Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

Jackson filed a pro se complaint against Kaiser under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act. After unsuccessfully attempting to serve the summons and complaint, Jackson sought counsel. Jackson never properly served Kaiser; Kaiser never appeared in the action. In April 2016, Jackson retained Horowitz to assist her “with regard to” the suit. Horowitz advised Jackson to dismiss her pending lawsuit without prejudice, believing that she could re-file by September 30, 2016. Although they apparently contemplated that Horowitz would prepare a new complaint, Jackson did not retain Horowitz as counsel of record. Jackson filed a Request for Dismissal prepared by Horowitz. On September 9, 2016, Horowitz informed Jackson that his advice had been based on his misunderstanding of the statute of limitations, which had expired on December 29, 2015, the date Jackson had filed her action. Jackson’s claims are now time-barred. Jackson retained Horowitz on a limited scope basis to represent her on an application seeking relief from the dismissal under Code of Civil Procedure 473(b). The court denied that application, stating that Horowitz’s erroneous advice could not serve as the basis for relief because he did not represent Jackson at the time and did not make an appearance in the case until October 2016, and section 473's mandatory relief provision did not apply to voluntary dismissal. The court of appeal affirmed. Although the order was appealable, section 473(b) mandatory relief is unavailable for this type of voluntary dismissal. View "Jackson v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals" on Justia Law

In 2008, Defendant was charged with the sexual assault of his 10-year-old daughter, J.G. The indictment alleged that defendant inserted his fingers in J.G.’s vagina, licked her vagina, and touched her buttocks. After his conviction, Defendant filed multiple pro se collateral challenges to his convictions and at various times was represented by different attorneys. In 2015, Defendant filed a pro se motion seeking DNA testing under the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/116-3). The state argued that the controversy at trial was not whether another individual had committed the crime but whether the alleged assault occurred at all. At a hearing, Defendant appeared pro se but was accompanied by attorney Brodsky, who sought to file a Supreme Court Rule 13 limited scope appearance. The court denied Brodsky’s oral request, stating that allowing the motion would mean that attorney Caplan, Brodsky, and the defendant were all working on the case. Defendant later argued extensively in support of his DNA motion. Brodsky was not present. The appellate court vacated the denial of the motion, citing the U.S. Supreme Court’s "Powell: decision concerning a court's refusal to hear chosen counsel. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, finding no “Powell” violation. A section 116-3 action is civil in nature and independent from any other collateral post-conviction action and Brodsky’s request failed completely to comply with the requirements of that rule. View "People v. Gawlak" on Justia Law

In an action arising out of a fee dispute between a law firm and two clients, the action was removed to federal court and then the unpaid-fees claims proceeded to arbitration. The district court granted the firm relief from the stay and issued an order dividing the counterclaims into two categories: those the clients could raise in arbitration and those they could not.Determining that it had jurisdiction, the Eighth Circuit held that the clients' counterclaims were within the scope of what the parties agreed to arbitrate and the counterclaims seeking something else -- like money from the firm -- were not. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment, with one exception. The court held that the district court should not have decided that the clients terminated the relationship, because the arbitrator should decide the issue. View "Meierhenry Sargent LLP v. Williams" on Justia Law

Adams, a resident and member of the State Bar of Delaware, wanted to be considered for a state judicial position. Following the announcement of several judicial vacancies, Adams considered applying but ultimately chose not to because the announcement required that the candidate be a Republican. Because Adams was neither a Republican nor a Democrat, he concluded that any application he submitted would be futile. Adams challenged the Delaware Constitution's provision that effectively limits service on state courts to members of the Democratic and Republican parties, citing Supreme Court precedent: A provision that limits a judicial candidate’s freedom to associate (or not to associate) with the political party of his choice is unconstitutional. The governor responded that because judges are policymakers, there are no constitutional restraints on his hiring decisions. The Third Circuit ruled in favor of Adams, concluding that judges are not policymakers because whatever decisions judges make in any given case relates to the case under review and not to partisan political interests. The portions of Delaware’s constitution that limit Adams’s ability to apply for a judicial position while associating with the political party of his choice violate his First Amendment rights. View "Adams v. Governor of Delaware" on Justia Law

