Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

Christine, represented by Goldstine, sought dissolution of marriage from Andrew. Andrew was represented by Boback. Holwell later became Andrew’s counsel. Before withdrawing, Boback successfully moved to disqualify Goldstine for improperly ordering Christine to provide Andrew’s mail that arrived at the marital home, opening and viewing the mail. Holwell billed Andrew $37,094.49 for the disqualification matter. Later, Jaquays appeared for Christine. LeVine appeared for Andrew. Christine sought interim attorney fees, arguing that she had paid Jaquays a retainer of $5000 and had an outstanding balance of $27,142.60 and that if the court determined that Andrew lacked the ability to pay her fees, it should order disgorgement from the money that Andrew had paid to Holwell. Andrew also sought attorney fees, owing $17,500.38 to Holwell and $26,000 to LeVine; Holwell testified that she was holding $13,000 that Andrew had paid to Boback because of a dispute as to who owned the money. The court found that both parties lacked an ability to pay reasonable attorney fees. Andrew had paid $66,382.28 to Holwell, $10,000 to LeVine, and $23,639.99 to Boback. Christine had paid $5000 to Jaquays and $13,117.04 to Goldstine. The court held that to “level the playing field,” each party should have $59,069.65 for attorney fees. The court ordered Holwell to disgorge $40,952.61 for payment to Jaquays. Holwell was held in contempt. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed reversal of the disgorgement order. Fees that have already been earned by an attorney in a dissolution of marriage proceeding are not considered “available funds,” such that they may be disgorged under the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (750 ILCS 5/501(c-1)(3). View "In re Marriage of Goesel" on Justia Law

After a bench trial, the trial court concluded that defendant attorney’s failure to adequately inform plaintiff Hannah Sachs of the risks of delay in filing a parentage action “negligently fell short of the standard of reasonably competent legal representation.” Despite the court’s conclusion that defendant breached her professional duty of care, the trial court determined that plaintiff failed to demonstrate direct causation or measurable damages as a result of defendant’s negligent advice. On appeal, plaintiff challenges the court’s legal conclusions and contends that the court’s factual findings established both causation and damages. The Vermont Supreme Court agreed with plaintiff, and reversed. View "Sachs v. Downs Rachlin Martin, PLLC" on Justia Law

This contempt proceeding arose from the failure of Petitioner, the birth father’s counsel in a youth in need of care proceeding, to appear at a termination of parental rights hearing before the Honorable Gregory G. Pinski. After Judge Pinski issued the order of contempt, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of review, arguing that the contempt hearing was criminal in nature and that she was not afforded due process. The Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s petition for a writ of review, holding (1) the district court had jurisdiction of these contempt proceedings pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. 3-1-511; and (2) substantial evidence supported the order of contempt. View "Cross Guns v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

Family Code section 271 does not authorize the court to award sanctions to non-parties, but rather is intended to promote settlement of family law litigation through shifting fees between the parties to the litigation. In this case, the Court of Appeal agreed that the trial court was without authority to award sanctions to respondents because they were not parties to this action. The court reasoned that sanctions may not be awarded under section 271 to a party's attorney when it was that attorney who was requesting the sanctions for the sole benefit of the attorney. Accordingly, the court reversed the order for sanctions. View "Webb v. Webb" on Justia Law

Rachelle and Charles Black were married for nearly 20 years and had three sons. They raised their children in a conservative Christian church and sent them to private, Christian schools. In 2011, Rachelle told Charles that she was lesbian, and the parties divorces shortly thereafter. In the order of dissolution, the trial court designated Charles as the primary residential parent. The final parenting plan also awarded Charles sole decision-making authority regarding the children's education and religious upbringing. The record showed that the trial court considered Rachelle's sexual orientation as a factor when it fashioned the final parenting plan. Furthermore, the Supreme Court found improper bias influenced the proceedings. “This bias casts doubt on the trial court's entire ruling, and we are not confident the trial court ensured a fair proceeding by maintaining a neutral attitude regarding Rachelle's sexual orientation. Accordingly, we reverse.” View "In re Marriage of Black" on Justia Law

