Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to alter the distribution of attorney's fees set forth in a contingency fee sharing agreement between two law firms in a products liability case. The court noted that it is unusual for the courts to revise fee-sharing agreements between lawyers, negotiated at arm's length, based upon the perceived fairness of the agreements. However, the court explained that this was not a typical personal injury litigation matter, which the district court presided over for more than seven years.Reviewing the matter in light of the construct of the Minnesota Code of Professional Conduct, the court found that the district court correctly analyzed the proportionality prong of Minnesota Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5(e) and did not abuse its discretion in altering the fee agreement and awarding the Padden Firm 15% of the disputed fee. The court also held that the district court did not err in finding that the Padden Firm did not take financial and ethical responsibility for the case within the meaning of Rule 1.5(e). View "Padden Law Firm, PLLC v. Trice" on Justia Law

The First Circuit reversed the district court's order sanctioning Attorney for failing to appear at a status conference, holding that where Attorney was fined without first being given a chance to show cause or explain her failure to appear, the court's order was an abuse of discretion.After Attorney failed to appear at a status conference the district court opened the conference by imposing a monetary sanction on Attorney for her failure to appear. Attorney filed two motions for reconsideration asking the court to excuse her non-appearance due to "mistake" in scheduling. The district court denied the motions for reconsideration. The First Circuit reversed, holding that the sanctions were an abuse of discretion because (1) the district judge in this case does not uniformly sanction all counsel who fail to appear; (2) it cannot be determined which non-appearing attorneys are sanctions and which ones are not; and (3) the district court fined Attorney without first giving her a chance to show cause or explain her failure to appear. View "In re Pimentel-Soto" on Justia Law

Mikhaeilpoor sued BMW and an auto dealership, asserting claims under the Song-Beverly Act (Civ. Code, 1790) stemming from her lease of a 2013 BMW. Mikhaeilpoor alleged that the defendants: failed to promptly replace her car or make restitution; failed to commence repairs aimed at conforming the car to its warranty; failed to make available adequate service and repair facilities; and breached express and implied warranties. A jury awarded $17,902.54 in compensatory damages and $17,902.54 in civil penalties. Mikhaeilpoor sought attorney fees of $344,639 under section 1794(d): $226,426, plus a 0.5 multiplier enhancement and $5,000 for the fee resolution process. Her motion was opposed as vastly overstating the work performed with excessive hourly rates and an unwarranted adjustment.The judge “went through all the bills” and was “aghast” that counsel sought $343,000 in fees for “a very simple case.” The court did not consider whether Mikhaeilpoor should have accepted a Code of Civil Procedure section 998 offer, but calculated 225 hours at a $350 hourly rate and found that $95,900 was the reasonable amount of attorney fees. The court of appeal affirmed. The trial court was in the best position to evaluate the professional services rendered before it; its decision is supported by substantial evidence. View "Mikhaeilpoor v. BMW of North America, LLC" on Justia Law

The IRS served a John Doe summons on the Texas Law Firm, which provides tax-planning advice, seeking documents for “U.S. taxpayers," who, during specified years, used the Firm's services "to acquire, establish, maintain, operate, or control" a foreign financial account, asset, or entity or any foreign or domestic financial account or assets in the name of such foreign entity. A John Doe summons, described in 26 U.S.C. 7609(c)(1), does not identify the person with respect to whose liability the summons is issued. The government made the required showings that the summons relates to the investigation of a particular person or ascertainable group or class, there is a reasonable basis for believing that such person or group or class may fail or may have failed to comply with any provision of internal revenue law, and the information sought and the identity of the person or persons is not readily available from other sources. The Firm moved to quash, claiming that, despite the general rule a lawyer’s clients’ identities are not covered by the attorney-client privilege, an exception exists where disclosure would result in the disclosure of confidential communication.The Fifth Circuit affirmed in favor of the government. Blanket assertions of privilege are disfavored. The Firm's clients’ identities are not connected inextricably with privileged communication. If the Firm wishes to assert privilege as to any responsive documents, it may do so, using a privilege log to detail the foundation for each claim. View "Taylor Lohmeyer Law Firm. P.L.L.C. v. United States" on Justia Law

Kaleb Basey, who was convicted of federal crimes, filed a federal civil rights lawsuit in January 2016 against several Alaska state troopers based on their actions during his investigation and arrest. In September, Basey submitted two public records requests to the Alaska State Troopers seeking various documents relating to the investigation of his case, including two troopers' disciplinary records. Basey's requests were promptly denied on the ground that the information pertained to pending litigation. Asking for reconsideration, Basey's request was again denied, again citing the pending litigation. Acting pro se, Basey appealed, and his appeal reached the Alaska Supreme Court. In 2017, the Supreme Court reversed a superior court's dismissal order, holding that neither disclosure exception the State used as grounds for resisting Basey's request had applied. Basey moved to compel production of the requested records in January 2018. The State responded by agreeing to produce certain records, denying the existence of others, and asserting that the requested disciplinary records were private personnel records exempt from disclosure. In a seonc trip to the Alaska Supreme Court, the issue before the Court was whether state employee disciplinary records were confidential “personnel records” under the State Personnel Act and therefore not subject to disclosure under the Alaska Public Records Act. To this, the Court concluded that, with one express statutory exception not relevant to this case, the answer was “yes.” View "Basey v. Alaska Dept. of Pub.Safety" on Justia Law

