Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

The issue this case presented for the Oklahoma Supreme Court's review was whether the district court erred in sustaining a legal parent's motion to disqualify opposing counsel. More specifically, the question centered on whether the integrity of the judicial process was likely to suffer real harm when an attorney who represents a client in a proceeding to establish paternity and to determine custody of a minor child failed to report suspected child abuse to the proper authorities as required by statute, conducts a forensic interview of the child to obtain evidence to support the client's position, did not obtain the legal parent's permission prior to the interview, and filed his own affidavit attesting to the credibility of the child's affidavit. Brandy Poindexter (Mother) is the legal parent of a minor child (Child) born in 2005. On September 6, 2006, Michael Jensen (Client) filed a paternity action seeking joint custody of Child. William D. Thomas (Attorney) filed an entry of appearance on Client's behalf, becoming Client's fourth attorney in the paternity proceeding. The issue of paternity is not contested, but the district judge has yet to enter a final paternity decree. Child again alleged that he had been abused by Mother and her husband. This time, Client did not report the new allegations to DHS, but instead brought the Child to Attorney to be interviewed. On January 12, 2014, Attorney conducted a forensic interview of Child without seeking permission from Mother or securing independent counsel for Child. Only Attorney and Child were present during the interview. At a subsequent hearing on paternity, Mother moved to disqualify Attorney. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the district court did not err in sustaining the motion to disqualify opposing counsel when the attorney likely compromised the legal parent's right to a fair proceeding by contaminating the fact-finding procedure and by establishing a relationship of undue influence with the child. View "Jensen v. Poindexter" on Justia Law

In 2009, the dissolution court dissolved the marriage of James and Diana Jordan. The court ordered that, after payment of attorneys fees and other obligations, the balance of the parties’ account at Northwestern Mutual (account) be divided equally between the parties. Plaintiff, Diana’s father, brought this action against James to collect the outstanding balance on James’s promissory note to him. The trial court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff. James then filed a claim for a determination of interests in the account. Defendants, the attorney and firm that represented James in the dissolution action, also sought a determination of interests in the account, claiming that they had a claim prior in right to Plaintiff’s claim by virtue of the charging lien arising by operation of law in the dissolution action. The trial court concluded that Defendants had no superior interest in the account because a charging lien in connection with a dissolution action would be prohibited by the Rules of Professional Conduct. The Appellate Court reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that attorneys are not entitled by operation of law to equitable charging liens on marital assets for fees and expenses incurred in obtaining judgments for their clients in marital dissolution proceedings. View "Olszewski v. Jordan" on Justia Law

The district court awarded attorneys fees to Lynn Urrutia against appellants Ty Harrison and Robert Schutte under Idaho Code section 12-120(3), 12-121, and 12-123, as well as sanctions against the appellants' attorney under Idaho Code section 12-123 and I.R.C.P. 11. These awards stemmed from the divorce of Lynn and Johnny Urrutia in 2007 and the divorce decree's division of the marital property. "'The most egregious conduct of defendants,' in the district court's opinion, was the filing of the Third Amended Counterclaim, which 'states two causes of action against Lynn: (1) that the second lien has priority over Lynn's claims and (2) that Lynn as the owner of the property was unjustly enriched.' The judge noted that the Second Lien, with a priority date of 2008, could not conceivably be higher in priority than Lynn's deed of trust, which was recorded in 2007. He observed that the Appellants knew the $220,000 claimed in the Second Lien, like the First Lien, contained numerous items that did not constitute improvements to the arena property and were not lienable under the mechanic's lien statutes. And, even though the Appellants knew that the owner of record of the arena property was Sundance Arena, LLC, they sought personal recovery against Lynn under an unjust enrichment theory for improvements made to the property, which she did not own." Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the award of fees and sanctions to Lynn Urrutia. View "Urrutia v. Harrison" on Justia Law

Wife and Husband married in 2003. In 2005 and 2008, Wife and Husband executed marital settlement agreements. In 2009, Husband filed a complaint for divorce, alleging that the separation agreements were voidable at his demand. In support of his demand, Husband argued that the attorney, who earlier assisted the Wife in obtaining permanent resident status and in the United States and largely served as scrivener to the settlement agreements, violated the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct by failing to obtain Husband’s informed consent to her representation of Wife in connection with the two settlement agreements. The circuit court held that the separation agreements were not voidable and entered a judgment of absolute divorce in which the separation agreements were incorporated. The intermediate appellate court affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that sufficient grounds to render the agreements voidable were not present in this case.View "Li v. Lee" on Justia Law

