Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

In a civil action for underinsured motorist benefits, a law firm representing the plaintiff engaged in ex parte communications with an orthopedic surgeon disclosed by the defendant insurance company as an expert witness. The firm scheduled an appointment for the expert to examine the plaintiff and subsequently disclosed the expert as their own witness, indicating that the expert would testify that the plaintiff's shoulder injury was related to the accident. The expert's report, following the examination, supported this causation.The trial court disqualified the expert from testifying and imposed sanctions on the law firm, requiring it to pay the defendant for the expenses incurred in retaining the expert. The court concluded that the law firm's conduct violated Practice Book § 13-4, which it interpreted as implicitly prohibiting ex parte communications with an opposing party's disclosed expert witness. The Appellate Court reversed the trial court's order, finding that Practice Book § 13-4 did not clearly prohibit such ex parte communications.The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Court's decision, agreeing that Practice Book § 13-4 was not reasonably clear in prohibiting ex parte communications with an opposing party's disclosed expert witness. The court emphasized that the rule's current version lacks explicit limiting language and that the difference in treatment between disclosed expert witnesses and nontestifying experts in the rule supports this conclusion. The court declined to exercise its supervisory authority to create a new rule prohibiting such conduct, noting that the issue did not rise to a level warranting such an extraordinary remedy. View "Epright v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The plaintiff, a developer and manufacturer of resinous flooring systems, sued several individual and corporate defendants for misappropriation of trade secrets, among other claims. The key individual defendant, S, was a former employee who developed a product called Poly-Crete for the plaintiff. After resigning, S started his own business and developed similar products, allegedly using the plaintiff’s trade secrets. The plaintiff claimed that S and other defendants, including companies that tested and used S’s products, misappropriated its trade secrets.The trial court conducted a bench trial in three phases. In the first phase, the court found that the plaintiff’s formulas for Poly-Crete and other products were trade secrets but ruled that the noncompete agreement S signed was unenforceable due to lack of consideration. The court also found that the plaintiff’s common-law confidentiality claim was preempted by the Connecticut Uniform Trade Secrets Act (CUTSA).In the second phase, the court found that S and some defendants misappropriated the plaintiff’s trade secrets to create products like ProKrete and ProSpartic. However, it ruled that other defendants, including Indue, Krone, ECI, and Merrifield, did not misappropriate the trade secrets as they did not know or have reason to know about the misappropriation. The court also granted attorney’s fees to Krone and ECI, finding the plaintiff’s claims against them were made in bad faith.In the third phase, the court ordered the defendants who misappropriated the trade secrets to disgorge profits and enjoined them from using the trade secrets. The court also sanctioned the plaintiff for attempted spoliation of evidence by its president, F, who tried to remove incriminating photos from the company’s Facebook page during the trial.The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s rulings on most issues but reversed the judgment regarding the enforceability of the noncompete agreement and the standard for determining misappropriation. The case was remanded for further proceedings on these issues. View "Dur-A-Flex, Inc. v. Dy" on Justia Law

Daniel’la Deering, an in-house lawyer for Lockheed Martin, was terminated and subsequently sued the company for discrimination and retaliation. While her discrimination claim was dismissed at the summary judgment stage, her retaliation claim was set to go to trial. However, during the litigation, Deering misled Lockheed Martin and the district court about her employment status and income. She falsely claimed to be employed by nVent and did not disclose her higher-paying job elsewhere, even submitting false information in a deposition, declaration, and settlement letters.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota, presided over by Judge David S. Doty, found that Deering’s actions constituted intentional, willful, and bad-faith misconduct. Lockheed Martin discovered the deception shortly before the trial, leading to an emergency motion for sanctions. The district court dismissed Deering’s case with prejudice and awarded Lockheed Martin $93,193 in attorney fees. Deering’s motions for a continuance and reconsideration were also denied by the district court.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the case due to Deering’s prolonged and intentional deception. The court emphasized that dismissal was appropriate given the severity and duration of the misconduct. Additionally, the appellate court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s denial of Deering’s motions for a continuance and reconsideration. However, the appellate court dismissed Deering’s appeal regarding the attorney fee award due to a premature notice of appeal. View "Deering v. Lockheed Martin Corp." on Justia Law

