Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

The case involves Rudolph Amador, who was convicted of two counts of criminal sexual contact of a minor and one count of child abuse. The charges stemmed from allegations that Amador sexually abused his friend's eleven-year-old daughter. After the initial trial, the district court ordered a new trial due to prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance of counsel. However, the court denied Amador's argument that the retrial was barred. Amador was retried and convicted on all three counts.Amador appealed to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the retrial was barred by double jeopardy and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court of Appeals rejected Amador's arguments and affirmed his convictions. Amador then petitioned for a writ of certiorari on both issues to the Supreme Court of the State of New Mexico.The Supreme Court of the State of New Mexico reversed the Court of Appeals' decision. The court held that Amador's second trial was barred by double jeopardy under Article II, Section 15 of the New Mexico Constitution. The court found that the prosecutor's misconduct, which included misrepresenting Amador's conditional discharge as a felony conviction and repeatedly referring to Amador as a pedophile during closing arguments, demonstrated a willful disregard of the resulting mistrial. The court remanded the case to the district court to vacate Amador's convictions and discharge him from any further prosecution in this matter. View "State v. Amador" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Justin Lee Camperud, who was accused of sexually abusing a child in 2016. The child's mother reported the incident to the Fargo police department in July 2021. The child was later interviewed by the Red River Children's Advocacy Center, a non-governmental organization. In October 2021, Dr. Anna Schimmelpfennig, the director of mental health services at the Center, participated in a mental health assessment for the child. The State notified Camperud in November 2022 that it intended to call Schimmelpfennig as an expert witness. However, the State failed to disclose that Schimmelpfennig was married to a Cass County Assistant State’s Attorney and that she had participated in the child's mental health assessment.The case was initially heard in the District Court of Cass County, East Central Judicial District. On the day before the trial was to start, Camperud learned about Schimmelpfennig's marriage and her participation in the child's assessment. He moved to exclude Schimmelpfennig’s testimony due to the State's failure to provide him with this information. The district court allowed Camperud to question Schimmelpfennig about her relationship with the Assistant State’s Attorney and her involvement in the child's assessment. The court also delayed the start of the trial by a day. Despite Camperud's attempts to impeach Schimmelpfennig over her marriage, a jury found him guilty of gross sexual imposition.The case was then reviewed by the Supreme Court of North Dakota. Camperud argued that the district court abused its discretion by not granting a continuance after he and the court learned about the undisclosed evidence. The Supreme Court acknowledged that the State had committed discovery violations. However, it ruled that the district court had chosen the least severe sanctions to rectify the non-disclosure, including requiring the production of the assessment, limiting the expert’s testimony, permitting two voir dire sessions of the expert, and delaying the start of trial. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that it did not abuse its discretion by denying Camperud’s motion for a continuance. View "State v. Camperud" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed a case involving Kevin Dowling, who was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. Dowling was initially charged with robbery, indecent assault, and attempted rape of Jennifer Myers, who identified him as her assailant. Two days before his trial, Myers was found dead in her art gallery. Dowling was subsequently charged with her murder. At trial, the prosecution argued that Dowling killed Myers to prevent her from testifying against him. The prosecution presented evidence including a video of Dowling’s fabricated alibi, a letter in which he confessed to attacking Myers, and testimony from several witnesses. Dowling was convicted and sentenced to death.Dowling later filed a petition under the Post Conviction Relief Act, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate the accuracy of a receipt from a store where a witness claimed to have seen him on the day of the murder. He also claimed that the prosecution violated his due process rights by not disclosing cash register journals from the store, which would have shown that the time on the receipt was correct. The PCRA court granted Dowling a new trial, but the Commonwealth appealed.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed the PCRA court's decision, concluding that Dowling failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability that the outcome of his trial would have been different had his counsel conducted further investigation or had the prosecution disclosed the register journals. The court also found that the false testimony of a police officer about the time on the receipt could not have affected the judgment of the jury, given the substantial independent evidence incriminating Dowling in Myers’ murder. View "Commonwealth v. Dowling" on Justia Law

