Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

An employee crashed a Verizon truck and admitted to snorting heroin earlier that day. When his supervisor visited his home to have paperwork completed, the encounter became hostile. Verizon fired him. He filed a Massachusetts workers' compensation claim, based on injuries from the accident and alleged psychological harm based on-the-job harassment by the supervisor before the accident and the supervisor's visit to the house. An ALJ rejected the claims and the review board affirmed. A state court affirmed. Employee filed a second workers' compensation claim pertaining solely to the incident at the house. The claim was rejected by the ALJ as res judicata; the board and court affirmed, with an award of double costs against the employee for frivolous appeal. Employee then filed suit against Verizon and the supervisor, charging intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and trespass. The court dismissed, based on preemption provisions of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 185(a), and the exclusivity provision of the Compensation Act, Mass. Gen. L. ch. 152, 24. The court ordered plaintiff's attorney to pay $34,908.12 to reflect only defendants’ attorney fees incurred after the court's warning about the lawsuit's viability. The First Circuit affirmed. View "McCarty v. Verizon New England Inc." on Justia Law

Employee filed a workers' compensation claim against Employer. Employer's Insurer accepted liability for Employee's claim. Insurer contracted with third-party Adjuster to provide services for Employee's claim. Employee and Insurer disagreed over elements of the claim, and Attorney advised Insurer on various legal matters. The claim was eventually resolved. Employee then filed the present action for unfair claims settlement practices, naming Insurer and an employee of Adjuster as defendants. Employee served Employer with a subpoena requesting, inter alia, a letter Attorney wrote to Adjuster's employee concerning the underlying case. Employer and Insurer objected to the subpoena, citing attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine. The court denied the motions. Insurer then petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of supervisory control. The Court dismissed the petition, holding that the district court correctly applied the law of attorney-client privilege but incorrectly analyzed the work product doctrine. However, because the court reached the proper conclusion, supervisory control was unnecessary. View "Am. Zurich Ins. v. Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Ketan Bulsara filed a medical-malpractice and wrongful-death action against Dr. Julia Watkins stemming from the stillbirth of his child. A jury returned a judgment in favor of Dr. Watkins. The trial court subsequently denied Bulsara's motion for new trial. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in denying Bulsara's motion for a new trial where Bulsara demonstrated a reasonable possibility of prejudice in light of defense counsel's continued representation of Dr. Watkins after the filing of Bulsara's lawsuit while in possession of confidential information from an expert who previously consulted with Bulsara and his former counsel, in contravention of the Court's rules. View "Bulsara v. Watkins" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, David and Barbara Smith, asserted various claims arising out of the construction of their home against Defendants, Donald L. Mattia, Inc. (DLM), Donald Mattia, and Barbara Joseph (Barbara). The Chancery Court (1) granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment on (i) Plaintiffs' breach of contract claim and (ii) Plaintiffs' civil conspiracy claim; (2) denied Defendant's motion for summary judgment on (i) Plaintiffs' claim for misappropriation of Plaintiffs' backfill and money paid to DLM that was not applied to their project and (ii) Plaintiffs' claim that Defendants fraudulently induced Plaintiffs to purchase excess lumber and misappropriated $8,836 in connection with the purchase of excess lumber; (2) granted Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, as Defendants did not articulate a viable cause of action in their counterclaim; and (3) denied Barbara's motion for Chan. Ct. R. 11 sanctions where there was no evidence that Plaintiffs' attorney did not have a good faith belief in the legitimacy of the claims asserted against Barbara. View "Smith v. Donald L. Mattia, Inc." on Justia Law

Law Firm filed a verified petition for a writ of mandamus to compel Housing Authority to provide copies of all records that documented any and all instances of lead poisoning in the last fifteen years in any dwelling owned or operated by Housing Authority. The court of appeals (1) granted Law Firm's motion for summary judgment regarding the request for lead-poisoning documents and ordered Housing Authority to produce the documents, and (2) granted $7,537 in attorney fees to Law Firm. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) to the extent that Law Firm's request properly sought the lead-poisoning records, the court of appeals did not err in granting the writ of mandamus to compel Housing Authority to provide access to them; (2) the personal identifying information in Housing Authority's lead-poisoning documents was not obtainable under the Public Records Act, but the remainder of the completed forms was subject to disclosure; and (3) the court of appeals erred in awarding attorney fees to Law Firm. Remanded. View "State ex rel. O'Shea & Assocs. Co., L.P.A. v. Cuyahoga Metro. Hous. Auth." on Justia Law

