Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

After the court reversed and remanded for an award of social security disability benefits to plaintiff, plaintiff moved for an award of attorney's fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. 2412(d). The court concluded that the district court abused its discretion in denying the fees where the government's underlying action was not substantially justified in this case. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's denial of plaintiff's motion and remanded for an award of fees and costs. View "Meier v. Colvin" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an attorney, filed suit against the Judge Advocate General (JAG) of the Navy and others, alleging violation of his constitutional rights in an administrative decision which suspended him from practice before naval courts. The disciplinary proceedings stemmed from plaintiff's filing of an appellate brief containing statements he knew were false and misleading. The court concluded that the district court did not err in holding that the Navy JAG had authority to discipline plaintiff; plaintiff received ample due process and his Fifth Amendment rights were not violated during the proceedings against him; and the record did not support plaintiff's Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 551, 701, and 706, claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claims and denied his request for mandamus review. View "Partington v. Houck, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an ALJ, brought this action alleging that HUD had interfered with his decisional independence and thereby violated the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq. The court concluded that it need not decide whether the district court correctly dismissed plaintiff's claims for lack of standing where the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111, deprived the district court of subject matter jurisdiction over the complaint. View "Mahoney v. Donovan, et al." on Justia Law

The Judicial Tenure Commission (JTC) issued a formal complaint against Judge Deborah Adams of the Third Circuit Court for misconduct (misrepresentations under oath, forgery and the filing of forged and unauthorized pleadings, and misrepresentations to the commission). The JTC found two of the three counts against Judge Adams were established by a preponderance of the evidence, and recommended that she be suspended without pay for 180 days and ordered to pay costs. The Supreme Court affirmed the JTC's findings of fact and conclusions of law. However, the Court rejected the JTC's recommendation of suspension and instead removed her from office. View "In re Adams" on Justia Law

Using FOIA requests directed to the South Carolina DMV, attorneys obtained names and addresses, then sent letters to more than 34,000 individuals, seeking clients for a lawsuit against car dealerships for violation of a state law. The letters were headed “ADVERTISING MATERIAL,” explained the lawsuit, and asked recipients to return an enclosed card to participate in the case. Recipients sued the attorneys, alleging violation of the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994 (DPPA), 18 U.S.C. 2721(b)(4), by obtaining, disclosing, and using personal information from motor vehicle records for bulk solicitation without express consent. The district court dismissed, based on a DPPA exception permitting disclosure of personal information "for use in connection with any civil, criminal, administrative, or arbitral proceeding," including "investigation in anticipation of litigation." The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded. An attorney’s solicitation of clients is not a permissible purpose under the (b)(4) litigation exception. DPPA’s purpose of protecting privacy in motor vehicle records would be substantially undermined by application of the (b)(4) exception to the general ban on disclosure of personal information and ban on release of highly restricted personal information in cases there is any connection between protected information and a potential legal dispute. The Court noted examples of permissible litigation uses: service of process, investigation in anticipation of litigation, and execution or enforcement of judgments and orders. All involve an attorney’s conduct as an officer of the court, not a commercial actor, seeking a business transaction. A contrary reading of (b)(4) could affect interpretation of the (b)(6) exception, which allows an insurer and certain others to obtain DMV information for use in connection with underwriting, and the (b)(10) exception, which permits disclosure and use of personal information in connection with operation of private tollroads. View "Maracich v. Spears" on Justia Law

Respondent Magistrate Judge James Naranjo placed a phone call on behalf of his stepson Albert Hernandez who was a party in a child-support enforcement proceeding assigned to another judge. After Mr. Hernandez was jailed for nonpayment of support, respondent called the judge presiding over Hernandez's case stating Hernandez was not a flight risk, and requested that Hernandez's bond be reduced, or that he be released from custody. As a result, the judge in Hernandez's case recused himself. The Judicial Standards Commission filed charges against respondent for willful misconduct, and recommended the imposition of discipline. The Supreme Court granted the Commission's petition and imposed a ninety-day suspension (60 days deferred), and a public censure. View "In the Matter of Naranjo" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-Appellees Carl and Pamela Morton filed a petition for guardianship against Defendant-Appellant Terry Hanson. An in-house attorney who did not carry malpractice insurance was appointed by the Family Court to represent Defendant. The Family Court certified a question to the Supreme Court concerning in-house attorneys appointed to represent indigent parties. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that in-house counsel appointed by the Family Court had qualified immunity under the Delaware Tort Claims Act. Furthermore, lack of malpractice insurance is not "good cause" for an attorney to withdraw from court-appointed representation. View "Hanson v. Morton" on Justia Law

