burton v. Infinity Capital Management" on Justia Law