Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

Defendant Zirachuen Rivera drove through a DWI checkpoint in Bernalillo County and an officer suspected he had been drinking alcohol. Defendant showed signs of impairment on the standard field sobriety tests and was arrested on suspicion of driving while intoxicated. Defendant’s bench trial began in Metropolitan Court where assistant district attorney Rachel Bayless entered an appearance for both herself and Chris Mills, a purported attorney, on behalf of the State. At the conclusion of trial, Defendant was found guilty of driving while intoxicated. Upon leaving the courtroom, defense counsel overheard Mills telling Bayless that he had decided not to take the New Mexico bar exam. Upon learning that Mills was not a licensed New Mexico attorney, Defendant filed a motion for a mistrial and a new trial. Defendant later attached a certificate from the Chief Clerk of the New Mexico Supreme Court to affirm that Mills was not on the official roll of New Mexico attorneys.In its opinion in this case, the Supreme Court clarified the rules and judicial precedent pertaining to the authorized practice of law in all state courts. The Court held that practice is limited to "duly licensed attorneys who are members of the State Bar or otherwise authorized by this Court’s rules in specific, limited circumstances." Because the Court of Appeals relied on statutory expressions that appeared to permit the unauthorized practice of law in magistrate courts, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals while affirming Defendant's conviction. View "New Mexico v. Rivera" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to transporting a minor in interstate commerce for the purpose of prostitution, 18 U.S.C. 2423(a) and was sentenced to 210 months' imprisonment. Appeal was dismissed on the basis of waiver in the plea agreement. Defendant filed a collateral attack within a year, arguing that his attorney had a conflict of interest, because he formerly represented one of defendant's prostitutes in a different case, and furnished ineffective assistance of counsel because he did not obtain a formal waiver of the conflict. The district court denied the petition, concluding that the record did not supply any reason to think that counsel's work on the 2003 prostitution claim would have diminished his ability to represent defendant effectively. A subsequent motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) was accompanied by more factual detail, but was denied. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of the petition and vacated with respect to the 60(b) motion, instructing the district court to dismiss the motion as a successive collateral attack, barred by 28 U.S.C. 2244(b) even though the first ruling was still pending on appeal. View "Phillips v. United States" on Justia Law

While representing a criminal defendant on appeal, the Office of the State Public Defender was sanctioned by the court of appeals in a footnote after the court found that the appendix to the assistant state public defender's brief was deficient and the attorney's certification of the appendix was false in violation of Wis. Stat. 809.19(2)(a). The Public Defender objected to the summary procedure used by the court of appeals in finding a violation of Rule 809.19(2)(a) without giving notice to counsel and without giving counsel an opportunity to be heard in writing. On review, the Supreme Court suggested that hereafter when the court of appeals considers imposing a sanction in such a situation, an order to show cause should be issued directing counsel to explain why a violation of Rule 809.12(2)(a) and (b) should not be found and why the attorney should not pay a stated amount of money to the clerk of the court as a sanction. Remanded with instructions to modify the footnote. View "State v. Nielsen" on Justia Law

This action arose from a complaint filed in 2006 with the Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance against a then Mississippi Supreme Court Justice. The justice was ultimately acquitted of various criminal charges and his wife plead guilty to tax evasion. After the cessation of the criminal prosecution, the prosecuting U.S. Attorney, relative to plaintiff, filed a complaint with the Commission. Accordingly to the justice and his wife, the U.S. Attorney unlawfully attached their tax and other financial records obtained during the criminal investigation to the complaint. Plaintiff served as a member of the Commission and participated in the Commission's investigation of the justice. Although the Commission dismissed the complaint, counsel to the justice and his wife sent plaintiff two letters threatening legal action based on his role in the investigation. Plaintiff responded by filing a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment of immunity from suit for conduct arising out of his duties with the Commission. The justice's wife subsequently filed counterclaims against plaintiff, asserting various federal and state law causes of action arising, in relevant part, from plaintiff's alleged disclosure of the Commission's confidential investigation. The court held that the judgment of the district court, insofar as it denied immunity to plaintiff for his filing of the declaratory relief action, was reversed, and the case remanded to the district court for further proceedings. View "Lampton v. Diaz, Jr., et al." on Justia Law

Defendant, a Maryland attorney, was convicted of offenses related to a scheme to launder proceeds that he obtained from a client. On appeal, defendant challenged several counts of conviction for money laundering, as well as his obstruction of justice conviction, and the denial of his motion to sever the failure-to-file counts. The court affirmed the convictions for money laundering under 18 U.S.C. 1956 and 1957, and affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to sever. The court reversed, however, defendant's conviction on the obstruction-of-justice charge for insufficient evidence. Therefore, the court remanded for resentencing.

