Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

This appeal centered on a challenge to the practice of requiring private attorneys who may be privy to confidential information related to a grand jury investigation to commit to maintaining the secrecy of all information they may acquire regarding the grand jury. The 40th Statewide Investigating Grand Jury was convened in 2016. Under the authority of the 40th Statewide Investigating Grand Jury, subpoenas requiring the production of documents were recently issued to the Dioceses of Harrisburg and Greensburg (“Appellants” or the “Dioceses”). Their counsel requested a copy of the notice of submission that the Office of the Attorney General (the “OAG”) had provided to the supervising judge. The supervising judge replied that he would furnish a copy of this notice to counsel, but that counsel first would be required to sign and submit appearance form, which included an oath or affirmation to keep all that transpired in the Grand Jury room secret (under threat of penalty of contempt). Counsel declined to accept these terms, however, and Appellants lodged a joint motion to strike the non-disclosure provision from the entry-of-appearance form. They argued that the requirement of secrecy was not authorized by the Investigating Grand Jury Act, both as to the obligation being imposed upon counsel and, alternatively, in terms of the breadth of that duty. The Dioceses’ lead contention was that the secrecy requirement of 42 Pa.C.S.A. Section 4549(b) did not apply to private attorneys, positing that, “[b]y its terms,” Section 4549(b) applies only to persons who are “sworn to secrecy” -- i.e., those who are required in practice to sign an oath of secrecy -- such as “Commonwealth attorneys, grand jurors, stenographers, typists, and operators of recording equipment.” The Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded an attorney would will be privy to matters occurring before an investigating grand jury shall be sworn to secrecy per the requirements of the Investigating Grand Jury Act, either via an appropriately tailored entry-of-appearance form or otherwise. The obligation of confidentially generally extends to all matters occurring before the grand jury, which includes, but is not limited to, what transpires in a grand jury room. A lawyer otherwise subject to secrecy, however, may disclose a client’s own testimony to the extent that the client would otherwise be free to do so under applicable law. Such disclosure is also subject to the client’s express, knowing, voluntary, and informed consent; the Rules of Professional Conduct; and specific curtailment by a supervising judge in discrete matters following a hearing based on cause shown. View "In Re: 40th Statewide IGJ" on Justia Law

In 2009 Blanchard, a Chicago law firm, provided legal services to an Indian pharmaceutical company, Lupin India, and its American subsidiary, Lupin USA, concerning the patentability of a generic birth‐control drug that Lupin India planned to launch in the U.S. through Lupin USA. When the Lupin companies initially sought Blanchard’s advice, the firm sent an engagement letter outlining its hourly fees and other terms. Neither Lupin India nor Lupin USA signed the letter, but Blanchard provided the requested legal services and the companies, at first, paid the firm for its work. In October 2009 Blanchard sent its two final invoices, which went unpaid. Seven years later Blanchard sued the Lupin companies for breach of contract and unjust enrichment. A district judge dismissed both claims as untimely. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part. The unjust enrichment claim is untimely, having accrued in 2009 when Blanchard furnished the services and the Lupin companies did not pay. The five‐year statute of limitations expired long before suit was commenced. The contract claim is timely, however. Though the engagement letter is unsigned, it counts as a written contract under Illinois limitations law, and the claim for breach is therefore governed by a ten‐year statute of limitations. View "Blanchard & Associates v. Lupin Pharmaceuticals, Inc." on Justia Law

The attorneys for plaintiff Lisa Levingston, O.D., failed to file an opposition to a motion for summary judgment. They had been substituted into the case after Levingston’s former attorneys were disqualified and the opposition that the former attorneys had filed was stricken. At the hearing on the motion, Levingston’s new counsel claimed they had not known that they needed to file a new opposition; they requested relief from default, under Code of Civil Procedure section 473(b), and a continuance. The trial court found that new counsel’s failure was inexcusable neglect, and granted summary judgment. The Court of Appeal concurred with the trial court’s finding that due to new counsel’s inexcusable neglect, Levingston was not entitled to relief under Code of Civil Procedure section 473(b); nevertheless, under controlling case law, she was entitled to a continuance to file an opposition. View "Levingston v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan" on Justia Law

Seven members of the Supreme Court of Alabama, including the Chief Justice, recused themselves from consideration of all matters related to this mandamus petition pursuant to Canon 3.C of the Alabama Canons of Judicial Ethics. Their recusal left Associate Justices William Sellers and Brady Mendheim, Jr., to hear the petition. Justice Sellers, as Acting Chief Justice, notified the parties that an additional five justices would be selected by random drawing from a pool of retired justices and judges and active circuit judges, after which five judges were appointed to serve as Special Associate Justices. Former Alabama Supreme Court Justice Roy Moore and his campaign committee, "Judge Roy Moore for US Senate" ("the Committee"), petitioned the Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Montgomery Circuit Court ("the trial court") to transfer an action filed by Leigh Corfman alleging defamation against Moore and the Committee to the Etowah Circuit Court. “Considering a mandamus petitioner's heavy burden” and all the materials before it, the Court concluded that the trial court did not exceed its discretion in denying the motion for a change of venue based on the interest of justice or on the convenience of the parties and the witnesses. Accordingly, it denied the petition. View "Ex parte Roy S. Moore and Judge Roy Moore for US Senate." on Justia Law

