Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

Shane Clark Johnson was charged with deliberate homicide in 2013 for the death of his brother, Travis. The jury could not reach a verdict on deliberate homicide but convicted Johnson of negligent homicide with a dangerous weapon. On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial. The State again charged Johnson with deliberate homicide but amended the charge to negligent homicide after Johnson filed a motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds. The second jury found Johnson guilty of felony negligent homicide and that he used a weapon in the commission of the offense.In the first trial, Judge Daniel Boucher allowed Johnson to present a defense of justifiable use of force, but limited evidence about Travis’s violent behavior and other specific acts. Johnson testified that Travis attacked him, leading to a struggle over a gun, which resulted in Travis’s death. The jury convicted Johnson of negligent homicide. On remand, Judge Matthew J. Cuffe presided over the second trial. Johnson did not present a self-defense theory but argued the shooting was accidental. The prosecutor’s closing arguments included comments on the State’s charging decisions and the lack of evidence that Travis was suicidal, which Johnson’s counsel did not object to at trial.The Montana Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the conviction. The court found that the prosecutor’s comments were permissible and did not warrant a mistrial. The court also declined to exercise plain-error review for the unobjected comments about the State’s charging decisions. Johnson’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims were deemed not record-based and more appropriate for postconviction relief. The court held that the District Court legally imposed a consecutive weapon enhancement sentence in addition to the persistent felony offender sentence. View "State v. Johnson" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted by a jury in the Allegan Circuit Court of multiple counts of criminal sexual conduct. During the trial, the presiding judge exchanged emails with the county prosecutor, expressing concerns about the police investigation. The defendant later discovered these communications and moved for a new trial, alleging judicial and prosecutorial misconduct, and ineffective assistance of counsel. The case was reassigned to a different judge, who granted the motion for a new trial due to the appearance of impropriety created by the emails. The prosecution appealed this decision.The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, holding that the trial court had abused its discretion in granting a new trial. The appellate court concluded that the trial judge's ex parte communications were permissible for administrative purposes under the judicial conduct code and did not influence the jury's verdict. The defendant then sought leave to appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court.The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the trial judge's ex parte communications violated the Michigan Code of Judicial Conduct. The court found that these communications were not for administrative purposes and created an appearance of impropriety. However, the court concluded that the communications did not show actual bias or a high probability of bias that would violate the defendant's constitutional rights. The court also determined that the trial judge's failure to recuse herself did not result in a miscarriage of justice, as the jury was unaware of the communications and the trial prosecutor did not alter her strategy in response to them. Therefore, the court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision, holding that the trial court had no legal basis to grant a new trial. View "People of Michigan v. Loew" on Justia Law

Marcellus Williams was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death following a jury trial. His conviction and sentence were affirmed by the Supreme Court of Missouri, and his postconviction relief was denied. Williams sought additional DNA testing through a habeas corpus petition, which led to a temporary stay of execution and the appointment of a special master to oversee the testing. The results did not demonstrate his innocence, and his habeas petition was denied. Subsequent petitions for writs of habeas corpus and declaratory judgment were also denied.The St. Louis County prosecutor filed a motion to vacate Williams' conviction and death sentence, citing potential actual innocence based on DNA evidence, ineffective assistance of counsel, and racial discrimination in jury selection. This motion remains pending in the circuit court. Despite this, the Supreme Court of Missouri issued a warrant of execution for Williams, setting a new execution date.The Supreme Court of Missouri reviewed Williams' motion to withdraw the warrant of execution, arguing that the prosecutor's motion constituted a state postconviction motion, which should bar setting an execution date. The court found that Rule 30.30(c) only refers to postconviction motions filed by the defendant, not the prosecutor. Since Williams had already exhausted his state postconviction remedies, the court held that the execution date was properly set. The court also noted that the pending prosecutor's motion did not automatically warrant a stay of execution and that Williams had not demonstrated the necessary factors for equitable relief. Consequently, the court overruled Williams' motion to withdraw the warrant of execution. View "State v. Williams" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of first-degree murder for the stabbing death of Jordan Baskin. After his conviction, the defendant filed a motion for a new trial, claiming his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance during a police interview where incriminating evidence was obtained. The defendant argued that his trial counsel failed to provide effective representation and had a conflict of interest because filing a motion to suppress the evidence would have been against her own interests.The Superior Court judge allowed the motion for a new trial, finding that the trial counsel had an actual conflict of interest and that the defendant did not waive this conflict knowingly and intelligently. The judge concluded that the conflict alone warranted a new trial without needing to show additional prejudice.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that the trial counsel's personal interests materially interfered with her independent professional judgment, creating an actual conflict of interest. This conflict arose because the trial counsel's performance during the police interview was in question, and she could not provide detached advice or pursue a motion to suppress the evidence obtained during the interview zealously. The court also determined that the defendant did not validly waive this conflict, as the colloquies before trial did not address the specific conflict related to the adequacy of counsel's performance at the police interview. Therefore, the court affirmed the order for a new trial. View "Commonwealth v. Brown" on Justia Law

