Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court sanctioned Judge Michael Kwan to a six-month suspension without pay for Kwan's violations of the Utah Code of Judicial Conduct, holding that a six-month suspension was an appropriate sanction.Judge Kwan violated the Utah Code of Judicial Conduct when he made politically charged comments to a defendant in his courtroom and when he improperly used his judicial authority to seek the removal of a member of the court's staff from the premises. Kwan further violated the code of conduct when he made an online post critical of then-presidential candidate Donald Trump. The Judicial Conduct Commission recommended a six-month suspension. Judge Kwan argued that the sanction was inappropriate because it was an unlawful attempt to regulate his constitutionally-protected speech. The Supreme Court concluded that a six-month suspension without pay was appropriate, holding (1) a judicial disciplinary proceeding is an improper venue to press Judge Kwan's constitutional claims, and, bound by precedent, this Court declines to address the constitutional questions; and (2) Judge Kwan's online speech that he conceded the Court could permissibly sanction, combined with the other misconduct, warranted the six-month suspension. View "In re Inquiry of Honorable Judge Michael Kwan" on Justia Law

The trust appealed the district court's grant of the law firm's request for a percentage fee awarded from the common settlement fund. The fee award was compensation for the law firm's representation of a class of plaintiffs that settled securities law claims against BioScript. The trust was a member of the class and objected to the fee award.The Second Circuit affirmed and held that, regardless of whether the claims settled here were initiated under fee‐shifting statutes, the common‐fund doctrine properly controls the district court's allocation of attorneys' fees from a common settlement fund. The court explained that class plaintiffs have received the benefit of counsel's representation and assumption of the risk that the lawsuit will not render a recovery, and thus the class may be fairly charged for counsel's assumption of contingent risk. Therefore, the court held that the district court was entitled to exercise its discretion in awarding either a percentage‐of‐the‐fund fee or a lodestar fee to class counsel. View "Fresno County Employees' Retirement Assoc. v. Isaacson/Weaver Family Trust" on Justia Law

After plaintiffs prevailed in a long-running Individuals with Disabilities Education Act class action, the district court relied on the USAO's new matrix in awarding attorney fees. The DC Circuit vacated the award and held that the new matrix departs from the statutory requirement in 20 U.S.C. 1415(i)(3)(C) that reasonable fees be tethered to "rates prevailing in the community" for the "kind and quality of services furnished." Accordingly, the court remanded for the district court to recalculate the hourly rate based on evidence that focuses on fees for attorneys practicing complex federal litigation in the District of Columbia. View "DL v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court ordered that Racine County Circuit Court Judge Michael J. Piontek be suspended from the office of circuit judge without compensation and prohibited from exercising any of the powers or duties of a Wisconsin circuit judge, for a period of five days, holding that suspension was warranted.The Judicial Commission filed a complaint against Judge Piontek alleging that he had engaged in judicial misconduct by his actions in presiding over two different criminal matters. The Judicial Conduct Panel recommended that the Supreme Court suspend Judge Piontek between five and fifteen days. The Supreme Court found that suspension was warranted and that a five-day suspension was appropriate. View "Wisconsin Judicial Commission v. Piontek" on Justia Law

Law Funder filed suit against defendant and his law firm for legal malpractice. The district court found a series of discovery violations and related malfeasance, striking defendant's answer. After defendant did not move to replead, the district court entered a default judgment against him and awarded Law Funder $3 million.The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's entry of default judgment against defendant, but held that the district court improperly calculated damages under Texas law. In this case, the district court erred in awarding Law Funder compensatory damages for attorney fees and costs that it would have incurred regardless of defendant's negligence. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's final judgment and remanded for a new trial on damages. View "Law Funder, LLC. v. Munoz" on Justia Law

In this mandate-of-funds action in which the only remaining dispute was over what attorney's fees and expenses the Judges of Lake Superior Court should recover, the Supreme Court affirmed the Special Judge's ruling that the Judges were entitled to recover $176,467.17, holding that the Special Judge did not abuse his discretion.In 2017, fourteen Judges of the Lake Superior Court issued an order of mandate of funds requiring the Lake County Council and the Lake County Auditor (collectively, the Council) to provide funding, including raises, for court employees. A Special Judge heard the case, and the parties subsequently agreed to settle the dispute. The Judges requested $223,234.17 in legal fees and expenses incurred in prosecuting the mandate action. The Special Judge ordered the Council to pay the Judges $176,467.17 for their fees and expenses. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that substantial evidence supported the award to the Judges. View "Lake County Council v. Honorable John R. Pera" on Justia Law

