Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

The circuit court dismissed an action brought by Vilas County District Attorney Albert Moustakis who sought to restrain the Wisconsin Department of Justice from releasing records pertaining to Moustakis in response to a public records request by The Lakeland Times, a newspaper located in Minocqua. The request sought records of any "complaints or investigations regarding Vilas County District Attorney Al Moustakis" and records "regarding any investigation of [Moustakis's] conduct or handling of cases while district attorney." The request also sought "information related to complaints and investigations regarding Mr. Moustakis that were completed or ended without any action taken against him[,]" as well as "any communications between Mr. Moustakis and [Department of Justice] since he took office in 1995." The court of appeals affirmed the order of the circuit court. Finding no error in the circuit or appellate courts' decisions, the Supreme Court also affirmed. View "Moustakis v. Wisconsin Department of Justice" on Justia Law

CRST trucking company requires its drivers to graduate from its training program before becoming certified drivers. In 2005, new driver Starke filed an EEOC charge, alleging that she was sexually harassed by male trainers during her training (42 U.S.C. 2000e–5(b)).The Commission ultimately informed CRST that it had found reasonable cause to believe that CRST subjected Starke and “a class of employees and prospective employees to sexual harassment.” In 2007, having determined that conciliation had failed, the Commission filed suit. During discovery, the Commission identified over 250 allegedly aggrieved women. The district court dismissed, held that CRST was a prevailing party, and awarded the company over $4 million in fees. The Eighth Circuit reversed the dismissal of two claims and vacated the award. On remand, the Commission settled Starke’s claim and withdrew the other. The district court again awarded more than $4 million, finding that CRST had prevailed on more than 150 claims because of the Commission’s failure to satisfy pre-suit requirements. The Eighth Circuit reversed, stating that dismissal was not a ruling on the merits. A unanimous Supreme Court vacated. A favorable ruling on the merits is not a necessary predicate to find that a defendant is a prevailing party. A plaintiff seeks a material alteration in the legal relationship between the parties; a defendant seeks to prevent that alteration, and that objective is fulfilled whenever the plaintiff ’s challenge is rebuffed, irrespective of the precise reason for the decision. Title VII’s fee-shifting statute allows prevailing defendants to recover whenever the plaintiff ’s “claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless.” Congress must have intended that a defendant could recover fees expended in such litigation when the case is resolved in the defendant’s favor, whether on the merits or not. View "CRST Van Expedited, Inc. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n" on Justia Law

The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act prohibits “abusive debt collection practices,” 15 U.S.C. 1692(a)–(d), barring “false, deceptive, or misleading representation[s].” The definition of “debt collectors,” excludes “any officer . . . of . . . any State to the extent that collecting . . . any debt is in the performance of his official duties.” Under Ohio law, overdue debts owed to state-owned agencies and instrumentalities are certified to the State’s Attorney General, who may appoint, as independent contractors, private attorneys, as “special counsel” to act on the Attorney General’s behalf. Special counsel must use the Attorney General’s letterhead in communicating with debtors. Attorneys appointed as special counsel, sent debt collection letters on the Attorney General’s letterhead to debtors, with signature blocks containing the name and address of the signatory as well as the designation “special” or “outside” counsel to the Attorney General. Each letter identified the sender as a debt collector seeking payment for debts to a state institution. Debtors filed a putative class action, alleging violation of FDCPA. The district court granted defendants summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit vacated, concluding that special counsel, as independent contractors, are not entitled to the FDCPA’s state-officer exemption. The Supreme Court reversed. Even if special counsel are not “state officers” under the Act, their use of the Attorney General’s letterhead does not violate Section 1692e. The letterhead identifies the principal—Ohio’s Attorney General—and the signature block names the agent—a private lawyer. A debtor’s impression that a letter from special counsel is a letter from the Attorney General’s Office is “scarcely inaccurate.” View "Sheriff v. Gillie" on Justia Law

Binder, a law firm representing claimants before the SSA, appealed from summary judgment in two related cases where Binder seeks past attorney's fees. When Binder sought to hold the SSA liable for the fees, the district courts granted summary judgment to the SSA on the basis of sovereign immunity. The court affirmed the judgments and held that, regardless of the SSA’s statutory duties to withhold attorney’s fees from payments to successful claimants, there is no waiver of sovereign immunity in 42 U.S.C. 406(a) that would permit Binder’s lawsuits for money damages. View "Binder & Binder v. Colvin" on Justia Law

The district court held that NSC, a small nonprofit corporation registered in Virginia, is ineligible for attorney's fees under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 5524(a)(4)(E)(i). In keeping with Kay v. Ehrler, Baker & Hostetler LLP v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, and the decisions of its sister circuits, the court held that a corporation with a legal identity distinct from the attorney who represents it in litigation is eligible to recover attorney’s fees under FOIA. Because NSC is such a corporation, it is not barred by the pro se litigant exception. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "National Security Counselors v. CIA" on Justia Law

