Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs and appellants Antonio and Imelda Aranda and their son-in-law, Heriberto Ponce, (together, Ponce and Aranda) appeal from the trial court’s entry of a judgment of dismissal following an order imposing both terminating and monetary sanctions against them and their attorneys under Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7. 1 The trial court found that Ponce and Aranda’s complaint was presented primarily for an improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation. Ponce and Aranda received a permanent loan modification under the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP). Ultimately they defaulted on the loan when the error-filled modification agreement called for higher payments they could not afford. Wells Fargo transferred the note and deed of trust to Consumer Solutions 3, LLC in November 2010. Defendant and respondent Specialized Loan Services, LLC (Specialized) serviced the loan on behalf of Consumer Solutions. In the meantime, Ponce and Aranda were still trying to work things out with Wells Fargo. One Wells Fargo representative told Ponce’s wife, Alma, that they should not make further payments until the mistakes were corrected. Other representatives called Ponce demanding payment. Wells Fargo refused to accept any reduced payment, and ultimately invited Ponce and Aranda to apply for another loan modification. Specialized recorded a notice of trustee’s sale in December 2010, while Ponce and Aranda’s second application was pending. A Wells Fargo representative told Ponce “not to worry about the notice because the trustee sale was scheduled by mistake.” Over the next several weeks, other Wells Fargo representatives reassured Ponce and Aranda that the property would not be sold because they had been approved for a loan modification. Despite these assurances, a trustee’s sale was held on January 18, 2011, at which Residential Investments LLC acquired title to the property. Residential Investments filed a complaint in unlawful detainer against plaintiffs. The trial court found that Ponce and Aranda’s complaint responding to Residential Investments’ was presented primarily for an improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation. On appeal, Ponce and Aranda argued the claims asserted in their complaint were not frivolous and therefore, could not have been asserted for an improper purpose. The Court of Appeal agreed, and reversed the trial court’s entry of judgment based on terminating sanctions against Ponce and Aranda and entry of monetary sanctions against Ponce and Aranda and their attorneys. View "Ponce v. Wells Fargo Bank" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs MMM Holdings, Inc. (MMM), and MSO of Puerto Rico, Inc. (MSO), sued defendant Marc Reich, the attorney who represented their adversary in a whistleblower qui tam action filed against plaintiffs federal district court. Plaintiffs alleged claim and delivery, conversion, civil theft, unjust enrichment, and unfair competition, and contended Reich received, wrongfully possessed, and refused to turn over, some 26,000 electronically stored documents his client, Jose “Josh” Valdez, took with him in 2010 when he was terminated by MSO for his allegedly “vocal opposition to what he perceived as Plaintiffs’ fraudulent practices.” Reich filed a special motion to strike the complaint under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, the anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) statute. The court granted the motion, concluding the claims asserted by plaintiffs against Reich involved Reich’s petitioning activity protected by the anti-SLAPP statute, and that plaintiffs had not shown, and could not show, a probability they would prevail on any of their claims. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed that order. View "MMM Holdings, Inc. v. Reich" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs MMM Holdings, Inc. (MMM), and MSO of Puerto Rico, Inc. (MSO), sued defendant Marc Reich, the attorney who represented their adversary in a whistleblower qui tam action filed against plaintiffs federal district court. Plaintiffs alleged claim and delivery, conversion, civil theft, unjust enrichment, and unfair competition, and contended Reich received, wrongfully possessed, and refused to turn over, some 26,000 electronically stored documents his client, Jose “Josh” Valdez, took with him in 2010 when he was terminated by MSO for his allegedly “vocal opposition to what he perceived as Plaintiffs’ fraudulent practices.” Reich filed a special motion to strike the complaint under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, the anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) statute. The court granted the motion, concluding the claims asserted by plaintiffs against Reich involved Reich’s petitioning activity protected by the anti-SLAPP statute, and that plaintiffs had not shown, and could not show, a probability they would prevail on any of their claims. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed that order. View "MMM Holdings, Inc. v. Reich" on Justia Law