The case involves Christopher Vargas Zayas, who was convicted for malice murder and a related crime in connection with the shooting death of his girlfriend, Carly Andrews. The shooting occurred in September 2018, and Zayas was indicted for multiple charges, including malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, family violence, possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, and three counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Zayas was found guilty on all five counts and sentenced to life in prison with the possibility of parole. He filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied by the trial court.Zayas appealed his convictions, arguing that the circumstantial evidence at trial was insufficient to exclude the alternative hypothesis that the pistol discharged accidentally as Andrews grabbed it. He also argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress statements he made to investigators at the police station before he received Miranda warnings. The Supreme Court of Georgia, however, affirmed the convictions, concluding that the circumstantial evidence authorized the jury to reject Zayas's alternative hypothesis as unreasonable, that trial counsel was not deficient for failing to seek to suppress Zayas's statements, and that Zayas suffered no prejudice from any instructional error. View "ZAYAS v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

The case involves Clark Ryan Ramsey, an attorney who represented Justin Kalina in a felony assault case. Jessica Foote, a witness in the assault case, was investigated for alleged theft from Kalina's Uber Eats account, but no charges were brought against her. Ramsey sought information from the prosecutor in the assault case that had been gathered in the theft investigation, which he believed could be used to impeach Foote. He submitted a modified form to the Yellowstone County Sheriff’s Office (YCSO) requesting copies of the Confidential Criminal Justice Information (CCJI) in the theft case, noting he sought copies of CCJI regarding Foote. The YCSO disseminated the CCJI to Ramsey.The State filed a motion in the Justice Court, seeking to charge Ramsey with misdemeanor forgery and misdemeanor solicitation of the misuse of confidential criminal justice information, stemming from Ramsey’s submission of the form to the YCSO and subsequent receipt of CCJI from that agency. Ramsey filed a Motion to Dismiss, asserting the matter must be dismissed due to a lack of probable cause because, as a matter of law, the State could not prove the elements of forgery or solicitation. The Justice Court denied Ramsey’s motion to dismiss.Ramsey then petitioned the Supreme Court of the State of Montana for a writ of supervisory control directing the Yellowstone County Justice Court to reverse its order denying Ramsey’s motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court found that there was not probable cause to believe Ramsey committed either offense charged in this case and the Justice Court should not have granted the State’s motion for leave to file a complaint. The Supreme Court accepted and granted Ramsey’s petition, reversed the Justice Court’s finding of probable cause and accompanying order allowing filing of amended complaint, and remanded the matter to the Justice Court with instructions to dismiss. View "Ramsey v. Yellowstone County Justice Court" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Khalil Jamandre Sanders, who was charged with first-degree assault, illegal discharge of a firearm, menacing, possession of a weapon by a previous offender, and two counts of violence after shooting and injuring Jamie Vasquez during a road-rage incident. Sanders requested the presiding judge to recuse herself from the case, arguing that she had experienced a similar incident of criminal conduct, which could potentially bias her judgment. The trial court denied Sanders's motions, and the case proceeded to trial, resulting in Sanders's conviction.The Colorado Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's decision, concluding that the trial judge's recusal was not required under the Due Process Clauses of the United States and Colorado Constitutions, section 16-6-201(1)(d), C.R.S. (2023), and Crim. P. 21(b), or the Colorado Code of Judicial Conduct (“C.J.C.”) 2.11. The division determined that disqualification was not necessary because Sanders failed to demonstrate actual bias on the part of the judge.The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado affirmed the division's judgment but on somewhat different grounds. The court concluded that the division applied too strict a standard by requiring a showing of actual bias to support a disqualification motion. However, the court agreed that disqualification was not warranted on the facts of this case. The court also concluded that Sanders had not established an appearance of partiality that might have required the trial court to recuse itself under C.J.C. 2.11(A). View "Sanders v. The People of the State of Colorado" on Justia Law