Paz defaulted on a $695 credit card debt. PRA, a debt collector, purchased the debt and attempted to collect but violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act by failing to report that Paz disputed the debt. Paz filed suit in June 2014. PRA invoked FRCP 68, offering to eliminate the debt and pay Paz $1,001 plus reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs as “agreed ... and if no agreement can be made, to be determined by the Court.” The agreement stated that “[t]his … is not to be construed as an admission that ... Plaintiff has suffered any damage.” Paz accepted PRA’s offer. Counsel agreed to attorneys’ fees of $4,500. PRA nonetheless continued to report Paz’s debt to credit reporting agencies, even confirming its validity in response to inquiries. Paz filed another lawsuit and unsuccessfully attempted to add class claims. PRA again invoked Rule 68, offering $3,501 on the same terms as the first settlement. Paz never responded. The court limited the claims allowed to go to trial. Days before trial, PRA offered Paz $25,000 plus attorneys’ fees and costs. Paz rejected the offer. A jury found for Paz but determined that Paz had sustained no actual damages, so his recovery was limited to $1,000 in statutory damages for his FDCPA claim. Paz sought $187,410 in attorneys’ fees and $2,744 in costs, 15 U.S.C. 1692(k)(a)(3). The Seventh Circuit affirmed an award of $10,875, reasoning that Paz’s rejection of meaningful settlement offers precluded a fee award so disproportionate to his recovery. View "Paz v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the federal district court denying Appellant's request for a declaratory judgment asserting that a protective order that remained in effect in his now-closed state criminal case was unconstitutional, holding that the state court judge was protected from this lawsuit by the doctrine of judicial immunity.Appellant filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that the protective order violated his First Amendment rights. Appellee, the state court judge, responded with a motion to dismiss, arguing that she was protected by judicial immunity. The federal district court granted Appellee's motion to dismiss. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Appellee's actions were shielded from attack by judicial immunity. View "Zenon v. Guzman" on Justia Law

David Kosmann appealed a district court judgment relating to a dispute that arose from the sale of real property. He claimed the district court erred in enforcing an oral settlement agreement reached in mediation between Kosmann, Kevin Dinius, and Dinius & Associates, PLLC (collectively “Dinius”). Kosmann also argued the trial court erred in: (1) awarding attorney fees to Dinius as a sanction against Kosmann and his attorney; (2) declining to impose sanctions against Dinius and his attorney; and (3) striking an untimely memorandum and declaration in support of his motion to reconsider. After review of the trial court record, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Supreme Court determined the district court did not err in enforcing the settlement agreement; the court also did not err in declining to impose sanctions against Dinius on ethics violations. However, the Supreme Court determined the district court abused its discretion in imposing I.R.C.P. 11 sanctions against Kossman and his counsel: the district court did not act consistently with the applicable legal standard for imposing sanctions pursuant to I.R.C.P. 11(b). The Supreme Court declined to address all other issues Kossman raised, and determined he was not entitled to attorney fees on appeal. "The record in this case is so tarnished with questionable conduct that it has presented this Court with a vexing ethical and legal dilemma. While we are gravely concerned over the potential ethical lapses which allegedly occurred during the mediation of this matter, there are no findings in the record concerning these matters. Therefore, as the trial court determined, we will leave to the Idaho State Bar, if properly called upon, the responsibility to investigate this matter further and make the necessary findings and conclusions as to the ethical issues presented." View "Kosmann v. Dinius" on Justia Law

This dispute between the bankruptcy court and Chapter 13 debtor's attorneys involved no-money-down business models where the debtor's attorney agrees to advance the costs of filing fees, credit counseling course fees, and credit report fees on behalf of the debtor. The bankruptcy court concluded that these fees were non-reimbursable under the district's no-look fee order and that counsel could never be reimbursed by statute.The Fifth Circuit held that debtor's counsel in this case was not entitled to additional reimbursement for advancing the costs of the filing fees, credit counseling fees, and credit report fees as administrative expenses necessary for preserving the estate under 11 U.S.C. 503(b)(1). However, 11 U.S.C. 503(b) and 330 provide bankruptcy courts with the discretion to compensate debtor's counsel for advancing the costs of filing fees, credit counseling fees, and credit report fees if they choose to do so. Therefore, the court held that the bankruptcy court did not err in interpreting its own standing order on no-look fee compensation, but that it did err in its conclusion that bankruptcy courts lack the discretion to ever award reimbursement of those fees. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and vacated in part. View "McBride v. Riley" on Justia Law