In 2002 a Greyhound bus struck and killed Claudia. Her daughter, Cristina, age seven, witnessed the accident. In 2016 Cristina settled claims against Greyhound and other potentially responsible persons for $5 million. Klein, Cristina’s stepfather, believes that Cristina allocated too much of the settlement to herself as damages for emotional distress and not enough to him. His suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleged that Cristina conspired with state judges, law firms, Greyhound, and others, to exclude him from financial benefits. Klein sued as the purported administrator of Claudia’s estate although he had not been appointed as administrator. Klein and Cristina became co-administrators, but Klein was soon removed by a state judge. Defendants asked the federal judge to dismiss the suit as barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, under which only the U.S. Supreme Court may review the civil state court judgments. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal on the merits. Collateral litigation in federal court is blocked by principles of preclusion and by Rooker's holding that errors committed in state litigation cannot be treated as federal constitutional torts. The court noted that the “long and tangled history" of the case was caused by Klein’s (or his lawyer’s) "inability or unwillingness to litigate as statutes and rules require.” They had neither briefed the proper issue on appeal nor attached the judgment, as required. “They are not entitled to divert the time of federal judges” and will be penalized for any further attempts. View "Xydakis v. O'Brien" on Justia Law

The "exceptional case" standard for awarding attorney's fees in Patent Act cases, as articulated by the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 572 U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014), also applies to Lanham Act cases. In this case, plaintiff appealed the district court's award of attorney's fees to defendant, arguing that the district court's decision to award attorney's fees and the amount of fees awarded were made in error. The court held that the district court did not abuse its decision here by applying the "exceptional case" standard. View "Edward Lewis Tobinick, MD v. M.D. Steven Novella" on Justia Law

Jansen pleaded guilty to wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343, and tax evasion, 26 U.S.C. 7201. Before sentencing, Jansen’s third attorney (Steinback) withdrew. His new attorney, Beaumont, requested Rule 16 discovery and obtained 42,700 documents. Jansen filed a pro se motion to continue his sentencing proceedings because none of his prior attorneys had requested or reviewed those documents. Weeks later, Beaumont withdrew, citing irreconcilable differences; he was replaced by Richards. Jansen indicated to the court that he wished to withdraw his guilty plea as not “knowing and voluntary” because of ineffective assistance of counsel. Richards also withdrew. The court permitted Jansen to proceed pro se but denied his motion to withdraw his plea and sentenced Jansen to 70 months’ imprisonment with a restitution payment of $269,978 to the IRS. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, remanding the issue of restitution to allow the district court to clarify that its imposition of restitution is a condition of supervised release rather than a criminal penalty. The district court made the sound factual finding that Jansen hired Steinback “to negotiate the best possible plea agreement,” not to go to trial. Steinback formulated a “four-fold” “tactical strategy” that included forgoing investigation and discovery so that such a strategy was objectively reasonable. View "United States v. Jansen" on Justia Law

This matter arose from a wrongful death lawsuit filed by the Estate of Richard Eazor deriving from a motor vehicle accident. The Eazor Estate was represented by Attorney William Weiler, Jr., who entered his appearance in the matter in March 2005. By December 1, 2005, Weiler became associated with Meyer, Darragh, Buckler, Bebenek & Eck, P.L.L.C. Weiler brought the Eazor Litigation with him and Meyer Darragh attorneys worked on the Eazor Litigation for over seventy hours over a nineteen-month period. In May 2007, Weiler resigned from Meyer Darragh. At that time, Meyer Darragh understood it would continue as lead counsel in the Eazor Litigation along with Weiler at his new firm. Written correspondence at the time of Weiler’s separation from Meyer Darragh indicated that Meyer Darragh would receive two-thirds of the attorneys’ fees arising out of the Eazor Litigation, and Weiler would retain one- third of the fees. In an earlier decision in this case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held Meyer Darragh, as predecessor counsel, was not entitled to breach of contract damages against successor counsel, the Law Firm of Malone Middleman, P.C., where a contract regarding counsel fees did not exist between the two firms. The Supreme Court granted discretionary review nunc pro tunc to determine whether Meyer Darragh was entitled to damages in quantum meruit against Malone Middleman, where the trial court initially held such damages were recoverable, but the Superior Court reversed. After review, the Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court and remanded to the trial court for reinstatement of its award of damages in quantum meruit to Meyer Darragh against Malone Middleman. View "Meyer, Darragh, Buckler, Bebenek & Eck, P.L.L.C. v. Law Firm of Malone Middleman, P.C." on Justia Law

