Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated, appealed the district court's dismissal of his putative collection action seeking damages from defendants for violations of the overtime provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq. Plaintiff's complaint arose out of his work as a contract attorney in North Carolina. The court agreed with the district court’s conclusion that: (1) state, not federal, law informs FLSA’s definition of “practice of law;” and (2) North Carolina, as the place where plaintiff worked and lived, has the greatest interest in this litigation, and thus the court looks to North Carolina law to determine if plaintiff was practicing law within the meaning of FLSA. The court, however, disagreed with the district court’s conclusion, on a motion to dismiss, that by undertaking the document review plaintiff allegedly was hired to conduct, he was necessarily “practicing law” within the meaning of North Carolina law. The court found that accepting the allegations as pleaded, plaintiff adequately alleged in his complaint that his document review was devoid of legal judgment such that he was not engaged in the practice of law, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Lola v. Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom" on Justia Law

Hess, an attorney, had worked on a number of medical-malpractice cases before his law firm, Kanoski terminated his employment. Many of these cases settled after Hess’s termination, and Hess was not compensated. He sued under his employment agreement and under the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act, adding claims of tortious interference, wrongful discharge, unjust enrichment, and quantum meruit. In 2011, the district court dismissed each of Hess’s claims. On remand the district court held that Hess was not entitled to compensation for the post-termination settlements. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, based on its interpretation of Hess’s employment contract provisions that Hess would receive bonus pay in the amount of 15 percent of all fees “generated over the base salary (or $5,000 per month),” that the bonus shall increase to 25 percent “on all fees received annually in excess of $750,000.00,” and that that, “where the Corporation retains clients upon Employees [sic] termination that Employee has no proprietary interest in fees to be earned since the Employee is to be fully compensated through his salary and/or bonus for all work done while an Employee of the Corporation.” View "Hess v. Kanoski & Associates" on Justia Law

Cypress sued, alleging that Maxim, had misappropriated a trade secret, or was in the process of doing so, by seeking to hire away specialists in touchscreen technology, a field in which Cypress and Maxim compete. Maxim responded that it was entitled to solicit prospective employment candidates in Cypress’s workforce and that there was no evidence it had acquired, or was seeking to acquire, any trade secret. After failing to secure temporary injunctive relief, and failing to obtain an order placing under seal evidence derived by Maxim from public sources, Cypress dismissed the action. The trial court awarded Maxim attorney fees under Civil Code 3426.4, which authorizes such an award to the prevailing party where a claim for misappropriation of trade secrets is found to have been made in bad faith. The court of appeal affirmed, stating that the finding of bad faith was amply supported by evidence that defendants did no more, and Cypress accused them of no more, than attempting to recruit the employees of a competitor. Cypress dismissed the suit to avoid an adverse determination on the merits. View "Cypress Semiconductor Corp. v. Maxim Integrated Prods., Inc." on Justia Law

Ragozzine was a tenure-track professor at Youngstown State University. He did not produce much scholarship. Ragozzine attributed the delay to his lab’s not being fully operational until his second academic year. In his fifth academic year, his mother and his wife fell ill, with some caretaking responsibilities falling on him. He was granted a year’s delay in the review of his tenure application. Although he met the minimum requirements with a last-minute flurry of publications, he was denied tenure because YSU determined that he lacked promise of consistent scholarly production. Ragozzine sued, alleging that he was discriminated against on the basis of sex in violation of Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause; that YSU violated his rights under the Family Medical Leave Act, and that irregularities in his tenure review violated his procedural and substantive due process rights. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. Ragozzine subsequently moved to disqualify the judge, based on a previously undisclosed dating relationship between the judge and a YSU faculty member, arguing that the relationship created an appearance of impropriety under 28 U.S.C. 455 and the Code of Conduct for Judges. The district court denied that motion, concluding that no reasonable person would question her impartiality. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Ragozzine v. Youngstown State Univ." on Justia Law

Colosi lost a wrongful termination suit against her former employer, JLL. As the prevailing party, JLL filed a $6,369.55 bill of costs that the court clerk approved without modification, Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1). Colosi objected to most of the charges and moved to reduce the bill to $253.50. The district court denied the motion, finding each cost reasonable, necessary to the litigation, and properly taxable under statute, 28 U.S.C. 1920. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Most of the costs Colosi challenged related to witness depositions. Necessity is determined as of the time of taking, and the fact that a deposition is not actually used at trial is not controlling. View "Colosi v. Jones Lang LaSalle Am., Inc." on Justia Law

Knight, a member of the International Longshoremen’s Association, was financial secretary for the Local. In 2000, he distributed a flier stating the Local was hosting the Worker’s Coalition. McBride, director of Diamond State Port Corporation (which operates the Port of Wilmington where Union members work) offered to be a speaker and contributed $500 to the hotel hosting the meeting. The Union’s national vice president, Paylor, told McBride that Worker’s Coalition was not affiliated with the Union. McBride withdrew as a speaker, but he did not seek return of the $500. Knight filed Union charges against Paylor for interfering with the Local. Paylor counter-charged, alleging frivolous claims and using the Union name without permission. A hearing board cleared Paylor, but decided that Knight committed violations. Knight filed suit. On first remand, the district court ordered and the Union created a new policy and held a new hearing. The Union did not comply with an order to change its constitution. On second appeal, the Third Circuit held that Knight’s due process rights were not violated in the second hearing, but the district court awarded Knight attorney’s fees ($243,758.34), costs, and interest, reasoning that, because of Knight’s suit, Union members: can no longer be disciplined for harmless references to the Union name or logo; are more aware of disciplinary hearing due process rights; and, are properly informed about the Act. On third appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed. View "McBride v. Int'l Longshoremens Ass'n" on Justia Law

