Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that New York City officers used excessive force when arresting her. On appeal, plaintiff primarily seeks a new trial on damages and challenges portions of the district court's order awarding attorney's fees and costs incurred prior to the date of defendants' Rule 68 Offer. The court concluded that the district court did not err in refusing to give a separate charge as to future damages and plaintiff failed to establish that any potentially improper conduct by defense counsel prejudiced the jury's award of punitive damages. The district court properly applied Rule 68 and did not abuse its discretion by reducing the reasonable hourly rate of plaintiff's lead counsel. The court held that Rule 68 offers need not, as a per se rule, expressly apportion damages among multiple defendants. With respect to apportionment, a Rule 68 offer is operative so long as it is capable of being compared to the prevailing plaintiff's ultimate recovery. Because the Offer meets this standard, the court affirmed the district court's decision. The court rejected plaintiff's claim that the district court erred in reducing the amount of her awardable attorney's fees. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment and order of the district court.View "Stanczyk v. City of New York, et al." on Justia Law

These consolidated appeals concern the ongoing tobacco litigation that began as a class action in Florida courts more than two decades ago. At issue is the fate of 588 personal injury cases filed on behalf of purportedly living cigarette smokers who, as it turns out, were dead at the time of filing (predeceased plaintiffs), 160 loss of consortium cases filed on behalf of spouses and children of these predeceased plaintiffs, and two wrongful death cases filed more than two years after the decedent-smoker's death. Plaintiffs' counsel sought leave to amend the complaints, but the district court denied those requests and dismissed the cases. The root of the problem occurred back in 2008 when these cases were originally filed where the law firm that brought the cases did not have the time or resources required to fully investigate all the complaints. Consequently, problem after problem cropped up once the district court started going through the inventory of cases. The defects that led to these consolidated appeals stemmed from counsel's failure to obtain accurate information regarding whether or when certain smokers died. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of these cases where, among other reasons, the problems could have been avoided if counsel had properly investigated the claims, and even if that lack of diligence were somehow excusable, counsel failed to inform the court that so many complaints were defective. View "4432 Ind. Tobacco Plaintiffs v. Various Tobacco Companies, et al." on Justia Law

Alberto Daniel Saucedo Suarez and his attorneys, Allan Davis and the law firm of Robinson Calcagnie Robinson Shapiro Davis, Inc. appealed a trial court's award of attorney fees and costs to the City of Corona. In 2008, Suarez was injured when the compressed natural gas (CNG) tank in a van in which he was a passenger exploded while being filled at a fueling station owned by the City. In April 2009, Suarez sued the City and a number of other defendants. Suarez proceeded against the City on a theory of dangerous condition of public property. Appellants contended the trial court erred because: (1) section 1038 did not authorize an award of attorney fees and costs against a party's counsel; (2) the commissioner issuing the award did not have jurisdiction; (3) the award was not proper where the action was brought and maintained with reasonable cause; (4) the fees and costs awarded were not reasonably and necessarily incurred; and (5) the award violated due process. The Court of Appeal agreed that section 1038 did not authorize an award of fees and costs against a party's attorney. Accordingly, the Court reversed that portion of the judgment awarding the City its fees and costs against the Attorneys. In all other respects, the Court affirmed. View "Suarez v. City of Corona" on Justia Law

KDC had cash flow problems and, in 2004, hired Johnson. Johnson retained the law firm (GPM) of his acquaintance, Tenenbaum. GPM sent KDC an engagement letter that included conflict‐waiver language regarding Johnson and a company affiliated with Johnson. Johnson soon resigned and joined First Products. GPM resigned as KDC’s counsel. KDC filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Its assets were purchased at auction by First Products. No other bids were received; the bankruptcy court approved the sale. The bankruptcy was later converted to a Chapter 7 liquidation proceeding. The bankruptcy trustee hired Sullivan as special counsel. Sullivan had filed a shareholder derivative action before KDC filed for bankruptcy, alleging that directors and officers of KDC had conspired to defraud the company of its intellectual property by driving KDC out of business and purchasing its assets at bargain prices. In 2010, a Wisconsin state judge entered judgment, finding some defendants, including Johnson, had engaged in a civil conspiracy to defraud KDC and steal its assets. In 2012, KDC, through its bankruptcy trustee, brought claims against GPM, alleging involvement in the scheme to defraud KDC orchestrated by Johnson. On summary judgment, the district court determined that the remaining claims were barred by the six‐year Wisconsin statute of limitations because KDC was on notice of GPM’s alleged fraud by 2006, when Sullivan received KDC’s client file. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "KDC Foods, Inc. v. Gray, Plant, Mooty, Mooty & Bennett, P.C." on Justia Law

Davis retained Fenton to represent her in a home foreclosure proceeding. Davis later sued Fenton for malpractice. Davis claimed that, although she paid Fenton several thousand dollars, he did virtually nothing to help her and that he targeted her for inferior service based on her race, in violation of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. 3601. That case is stayed pending arbitration. Fenton brought his own lawsuit in state court, against Davis’s lawyers: Dudley and Sidea, alleging that they intentionally spread false information about him to clients and business associates. Fenton also alleged that Sidea, who had previously worked at Fenton’s law office, had improperly obtained confidential information about Fenton’s clients and shared it with Dudley. The complaint claimed conversion, tortious interference with a business relationship, and defamation. Dudley and Sidea filed a notice of removal in federal court, citing the general removal statute, 28 U.S.C. 1441, and the civil rights removal statute, 28 U.S.C. 1443. Days later, despite the ongoing removal proceedings, the Cook County Court entered an ex parte preliminary injunction against Dudley and Sidea. The district court found that the case did not meet the removal requirements under either 28 U.S.C. 1441 or 1443 and remanded, The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Fenton v. Dudley" on Justia Law