Jacob Pyne was convicted of malice murder and other crimes related to the shooting death of Gerard Foster on July 6, 2016. Pyne, along with two women who worked as prostitutes for him, was in a car near an apartment complex. After an argument, Pyne and one of the women, Christoyna Section, walked to the complex. Section testified that Pyne began acting aggressively and, after an altercation with Foster, she ran away and heard gunshots. Foster was found dead with multiple gunshot wounds, and surveillance footage linked Pyne to the scene. Pyne was arrested in Tennessee three days later.A DeKalb County grand jury indicted Pyne on multiple counts, including malice murder and felony murder. After a jury trial, Pyne was found guilty on all counts and sentenced to life in prison without parole for malice murder, with additional concurrent and consecutive sentences for firearm possession. Pyne's motion for a new trial was denied by the trial court, leading to his appeal to the Supreme Court of Georgia.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed Pyne's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct. Pyne argued that his trial counsel failed to object to the State's allegedly inconsistent theories and that the prosecutor's comments during closing arguments improperly shifted the burden of proof and commented on his right to remain silent. The court found no merit in these claims, concluding that the State did not present inherently contradictory theories and that the prosecutor's comments were within the bounds of proper argument. The court affirmed Pyne's convictions, holding that his trial counsel's performance was not deficient and that the trial court did not err in its rulings. View "PYNE v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

In this case, a mother sought to set aside a family division order that terminated her parental rights to her daughter, G.L. The mother alleged that the Department for Children and Families (DCF) committed fraud on the court by withholding information about G.L.'s foster parents. The trial court denied her motion, and she appealed.The Superior Court, Franklin Unit, Family Division, initially terminated the mother's parental rights in December 2021, citing her volatile behavior and inconsistent contact with G.L. The court found that the mother had not made sufficient progress toward her case plan goals and that it was in G.L.'s best interests to terminate parental rights. The mother appealed this decision, but the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the termination order in June 2022.The mother then filed a motion to set aside the termination order, arguing that DCF had committed fraud on the court by not disclosing negative information about the foster parents. She claimed that this information was relevant to the termination proceedings and that DCF's failure to disclose it constituted fraud. The family division held an evidentiary hearing and found that DCF's practice of storing certain records separately was not intended to hide information. The court also found that the DCF worker and attorneys were not aware of the negative information during the termination proceedings.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the family division's decision. The court held that fraud on the court requires a showing of intentional deception or a deliberate scheme to defraud. The court found that the mother failed to prove that DCF engaged in such conduct. The court also noted that the information about the foster parents was not central to the termination decision, which was based primarily on the mother's inability to resume parenting within a reasonable time. Therefore, the court concluded that the family division did not abuse its discretion in denying the mother's motion to set aside the termination order. View "In re G.L." on Justia Law

Vanessa Wells, a parent in the Lakota Local Schools district, filed a public records request seeking legal documentation related to the district's superintendent, Matt Miller, from the law firm of Elizabeth Tuck. Wells was concerned about allegations against Miller. The district's attorney, Brodi Conover, responded by providing a cease-and-desist letter but withheld other documents. Wells clarified her request to include all communications between Tuck and the school board regarding Miller from September 2022 to January 2023. Conover responded that certain communications were privileged and not subject to disclosure.Wells also requested all legal invoices from January 2022 to January 2023. Conover provided redacted invoices, omitting attorney names, hours, rates, and service descriptions, citing attorney-client privilege. In September 2023, after Wells filed a mandamus action, the district provided less-redacted invoices, retaining only the narrative descriptions and bank-account-related information.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case. It granted a writ of mandamus ordering the district to produce a demand letter from Tuck, rejecting the district's argument that it was protected under a federal settlement privilege. The court found that the district's reliance on Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Chiles Power Supply, Inc. was misplaced. The court awarded Wells $2,000 in statutory damages for the district's failure to timely produce the demand letter and the improperly redacted invoices. The court also awarded some attorney fees and court costs to Wells but denied additional attorney fees related to the invoices, finding no evidence of bad faith by the district. View "State ex rel. Wells v. Lakota Local Schools Board of Education" on Justia Law

A group of landowners (the Andersons) sued their neighbors (the Wilsons) over a property dispute involving access to remote parcels near a lake. The Andersons argued that a public easement existed over the Wilsons' property, providing access from a highway to their properties. They claimed this easement was established by patent, subdivision agreement, prescription, and under Revised Statute 2477 (RS 2477). The Wilsons contended that any access was permissive and private. The dispute arose after the Wilsons blocked access due to perceived excessive use by unauthorized individuals.The Superior Court of Alaska, Third Judicial District, held a 12-day bench trial. The court found in favor of the Wilsons, concluding that no public easement existed. It determined that the Andersons had only a private easement over the Wilsons' property. The court also awarded the Wilsons 75% of their attorney’s fees, finding them to be the prevailing party. The Andersons appealed both the easement determination and the attorney’s fee award.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case. It affirmed the Superior Court's decision that no public easement existed, agreeing that the Andersons had not provided clear and convincing evidence of public use before the land was withdrawn from the public domain. The court also upheld the finding that no easement by implication, necessity, or estoppel existed. However, the Supreme Court vacated the attorney’s fee award and remanded it for further consideration. It found that the billing records were insufficiently detailed and included fees unrelated to the litigation. The court also noted that the hourly rates charged by the Wilsons' attorney were significantly higher than those customarily charged in the locality, requiring further examination of their reasonableness. View "Anderson v. Wilson" on Justia Law