Higher Taste sued the Park district under 42 U.S.C. 1983, requesting a declaration that Resolution 40-05 violated its rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and an injunction barring the resolution's enforcement. The district court granted Higher Taste's motion for a preliminary injunction, expressly ruling that Higher Taste had demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits. The parties later executed a written settlement agreement. Higher Taste then moved for attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. 1988(b), which permitted an award to the "prevailing party" in certain civil rights actions, including those brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court denied the motion. The court reversed and concluded that, because Higher Taste was a prevailing party within the meaning of section 1988, it should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust. On remand, the district court should determine in the first instance whether such special circumstances exist. View "Higher Taste, Inc. v. City of Tacoma" on Justia Law

The Chicago Inspector General initiated an investigation of possible improprieties in how a former city employee was awarded a city contract without the normal competitive process. Documents were sought from the city’s law department. Some furnished documents contained redactions, based on attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine. The Inspector General issued a subpoena, under the Municipal Code, but when the law department refused to comply, private lawyers were retained. The trial court dismissed, with prejudice, an action seeking an order to produce unredacted documents. The appellate court reversed and remanded for in camera inspection of the unredacted documents to resolve the claims of privilege. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the dismissal. Although the municipal code allows the Inspector General to conduct investigations and issue subpoenas, it does not confer the power to unilaterally retain private counsel to initiate enforcement proceedings or prosecutions in the Inspector General’s own name. The office of the Inspector General is a creature of municipal ordinance, not state statute, and has no legal status apart from the city. The Illinois Municipal Code gives that authority to Corporation Counsel. There are no statutory provisions for appointment of special counsel, even though Corporation Counsel, the one subpoenaed, has a conflict of interest in resisting production by claiming privilege. The Inspector General should look to the mayor for recourse. View "Ferguson v. Patton" on Justia Law

The Judicial Standards Commission filed a petition for discipline against Espanola municipal court judge Respondent Stephen S. Salazar. David Vigil, the son of a member of Respondent’s church and an acquaintance, manufactured a custom chopper motorcycle which he allowed John Martinez to test ride. Vigil did not produce a title to the vehicle prior to allowing Martinez to test ride it. Ohkay Owingeh police towed the motorcycle during the course of a criminal case for domestic violence against Martinez. The seized motorcycle was towed by George and David Luna d/b/a Aces Towing and Recovery, LLC. Vigil phoned and later visited Respondent for help in recovering the motorcycle. Respondent directed Vigil to have his attorney draft an ex parte order regarding the motorcycle. Vigil delivered the order to Respondent in the lobby of the courthouse and Respondent signed it. In the order, Respondent directed George Luna and Aces Towing to return Vigil’s motorcycle. The order falsely stated that Respondent had held a hearing on the matter. Respondent did not give notice or an opportunity to be heard to the Lunas or their company. In addition, Respondent embossed the official seal of the Espanola Municipal Court upon the order even though there was no case pending or court file existing in that court for the matter. Respondent also failed to inquire if Vigil’s matter was pending in Rio Arriba County Magistrate Court or was part of any other action in any other court; Martinez’s case was, in fact, pending in Rio Arriba County Magistrate Court. When Respondent signed the order, he was on probation with the Commission following a trial before the Commission in November 2009. George Luna and Aces Towing filed a Petition for Writ of Prohibition and Superintending Control in the district court seeking to quash Respondent’s order. The First Judicial District Court granted the writ petition and quashed the order. The Supreme Court issued an order accepting the Commission’s recommendation for discipline suspending Respondent without pay for ninety days, placing Respondent on probation for the remainder of his current term of office, requiring Respondent to pay restitution to the injured parties, requiring Respondent to pay all costs associated with the disciplinary process and ordering a public censure of Respondent. View "In the Matter of Salazar" on Justia Law