In this products-liability and wrongful-death suit, the Supreme Court vacated the order of the trial court sanctioning an attorney for commissioning a pretrial survey that commenced in the county of suit shortly before trial, holding that the sanctions order, issued under the court's inherent authority, could not stand because evidence of bad faith was lacking.After a hearing, the trial court imposed sanctions against the attorney that commissioned the pretrial survey, ordering the attorney to complete ten hours of legal ethics education and pay the movants $133,415 in attorneys fees and expenses. The court did not find that the attorney violated any disciplinary rules or other applicable authority, instead concluding that the attorney's conduct was intentional, in bad faith, and an abuse of the legal system and the judicial process. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the attorney's attitude and intermittent obstinance at the sanctions hearing likely taxed the trial court's patience but did not itself justify the imposition of sanctions; and (2) the attorney's errors in commissioning and executing the survey did not constitute bad faith. View "Brewer v. Lennox Hearth Products, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court concluded that Respondent, David E. Ferguson, Magistrate of Wayne County, violated several provisions of the West Virginia Code of Judicial Conduct and that a harsher sanction than that recommended by the West Virginia Judicial Hearing Board was appropriate.This case stemmed from Respondent's violation of a state fishing law and the coercive and belligerent behavior that Respondent exhibited when he was issued a citation. The Board concluded that Respondent violated several provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct and recommended that Respondent be suspended for thirty days without pay. The Supreme Court adopted the Board's conclusions of law regarding Respondent's rule violations with the modification of concluding that Respondent committed an additional violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct. The Court further found that a harsher sanction than that recommended by the Board was warrant due to Respondent's flagrant attempt to intimidate law enforcement officers. The Court suspended Respondent for ninety days without pay, reprimanded him, and ordered him to pay a total fine of $2,000 and the costs of this disciplinary proceeding. View "In re Honorable David E. Ferguson" on Justia Law

Sharon Walsh retained Swapp Law, PLLC, d/b/a Craig Swapp & Associates ("CS&A") after she was involved in two car accidents in 2013. In the negligence action stemming from the first accident, Walsh followed firm employee Stephen Redd’s advice and settled the case. Walsh then changed representation and, with her new counsel, settled the second case. On March 2, 2017, Walsh filed this action alleging, among other things, that CS&A was negligent in advising her to settle the first case while the second case was still pending and by failing to advise her of an underlying subrogation responsibility in the first case. CS&A moved for summary judgment. It argued that Walsh’s claim was time-barred under Idaho Code section 5-219(4)’s two-year statute of limitations because her malpractice claim began to accrue when she released the first claim. The district court agreed and granted the motion. Walsh timely appeals. Based on its review of the record, the Idaho Supreme Court determined the district court did not err in awarding summary judgment to CS&A. The district court properly determined that Walsh’s claim was time barred under Idaho Code section 5-219 because her cause of action accrued when she signed the release of claims for the First Collision case more than two years prior to her filing the action at hand. Further, the district court properly determined that the fraudulent-concealment provision of Idaho Code section 5-219(4) did not apply because Walsh was put on inquiry of CS&A’s alleged malpractice in June 2015, more than one year prior to filing this action. The district court’s decision granting CS&A’s motion for summary judgment and its final judgment were thus affirmed. View "Walsh v. Swapp Law" on Justia Law

Reynolds purchased a Ford truck. Over the next six years, Reynolds had the truck repaired 15 times but it continued to malfunction. Ford denied Reynolds’s request that it buy back or replace the truck under the Song-Beverly Act. Reynolds filed suit, raising several claims, including one under the Song-Beverly Act. The parties settled for $277,500.00. Ford agreed to “pay [Reynolds’s ] attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses pursuant to Civil Code section 1794(d) in an amount determined by the Court ... to have been reasonably incurred by [Reynolds].” Reynolds sought fees of $308,696.25. Reynolds had retained counsel on a contingency fee basis.The court conducted a lodestar analysis and awarded $201,891--compensation for 457.85 hours at reasonable hourly rates ($225-500/hour), plus a lodestar multiplier of 1.2, “reasonable and appropriate" to the objectives of the Act. The court ruled Reynolds had no obligation to disclose the terms of the retainer agreement: “Many statutory fee-award provisions begin with the lodestar method but are governed by the specific statutory requirement that the final fee award be ‘reasonable’ in nature. No such requirement is found in the Song-Beverly Act. The fee award must be based on the court’s calculation of the ‘actual time expended ... determined by the court to have been reasonabl[y] incurred. ... The court does not have the discretion to consider whether plaintiff’s attorney received additional compensation by ... a separate retaine[r] agreement.The court of appeal affirmed. Ford's concern that it is improper for a court to disregard a potential contingency fee award in determining the statutory fee under section 1794 is a question “more appropriately directed to the Legislature.” View "Reynolds v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law

Dragon sued 10 defendants, alleging patent infringement. Based on petitions by DISH and SXM (collectively, “DISH”), the Board instituted inter partes review (IPR) of the patent. The district court stayed proceedings as to DISH but proceeded as to the other defendants. After the court issued a claim construction order, Dragon, DISH, and the other defendants stipulated to noninfringement as to the accused products. The court entered judgment in favor of all defendants. In the parallel IPR, the Board issued a final decision holding unpatentable all asserted claims.DISH sought attorneys’ fees under 35 U.S.C. 285 and 28 U.S.C. 1927. Before the motions were resolved, Dragon appealed both the judgment of noninfringement and the Board’s decision. The Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s decision and dismissed the district court appeal as moot. On remand, the district court vacated the judgment of noninfringement as moot but denied DISH’s motions for attorneys’ fees, holding that “success in a different forum is not a basis for attorneys’ fees” in the district court. The Federal Circuit vacated. The judgment of noninfringement was vacated only because DISH successfully invalidated the claims in parallel IPR proceedings, rendering moot Dragon’s infringement action. DISH’s success in obtaining a judgment of noninfringement, although later vacated because of its success in IPR, supports holding that they are prevailing parties. View "Dragon Intellectual Property LLC v. DISH Network LLC" on Justia Law