Using FOIA requests directed to the South Carolina DMV, attorneys obtained names and addresses, then sent letters to more than 34,000 individuals, seeking clients for a lawsuit against car dealerships for violation of a state law. The letters were headed “ADVERTISING MATERIAL,” explained the lawsuit, and asked recipients to return an enclosed card to participate in the case. Recipients sued the attorneys, alleging violation of the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994 (DPPA), 18 U.S.C. 2721(b)(4), by obtaining, disclosing, and using personal information from motor vehicle records for bulk solicitation without express consent. The district court dismissed, based on a DPPA exception permitting disclosure of personal information "for use in connection with any civil, criminal, administrative, or arbitral proceeding," including "investigation in anticipation of litigation." The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded. An attorney’s solicitation of clients is not a permissible purpose under the (b)(4) litigation exception. DPPA’s purpose of protecting privacy in motor vehicle records would be substantially undermined by application of the (b)(4) exception to the general ban on disclosure of personal information and ban on release of highly restricted personal information in cases there is any connection between protected information and a potential legal dispute. The Court noted examples of permissible litigation uses: service of process, investigation in anticipation of litigation, and execution or enforcement of judgments and orders. All involve an attorney’s conduct as an officer of the court, not a commercial actor, seeking a business transaction. A contrary reading of (b)(4) could affect interpretation of the (b)(6) exception, which allows an insurer and certain others to obtain DMV information for use in connection with underwriting, and the (b)(10) exception, which permits disclosure and use of personal information in connection with operation of private tollroads. View "Maracich v. Spears" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Exxon Mobil alleging damages caused by exposure to naturally occurring radioactive material. On appeal, Exxon Mobil challenged the dismissal of its intervention based on the district court's ruling that a memorandum prepared by Exxon Mobil's in-house counsel was ineligible for the protections of the attorney-client privilege. The court concluded that the manifest purpose of the memorandum was to deal with what would be the obvious reason Exxon Mobil would seek its lawyer's advice in the first place, namely to deal with any legal liability that may stem from under-disclosure of data, hedged against any liability that may occur from any implied warranties during complex negotiations. Accordingly, the court concluded that the memorandum was privileged and vacated and remanded the judgment of the district court. View "Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Hill, et al." on Justia Law

The Federal Election Commission opened an investigation into alleged discrepancies in ARMPAC's financial reporting. ARMPAC conceded that it had violated federal election laws and agreed to pay a civil penalty and terminate operations. Appellant, former treasurer of ARMPAC, was named in the Conciliation Agreement in his official capacity as treasurer. Appellant then filed suit against the law firm that represented ARMPAC and three lawyers, alleging that defendants failed to keep him informed about the Commission's investigation of ARMPAC, signed documents on his behalf without permission, and defamed him in the Agreement. The district court dismissed or granted summary judgment to defendants on each of appellant's claims. The district court concluded that appellant's defamation claim based on the signing of the Agreement was barred by the judicial privilege. The district court also concluded that appellant's remaining negligence claim was barred under D.C. law. The court concluded that appellant's defamation claim was based on statements contained within the Agreement reached between the Commission and ARMPAC, and therefore was encompassed within the judicial privilege. The court also concluded that no D.C. case holds that a plaintiff may maintain a negligence action based on the allegedly defamatory communication. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Teltschik v. Williams & Jensen, PLLC, et al." on Justia Law

The United States investigated Jeffrey Epstein's sexual abuse of minors, but failed to confer with the victims before entering a non-prosecution agreement with Epstein. Two victims filed suit under the Crime Victims' Rights Act, 18 U.S.C. 3771, to enforce their rights and sought to discover the correspondence between Epstein's attorneys and the United States regarding the non-prosecution agreement. Epstein and his attorneys intervened to object to that discovery as privileged. The district court overruled the objection and ordered disclosure. Intervenors appealed and the victims moved to dismiss. The court concluded that it had jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal and that the plea negotiations were not privileged from disclosure where Federal Rule of Evidence 410 provided no privilege for plea negotiations, the intervenors waived any work-product privilege, and the court declined to recognize a common-law privilege for plea negotiations. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Doe v. Black" on Justia Law

Lewis was injured in an automobile accident and her health plan paid $180,000 for her medical treatment Lewis filed a tort suit against the driver (her son-in-law), represented by Georgia lawyer Lashgari, and obtained a $500,000 settlement. Lashgari knew the plan had a subrogation lien, but split the proceeds between himself and Lewis. He claimed that the plan was owed nothing. The plan filed suit under ERISA to enforce the lien, 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(3). The defendants argued that because the settlement funds have been dissipated, the suit was actually for damages, not authorized by ERISA. The district judge ordered the defendants to place $180,000 in Lashgari’s trust account pending judgment. The defendants did not comply. A year later, the defendants having neither placed any money in a trust account nor produced any evidence of their inability to pay, the judge held them in civil contempt, ordered them to produce records that would establish their financial situations, and ordered Lashgari to documents relating to the contempt to the General Counsel of the State Bar for possible disciplinary proceedings against him. The defendants appealed the contempt order. The Seventh Circuit dismissed, characterizing the appeal as frivolous and the defendants’ conduct as outrageous. View "Cent. States, SE & SW Areas Health & Welfare Fund v. Lewis" on Justia Law