The defendant, Otho Harris, visited a Boost Mobile store for assistance with his broken cellphone. When told it could not be repaired, he became enraged and later set fire to the store, causing extensive damage. Harris was charged with arson and, after difficult relationships with three different appointed attorneys, he chose to represent himself and eventually pleaded guilty. He was sentenced to eight years in prison and ordered to pay $195,701 in restitution.The case moved slowly due to Harris's disagreements with his appointed counsel. After the third appointed lawyer moved to withdraw, Harris decided to represent himself. He filed numerous pretrial motions and requests with the court. A few weeks before the scheduled trial date, he agreed to plead guilty and signed a written plea agreement with the government. The judge accepted his guilty plea and set the case for sentencing.On appeal, Harris challenged only the restitution order, arguing that it was not supported by a proper investigation and determination of the loss amount. However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found that Harris had waived his right to challenge the restitution order by expressly affirming the accuracy of the factual material in the presentence report at the sentencing hearing. The court noted that Harris had ample notice of the restitution amount, the factual basis for it, and an opportunity to object. He did not object; on the contrary, he affirmed that he was satisfied with the accuracy of the factual material in the presentence report. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Harris" on Justia Law

In 2022, Walter D. Giese was charged with cyberstalking and making harassing phone calls to Sharon Griffin, the county manager for Onslow County, North Carolina. Giese moved to disqualify District Attorney Ernie Lee and his staff from prosecuting him, arguing that Griffin's role as county manager, which included overseeing the county's facilities and public services and proposing the county budget, created a conflict of interest. Giese contended that the prosecutors had a "self-interest" in appeasing Griffin, which could influence their decision-making in his case. The district court agreed and barred the Fifth Prosecutorial District from handling the case. The State challenged this decision, but the superior court upheld the disqualification order, finding a conflict of interest.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the superior court's order and vacated it, finding that the lower courts had erred in disqualifying the entire Fifth Prosecutorial District without finding an actual conflict of interest. The court clarified that an actual conflict of interest exists when the prosecution, by virtue of a prior attorney-client relationship, obtains confidential information that has been or is likely to be used to the detriment of the defendant. The court found that this was not the case here, as there was no evidence to suggest that anyone in the Fifth Prosecutorial District had ever represented Giese or obtained confidential information that could be used against him. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "State v. Giese" on Justia Law

In October 2016, 65-year-old David Pena was assaulted by a stranger on the street. Pena, who did not see his attacker's face during the assault, later identified Mark Watkins as the assailant. Watkins was subsequently convicted of assault in the first degree, assault in the second degree, and criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree. The only identification evidence presented at trial was Pena's testimony, who identified Watkins as his attacker and the person depicted in surveillance footage of the attack. The surveillance video, however, was too blurry to clearly depict the assailant's face.Watkins appealed his conviction, arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a cross-racial identification instruction. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, holding that Watkins' ineffective assistance of counsel claim was unreviewable on direct appeal because it involved matters not fully explained by the record. The panel also concluded that Watkins received effective assistance under the state and federal standards because he had not shown that it was objectively unreasonable for counsel to refrain from requesting a jury charge on cross-racial identification.The Court of Appeals of New York affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that at the time of Watkins' trial in July 2017, there was no clear entitlement to a cross-racial identification charge. The court noted that while a cross-racial identification charge had been recommended by both the American Bar Association and the New York State Justice Task Force, the court's precedent had long vested the trial court with discretion over the content of an eyewitness identification charge. Therefore, the court concluded that the decision to forgo a request for the cross-racial identification charge was not the kind of "egregious" single error that rises to the level of ineffective assistance. View "People v Watkins" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Alvin Brown, who pleaded guilty to two counts of endangerment of a child. After serving his sentence, he was put on probation. However, the State filed a petition to revoke his probation after he violated its terms. The court ordered Brown to wear an alcohol SCRAM bracelet and remain in custody at the Lake Region Law Enforcement Center until a spot was available at a halfway house. Brown was warned that leaving the halfway house would be considered an escape, which would result in additional charges. Despite these warnings, Brown absconded from the Center and was subsequently charged with escape, to which he pleaded guilty.Brown later filed a petition for postconviction relief, arguing that his conviction was invalid and his trial attorney was ineffective. He claimed that he was not in official detention when he left the Center, and therefore, the State could not charge him with escape. The district court denied his petition, finding that Brown was indeed in official detention and that he failed to establish the second prong of the Strickland test, which requires showing a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the district court's decision. The court found no error in the lower court's determination that Brown was in official detention when he left the Center. It also agreed with the lower court's finding that Brown did not meet the second prong of the Strickland test. The court concluded that Brown's arguments were either unnecessary for the decision or without merit. View "Brown v. State" on Justia Law