Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court's denial of attorneys' fees in plaintiff's action under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Although the district court correctly determined that Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 (1992), provided the relevant legal framework in this case, the court held that the district court was in the best position to determine whether this lawsuit achieved a compensable public goal justifying a fee award. Plaintiff argued that this was an unusual case justifying a fee award because the litigation secured an ASL interpreter for Nelson Arce, achieved recognition of the rights of deaf probationers and prisoners to disability accommodations, deterred future ADA violations, and prompted necessary reforms in the defendants' policies toward deaf individuals. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Shelton v. Louisiana State" on Justia Law

After Brown Sims, a Houston law firm, successfully obtained a favorable result for its client, AJR, the client colluded with the opposing party, CNA and its attorneys, to consummate a settlement just between themselves. After settlement, the district court dismissed the case as moot.The Fifth Circuit held that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over Brown Sims's claims against CNA. The court also held that Brown Sims met all of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24's criterion for intervention as of right and the district court erred in concluding otherwise. Furthermore, the district court erred in denying the Rule 60(b)(5) and (b)(6) motions. Accordingly, the court reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further consideration. View "Adam Joseph Resources v. CNA Metals Limited" on Justia Law

A district court ordered Jackson National Life to pay about $191,000 on a policy of life insurance. The court added that the insurer had litigated unreasonably and ordered it to reimburse Cooke’s legal fees under 215 ILCS 5/155. The insurer paid the death benefit and appealed the attorneys’ fees. Because the district court had not specified the amount, the Seventh Circuit dismissed the appeal as premature. The district court then awarded $42,835 plus interest. The district judge concluded that there had been a good faith coverage dispute, so the insurer could not be penalized for insisting that a judge resolve the parties’ dispute, but added, “Jackson’s behavior in this litigation has been much less reasonable.” The Seventh Circuit reversed, first rejecting Cooke’s appeal on the merits award. Cooke did not appeal within 30 days of the order specifying the amount payable on the policy, and a later award of fees did not reopen that subject. The court erred in applying Illinois state law to the conduct of litigation in federal court and Jackson’s litigation conduct did not violate the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. View "Cooke v. Jackson National Life Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Matthew LeFande appealed a criminal contempt order for refusing a magistrate judge's orders to take the witness stand and be sworn for in-court questioning on the record in lieu of an ordinary, out-of-court deposition in a civil action. LeFande served as counsel for defendants in an underlying civil case.The DC Circuit affirmed the criminal contempt order, holding that a fair-minded and reasonable trier of fact could accept the evidence as probative of a defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In this case, LeFande did not dispute that he willfully violated the magistrate judge's orders. Furthermore, the district court indisputably had jurisdiction over the underlying action; the district court had personal jurisdiction over LeFande based on his nexus with the forum and the case; LeFande's objection that the order to testify violated the attorney-client privilege was contrary to circuit law, and to the magistrate judge's and district judge's prior orders applying that precedent to LeFande; the validity of the contempt order was unaffected by LeFande's assertion that District Title sought to depose him for an improper purpose; and LeFande's discovery argument lacked merit. View "In re: Deposition of Matthew Lefande" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment granting attorneys' fees and costs to defendants under section 505 of the Copyright Act and section 35(a) of the Lanham Act. These provisions authorized the district court to award fees to the prevailing party in a lawsuit. The court held that defendants met the definition of "prevailing party" under both fee-shifting provisions. Although defendants did not obtain a dismissal on the the Copyright and Lanham Acts claims, defendants have fulfilled their primary objective by obtaining dismissal of the complaint on collateral estoppel grounds. View "Manhattan Review, LLC v. Yun" on Justia Law

In this trademark infringement action, the district court granted Alliance for Good Government summary judgment on its trademark infringement claim against Coalition for Better Government, enjoined Coalition from the use of both its logo and its trade name, and then awarded Alliance attorney's fees incurred in bringing the lawsuit. The Fifth Circuit affirmed in part and held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Alliance was entitled to fees. The court remanded for the district court to reassess the amount of fees, because the court has since modified the district court's injunction to permit Coalition to use its trade name. View "Alliance for Good Government v. Coalition for Better Government" on Justia Law