After an automobile collision in which Travis Becker struck Rickey Whitaker, Whitaker filed suit for personal injuries. Thereafter, Whitaker's lawyer ignored repeated requests to provide information about his client's medical treatment, responded only after the trial court ordered him to do so, and then supplied false and misleading information in a way that damaged Becker's ability to ascertain the facts necessary to litigate the case. Becker's counsel filed a motion for sanctions. The trial court found that Whitaker and his lawyer had acted in bad faith and dismissed the case. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court, holding that the court acted within its discretion in making it clear to counsel that this type of behavior was unacceptable. View "Whitaker v. Becker" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Northern Virginia Real Estate and its principal broker, Lauren Kivlighan, filed an eight-count second amended complaint against McEnearney Associates, its real estate agent Karen Martins, and David and Donna Gavin (collectively, Defendants), alleging conspiracy to harm in business, interference with contract expectancy, and defamation. The trial court eventually entered an order granting Plaintiffs' motion to nonsuit all counts and dismissing the case as to all counts and all parties. Defendants subsequently filed motions for sanctions against Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs' counsel, Forrest Walpole, seeking attorneys' fees and costs and arguing that Plaintiffs violated Va. Code Ann. 8.01-271.1 by filing the suit without any basis in fact, without support in law, and with improper purposes. The trial court granted the motions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err when it imposed sanctions jointly and severally against Plaintiffs and Walpole; and (2) the trial court applied an objective standard of reasonableness in concluding that the facts of this case could not support a reasonable belief that the Plaintiffs' claims along with the damages sought were well grounded in fact or law as required by section 8.01-271.1. View "N. Va. Real Estate v. Martin" on Justia Law

The issue before the court was whether Defendant John Rogers was "exonerated" when his conviction was reversed and his case remanded for trial, or on the day his indictment was dismissed. Defendant sued the Cape May Public Defender's office for malpractice. The date the case was reversed would subject Defendant's claim to a one-year time bar, but a dismissal would not. One year later, his attorney filed a motion for leave to file a late notice of tort claim, which was denied. The trial judge determined that Defendant's claim accrued in 2007, and because he filed his notice more than one year later, the court concluded it lacked jurisdiction to hear his case. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the late notice must be filed within one year after accrual of a claim; "exoneration" (and therefore accrual) occurred in 2007. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Defendant was not "exonerated" until the indictment was dismissed with prejudice in 2008. His claim was thus not barred by the one year filing limitation. Nevertheless, because the claim was filed ten days beyond the ninety-day limit, the Court remanded the case for further proceedings to determine whether the "extraordinary circumstances" as defined by the governing statute was satisfied. View "Rogers v. Cape May County Office of the Public Defender" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued defendants under Title VII, alleging claims of racial harassment and constructive discharge. Plaintiff subsequently appealed the district court's dismissal of his complaint based on a finding that plaintiff committed perjury and the district court's grant of defendants' motion for sanctions. Plaintiff argued that a less severe sanction was more appropriate and that the district court should have held an evidentiary hearing to allow plaintiff to explain his conflicting testimony. Plaintiff's counsel, who was separately sanctioned, also appealed the denial of his motion for recusal of the magistrate judge. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in deciding to dismiss plaintiff's complaint with prejudice where plaintiff plainly committed perjury; plaintiff's argument that the district court failed to hold a hearing was meritless where he made no effort to explain why he and his attorney failed to show at the hearing held by the district court to address objections to the magistrate judge's report; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying counsel's motion for recusal where a reasonable person would not question the magistrate judge's impartiality in this case. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Brown v. Oil States Skagit Smatco, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sought to reopen a judgment entered in 2001 after the district judge that entered judgment for defendants in plaintiffs' person injury case was impeached and removed from office. Plaintiffs filed what they termed an independent action in equity on grounds that the judgment was procured by fraud involving the district judge. A new district judge dismissed the suit as barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The court reversed and remanded after applying a five-element analysis of an independent action in equity. View "Turner, et al. v. Pleasant, et al." on Justia Law