Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), an administrative due process complaint about a child's educational placement can result in an administrative hearing. At least 10 days before the hearing, the school district can extend a “10-day” settlement offer, 20 U.S.C. 1415(i)(3)(D)(i)(I)-(III). That offer limits a parent’s eligibility for attorney’s fees to only those fees accrued before the offer. If a parent rejects the offer, the parent may only receive attorney’s fees for work done after the offer if the hearing leads to more favorable relief than the offer included, or the parent was substantially justified in rejecting the offer. Rena filed a complaint against the Colonial School District to determine an appropriate placement for her daughter. Colonial extended and Rena rejected a 10-day offer. After a hearing, an administrative officer ordered a private school placement for the student. The district court awarded Rena attorney’s fees only for work performed before the offer. The Third Circuit reversed, holding that Rena was substantially justified in rejecting Colonial’s offer. Colonial made a valid offer of settlement and Rena did not receive more favorable relief in the administrative order but she was substantially justified in rejecting the offer because it did not address attorney’s fees. View "Rena C. v. Colonial School District" on Justia Law

McCoy, charged with murdering his estranged wife’s family, pleaded not guilty, insisting that he was out of state at the time of the killings and that corrupt police killed the victims. Although he adamantly objected to any admission of guilt, the court permitted his counsel, English, to tell the jury that McCoy “committed [the] three murders” and to argue that McCoy’s mental state prevented him from forming the specific intent necessary for first-degree murder. McCoy testified in his own defense, maintaining his innocence and pressing an alibi. At the penalty phase, English again conceded McCoy’s guilt, urging mercy because of McCoy’s mental issues. The jury returned three death verdicts. The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed. The Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right to choose the objective of his defense and to insist that counsel refrain from admitting guilt, even when counsel’s experienced-based view is that confessing offers the best chance to avoid the death penalty. Some decisions are reserved for the client—including whether to plead guilty, waive a jury trial, testify in one’s own behalf, and forgo an appeal. Rejecting the Louisiana Supreme Court’s conclusion that English’s refusal to maintain McCoy’s innocence was necessitated by a Rule of Professional Conduct that prohibits counsel from suborning perjury, the Court noted that there was no avowed perjury. English harbored no doubt that McCoy believed what he was saying. Ineffective-assistance-of-counsel jurisprudence does not apply where the client’s autonomy, not counsel’s competence, is at issue. The violation of McCoy’s protected autonomy right was structural in kind. McCoy must be accorded a new trial without any need to show prejudice. View "McCoy v. Louisiana" on Justia Law

Based upon the findings and conclusions and the recommendation of the Judicial Standards Commission, the Supreme Court concluded that Respondent Gary L. Henderson, a Judge of the General Court of Justice, District Court Division 26, be publicly reprimanded for violations of Canons 1, 2A, 3A, and 3B of the North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct amounting to conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute, in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. 7A-376. The Supreme Court then ordered that Henderson be publicly reprimanded, holding that the Commission’s findings of fact were supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence in the record and that the Commission’s findings of fact supported its conclusions of law. View "In re Henderson" on Justia Law

Based upon the findings and conclusions and the recommendation of the Judicial Standards Commission, the Supreme Court concluded that Respondent Gary L. Henderson, a Judge of the General Court of Justice, District Court Division 26, be publicly reprimanded for violations of Canons 1, 2A, 3A, and 3B of the North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct amounting to conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute, in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. 7A-376. The Supreme Court then ordered that Henderson be publicly reprimanded, holding that the Commission’s findings of fact were supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence in the record and that the Commission’s findings of fact supported its conclusions of law. View "In re Henderson" on Justia Law

If a party is successful and has conferred a significant benefit by prevailing at trial and obtaining a judgment that a construction project violates the zoning laws in existence at the time, as in this case, that party was not precluded from obtaining attorney's fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5 because the losing party gets the zoning laws changed and the project's validity under the changed law has yet to be finally determined. The Court of Appeal held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in fixing the amount of attorney's fees and affirmed the award of attorney's fees. View "La Mirada Avenue Neighborhood Association of Hollywood v. Los Angeles" on Justia Law

NPC’s adversary proceeding against the Chapter 7 Trustee and his surety alleged that the trustee breached his fiduciary duties with respect to one of the Debtor’s assets, a former Benton Harbor manufacturing facility. NPC’s attorney (Demorest) served five non-parties with subpoenas duces tecum under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45. The ensuing discovery dispute, including several motions, hearings, and orders, resulted in an award of attorney fees and costs to the non-parties, $104,770.00 to one group and $61,417.50 to another. After a subsequent finding of civil contempt for failure to pay, payment was made and the bankruptcy court ordered payment of an additional $4,725.00 in attorney fees and costs incurred in connection with the contempt proceedings. The district court and Sixth Circuit affirmed. The bankruptcy court specifically found, after a case-specific inquiry, that the subpoenas issued to the non-parties were unduly burdensome, given the undisputedly broad scope of the requests and the temporal reach of the requests. As an experienced commercial litigator, Demorest would have known that complying with such subpoenas would involve considerable time and resources, implicate significant concerns about customer privacy, and require review for privileged communications and attorney work product. The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in finding that sanctions were warranted. View "New Products Corp. v. Dickinson Wright PLLC" on Justia Law