After Mako acquired a historic building with intentions to restore it using state and federal historic tax credits, it retained the law firm of Winthrop & Weinstine to draft the tax credit bond. CRBT then retained Winthrop to represent it in connection with the building tax credit project. CRBT, through counsel Winthrop, later sought to foreclose on the building. Mako retained separate counsel and moved to dismiss the complaint and to disqualify Winthrop. The district court denied both of Mako's motions and awarded $5.2 million to CRBT.The Eighth Circuit held that the district court did not err by denying Mako's motion to dismiss the action for failure to join Chevron as a necessary party under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(a)(1); the district court did not err in calculating the money judgment; and, although the district court erred in failing to disqualify Winthrop as counsel for CRBT, the error was harmless. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment for money damages; reversed the district court's denial to disqualify counsel in any future proceedings; and, as proceedings continue and the Winthrop law firm has a conflict of interest necessitating removal as counsel, remanded for further proceedings. View "Cedar Rapids Bank & Trust Co. v. Mako One Corp." on Justia Law

Jarvis Properties, a limited partnership, owns a parcel of land. Its general partners, Todd and James (brothers), each own a 50 percent interest in the partnership, which is less than the majority consent required to act on behalf of the partnership (Corp. Code, 15904.06(a)). The brothers cannot agree on what to do about the parcel. Their partnership agreement does not address decision-making deadlocks. James sought partition by sale, naming Todd and Jarvis Properties as defendants. Todd hired his own lawyer and hired a separate lawyer, Roscoe, to represent the partnership. James objected to having Roscoe represent the partnership and moved to disqualify Roscoe. James argued that Roscoe was not authorized to act by the requisite majority of the general partners and that Roscoe, who took the position that he was not subject to the direction of either partner and was being paid by Todd, was not acting in the best interests of the partnership and would run up unnecessary litigation costs and deplete the partnership’s limited assets. The court of appeal affirmed an order disqualifying Roscoe. James had a sufficient interest to challenge Roscoe’s authority, having demonstrated a risk that Roscoe's representation may advance Todd’s interests and may not be in the Partnership's best interests. On remand, the court may wish to explore options for resolving deadlock at the entity level and consider appointing a receiver or other neutral. View "Jarvis v. Jarvis" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's order enjoining Reed Smith's action for tortious interference and unjust enrichment in New York state court against Wohl & Fruchter, in a dispute arising from the two firms' concurrent representation of the plaintiff class in the now-settled litigation. The court held that the district court had ancillary jurisdiction over the motion to stay the state court proceedings; the district court properly declined to abstain from exercising jurisdiction where all six factors in Woodford v. Cmty. Action Agency of Green Cty., Inc., 239 F.3d 517, 522 (2d Cir. 2001), favored retaining jurisdiction; the injunction was proper under the Anti-Injunction Act where the district court properly issued the injunction to prevent Reed Smith from relitigating the terms of the Fee Order; and Wohl & Fruchter's cross appeal was procedurally untenable. View "Kaplan v. Reed Smith LLP" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that Rule 6 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Hawai’i (RSCH) did not prohibit Dentons US LLP from practicing law in Hawai’i through its Hawai’i-licensed attorneys because the portions of RSCH Rule 6 that prohibit non-Hawai’i-licensed attorneys from serving as directors or officers of Hawai’i law firms with a multi-jurisdictional presence were repealed by implication by other rules of the Court.When the RSCH Rule 6 was first promulgated, only Hawai’i-licensed attorneys could serve as partners or shareholders in Hawai’i law corporations. The Court’s ethical rules governing the practice of law changed thereafter to eliminate the requirement that only Hawai’i-licensed attorneys could serve as partners in Hawai’i law firms and to allow law firms practicing in Hawaii to have non-Hawai’i-licensed members. The Supreme Court held that RSCH Rule 6 did not prohibit a former law firm partners’ practice of law in Hawai’i as part of Dentons US LLP because the portions of RSCH Rule 6 at issue have been superseded, by implication, by other rules of the Court that permit law firms composed of Hawai’i-licensed and non-Hawaii-licensed attorneys to practice law in Hawai’i, to mean “in this state or in any other state or territory of the United States or the District of Columbia.” View "Sheveland v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law