Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

Defendant, convicted under 18 U.S.C. 371 of conspiracy to defraud the United States while serving as in-house general counsel to the company involving the company's filing of false tax returns with the IRS. He was sentenced to 41 months of imprisonment, followed by three years of supervised release, and ordered to pay restitution to the IRS. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The jury instructions adequately addressed the elements of conspiracy. There was no need for mention of the attorney-client privilege or of an attorney's potential obligation to report illegal activity. The government’s theory of liability was not dependent on whether defendant had an affirmative duty to inform, yet failed to do so; conviction did not turn on whether defendant's actions were governed by the attorney-client privilege. There was sufficient evidence to support the conviction.

Petitioner was convicted of drug and firearm offenses in Michigan state court based on her presence in a house where the drugs were found. She did not own the house and claimed that she did not know the drugs were there. Her lawyer, high on cocaine for much of the time he represented her, never interviewed any of the other people in the house or called them as witnesses. The district court rejected a habeas corpus petition as untimely. The Sixth Circuit remanded. The one-year limitations period on habeas applications by state prisoners, 28 U.S.C. 2244, includes an exception: when a prisoner files an original petition within the one-year deadline, and later presents new claims in an amended petition filed after the deadline passes, the new claims relate back to the date of the original petition if the new claims share a common core of operative facts. Petitioner failed to present the claim in state court and, therefore, has not exhausted remedies, and the district court must decide whether to hold the claim in abeyance.

After Dimitri Henley was convicted of five counts of second degree sexual assault, Henley made several attempts to seek a new trial. Henley also moved Justice Roggensack to recuse herself from the review of his case. Roggensack denied the motion. The current appeal involved a motion for reconsideration of the Supreme Court's decision reversing the circuit court's order granting Henley a new trial. Henley argued that by denying him a new trial and by providing no court procedures for reviewing Justice Roggensack's decision not to recuse, the Court denied Henley's right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court held (1) the motion for reconsideration met none of the criteria for granting a motion for reconsideration and was therefore denied; (2) determining whether to recuse is the sole responsibility of the individual justice for whom disqualification from participation is sought; (3) a majority of the Court does not have the power to disqualify a judicial peer from performing the constitutional functions of a Supreme Court justice on a case-by-case basis; and (4) Henley received due process.

Petitioner, an attorney appointed under the Criminal Justice Act (CJA), 18 U.S.C. 3006A, appealed from various orders of the district court, asking the district court to reimburse her for various extrajudicial activities undertaken "to delay and prevent" the execution of a Missouri convicted murderer. The court held that the CJA did not confer jurisdiction on a circuit chief judge to review a district court's reduction of a CJA voucher and therefore, petitioner's request for such review was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Charged with conspiracy to possess and distribute at least five kilograms of cocaine and at least fifty grams of crack cocaine (21 U.S.C. 841), and for possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense (18 U.S.C. 924), defendant retained private counsel. After receiving notice of a potential conflict of interests based on the possibility that the attorney could be called as a witness with respect to how he received payment, the court disqualified the attorney and appointed counsel. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment on the cocaine offenses and to 60 months for the firearm. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting a Sixth Amendment claim. The disqualification of counsel was not plain error. The prosecutor's closing argument did not amount to an impermissible "once a drug dealer always a drug dealer" statement, but simply questioned the defendant's credibility and character.

After a violation report was filed against defendant Ramondo Howard alleging defendant had violated the terms and conditions of his probation, defendant filed a pro se motion indicating that he wished to release his attorney and wanted new counsel to be appointed, confirming on the record he had filed a complaint against his attorney with the court's disciplinary board. The hearing justice excused defendant's attorney. Defendant then filed motions to recuse and change venues, both of which the hearing justice denied. At the violation hearing, the hearing justice found defendant to be a violator of the terms and conditions of his probation. Before the hearing began, however, the hearing justice expressed his belief that defendant needed to be "warehoused" and was "beyond rehabilitation." Defendant appealed, arguing the hearing justice erred by failing to recuse himself from the case because the justice lacked the objectivity and impartiality to fairly hear and render judgment. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that because the hearing justice chose to express his opinions prior to the commencement of the violation hearing, the justice displayed a clear inability to render fair judgment and erred by declining to recuse under the circumstances. Remanded.

Barbara Roberts sued Steve Lanier and his firm Steve Lanier, PC, and Rodney Stallings and his firm Coggin & Stallings, LLC. In 2006, Ms. Roberts was arrested on murder charges and sent to the Cherokee County jail. She contacted Attorney Lanier, who then met with her and agreed to represent her in her criminal proceedings. The contract between them provided that Ms. Roberts would pay a "nonrefundable retainer" of $50,000. At that time, Ms. Roberts executed a power-of-attorney authorizing Mr. Lanier to withdraw the retainer from her bank accounts. Ms. Roberts testified at trial that she first learned that Mr. Lanier was not licensed to practice law in Alabama when she appeared for her first hearing at the district court. It was then that she was introduced to Mr. Stallings, who "associated" on her case. Seeing no need for two lawyers, she tried to terminate Mr. Lanier's representation. Mr. Stallings eventually managed Ms. Roberts' case, having all her mail sent to his office so that he could "oversee every aspect" of her personal life, including payment of all outstanding bills and expenses. Ms. Roberts alleged that instead of using her money for the purposes she intended, Mr. Stallings misappropriated approximately $100,000 of her funds. Ms. Roberts was eventually convicted of capital murder and sentenced to life without parole. She later learned that the "nonrefundable retainer" language in her contract with Mr. Lanier was unenforceable under Alabama law, and sued her former lawyers for legal malpractice. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the lawyers. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the lawyers only with respect to employment contract and the "nonrefundable retainer" and the misappropriation of Ms. Roberts' money for expenses while she awaited trial. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings.

Plaintiff sued defendant, a county judge in Mississippi, under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for allegedly causing plaintiff to be prosecuted without probable cause. At issue was whether the district court properly denied defendant's motion, concluding that genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment. The court held that defendant was entitled to qualified immunity where the district court did not explain the constitutional right that he had purportedly violated and, under the circumstances of the case, plaintiff had not shown that defendant's actions tainted the deliberations of the magistrate who issued the arrest warrant or the grand jury that returned the indictment. The court also held that, because the appeal was resolved on grounds of qualified immunity, the court need not address whether defendant was entitled to judicial immunity. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's denial of summary judgment.

In a memorandum opinion, the court addressed whether defense counsel gave implied consent to a mistrial. The court held that there was ample basis on the record for the trial court to conclude that defendants agreed that a mistrial on the undecided charges was the appropriate course of action. The court also held that, because it found no basis to disturb the Appellate Division's factual finding of implied consent, it had no occasion to address the People's alternative argument that there was manifest necessity for the mistrial.

The district court denied a petition for habeas corpus by an inmate serving 40 years for attempted murder and aggravated battery on a senior citizen and certified three issues as appealable. The Seventh Circuit clarified the obligation of appointed appellate counsel. Counsel has no obligation to argue claims, urged by the client, that were not certified as appealable, but could request amendment of the certificate if the claims are debatable. If counsel regards certified issues as frivolous those issues need not be argued and counsel should inform the court. Because prisoners do not have a right to appointed counsel on collateral claims there is no tension between the constitutional right to representation and the ethical obligation to not advance frivolous claims.