Magana was charged with two counts of rape. His trial counsel, Everett, sought a fifth continuance but failed to appear for the motion hearing. Everett then exercised a peremptory challenge against the assigned judge, resulting in its reassignment. Everett unsuccessfully sought to exercise a second peremptory challenge, then moved for recusal, asserting that the judge was biased. Everett voluntarily withdrew that motion. On the second day of trial, Everett moved to appoint an expert to testify that his client’s confession was involuntary. The judge ruled that Everett was not prepared to proceed and was not providing adequate representation and continued the trial. The court then granted the prosecution’s motion to remove Everett as counsel, finding that due to Everett’s conduct, the alleged victim, the prosecution, and Magana had been denied a speedy trial and that it had no faith that Everett would be prepared for trial on a timely basis. The court of appeal denied relief. Everett withdrew his first statement of disqualification; the court correctly found his second statement of disqualification untimely. A trial court has authority to remove defense counsel to ensure that adequate representation is provided, and to prevent substantial impairment of court proceedings. While such authority is to be sparingly exercised, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in this case. View "Magana v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal vacated an arbitration award in favor of a client against a law firm because the award was procured by "undue means" as that term was used in Code of Civil Procedure section 1286.2. As an initial matter, the court held that the law firm did not waive its right to appeal. On the merits, the court held that the trial court erred in confirming the arbitration award that took into consideration claims not made in the arbitration demand and to which the law firm was not given an adequate or meaningful opportunity to respond. View "Baker Marquart LLP v. Kantor" on Justia Law

Investco and its promoters sold LLC memberships to the public. The Department of Business Oversight (DBO) believed those interests constituted “securities” but were sold without Department of Corporations qualification. Prospective investors were told that specific property would be purchased at a favorable price. The 443 investors ($22,725,000) were not told that other LLCs had purchased that property weeks earlier for a substantially lower price for sale to the Investco LLC, profiting Investco and the promoters. DBO filed a civil action. Under a confidential settlement agreement, a special master was appointed to oversee the sale of the properties. DBO sent notices to investors, including Respondents. Respondents filed civil actions; defendants moved to amend the interlocutory judgment to stay actions against them arising out of the settlement's subject matter. DBO joined the defendants’ objections, arguing that the suits would cause “bargain” sales to the detriment of other investors. Respondents filed a “special appearance,” opposing the motion to modify, arguing that they were involuntarily bound by the settlement. The court stayed Respondents’ actions as to the LLCs, but allowed suits against Investco and the promoters, and expanded the duties of the special master. The court of appeal affirmed an award of attorney fees against Investco and DBO. Respondents were successful parties; enforced an important right affecting the public and fraud victims; and provided necessary, non-duplicative, significant benefits, while incurring litigation expenses out of proportion to their personal interests. View "People v. Investco Management & Development LLC" on Justia Law

In 1995, Raniere assigned all rights in the five patents to GTI. Raniere is not listed on GTI’s incorporation documents as an officer, director, or shareholder. GTI dissolved in 1996. In 2014, Raniere executed a document on behalf of GTI, as its “sole owner,” purportedly transferring the patents to himself. Raniere subsequently sued Microsoft and AT&T for infringement, identifying himself as the patents’ owner. Microsoft moved to dismiss for lack of standing, noting that the PTO’s records indicated that Raniere did not own the patents. Raniere produced documents that, according to the court, failed to indicate that Raniere had an ownership interest in GTI at any time or had the right to assign the patents. Raniere obtained documents from an attorney, showing the GTI shareholders’ consent to a transfer of shares from Raniere’s ex-girlfriend (75% owner of GTI) to Raniere. The documents did not indicate that any transfer was completed and did not establish that Raniere owned the patents. The district court held a hearing, found that Raniere’s testimony contradicted Raniere’s earlier representation that the shares had already been transferred and was “wholly incredible and untruthful,” concluded that Raniere was unlikely to be able to cure the standing defect, dismissed the case, and found that Raniere’s conduct demonstrated “a clear history of delay and contumacious conduct.” The Federal Circuit affirmed the dismissal and a subsequent award of prevailing parties attorney fees and costs, 35 U.S.C. 285. View "Raniere v. Microsoft Corp." on Justia Law