The parties married in 1992 and divorced in 2005. During their ongoing “litigation war” the court granted husband Family Code section 2711 sanctions of $767,781.23, including: $500,000 for wife’s “relentless and culpable conduct” in “driv[ing] up the cost of the litigation” and “purposefully frustrat[ing]" the settlement; $180,000 for causing a reduction in the sale price of property awarded to husband in the dissolution judgment; and $45,000 in interest on husband’s attorney fees. The court also awarded husband $28,510 in rents and security deposits that wife received on properties awarded to husband in the dissolution judgment. The court of appeal reversed in part. Section 271 sanctions are limited to “attorney’s fees and costs” so the court erred by imposing sanctions for conduct in increasing the cost of the litigation and frustrating settlement and for causing a reduction in the sale price of real property. The court otherwise affirmed, rejecting wife’s arguments that the court erred by granting the rents motion; the court violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (42 U.S.C. 12101) by denying her requests for accommodation and holding a motion hearing in her absence; and that husband was not entitled to attorney fees because he used the services of an attorney who previously represented wife. View "Sagonowsky v. Kekoa" on Justia Law

After the Court of Appeals of Maryland suspended Michael Tankersley’s law license when he refused to provide his social security number to the Client Protection Fund of the Bar of Maryland, Tankersley filed suit against the trustees of the Fund, and the judges and the clerk of the Court of Appeals. Tankersley filed suit against these defendants in their official capacities, seeking injunctive relief based on his claim that his suspension violated the federal Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. 552a. The district court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss. Both the Tax Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. 405(c)(2)(C)(i), and the Welfare Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. 666(a)(13)(A), allow states to collect individuals’ social security numbers in specific situations. The court held that the district court erred in relying on section 666 of the Welfare Reform Act to dismiss Tankersley’s complaint. In this case, the court agreed with Tankersley that “applicant” cannot properly be read to include a Maryland attorney who must pay an annual fee to maintain his license. However, the court concluded that section 405 of the Tax Reform Act applies to Tankersley, and the state of Maryland may lawfully compel him to provide his social security number to the Fund or consequently have his law license suspended. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Tankersley v. Almand" on Justia Law

Tracy and Jose married in 1996. They later separated. Tracy filed a petition for dissolution in 2011. In 2012, the superior court ordered temporary spousal support. The parties decided not to further litigate the case in the superior court and stipulated to the appointment of attorney Perkovich as judge pro tempore, under California Rules of Court 2.830-2.834. After Perkovich had served for two years, Tracy learned that Perkovich had not disclosed “in writing or on the record” professional relationships she had with lawyers in the proceeding, as required by the Rules. Tracy filed in the superior court a statement seeking disqualification. Perkovich failed to respond in accordance with statutory procedure. The presiding judge ordered her disqualified, holding that she was deemed to have consented to disqualification by her failure to file a consent or verified answer. The case was reassigned; discovery proceeded. The court delayed a hearing on Tracy’s motion to set aside orders made by Perkovich. The court of appeal held that Perkovich’s failure to contest the claims means that those factual allegations must be taken as true and that she was automatically disqualified. Her rulings are all void; the settlement agreement signed before her disqualification was tainted and may not be enforced. Perkovich’s conduct did not taint the proceedings before the superior court judge who replaced her. View "Hayward v. Super Court" on Justia Law

After respondent received a judgment for child support arrears and penalties against appellant in Nevada, as well as an award of attorney fees, appellant appealed the order. Under NRS 125.040(1)(c), a district court has discretion in a divorce suit to require one party to pay an amount of money necessary to assist the other party in carrying on or defending the suit. The court held that a district court has jurisdiction to award attorney fees pendente lite for the costs of an appeal pursuant to NRS 125.040. In this case, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding such fees. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's order. View "Griffith v. Gonzales-Alpizar" on Justia Law

In order to avoid foreclosure, Wife sold the marital home to Lawyer, who already had a junior lien on the property in the form of a family law attorney's real property lien. On appeal, Wife challenged the superior court's order disqualifying Lawyer from representing her in divorce proceedings with Husband. Husband argues that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in disqualifying Lawyer because Lawyer violated California State Bar Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3-300, which prohibits lawyers from entering into unfair business agreements with their clients. The court concluded that the trial court erred in disqualifying Lawyer on Husband’s motion because Husband had no standing where he has no personal stake; regardless of Husband's standing, the court saw no continuing effect Lawyer’s alleged misconduct will have on the subsequent proceedings and concluded that no grounds otherwise support disqualifying Lawyer; and therefore, the court reversed the judgment. View "Murchison v. Murchison" on Justia Law