Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

After a violation report was filed against defendant Ramondo Howard alleging defendant had violated the terms and conditions of his probation, defendant filed a pro se motion indicating that he wished to release his attorney and wanted new counsel to be appointed, confirming on the record he had filed a complaint against his attorney with the court's disciplinary board. The hearing justice excused defendant's attorney. Defendant then filed motions to recuse and change venues, both of which the hearing justice denied. At the violation hearing, the hearing justice found defendant to be a violator of the terms and conditions of his probation. Before the hearing began, however, the hearing justice expressed his belief that defendant needed to be "warehoused" and was "beyond rehabilitation." Defendant appealed, arguing the hearing justice erred by failing to recuse himself from the case because the justice lacked the objectivity and impartiality to fairly hear and render judgment. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that because the hearing justice chose to express his opinions prior to the commencement of the violation hearing, the justice displayed a clear inability to render fair judgment and erred by declining to recuse under the circumstances. Remanded.

Barbara Roberts sued Steve Lanier and his firm Steve Lanier, PC, and Rodney Stallings and his firm Coggin & Stallings, LLC. In 2006, Ms. Roberts was arrested on murder charges and sent to the Cherokee County jail. She contacted Attorney Lanier, who then met with her and agreed to represent her in her criminal proceedings. The contract between them provided that Ms. Roberts would pay a "nonrefundable retainer" of $50,000. At that time, Ms. Roberts executed a power-of-attorney authorizing Mr. Lanier to withdraw the retainer from her bank accounts. Ms. Roberts testified at trial that she first learned that Mr. Lanier was not licensed to practice law in Alabama when she appeared for her first hearing at the district court. It was then that she was introduced to Mr. Stallings, who "associated" on her case. Seeing no need for two lawyers, she tried to terminate Mr. Lanier's representation. Mr. Stallings eventually managed Ms. Roberts' case, having all her mail sent to his office so that he could "oversee every aspect" of her personal life, including payment of all outstanding bills and expenses. Ms. Roberts alleged that instead of using her money for the purposes she intended, Mr. Stallings misappropriated approximately $100,000 of her funds. Ms. Roberts was eventually convicted of capital murder and sentenced to life without parole. She later learned that the "nonrefundable retainer" language in her contract with Mr. Lanier was unenforceable under Alabama law, and sued her former lawyers for legal malpractice. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the lawyers. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the lawyers only with respect to employment contract and the "nonrefundable retainer" and the misappropriation of Ms. Roberts' money for expenses while she awaited trial. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings.

Plaintiff sued defendant, a county judge in Mississippi, under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for allegedly causing plaintiff to be prosecuted without probable cause. At issue was whether the district court properly denied defendant's motion, concluding that genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment. The court held that defendant was entitled to qualified immunity where the district court did not explain the constitutional right that he had purportedly violated and, under the circumstances of the case, plaintiff had not shown that defendant's actions tainted the deliberations of the magistrate who issued the arrest warrant or the grand jury that returned the indictment. The court also held that, because the appeal was resolved on grounds of qualified immunity, the court need not address whether defendant was entitled to judicial immunity. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's denial of summary judgment.

In a memorandum opinion, the court addressed whether defense counsel gave implied consent to a mistrial. The court held that there was ample basis on the record for the trial court to conclude that defendants agreed that a mistrial on the undecided charges was the appropriate course of action. The court also held that, because it found no basis to disturb the Appellate Division's factual finding of implied consent, it had no occasion to address the People's alternative argument that there was manifest necessity for the mistrial.

The district court denied a petition for habeas corpus by an inmate serving 40 years for attempted murder and aggravated battery on a senior citizen and certified three issues as appealable. The Seventh Circuit clarified the obligation of appointed appellate counsel. Counsel has no obligation to argue claims, urged by the client, that were not certified as appealable, but could request amendment of the certificate if the claims are debatable. If counsel regards certified issues as frivolous those issues need not be argued and counsel should inform the court. Because prisoners do not have a right to appointed counsel on collateral claims there is no tension between the constitutional right to representation and the ethical obligation to not advance frivolous claims.

After his state conviction for murder was overturned, the plaintiff brought federal claims against state officials and prosecutors and malpractice claims against his own lawyers. He stipulated to dismissal of claims against officials; the district court entered summary judgment, rejecting the malpractice claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the plaintiff failed to establish proximate cause, as a matter of law. A report by plaintiff's expert did not establish that the attorneys' performance during voir dire caused the guilty verdict.

The district court dismissed indictment of a criminal defense attorney and co-conspirators under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1962(c). The underlying criminal enterprises included murder of witnesses in drug cases, bribery of a witness, using the law office to sell cocaine and operate a prostitution business, wire fraud relating to real estate sales, and helping evade parole restrictions. The indictment adequately alleged facts to establish all sub-elements required to establish both a pattern of racketeering activity and an enterprise, as well as all of the other elements of a RICO offense. On a motion to dismiss, the court was required to accept the allegations as true. The government was not required to show a pattern of similar acts or that the enterprise had a "traditional" structure.