Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

Stone sued Cook in the Eastern District of Texas, alleging infringement of the 327 patent, which relates to a basket-type medical device used to remove stones from biological systems. Venue was transferred to the Southern District of Indiana. Cook deposed the patent’s inventor, who stated, regarding the addition of the “sheath movement element” in claim 1 to overcome an examiner’s rejection, “I realize there is nothing novel about it.” Cook then petitioned the Patent and Trademark Office for inter partes review of all claims. Following the institution of IPR, one of Stone’s managing members offered to license the 327 patent to Cook for $150,000.00 but negotiations broke down. The Patent Board canceled all of the patent’s claims. Following a dismissal with prejudice, the court denied Cook’s motion for attorney fees, 35 U.S.C. 285. The Federal Circuit affirmed, agreeing the case was not “exceptional” and that Stone lacked any type of “clear notice” of the 327 patent’s invalidity by service of Cook’s invalidity contentions. While one might view Stone’s litigating position as weak given the inventor’s deposition testimony regarding the novelty and origin of claim 1’s sheath handle element, exceptionality is not assessed by a strong or even correct litigating position. View "Stone Basket Innovations, LLC v. Cook Medical LLC" on Justia Law

In 1995, Raniere assigned all rights in the five patents to GTI. Raniere is not listed on GTI’s incorporation documents as an officer, director, or shareholder. GTI dissolved in 1996. In 2014, Raniere executed a document on behalf of GTI, as its “sole owner,” purportedly transferring the patents to himself. Raniere subsequently sued Microsoft and AT&T for infringement, identifying himself as the patents’ owner. Microsoft moved to dismiss for lack of standing, noting that the PTO’s records indicated that Raniere did not own the patents. Raniere produced documents that, according to the court, failed to indicate that Raniere had an ownership interest in GTI at any time or had the right to assign the patents. Raniere obtained documents from an attorney, showing the GTI shareholders’ consent to a transfer of shares from Raniere’s ex-girlfriend (75% owner of GTI) to Raniere. The documents did not indicate that any transfer was completed and did not establish that Raniere owned the patents. The district court held a hearing, found that Raniere’s testimony contradicted Raniere’s earlier representation that the shares had already been transferred and was “wholly incredible and untruthful,” concluded that Raniere was unlikely to be able to cure the standing defect, dismissed the case, and found that Raniere’s conduct demonstrated “a clear history of delay and contumacious conduct.” The Federal Circuit affirmed the dismissal and a subsequent award of prevailing parties attorney fees and costs, 35 U.S.C. 285. View "Raniere v. Microsoft Corp." on Justia Law

IH’s patent relates to a method of purchasing goods at a local point-of-sale system from a remote seller. IH sued Bed Bath & Beyond for infringement. Two months later, the district court granted BBB summary judgment, concluding that the Supreme Court’s intervening decision, Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank, rendered the asserted claims invalid under 35 U.S.C. 101 because the asserted claims are directed to the abstract idea of “local processing of payments for remotely purchased goods.” The Federal Circuit affirmed. BBB moved for an award of attorney fees under 35 U.S.C. 285, arguing that, once Alice issued, IH should have reevaluated its case and dismissed the action. The district court granted BBB’s fees motion, holding that, “following the Alice decision, IH’s claims were objectively without merit,” and awarded BBB its attorney fees beginning from the date of the Alice decision, including fees incurred during the section 101 appeal. The Federal Circuit affirmed. IH’s claims were “dubious even before the Alice decision” and Alice was a significant change in the law as applied to the facts of this particular case. View "Inventor Holdings, LLC v. Bed Bath & Beyond, Inc." on Justia Law

AdjustaCam’s patent, which issued in 1999, discloses a camera clip that supports a camera both on a flat surface and when attached to a computer monitor. AdjutaCam’s infringement litigation against Newegg included a Markman order, indicating that AdjustaCam's suit was baseless, and extended expert discovery. Just before summary judgment briefing, AdjustaCam voluntarily dismissed its infringement claims against Newegg with prejudice. Newegg then sought attorneys’ fees under 35 U.S.C. 285. Following a remand in light of intervening Supreme Court precedent clarifying what constitutes an exceptional case, the district court again denied Newegg’s motion for fees. The Federal Circuit reversed. Based on the circumstances presented here, the wholesale reliance on the previous judge’s fact-finding was an abuse of discretion. The record points to this case as standing out from others with respect to the substantive strength of AdjustaCam’s litigating position. Where AdjustaCam may have filed a weak infringement lawsuit, accusing Newegg’s products of infringing the patent, AdjustaCam’s suit became baseless after the district court’s Markman order. View "AdjustaCam, LLC v. Newegg, Inc." on Justia Law

District court properly awarded “exceptional case” legal fees. In 2005, Dow filed an infringement action against NOVA, which argued that its product did not infringe and that Dow lacked standing because it had transferred ownership of the patents. In 2010, the district court entered judgment against NOVA for $61 million. The Federal Circuit affirmed. In a separate appeal from an award of supplemental damages, the Federal Circuit found the asserted claims invalid as indefinite under the Supreme Court’s intervening “Nautilus” standard, but did not disturb the 2010 judgment relating to preverdict infringement. NOVA became aware of evidence allegedly showing that Dow had committed fraud in obtaining the 2010 judgment but was time-barred from moving to set aside that judgment. In 2013, NOVA filed a separate action in equity for relief from the 2010 judgment, asserting misrepresentation of Dow’s ownership of the asserted patents, based on the testimony of a former Dow employee in an unrelated tax case and on the testimony of Dow’s expert, about testing on the accused product during separate Canadian litigation. The Federal Circuit affirmed dismissal. The district court awarded Dow $2.5 million under 35 U.S.C. 285, which allows courts to award “reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party” in “exceptional cases.” The court noted the weakness of NOVA’s litigating position and the manner in which NOVA pursued the case. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Nova Chemicals Corp. v. Dow Chemical Co." on Justia Law

