Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

An employee crashed a Verizon truck and admitted to snorting heroin earlier that day. When his supervisor visited his home to have paperwork completed, the encounter became hostile. Verizon fired him. He filed a Massachusetts workers' compensation claim, based on injuries from the accident and alleged psychological harm based on-the-job harassment by the supervisor before the accident and the supervisor's visit to the house. An ALJ rejected the claims and the review board affirmed. A state court affirmed. Employee filed a second workers' compensation claim pertaining solely to the incident at the house. The claim was rejected by the ALJ as res judicata; the board and court affirmed, with an award of double costs against the employee for frivolous appeal. Employee then filed suit against Verizon and the supervisor, charging intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and trespass. The court dismissed, based on preemption provisions of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 185(a), and the exclusivity provision of the Compensation Act, Mass. Gen. L. ch. 152, 24. The court ordered plaintiff's attorney to pay $34,908.12 to reflect only defendants’ attorney fees incurred after the court's warning about the lawsuit's viability. The First Circuit affirmed. View "McCarty v. Verizon New England Inc." on Justia Law

Employee filed a workers' compensation claim against Employer. Employer's Insurer accepted liability for Employee's claim. Insurer contracted with third-party Adjuster to provide services for Employee's claim. Employee and Insurer disagreed over elements of the claim, and Attorney advised Insurer on various legal matters. The claim was eventually resolved. Employee then filed the present action for unfair claims settlement practices, naming Insurer and an employee of Adjuster as defendants. Employee served Employer with a subpoena requesting, inter alia, a letter Attorney wrote to Adjuster's employee concerning the underlying case. Employer and Insurer objected to the subpoena, citing attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine. The court denied the motions. Insurer then petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of supervisory control. The Court dismissed the petition, holding that the district court correctly applied the law of attorney-client privilege but incorrectly analyzed the work product doctrine. However, because the court reached the proper conclusion, supervisory control was unnecessary. View "Am. Zurich Ins. v. Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a class-action in state court seeking overtime wages under the Illinois Minimum Wage Law, 820 ILCS 105/4a, and the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 207(a)(1). After the state court denied class certification, plaintiff filed suit in federal court, alleging that he was fired in retaliation for his overtime claim in violation of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. 215(a)(3). After the state suit was resolved for less than $5,000 and the federal case resulted in an award of about $11,000, plaintiff's attorney moved for attorneys' fees of $112,566. The district court awarded $1,864, reasoning that if the attorney had not misrepresented damages until the start of trial, the case would have settled quickly. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded. Although a district court has discretion in determining the lodestar, it cannot base its decision on an irrelevant consideration or reach an unreasonable conclusion. It was unreasonable for the court to cut almost all of the attorney's hours based on its conclusion that the case should not have gone to trial. View "Johnson v. G.D.F., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the former in-house counsel for Toyota Motor Corp. (TMS), presented TMS with a claim asserting, inter alia, constructive wrongful discharge related to TMS's alleged unethical discovery practices. TMS and plaintiff settled the claims and entered into a Severance Agreement. TMS subsequently sued in state superior court seeking a temporary restraining order (TRO) and permanent injunctive relieve to prevent plaintiff from violating the attorney-client privilege and plaintiff filed a cross complaint for a TRO and a permanent injunction prohibiting TMS from interfering with his business practices and those of his consulting business. The court held that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 1 et seq., governed the Severance Agreement; the FAA authorized limited review of the Final Award; and the arbitrator did not manifestly disregard the law governing the Severance Agreement where the arbitrator's writing was sufficient under the terms of the Severance Agreement and the arbitrator did not manifestly disregard California law in addressing plaintiff's affirmative defenses. The court also held that the district court did not err in denying plaintiff's contempt motion. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed. View "Biller v. Toyota Motor Corp., et al." on Justia Law

An associate, dismissed from the law firm after five years, sought bonuses and fees with respect to cases on which he worked that settled after his departure. He filed attorney's liens in Illinois state courts. When that strategy failed, he filed in federal court. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit reversed with respect to contract claims and claims under the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act (820 ILCS 115/2), but otherwise affirmed. No court has ever decided whether plaintiff's employment agreement entitled him to compensation for work he did on the cases at issue and he made a plausible case that the agreement entitles him to some portion of the revenues. His contract required the firm to give him 30 days' notice before terminating his employment, but it failed to do so. View "Hess v. Kanoski & Assocs. " on Justia Law