Anthony D. Lee, Sr. was convicted of aggravated kidnapping and aggravated sexual assault in 1996 and sentenced to 100 years in prison. Lee's defense was that the victim had voluntarily entered his car and that any sexual activity was consensual. He later sought postconviction relief, arguing that his attorney, Richard Friedman, had failed to interview several potential witnesses who could have corroborated his testimony. Lee supported his motion with six affidavits from these potential witnesses. The trial court denied Lee's ineffective-assistance claim, and the Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the decision.Lee then sought relief in federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The district court denied his petition, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit disagreed with the lower courts' decisions. The appellate court found that the state court had based its prejudice analysis on the flawed assumption that each witness would have merely repeated their affidavits and refused to say another word if called to testify. The appellate court vacated and remanded the case to the district court to hold an evidentiary hearing on Lee's claim.After a three-day hearing, the district court again denied Lee's § 2254 petition. The court concluded that Lee failed to establish that Friedman's performance fell below an objective standard of professional competence. Alternatively, the court concluded that any errors Friedman might have committed did not meaningfully compromise Lee's defense given the strength of the state's case. Lee appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court found that Lee failed to demonstrate a "reasonable probability" that the result of his trial would have been different had Friedman not committed professional errors. The court noted that none of the affidavits provided an explanation for the severity of the victim's injuries, and that the additional testimony from the witnesses may have ultimately weakened Lee's defense by contradicting his testimony or their own affidavits. View "Lee v. Galloway" on Justia Law

Mark Andrew Belyeu was charged with five offenses related to sexual exploitation of a minor. He initially pled guilty to two of the charges, but later withdrew his pleas. After a change of counsel, Belyeu again pled guilty to the same two charges. The court found his guilty pleas were knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently given. Belyeu was subsequently sentenced and judgment was entered.Belyeu filed a petition for postconviction relief, alleging that his guilty pleas were not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently given due to ineffective assistance of his trial counsel and the existence of newly discovered evidence. The district court dismissed Belyeu’s claims of actual innocence and his sentence not being authorized by law, and limited the evidentiary hearing to the remaining two claims. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied Belyeu’s petition for postconviction relief.The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that Belyeu failed to show that his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. The court also found that Belyeu failed to show that but for his counsel's alleged errors, he would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Furthermore, the court found that Belyeu did not meet his burden to show newly discovered evidence. Therefore, the court concluded that Belyeu could not show a manifest injustice based on the advice of his counsel or the existence of newly discovered evidence. View "Belyeu v. State" on Justia Law

