Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

For the same reasons stated in Rental Prop. Mgmt. Servs. v. Hatcher, 479 Mass. __ (2018), also decided today, the Supreme Judicial Court held that Fred Basile, a property manager, had no standing to bring a summary process action in his own name when he was neither the owner nor the lessor of the property.Basile brought this summary process action in the name of his sole proprietorship seeking to evict a tenant from a property for which Basile was neither the owner nor the lessor. The tenant asserted counterclaims for the unauthorized practice of law and violations of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A. The trial judge enjoined Basile from commencing summary process actions such as the one in this case but entered judgment in favor of Basile on the chapter 93A counterclaims. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) Basile had no standing to bring the summary process action; (2) to the extent Basile was acting as the agent of the property owner, he engaged in the unauthorized practice of law by signing and filing the complaint because he was not an attorney; and (3) Basile’s conduct on its own did not constitute an unfair or deceptive practice in violation of chapter 93A. View "Ahmed-Kagzi v. Williams" on Justia Law

Fred Basile, a property manager, had no standing to bring a summary process action in the name of his sole proprietorship seeking to evict a tenant from a property for which Basile was neither the owner nor the lessor. To the extent that Basile was acting on behalf of the property’s true owner when he filed the complaint, his conduct constituted the unauthorized practice of law because Basile was not an attorney.The Supreme Judicial Court further held (1) where the plaintiff in a summary process action is not the property’s owner or lessor, the complaint must be dismissed with prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; (2) where the plaintiff is the true owner or lessor but the complaint has been signed and filed by another non-attorney person, the court may either dismiss the complaint without prejudice based on the unauthorized practice of law or allow the plaintiff to retain counsel or proceed pro se; and (3) where a plaintiff seeks to evict a tenant without the standing to do so, or where a person who is not authorized to practice law signs and files a summary process complaint, and where that conduct is not inadvertent, a court has the inherent authority to impose appropriate sanctions. View "Rental Property Management Services v. Hatcher" on Justia Law

Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), an administrative due process complaint about a child's educational placement can result in an administrative hearing. At least 10 days before the hearing, the school district can extend a “10-day” settlement offer, 20 U.S.C. 1415(i)(3)(D)(i)(I)-(III). That offer limits a parent’s eligibility for attorney’s fees to only those fees accrued before the offer. If a parent rejects the offer, the parent may only receive attorney’s fees for work done after the offer if the hearing leads to more favorable relief than the offer included, or the parent was substantially justified in rejecting the offer. Rena filed a complaint against the Colonial School District to determine an appropriate placement for her daughter. Colonial extended and Rena rejected a 10-day offer. After a hearing, an administrative officer ordered a private school placement for the student. The district court awarded Rena attorney’s fees only for work performed before the offer. The Third Circuit reversed, holding that Rena was substantially justified in rejecting Colonial’s offer. Colonial made a valid offer of settlement and Rena did not receive more favorable relief in the administrative order but she was substantially justified in rejecting the offer because it did not address attorney’s fees. View "Rena C. v. Colonial School District" on Justia Law

McCoy, charged with murdering his estranged wife’s family, pleaded not guilty, insisting that he was out of state at the time of the killings and that corrupt police killed the victims. Although he adamantly objected to any admission of guilt, the court permitted his counsel, English, to tell the jury that McCoy “committed [the] three murders” and to argue that McCoy’s mental state prevented him from forming the specific intent necessary for first-degree murder. McCoy testified in his own defense, maintaining his innocence and pressing an alibi. At the penalty phase, English again conceded McCoy’s guilt, urging mercy because of McCoy’s mental issues. The jury returned three death verdicts. The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed. The Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right to choose the objective of his defense and to insist that counsel refrain from admitting guilt, even when counsel’s experienced-based view is that confessing offers the best chance to avoid the death penalty. Some decisions are reserved for the client—including whether to plead guilty, waive a jury trial, testify in one’s own behalf, and forgo an appeal. Rejecting the Louisiana Supreme Court’s conclusion that English’s refusal to maintain McCoy’s innocence was necessitated by a Rule of Professional Conduct that prohibits counsel from suborning perjury, the Court noted that there was no avowed perjury. English harbored no doubt that McCoy believed what he was saying. Ineffective-assistance-of-counsel jurisprudence does not apply where the client’s autonomy, not counsel’s competence, is at issue. The violation of McCoy’s protected autonomy right was structural in kind. McCoy must be accorded a new trial without any need to show prejudice. View "McCoy v. Louisiana" on Justia Law