Plaintiff's petition for rehearing was granted in part and denied in part. The court vacated and withdrew the previous opinion in this case and substituted the following opinion. At issue was whether an employer, who denied liability for nonpayment for overtime work, must pay attorney's fees and costs pursuant to 29 U.S.C. 216(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), if the employer tendered the full amount of overtime pay claimed by an employee, and moved to dismiss on mootness grounds where the employee conceded that "the claim for overtime should be dismissed as moot." The court concluded that, under such circumstances, the dismissal of the employee's complaint, without an award of attorney's fees, was not erroneous to section 216(b) because the district court did not award judgment to the employee as the prevailing party. View "Dionne v. Floormasters Enterprises, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed an employment discrimination suit, alleging race discrimination and retaliation, 42 U.S.C. 1981 and 42 U.S.C. 2000e. She failed to file a timely response to her employer's motion for summary judgment and the court granted the motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court was within its discretion in denying an extension. Plaintiff's counsel offered no explanation for missing the filing date by more than a month. There was no direct evidence of discrimination or retaliation; there was evidence of legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for any salary differences among workers in plaintiff's position. Plaintiff never complained to her employer that any actions taken against her by co-workers or by anyone at the company were related to race and nothing about cited incidents gave any hint that race was at issue. View "Keeton v. Morningstar, Inc." on Justia Law

The law firm successfully represented plaintiff in a Title VII retaliation suit against her employer. The jury awarded $65,000 in damage. The attorneys then sought attorneys' fees of 131,665.88. The district court awarded $70,000. The Seventh Circuit vacated, acknowledging concerns about excessive fees. The district court looked to impermissible considerations in calculating the award; most significantly, it reduced the statutory award based on the existence of an agreement, which specifies that the agreed contingent fee will not apply to the statutory award of fees(42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(k)). The court should have provided plaintiff with an opportunity to respond before applying the Consumer Price Index and the Laffey Matrix (a chart of hourly rates for attorneys and paralegals in the Washington, D.C. area, prepared by the U.S. Attorney’s Office to be used in fee-shifting cases), and should have provided a clear explanation as to how it arrived at the hourly rate of $400. The district court also erred in reversing its award of fees to outside counsel. View "Pickett v. Sheridan Health Care Ctr." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued defendants under Title VII, alleging claims of racial harassment and constructive discharge. Plaintiff subsequently appealed the district court's dismissal of his complaint based on a finding that plaintiff committed perjury and the district court's grant of defendants' motion for sanctions. Plaintiff argued that a less severe sanction was more appropriate and that the district court should have held an evidentiary hearing to allow plaintiff to explain his conflicting testimony. Plaintiff's counsel, who was separately sanctioned, also appealed the denial of his motion for recusal of the magistrate judge. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in deciding to dismiss plaintiff's complaint with prejudice where plaintiff plainly committed perjury; plaintiff's argument that the district court failed to hold a hearing was meritless where he made no effort to explain why he and his attorney failed to show at the hearing held by the district court to address objections to the magistrate judge's report; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying counsel's motion for recusal where a reasonable person would not question the magistrate judge's impartiality in this case. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Brown v. Oil States Skagit Smatco, et al." on Justia Law

DTC filed a complaint with the Court of Chancery against the Union and Harry Bruckner, a para-transit driver, in the nature of a declaratory judgment action (Complaint) pursuant to Title 1, Chapter 65. The Complaint sought an order vacating or modifying a labor arbitration award issued by a certain arbitrator pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement between DTC and the Union. The award reinstated Bruckner, who was terminated by DTC, with back pay less interim earnings. The Court of Chancery granted the Union's motion for summary judgment. DTC's sole argument on appeal was that the arbitrator's decision should be vacated due to the appearance of bias or partiality on the part of the arbitrator. The court held that the alleged bias or partiality which DTC attributed to the arbitrator failed to meet the "evident partiality" standard where the mere fact that an arbitrator may share a personal life experience with a party or a party's agent was legally insufficient to constitute a substantial relationship that a reasonable person would conclude was powerfully suggestive of bias. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed. View "Delaware Transit Corp. v. Amalgamated Transit Union Local 842" on Justia Law