The State and other defendants the New Hampshire Department of Education; Margaret Wood Hassan, individually; Christopher T. Sununu, as Governor; Virginia M. Barry, individually; and Frank Edelblut, as Commissioner of the New Hampshire Department of Education, appealed a superior court order granting plaintiffs Bedford School District and William Foote (collectively, “Bedford”), attorney’s fees in a case that Bedford had filed to recover adequate education funding that the State withheld in fiscal year 2016 because of a statutory limit on state funding imposed under RSA 198:41, III(b) (Supp. 2015) (repealed 2015, repeal effective July 1, 2017). On appeal, the State argued that because the trial court specifically declined to find that the State had acted in bad faith in this litigation, the trial court unsustainably exercised its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees. The State also argued that Bedford waived its right to attorney’s fees when it accepted education funds appropriated by a bill that contained a waiver provision. The New Hampshire Supreme Court found after review of the superior court record, that Bedford waived its right to an award of attorney’s fees, and thus reversed the superior court’s order. View "Bedford School District v. New Hampshire" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court granting motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment in an order that resulted in judgment for all defendants on Plaintiff’s complaint, holding that the proceedings below were without error.Plaintiff filed this action against judges and other court employees, the Board of Overseers of the Bar, the Maine Commission in Indigent legal Services, and the Lewiston Sun Journal challenging Defendants’ actions in an attorney disciplinary proceeding before the Board that resulted Defendant’s two-year suspension from the practice of law with conditions imposed on Plaintiff’s practice. Plaintiff’s complaint asserting numerous causes of action and allegations against Defendants. The superior court entered judgment for Defendants. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the superior court did not err in ruling that (1) most defendants were protected by statutory or common law immunities, (2) there were no disputes of fact regarding Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants, and (3) Defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. View "Carey v. Board of Overseers of the Bar" on Justia Law

Kenneth M. (Matazo) and Kazu Tagami were grantors of the Trust. Matazo and Kazu had three children: Kenneth K., Barbara, and Charles. A family dispute arose when the settlors suspected the prior trustee, who was Barbara's son, of embezzling funds from the Trust. Matazo and Kazu removed the prior trustee and appointed professional fiduciary Claudia Powell as trustee. Attorney Nancy Ewin drafted the restatement of the Trust; Powell hired attorney Kent Thompson to represent her in her fiduciary capacity as trustee of the Trust. A physician certified in March 2012 that Kazu was unable to make her own financial and medical decisions due to medical issues. Matazo died in August 2012. Kazu died almost three years later, in June 2015. Charles challenged two probate orders: (1) settling, allowing and approving the third and final predeath account and report of trustee (Third Account) and finding Charles objected to the Third Account without reasonable cause and in bad faith, which justified an award of costs and fees pursuant to Probate Code section 17211 (a); and (2) an award of attorney fees pursuant to Probate Code 17211 requiring Charles to pay these fees from his share of the Tagami Living Trust or personally if his share was inadequate. The Court of Appeal disagreed with Charles' contentions in both appeals and affirmed the Probate Court's orders. View "Powell v. Tagami" on Justia Law

Eight of Rembrandt’s at-issue patents address cable modem technology; the ninth involves over-the-air signals. Rembrandt filed multiple infringement suits against dozens of cable companies, cable equipment manufacturers, and broadcast networks. The cases were consolidated. After several years of litigation, the court entered final judgment against Rembrandt on all claims. Many of the defendants sought attorney fees under 35 U.S.C. 285. Nearly four years after the litigation ended, the court issued a brief order granting that motion, declaring the case exceptional, and granting the bulk of the requests for fees, including nearly all of the attorney fees incurred in the litigation: more than $51 million. The Federal Circuit affirmed the exceptional case designation but remanded, finding that the court erred by failing to analyze fully the connection between the fees awarded and Rembrandt’s misconduct. While the court’s findings that that Rembrandt: wrongfully gave fact witnesses payments contingent on the outcome of the litigation; engaged in, or failed to prevent, widespread document spoliation; and should have known that the revived patents were unenforceable, were “remarkably terse” and “shed little light on its justifications” none of those findings was based “on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence. View "In re Rembrandt Technologies, LP Patent Litigation" on Justia Law

Fuery, her friends Sciortino and Tomaskovic, and Chicago police officer Szura were involved in an altercation on the side of the road. The three women were arrested for battery of a police officer; each was acquitted. The women sued the City and Officer Szura under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1985. At trial, the defendants objected to various testimony as violating the court’s rulings on motions in limine, moved for a mistrial, and requested dismissal of all claims and attorneys’ fees as a sanction. The judge stated, “[t]here are plenty of options once the trial is concluded to deal with the misconduct … I am not letting it go.” The jury awarded Tomaskovic $260,000 against Szura on her excessive force claim, finding that Szura was acting within the scope of his employment, but found in favor of the defendants on all other claims. The court entered judgment in favor of the City and Szura on all claims but denied the claims for attorneys’ fees. The court found misconduct by plaintiffs’ attorney and that “plaintiffs actively participated.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that it was apparent, “even from the two-dimensional record, the judge’s patience being tried.” District courts “possess certain inherent powers, not conferred by rule or statute, to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases. That authority includes the ability to fashion an appropriate sanction for conduct which abuses the judicial process.” View "Fuery v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

In a previous appeal, the Eighth Circuit held that portions of Minnesota's Next Generation Energy Act were unconstitutional in North Dakota v. Heydinger, 825 F.3d 912 (8th Cir. 2016). The State appealed the district court's determination on remand that plaintiffs were entitled to attorney's fees and award of $1,310,088 in fees and costs. The court affirmed the district court's order without opinion. View "North Dakota v. Lange" on Justia Law