Based upon the findings and conclusions and the recommendation of the Judicial Standards Commission, the Supreme Court concluded that Respondent Gary L. Henderson, a Judge of the General Court of Justice, District Court Division 26, be publicly reprimanded for violations of Canons 1, 2A, 3A, and 3B of the North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct amounting to conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute, in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. 7A-376. The Supreme Court then ordered that Henderson be publicly reprimanded, holding that the Commission’s findings of fact were supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence in the record and that the Commission’s findings of fact supported its conclusions of law. View "In re Henderson" on Justia Law

Based upon the findings and conclusions and the recommendation of the Judicial Standards Commission, the Supreme Court concluded that Respondent Gary L. Henderson, a Judge of the General Court of Justice, District Court Division 26, be publicly reprimanded for violations of Canons 1, 2A, 3A, and 3B of the North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct amounting to conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute, in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. 7A-376. The Supreme Court then ordered that Henderson be publicly reprimanded, holding that the Commission’s findings of fact were supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence in the record and that the Commission’s findings of fact supported its conclusions of law. View "In re Henderson" on Justia Law

If a party is successful and has conferred a significant benefit by prevailing at trial and obtaining a judgment that a construction project violates the zoning laws in existence at the time, as in this case, that party was not precluded from obtaining attorney's fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5 because the losing party gets the zoning laws changed and the project's validity under the changed law has yet to be finally determined. The Court of Appeal held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in fixing the amount of attorney's fees and affirmed the award of attorney's fees. View "La Mirada Avenue Neighborhood Association of Hollywood v. Los Angeles" on Justia Law

NPC’s adversary proceeding against the Chapter 7 Trustee and his surety alleged that the trustee breached his fiduciary duties with respect to one of the Debtor’s assets, a former Benton Harbor manufacturing facility. NPC’s attorney (Demorest) served five non-parties with subpoenas duces tecum under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45. The ensuing discovery dispute, including several motions, hearings, and orders, resulted in an award of attorney fees and costs to the non-parties, $104,770.00 to one group and $61,417.50 to another. After a subsequent finding of civil contempt for failure to pay, payment was made and the bankruptcy court ordered payment of an additional $4,725.00 in attorney fees and costs incurred in connection with the contempt proceedings. The district court and Sixth Circuit affirmed. The bankruptcy court specifically found, after a case-specific inquiry, that the subpoenas issued to the non-parties were unduly burdensome, given the undisputedly broad scope of the requests and the temporal reach of the requests. As an experienced commercial litigator, Demorest would have known that complying with such subpoenas would involve considerable time and resources, implicate significant concerns about customer privacy, and require review for privileged communications and attorney work product. The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in finding that sanctions were warranted. View "New Products Corp. v. Dickinson Wright PLLC" on Justia Law

Magana was charged with two counts of rape. His trial counsel, Everett, sought a fifth continuance but failed to appear for the motion hearing. Everett then exercised a peremptory challenge against the assigned judge, resulting in its reassignment. Everett unsuccessfully sought to exercise a second peremptory challenge, then moved for recusal, asserting that the judge was biased. Everett voluntarily withdrew that motion. On the second day of trial, Everett moved to appoint an expert to testify that his client’s confession was involuntary. The judge ruled that Everett was not prepared to proceed and was not providing adequate representation and continued the trial. The court then granted the prosecution’s motion to remove Everett as counsel, finding that due to Everett’s conduct, the alleged victim, the prosecution, and Magana had been denied a speedy trial and that it had no faith that Everett would be prepared for trial on a timely basis. The court of appeal denied relief. Everett withdrew his first statement of disqualification; the court correctly found his second statement of disqualification untimely. A trial court has authority to remove defense counsel to ensure that adequate representation is provided, and to prevent substantial impairment of court proceedings. While such authority is to be sparingly exercised, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in this case. View "Magana v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal vacated an arbitration award in favor of a client against a law firm because the award was procured by "undue means" as that term was used in Code of Civil Procedure section 1286.2. As an initial matter, the court held that the law firm did not waive its right to appeal. On the merits, the court held that the trial court erred in confirming the arbitration award that took into consideration claims not made in the arbitration demand and to which the law firm was not given an adequate or meaningful opportunity to respond. View "Baker Marquart LLP v. Kantor" on Justia Law