Flora worked as Luzerne County Public Defender from 1980- 2013. He became Chief Public Defender in 2010, maintaining a private practice. His predecessor had tried to secure additional funding by submitting weekly reports concerning excessive caseloads and staffing deficiencies. Flora obtained grant funding for representing juveniles, but was not able to obtain additional money for adult offenders. Flora reported that the existing level of resources did not allow the Office to provide constitutionally adequate representation. The County was unresponsive, so Flora refused representation to those not faced with incarceration. In 2012 Flora initiated a class action lawsuit on behalf of indigent defendants and sought an injunction to prevent his firing. The state court ordered the County to provide adequate funding and prohibited refusing representation to indigent defendants. While the parties were in mediation, the County approved new positions. The funding litigation followed the “Kids for Cash” scandal. From 2003-2008, about 50% of Luzerne County juvenile offenders appeared in court without counsel. Virtually all were adjudicated delinquent. Federal investigators uncovered that judges had accepted kickbacks from for-profit juvenile detention facilities to send unrepresented juveniles to those facilities. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court ordered vacatur and expungement of thousands of delinquency adjudications. Flora alleges that, in 2013, he learned that 3,000 adjudications had not been expunged and reported the matter. Flora was relieved of his duties. Flora sued, alleging retaliation for his funding lawsuit and for reporting noncompliance with the expungement order. The district court dismissed. The Third Circuit vacated, finding that, under the Supreme Court’s 2014 decision, Lane v. Franks, Flora pled facts sufficient to allege that he spoke as a citizen. View "Flora v. County of Luzerne" on Justia Law

Danko practiced law with the firm of O’Reilly & Collins, until, in 2009, Danko sued O’Reilly, as an individual, and O’Reilly & Collins, for unpaid wages. Before trial, O’Reilly, as an individual, obtained directed verdict. In 2012, judgment was entered in favor of Danko for more than $2,000,000. Danko filed moved to amend the judgment and the costs and fee order “to include Terry O’Reilly as a judgment debtor for all amounts owed to Michael Danko” on the ground that O’Reilly knew that the firm owed Danko more than $2 million, but drew out all the firm’s available funds without reserving any amounts to satisfy the debt he knew was owed to Danko, telling Danko “you will not be able to execute on any judgment.” The court of appeal affirmed the trial court’s amendment of the judgment, citing Code Civ. Proc., 187. The court rejected arguments that the amendment was entered in violation of a stay in the bankruptcy of the firm; the amendment was precluded by the doctrine of res judicata; and the amendment was contrary to the principles governing collateral estoppel. View "Danko v. O'Reilly" on Justia Law

The Gallia County (Ohio) Public Defender Commission contracted with the non-profit Corporation for defense attorneys to represent indigent criminal defendants. The Corporation hired Bright, who represented R.G. before Evans, the county’s only trial judge. Bright negotiated a plea agreement, but R.G. hesitated during the plea colloquy. “Mere seconds” later, R.G. informed Bright and Evans that he would take the deal after all. Evans refused. Bright and the prosecutor met with Evans to convince the judge to accept R.G.’s plea. He refused. In pleadings, Bright criticized Evans’s policies as “an abuse of discretion,” “unreasonable,” “arbitrary … unconscionable.” Bright’s language did not include profanity and did not claim ethical impropriety. Evans subsequently contacted the Office of Disciplinary Counsel and filed a grievance against Bright and filed a public journal entry stating that Bright’s motion, although not amounting to misconduct or contempt, had created a conflict. He ordered that Bright be removed from the R.G. case. He then filed entries removing Bright from 70 other felony cases. The Corporation terminated Bright’s employment, allegedly without a hearing or other due process. Bright sued Evans, the Board, the Corporation, and the Commission. The district court concluded that Evans was “not entitled to absolute judicial immunity because his actions were completely outside of his jurisdiction.” The court held that Bright failed to sufficiently plead that the Board or the Commission retaliated against him for exercising his constitutional rights or that liability attached under the Monell doctrine, then dismissed claims against the Corporation. The Sixth Circuit reversed with respect to Evans. While Evans’s conduct was worthy of censure, it does not fit within any exception to absolute judicial immunity. The court affirmed dismissal of claims against the Board and Corporation; the First Amendment offers no protection to an attorney for his speech in court.View "Bright v. Gallia Cnty." on Justia Law

Huon, a lawyer representing himself, sued his former employer Johnson & Bell, and its attorneys, for intentional discrimination based on race (Asian) and national origin (Cambodian) in violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a), and 42 U.S.C. 1981. After remand, the district court granted the defendants judgment on the pleadings, concluding that Huon’s suit was barred by claim preclusion because it arose out of the same “series of connected transactions” as claims that he previously litigated in state court. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the claims mirrored those raised in state court.View "Huon v. Johnson & Bell, Ltd." on Justia Law