The Tuschl patents relate to RNA interference, a process for “silencing” genes from expressing the proteins they encode, which may be useful in treating various diseases. In 2000, before the invention was reduced to practice, Dr. Tuschl published an article describing the discoveries. Weeks later, Dr. Bass published a mini-review that focused on Tuschl’s article and included her own hypotheses about enzymatic processes that may be responsible for the RNAi activity reported in Tuschl’s article. Tuschl read Bass’ article and recognized and successfully tested her hypothesis. Bass’ mini-review was cited as prior art during prosecution of the Tuschl patents, each of which issued. Bass sued for correction of ownership, claiming that Bass should be named as either a sole or joint inventor of the patents. During depositions, Bass made admissions undermining allegations that Bass reduced the Tuschl invention to practice and that Bass collaborated with the inventors. On the eve of the deadline for dispositive motions, Bass withdrew the sole inventorship claims, but not the joint inventorship claim. The district court rejected the joint inventorship claims on summary judgment, finding no evidence of collaboration between Bass and the Tuschl inventors. The district court declined a request for eight million dollars in attorney fees under 35 U.S.C. 285, The Federal Circuit affirmed, finding that the case was not objectively unreasonable when all reasonable inferences were drawn in Bass's favor. View "University of Utah v. Max-Planck-Gesellschaft" on Justia Law

The patents-in-suit relate to soybeans genetically engineered to tolerate herbicide, and, particularly, to the Bayer-developed dmmg gene. The parties disagreed over the scope of Bayer’s license of the patents to MS Tech, specifically, whether the license granted MS Tech a broad license to commercialize and sublicense the soybean technology. MS Tech had sublicensed to Dow. When Bayer sued Dow for infringement, Dow raised that sublicense as an affirmative defense. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of Dow; the Federal Circuit affirmed. The district court then awarded Dow attorney fees under 35 U.S.C. 285, declaring this an "exceptional case.” The Federal Circuit affirmed, noting Bayer’s weak positions on the merits and litigation conduct. “Bayer’s own witnesses as well as key documents contradicted Bayer’s contorted reading of the contract.” Bayer’s arguments were “fallacious” because they were “implausible” and “made no business sense” in light of the facts surrounding the agreements and their negotiation. View "Bayer Cropscience AG v. Dow Agrosciences LLC" on Justia Law

MOVA technology can capture an actor’s facial performance for use in motion picture special effects and video games; it is secured by trademarks, copyrights, and patents, and is reflected in hardware, source code, and physical assets. VGHL claims that Perlman, the head of Rearden, declined to acquire the MOVA assets from OL2 and proposed OL2 sell to a Rearden employee, LaSalle. Perlman introduced LaSalle to Rearden’s corporate attorney who helped LaSalle establish his own company, MO2, and negotiated with OL2. Perlman later demanded that LaSalle convey the MOVA assets to Rearden and terminated LaSalle’s employment when LaSalle refused. MO2 sold the MOVA assets to SHST, which hired LaSalle, and began selling the technology. The Rearden parties claimed that SHST never obtained ownership and that LaSalle was simply hired to handle the acquisition on Rearden’s behalf. SHST sued, alleging that Rearden had made “false or misleading representations ... concerning the ownership of the MOVA Assets ... to mislead the public and actual and prospective users and licensees” and had falsely recorded assignments of the MOVA patents. During discovery, SHST moved to compel Rearden to produce documents exchanged between MO2 and Rearden’s corporate attorney. The district court granted the request, concluding that Rearden had not shown entitlement to assert attorney-client privilege on behalf of MO2 and that LaSalle waived privilege when he shared documents. The Federal Circuit denied a petition for mandamus. Rearden's arguments failed to carry the high burden required on mandamus to overturn the court’s discovery determination. View "In re: Rearden, LLC" on Justia Law

This appeal stems from an intellectual property dispute between two religious organizations. Plaintiff filed suit alleging that defendant is infringing its registered service marks in violation of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1114, and Florida law. The district court granted judgment for defendant. In the first appeal, the court reversed in part and remanded for reconsideration of whether the parties' marks are likely to be confused. The court was also critical of disparaging comments that the district judge made about the parties. On remand, the court concluded that the district court misapplied several factors in its analysis of likely confusion, incorrectly assessed the Florida Priory’s defense of prior use, relied on historical testimony that the court previously deemed inadmissible, and misinterpreted the court's instructions about consulting facts outside the record. The court declined to order reassignment after balancing the three factors in United States v. Torkington. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "Sovereign Military Hospitaller v. The Florida Priory of the Knights Hospitallers" on Justia Law

Cypress sued, alleging that Maxim, had misappropriated a trade secret, or was in the process of doing so, by seeking to hire away specialists in touchscreen technology, a field in which Cypress and Maxim compete. Maxim responded that it was entitled to solicit prospective employment candidates in Cypress’s workforce and that there was no evidence it had acquired, or was seeking to acquire, any trade secret. After failing to secure temporary injunctive relief, and failing to obtain an order placing under seal evidence derived by Maxim from public sources, Cypress dismissed the action. The trial court awarded Maxim attorney fees under Civil Code 3426.4, which authorizes such an award to the prevailing party where a claim for misappropriation of trade secrets is found to have been made in bad faith. The court of appeal affirmed, stating that the finding of bad faith was amply supported by evidence that defendants did no more, and Cypress accused them of no more, than attempting to recruit the employees of a competitor. Cypress dismissed the suit to avoid an adverse determination on the merits. View "Cypress Semiconductor Corp. v. Maxim Integrated Prods., Inc." on Justia Law