Larry D. Huggins III was convicted of felony murder, attempted aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery following a series of events that led to the deaths of two young men. Huggins and his accomplices planned to rob O.H., a minor who sold marijuana, but the plan went awry, resulting in a shootout. Huggins was injured and later arrested. At trial, Huggins testified, denying any intent to rob and claiming he was merely trying to buy marijuana.The Shawnee District Court found Huggins guilty on all counts. He was sentenced to a hard 25 life sentence for felony murder, with additional consecutive sentences for the other charges, totaling a minimum of 25 years plus 103 months. Huggins was also ordered to pay $2,500 in attorney fees.The Kansas Supreme Court reviewed several issues on appeal. Huggins argued that the jury instructions were erroneous because they did not match the charging document, which listed two victims for the attempted aggravated robbery. The court found the instructions legally appropriate as they included all statutory elements of the crime. Huggins also claimed insufficient evidence for his convictions, but the court held that the State did not need to prove he intended to rob both victims named in the charging document.Huggins challenged the voluntariness of his statements to police, arguing he was under the influence of medication and fatigued. The court found his statements voluntary, noting he was coherent and calm during the interview. Huggins also contested the admissibility of Facebook messages obtained via a search warrant, but the court ruled he failed to preserve this issue for appeal.The court found no prosecutorial error in the prosecutor's comments during closing arguments and rejected Huggins' claim of cumulative error. However, the court vacated the imposition of attorney fees, remanding the case for reconsideration of Huggins' ability to pay. The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the convictions but vacated and remanded the fee imposition. View "State v. Huggins" on Justia Law

In December 1974, Peter Sulfaro was shot and killed during an armed robbery at his shoe repair shop. His son, Paul Sulfaro, was the only witness. Three men, including Raymond Gaines, were convicted of the crime. Decades later, Gaines filed a motion for a new trial, citing new evidence and issues with the original trial.Gaines's convictions were affirmed by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in 1978. He made several unsuccessful attempts for postconviction relief. In 2021, he filed his fourth motion for a new trial, which was granted by a Superior Court judge. The Commonwealth appealed this decision to the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case and upheld the decision to grant a new trial. The court found that new scientific research on eyewitness identification, which was not available at the time of the original trial, could have significantly impacted the jury's deliberations. Additionally, the court found that the Commonwealth failed to disclose exculpatory evidence, including a note about a leg injury Gaines sustained before the crime and the arrest of a key witness, David Bass, which could have been used to challenge his credibility. The court also noted that the Commonwealth had an ethical duty to disclose any witness recantations, regardless of their credibility or timing.The court concluded that the combination of these factors indicated that justice may not have been done in the original trial, and therefore, a new trial was warranted. The decision to grant a new trial was affirmed. View "Commonwealth v. Gaines" on Justia Law

Four appellants sought post-conviction relief in Elkhart County, Indiana, alleging systemic police and prosecutorial misconduct that led to wrongful convictions. They argued that the judge, who had recused herself in a similar prior case involving Andrew Royer, should also recuse herself from their cases due to similar concerns about impartiality. The judge had previously recused herself in Royer's case because she had characterized Royer's attorney's comments as "defamatory" and had worked with many of the witnesses Royer intended to call, raising questions about her impartiality.In the lower courts, the Elkhart Circuit Court judge denied the appellants' motions for recusal, reasoning that her prior employment as a deputy prosecutor did not necessitate recusal and that her comments in Royer's case were misunderstood. The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decisions, agreeing with the judge's reasoning.The Indiana Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the judge's prior decision to recuse in Royer's case should have compelled her to recuse in these cases as well. The Court held that an objective observer, aware of the judge's prior recusal and the similar concerns raised in these cases, would reasonably question her impartiality. The Court emphasized that the judge's entanglement with the evidence had only deepened, and there was no change in circumstances that would eliminate the concerns leading to her initial recusal.The Indiana Supreme Court reversed the trial court's orders denying the motions for recusal and remanded the cases with instructions to grant the motions, ensuring that the judge recuses herself from these proceedings. View "Seabolt v. State" on Justia Law