In this child custody dispute, the trial court imposed $50,000 in sanctions jointly and severally against an attorney and her client for disclosing information contained in a confidential child custody evaluation report. The Court of Appeal affirmed in part and held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing sanctions on the attorney. In this case, the attorney intentionally asked questions regarding a child custody evaluation that included a psychological evaluation which disclosed highly personal information about the child and her family. The court concluded that the attorney's actions were reckless. However, the court reversed in part and held that there was nothing in the record to suggest that the client directed or even encouraged the attorney to disclose privileged information. View "Anka v. Yeager" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court terminated the disciplinary proceedings relating to the circumstances giving rise to this judicial misconduct case, holding that continued litigation would be an inefficient use of judicial resources because the court over which Respondent presided no longer existed and because Respondent consented to a prohibition on future judicial service.The Supreme Court, however, wrote in order to clarify municipal courts’ power to administer infraction cases and infraction deferral agreements and to caution judicial officers on the impropriety of assuming the prosecutor’s duties. The Court then held (1) municipal courts’ status as “special courts” does not absolve them of the duties of a separate but co-equal branch of government; and (2) municipal court judges must endeavor to maintain, preserve, and protect the independence of Indiana’s judiciary even when administering the lowest-level civil and criminal offenses. View "In re Honorable Geoff L. Robison" on Justia Law

In 2005, during Hurricane Katrina, a barge moored by Lafarge hurtled through a floodwall and unleashed catastrophic flooding in the Lower 9th Ward. Richard T. Seymour represented New Orleans residents, but withdrew from the Barge Litigation in 2011. After the Barge Litigation settled several years later, he moved to intervene in order to pursue his fees and expenses.The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision as to intervention of right and dismissed Seymour's appeal for lack of jurisdiction as to permissive intervention. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Seymour's motion to intervene came too late. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying permissive intervention because it was also untimely. View "St. Bernard Parish v. Lafarge North America, Inc." on Justia Law

A responding party's request for sanction-based attorney fees under Family Code section 271 is not a request for affirmative relief. In this dissolution case, the Court of Appeal affirmed the award of sanctions in the form of attorney fees. The court held that, because wife's request for attorney fees under section 271 was not a request for "affirmative relief," she did not run afoul of section 213 by requesting those fees in her responsive pleadings. The court also held that, because this issue was one of first impression based on husband's colorable interpretation of the law, the court denied wife's request that it order husband to pay her attorney fees on appeal as a sanction for filing an appeal that was "totally and completely without merit." Finally, the court held that wife’s request for attorney fees under section 271 was not a request for “affirmative relief,” she did not run afoul of section 213 by requesting those fees in her responsive pleadings. Finally, husband's argument that wife's February 2016 request was barred by the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata was foreclosed. View "Perow v. Uzelac" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought medical malpractice claims in Ohio state court against a doctor who operated on them and against several hospitals where he worked. The plaintiffs allege that the judge presiding over their case, Judge Schweikert, and Chief Justice O’Connor of the Ohio Supreme Court were biased against their claims. In accordance with Ohio law, they filed affidavits of disqualification against Judge Schweikert, and requested that Chief Justice O’Connor recuse herself from deciding Judge Schweikert’s disqualification. They then requested that a federal court enjoin Chief Justice O’Connor from ruling on the affidavit of disqualification pertaining to Judge Schweikert and enjoin Judge Schweikert from taking any action in their cases before the affidavit of disqualification was ruled upon. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the claims. The Younger abstention doctrine applies. The ability of Ohio courts to determine when recusal of a judge or justice is appropriate and to administer the recusal decision process in accordance with state law operates “uniquely in furtherance of the state courts’ ability to perform their judicial functions.” View "Aaron v. O'Connor" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal held that (1) an attorney does not have standing to petition to compel arbitration of his clients' claims; (2) a signatory to an arbitration agreement can compel a nonsignatory parent company of a signatory subsidiary on an agency theory where (a) the parent controlled the subsidiary to such an extent that the subsidiary was a mere agent or instrumentality of the parent and (b) the claims against the parent arose out of the agency relationship; (3) the arbitrator did not exceed his authority by substituting the attorney's clients as the real parties in interest in the arbitration; and (4) the arbitrator did not exceed his authority by denying attorneys' fees to a party that prevailed in the arbitration. Therefore, the court agreed with the reasoning in Safari Associates v. Superior Court (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1400, and declined to follow DiMarco v. Chaney (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1809 .Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded with directions for the trial court to enter new orders on the petition to compel arbitration and the cross-petitions to vacate and to correct the award. The court also reversed the trial court's order denying attorneys' fees in the postarbitration proceedings. View "Cohen v. TNP 2008 Participating Notes Program, LLC" on Justia Law