The case involves Miguel Tebalan Rivera who was convicted of second-degree murder and commission of a crime of violence while in possession of a knife with a blade longer than three inches. Rivera filed an application for postconviction relief, arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to advise him that if he did not testify, he would be convicted of second-degree murder.The trial court granted Rivera's application for postconviction relief, finding that his trial counsel's performance was deficient and that this deficiency prejudiced Rivera's defense. The court found that Rivera's trial counsel failed to advise him that if he did not testify, he would be convicted of second-degree murder. The court also found that Rivera's trial counsel failed to recognize and explain to Rivera that if he did not testify, he would be waiving his right to present his claim of self-defense.The State of Rhode Island appealed the trial court's decision, arguing that the trial court erred in finding that Rivera's trial counsel was ineffective. The Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that Rivera's trial counsel's performance was deficient and that this deficiency prejudiced Rivera's defense. The court found that Rivera's trial counsel failed to advise him that if he did not testify, he would be convicted of second-degree murder. The court also found that Rivera's trial counsel failed to recognize and explain to Rivera that if he did not testify, he would be waiving his right to present his claim of self-defense. View "Rivera v. State of Rhode Island" on Justia Law

In 2018, Brian Hollis pleaded guilty to one count of lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen and four counts of sexual exploitation of a child. He also admitted to being a repeat sexual offender, which mandates a fifteen-year minimum term of confinement. The district court imposed an indeterminate life sentence with twenty-five years determinate on the lewd conduct charge and concurrent determinate sentences of fifteen years for each of the sexual exploitation charges. Hollis appealed his conviction and sentence, but the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed them.Hollis then filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The district court appointed the Kootenai County Public Defender to represent him. However, Hollis' conflict counsel filed a motion to withdraw, stating that he was no longer able to "ethically or effectively represent" Hollis due to statements made by the district court judge against conflict counsel in a similar post-conviction case. The district court denied the motion to withdraw and the motion to continue the summary disposition hearing. The district court subsequently granted the State’s motion for summary disposition, holding that Hollis had not supported any of his claims with any admissible evidence.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho vacated the judgment of the district court, reversed the decisions on the motion to continue and motion to withdraw, vacated the decision granting summary disposition to the State, and remanded for further proceedings. The court held that the district court abused its discretion in denying the motion to withdraw and the motion to continue. The court also ordered the assignment of a new district court judge on remand. View "Hollis v. State" on Justia Law

The defendant, Charles Geoffrey Santoro, was convicted of negligent homicide after a retrial. The case stemmed from an incident at a bar where Santoro and another patron, Levi, had a confrontation. Santoro claimed that Levi choked him, leading him to reverse his truck in an attempt to escape, which resulted in Levi being run over and killed.In the first trial, Santoro was convicted and sentenced to 20 years in prison, with five years suspended and no parole restriction. However, this conviction was reversed by the Supreme Court of the State of Montana due to ineffective assistance of counsel.In the retrial, the District Court granted the State's motion to exclude expert testimony on the effects of strangulation, which had been admitted in the first trial. Santoro was again convicted and this time sentenced to 20 years in prison with a full 20-year parole restriction.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana found that the District Court abused its discretion by excluding the expert testimony on strangulation. The court held that this testimony was relevant and could have assisted the jury in determining whether Santoro's actions were a "gross deviation" from that of a reasonable person in Santoro's situation. The court also found that the State's enhanced sentencing recommendation after retrial was vindictive and that the District Court erred by failing to allow Santoro the opportunity to speak prior to sentencing. The court reversed the conviction and remanded the case for a new trial. View "State v. Santoro" on Justia Law

Willie Slocum, Jr. appealed the denial of his motion to correct, vacate, or set aside his convictions and sentences based on ineffective assistance of counsel. Slocum was indicted on two counts of drug conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. § 846, but argued that the two charged conspiracies were actually one. He claimed that he was punished twice for the same conspiracy in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause, and that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to raise a double jeopardy challenge before the trial court. The district court denied his motion without ordering a response from the government or holding an evidentiary hearing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found that the district court erred in its decision. The appellate court determined that Slocum was indeed punished twice for a single conspiracy in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause. However, the court noted that it was unclear whether trial counsel had a strategic reason for failing to raise a double jeopardy challenge. The court concluded that Slocum was entitled to an evidentiary hearing under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b) where the performance of his trial counsel could be assessed. Therefore, the court vacated the district court’s denial of Slocum’s § 2255 motion and remanded for an evidentiary hearing on Slocum’s ineffective assistance claim. View "United States v. Slocum" on Justia Law