This matter arose from a wrongful death lawsuit filed by the Estate of Richard Eazor deriving from a motor vehicle accident. The Eazor Estate was represented by Attorney William Weiler, Jr., who entered his appearance in the matter in March 2005. By December 1, 2005, Weiler became associated with Meyer, Darragh, Buckler, Bebenek & Eck, P.L.L.C. Weiler brought the Eazor Litigation with him and Meyer Darragh attorneys worked on the Eazor Litigation for over seventy hours over a nineteen-month period. In May 2007, Weiler resigned from Meyer Darragh. At that time, Meyer Darragh understood it would continue as lead counsel in the Eazor Litigation along with Weiler at his new firm. Written correspondence at the time of Weiler’s separation from Meyer Darragh indicated that Meyer Darragh would receive two-thirds of the attorneys’ fees arising out of the Eazor Litigation, and Weiler would retain one- third of the fees. In an earlier decision in this case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held Meyer Darragh, as predecessor counsel, was not entitled to breach of contract damages against successor counsel, the Law Firm of Malone Middleman, P.C., where a contract regarding counsel fees did not exist between the two firms. The Supreme Court granted discretionary review nunc pro tunc to determine whether Meyer Darragh was entitled to damages in quantum meruit against Malone Middleman, where the trial court initially held such damages were recoverable, but the Superior Court reversed. After review, the Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court and remanded to the trial court for reinstatement of its award of damages in quantum meruit to Meyer Darragh against Malone Middleman. View "Meyer, Darragh, Buckler, Bebenek & Eck, P.L.L.C. v. Law Firm of Malone Middleman, P.C." on Justia Law

Early in the proceedings in New Mexico ex rel. King v. Valley Meat Co., LLC, No. D-101- 3 CV-2013-3197 (Valley Meat case), A. Blair Dunn, counsel for Valley Meat Co., e-mailed an Inspection of Public Records Act (IPRA) request to First Judicial District Court Executive Officer Stephen Pacheco for production of, among other things, communications and records relating to the Valley Meat case, including “all communications between . . . Judge Matthew Wilson and his staff . . . and Court Clerk’s staff” and “[a]ny communications received by Judge Matthew Wilson and his staff, Judge Raymond Ortiz and his staff, and any member of the Court Clerk’s staff to/from any outside person or organization.” In this superintending control proceeding, the New Mexico Supreme Court clarified the constitutional and statutory procedures for IPRA enforcement actions to compel production of court records, and held that IPRA actions directed at a district court’s records had to be filed against the lawfully designated IPRA custodian and must be filed in the judicial district that maintains the records. Furthermore, the Court held that the contents of an officeholder’s personal election campaign, social media website, and the internal decision-making communications that are at the core of the constitutional duties of the judicial branch, such as preliminary drafts of judicial decisions, are not public records that are subject to mandatory disclosure and inspection under IPRA. View "Pacheco v. Hudson" on Justia Law

Defendants sought ex parte interviews with a number of non-party medical providers in this medical malpractice action. Because of this, an issue arose regarding the scope of the physician–patient privilege in medical-malpractice actions. Section 13-90-107(1)(d), C.R.S. (2017), prohibited certain medical providers from revealing, in testimony or otherwise, information about a patient gathered in the course of treating that patient. That prohibition, however, was not unlimited. The dispute, as presented to the Colorado Supreme Court, did not implicate the physician–patient relationship between Kelley Bailey (“Bailey”) and Defendants, meaning section 107(1)(d)(I) was inapplicable. Instead, the issue here was whether the non-party medical providers were “in consultation with” Defendants such that section 107(1)(d)(II) removed that typically privileged information from the protection of the physician–patient privilege. The Supreme Court held the non-party medical providers were not in consultation with Defendants for the purposes of section 107(1)(d)(II). However, the Court remanded this case to the trial court for consideration of whether the Baileys impliedly waived the physician–patient privilege for the non-party medical providers. On remand, if the trial court concluded that the Baileys did waive that privilege, it should reconsider whether there is any risk that: (1) ex parte interviews with the non-party medical providers would inadvertently reveal residually privileged information; or (2) Defendants would exert undue influence on the non-party medical providers in the course of any ex parte interviews. View "In re Bailey v. Hermacinski" on Justia Law