Blume Construction, Inc. appealed a district court judgment affirming a Job Service North Dakota decision, finding Blume did not file a valid appeal and the agency's determination assigning Blume a final penalty tax rate. Blume received a notice of determination from Job Service informing Blume that it would be assigned a penalty tax rate for unemployment insurance. The notice stated the agency conducted an audit and concluded there was a transfer of ownership and payroll between Blume and another company that was knowingly done to obtain a lower tax rate for unemployment insurance. The notice informed Blume it would be assigned the highest tax rate assignable for the next three years. The notice advised Blume the determination would become final unless a written appeal was made to Job Service within fifteen days. Job Service received an electronic appeal request for Blume signed by Craig Fidler. Fidler was identified as a licensed attorney from Colorado. Fidler was not licensed to practice law in North Dakota. In approximately May 2014, Fidler notified the referee he was unable to secure a sponsoring attorney licensed in North Dakota. During that same time period, the referee was informed a North Dakota attorney would be representing Blume. Blume argued the referee erred in finding Blume's attorney engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and the appealed request the attorney filed was void. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Blume Construction, Inc. v. North Dakota" on Justia Law

Several Albuquerque residents sued Mayor Richard Berry in his official capacity as Mayor of Albuquerque in state court over the City’s redistricting plan enacted after the 2010 census. This case arose out of an award of attorneys’ fees imposed as a sanction on attorneys who brought a voting-rights lawsuit on the residents' behalf against the Mayor. After dismissing the case, the district court found the attorneys unreasonably multiplied proceedings in what it called a meritless case and sanctioned them under 28 U.S.C. 1927. They argued the award was an abuse of discretion. The Mayor cross-appealed, arguing the court abused its discretion by declining to award fees under several other provisions the Mayor raised as grounds for sanctions. The Tenth Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that most of the attorneys’ arguments lacked merit. However, the Court vacated the award of fees and remanded for the trial court to consider whether a different trigger for the imposition of sanctions was appropriate. View "Baca v. Berry" on Justia Law

Jan Goldsmith was the San Diego City Attorney. League of California Cities was an association of 473 California cities and their public officials, which, among other purposes, advocates to protect and restore local control for cities to provide for the public health, safety, and welfare of their residents. Real Party in Interest, San Diegans for Open Government (SDOG), submitted a request under the Public Records Act to the City of San Diego (the City) seeking "[a]ny and all e-mails sent to or from [Jan Goldsmith's personal e-mail account] . . . that pertain in any way to the official business of the City of San Diego." Among other records, the City asserted an exemption to the disclosure of e-mails between a purported legal assistant for the League and attorney members of the League on the grounds they were not public records because they did not concern city business, or were otherwise privileged. SDOG filed a petition for writ of mandate seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the City and Goldsmith to compel disclosure of the e-mails. In a minute order, the trial court directed the City to provide SDOG with a privilege log identifying the documents not produced, along with the legal objection for not producing the documents. After considering the parties' briefing, the trial court declined to perform an in camera review of certain challenged e-mails. The court found the City failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that the e-mails were privileged or exempt under the Act, and ordered the City to produce the e-mails by a certain date. The League filed the instant petition for a peremptory writ of mandate or prohibition in the first instance, or an alternative writ or order to show cause seeking to vacate that part of the court's order requiring disclosure of the e-mails. The Court of Appeal concluded the term "a party," as used in the Act, was not limited to an actual party to the action. Accordingly, the nonparty here had standing to file the instant petition challenging the trial court's order. The Court further concluded the trial court erred by not conducting an in camera review of the documents as requested by the party asserting the documents were exempt from disclosure. Accordingly, we grant the petition and remand the matter for further proceedings. View "League of Cal. Cities v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Individuals requested documents under the California Public Records Act (Gov. Code, 6250) from Newark Unified School District. The District inadvertently included 100 documents that, the District contends, are subject to attorney-client or attorney work product privileges. Within hours of the release, the District sent e-mails asking for return of the documents. The recipients cited section 6254.5, contending that inadvertent release had waived the privileges. Under that statute, the disclosure of a document to the public waives any claim by an agency that the document is exempt from release. The District filed suit, seeking return or destruction of the documents. The trial court granted a temporary restraining order preventing dissemination, but ultimately agreed that section 6254.5 effected a waiver of confidentiality. The court of appeal reversed, finding that the legislative history demonstrates the intent to prevent public agencies from disclosing documents to some members of the public while asserting confidentiality as to others. Waiver as a result of an inadvertent release, while not necessarily inconsistent with that intent, was not within its contemplation. To harmonize section 6254.5 with Evidence Code 912, which has been construed not to effect a waiver of the privileges from an inadvertent disclosure, the court construed section 6254.5 not to apply to inadvertent release. View "Newark Unifed Sch. Dist. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Individuals requested documents under the California Public Records Act (Gov. Code, 6250) from Newark Unified School District. The District inadvertently included 100 documents that, the District contends, are subject to attorney-client or attorney work product privileges. Within hours of the release, the District sent e-mails asking for return of the documents. The recipients cited section 6254.5, contending that inadvertent release had waived the privileges. Under that statute, the disclosure of a document to the public waives any claim by an agency that the document is exempt from release. The District filed suit, seeking return or destruction of the documents. The trial court granted a temporary restraining order preventing dissemination, but ultimately agreed that section 6254.5 effected a waiver of confidentiality. The court of appeal reversed, finding that the legislative history demonstrates the intent to prevent public agencies from disclosing documents to some members of the public while asserting confidentiality as to others. Waiver as a result of an inadvertent release, while not necessarily inconsistent with that intent, was not within its contemplation. To harmonize section 6254.5 with Evidence Code 912, which has been construed not to effect a waiver of the privileges from an inadvertent disclosure, the court construed section 6254.5 not to apply to inadvertent release. View "Newark Unifed Sch. Dist. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law