In consolidated appeals of a termination-of-parental-rights judgment, appointed counsel for the appellant parent moved to withdraw on the ground that continued representation was barred by Rule 3.1 of the Vermont Rules of Professional Conduct. Upon review of the attorney's brief on the matter, the Supreme Court concluded that, absent client consent, a motion to withdraw by appointed appellate counsel in termination proceedings will generally not be granted, and therefore denied the motions.View "In re S.C." on Justia Law

Karavidas, admitted to practice law in Illinois in 1979, worked for the City of Chicago, the Attorney General, and several law firms. In 1988, he opened his own practice. His father executed will and trust documents prepared by another attorney in 2000, and died later the same day. Karavidas was named executor and successor trustee. His dealings with the estate resulted in charges of conversion of assets entrusted to him; breach of fiduciary obligations; conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, in violation of Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct; conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice; and conduct tending to defeat the administration of justice or to bring the courts or the legal profession into disrepute. The Review Board of the IARDC recommended that charges be dismissed. The Illinois Supreme Court agreed. Before professional discipline may be imposed under Supreme Court Rule 770, the Administrator must demonstrate that the attorney violated the Rules of Professional Conduct. Personal misconduct that falls outside the scope of the Rules may be the basis for civil liability or other adverse consequences, but may not result in professional discipline.View "In re Karavidas" on Justia Law

The underlying divorce proceedings were initiated by the husband in 2010 through his attorney, James, and were complicated because the couple had a three-year-old son. Both parties had debts and neither was able to pay attorney fees, but husband’s family contributed more than $8,000 on his behalf, which was paid to James. When James received the money, husband signed an agreement, designating the sum as an “advance retainer” and the attorney’s property, not placed in a client trust account. Citing the “leveling of the playing field” provisions of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, the trial court entered a “disgorgement” order for James to turn over to wife’s attorney half of the fees paid to him ($4,000). The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. The Marriage Act reflects a policy of giving trial courts discretion to do equity in dissolution proceeding by making interim fee awards where parties lack resources. Case law and ethics rules concerning attorney fees come from a different context and are not pertinent to marriage dissolution. The advance payment retainer argued by James might be appropriate in some circumstances, such as bankruptcy or a forfeiture proceeding. View "In re Marriage of Earlywine" on Justia Law

Thirteen years after the divorce was finalized, the Lamar County Chancery Court found that the former husband, Appellee John David Gatwood, was in arrears on certain financial obligations imposed by the divorce decree. Because of various extenuating circumstances, the chancellor ordered Gatwood to pay off his debt in monthly installments. More than a year after the chancery court judgment, the former wife's attorney, Jack Parsons, successfully filed a suggestion for writ of garnishment, significantly accelerating payment of Gatwood's financial obligations. Circumstances related to the manner in which the writ of garnishment was obtained resulted in sanctions against Parsons; the garnishment proceedings also gave rise to other rulings which were appealed to this Court. After review, the Supreme Court declined to find the trial court erred: evidence at trial supported that court's finding that attorney's fees and sanctions against Parsons and his client were appropriate. Accordingly, the circuit court's decision was affirmed. View "Cooper v. The Estate of William David Gatwood" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from disputes over the estate of the late Texas oil magnate and billionaire J. Howard Marshall. J. Howard died in 1995, leaving nearly all his assets to his son, Pierce, but excluding his wife, Anna Nicole Smith (Vickie), and his other son, Howard, from receiving any part of his fortune. Howard and his Wife eventually filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy and their case was assigned to Judge Bufford, who had previously presided over Vickie's Chapter 11 bankruptcy case. Judge Bufford published three separate opinions: (1) denying Pierce's motion for reassignment or recusal; (2) confirming the Plan and denying Pierce's motion to dismiss with respect to his constitutional arguments; and (3) confirming the Plan and denying Pierce's motion to dismiss with respect to his statutory arguments. Elaine, Pierce's widow, now appeals the district court's decision, contending that the district court erred in affirming the bankruptcy court's orders. The court addressed the various issues on appeal related to the motion for recusal or reassignment, constitutional issues, and non-constitutional issues, and ultimately affirmed the district court's decision. View "In the Matter of: Marshall" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-Appellees Carl and Pamela Morton filed a petition for guardianship against Defendant-Appellant Terry Hanson. An in-house attorney who did not carry malpractice insurance was appointed by the Family Court to represent Defendant. The Family Court certified a question to the Supreme Court concerning in-house attorneys appointed to represent indigent parties. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that in-house counsel appointed by the Family Court had qualified immunity under the Delaware Tort Claims Act. Furthermore, lack of malpractice insurance is not "good cause" for an attorney to withdraw from court-appointed representation. View "Hanson v. Morton" on Justia Law