Defendant, a state court judge and former criminal defense attorney, was convicted of two counts of wire fraud and one count of making false statements, stemming from defendant's use of his position as a state judge to obtain money and sexual favors in exchange for assisting a criminal defendant. Defendant subsequently appealed his conviction and his 60-month concurrent sentences. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion for a new trial; based on the record, the court concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the verdict would have been the same absent any error in the jury instructions and the indictment; and defendant's sufficiency of the evidence challenged failed. The court also held that the district court properly applied the specific offense characteristic; the second uncharged bribe could be used to increase the offense level for defendant's bribery conviction; and any monies rendered for legitimate legal services could not be subtracted from the loss value under U.S.S.G. 2C1.1(b)(2) because defendant and his colleague provided these services after the offense was detected. Therefore, none of defendant's several challenges required a new trial, reversal of conviction, or resentencing.

Appellant, a lawyer, was convicted of one count of conspiracy to obstruct justice, eight counts of attempted obstruction of justice; one count of bribery; and one count each of importation and possession of electronic surveillance equipment. On appeal, appellant challenged, among other things, the government's use of a confidential informant to meet with him and discuss the defense of his client. These meetings, which were recorded, revealed appellant's plans for the bribery and intimidation of potential trial witnesses against his client, who subsequently pled guilty. The court held that, in the circumstances of this case, the government's use of the informant was entirely proper, that the convictions concerning the surveillance equipment should be vacated, and that the convictions on all other counts should be affirmed. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for entry of a corrected judgment.

Respondent Municipal Court Judge Sheryl Polk McKinney's sister, who was the Clerk of the Town of Varnville, was arrested and charged with embezzlement of public funds, forgery, and misconduct in office.  Respondent's sister was accused of issuing checks in Respondent's name, forging respondent's name to the checks and converting the money for her personal use over an eight year period. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that by her misconduct, Respondent violated multiple Canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct (Rule 501, SCACR). The Court found Respondent’s misconduct warranted a suspension from judicial duties.  Respondent was suspended for thirty days. 

Petitioner, convicted of a non-fatal shooting, was sentenced as a habitual offender to 29-1/2 to 60 years for assault with intent to commit murder, to run concurrently with a sentence of 40 to 60 months for a felon-in-possession conviction, and a consecutive term of two years for a felony firearm conviction. He claims that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated because his attorney fell asleep while he was being cross-examined. Michigan state courts rejected appeals. The district court denied habeas relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. At most, the attorney was asleep for part of a single cross-examination; a petitioner must show that his attorney slept through a substantial portion of the trial for the "Cronic" presumption of prejudice to attach. Noting the overwhelming evidence, the court stated that petition did not show a reasonable probability that counsel could have prevented prejudicial events from occurring had he been awake, much less that it would have affected the outcome of the trial. Although the attorney was later arrested for cocaine use, there was no evidence that he was using cocaine during the trial..

After James Patrick filed a petition for postconviction relief, the district court judge who presided over Patrick's previous trial and sentencing recused herself and ordered that Patrick's postconviction proceedings be reassigned. Patrick filed a motion to invalidate the State's judicial substitution, which the district court denied. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the district court did not err when it denied Patrick's motion to invalidate the State's judicial substitution because the substitution in this instance was permitted, Patrick received notice of the substitution, and Patrick was not denied due process when the district court issued its order denying Patrick's motion without waiting for Patrick's reply brief; and (2) Patrick should have been given the opportunity to file his own motion for judicial substitution. The Court concluded that equity demanded that Patrick be given twenty days to move for a judicial substitution.