Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

This mandamus proceeding related to a disciplinary proceeding against a former prosecutor Jon L. Hall, who allegedly suppressed exculpatory evidence in an aggravated robbery prosecution. The Commission for Lawyer Discipline commenced a disciplinary action against Hall, alleging prosecutorial misconduct. The Commission then filed a motion seeking access to expunged records in the aggravated robbery case. The trial court refused the Commission access to the expunged criminal records for use in the disciplinary proceeding and ordered the Commission to turn over investigative records. The grievance panel in the disciplinary proceeding construed the district court’s actions as a bar to the disciplinary proceeding and granted Hall’s motion for summary judgment. The Commission then petitioned for writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court conditionally granted the writ and directed the trial court to vacate its order, holding that the expungement order did not bar the Commission from using records from the criminal trial in the grievance proceeding. View "In re State Bar of Tex. " on Justia Law

Thomas Hale filed for bankruptcy in 2005. During the course of that bankruptcy, he allegedly lied under oath and attempted to conceal from the bankruptcy trustee an agreement to sell property. After his relationship with the trustee became antagonistic, Hale sent her a package with unidentified material and a note that said, "Possible Haz-mat? Termites or Hanta virus [sic] from mice?" In 2013, Hale was convicted of making a materially false statement under oath in a bankruptcy case, concealing a contract from the bankruptcy trustee and creditors, and perpetrating a hoax regarding the transmission of a biological agent. Upon review of Hale's appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part: "instead of charging Hale with 'making a false declaration, certificate, verification, or statement under penalty of perjury' with regard to his representations in [his bankruptcy petition,] Hale was charged with falsely answering a temporally ambiguous question that inquired about numerous filings and was asked nearly a year after the documents were submitted. We do not think it proper to condone the prosecution’s creation of this ambiguity. We thus conclude that the error 'seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.'" The Court reversed the conviction with regard to the false statement, but affirmed in all other respects. View "United States v. Hale" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to using the telephone to facilitate his possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 843(b), and was sentenced to 24 months of probation. The sentencing judge imposed 18 conditions of probation and stated: “we’ll see what the next two years are going to bring in terms of your ability to conform …, because if you don’t, the 24 months of probation is going to be 24 months in prison,” meaning that if defendant violated any condition, he would be in prison for 24 months. Two months later, the probation service sought to revoke his probation. Defendant admitted: driving without a valid driver’s license; failing to attend a drug treatment program; and thrice submitting urine samples that tested positive for cocaine. Although the guidelines range for his probation violations was seven to 13 months, U.S.S.G. 7B1.4(a), the statutory maximum for his crime of conviction, the judge recalled the comments made at sentencing, and ordered 24 months’ custody. Defendant’s lawyer, stating that he had no non-frivolous ground for appealing the sentence, filed an Anders brief, to which defendant did not respond. The Seventh Circuit denied the Anders motion, stating that there is no authority indicating that a judge may treat a warning of consequences as creating a contract requiring him to impose those consequences should there be a violation. View "United States v. Tatum" on Justia Law

Radojcic, his daughters, his attorney Helfand, and the office manager for one of his companies, were indicted for 52 financial crimes involving fraud on mortgage lenders. It was also alleged that Radojcic, while owing the IRS more than two million dollars, fraudulently obtained rental checks exceeding $500,000 from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. After discovery, the state indicated its intent to call Helfand as a witness in exchange for use immunity. Helfand and Radojcic objected, asserting attorney-client privilege, and the trial court struck Helfand’s name from the state’s witness list. The appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, based on the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege, which applies when a client seeks the services of an attorney in furtherance of criminal or fraudulent activity. Transcripts of grand jury testimony met the standard of providing a reasonable basis to suspect the perpetration, or attempted perpetration, of a crime or fraud by Radojcic and a reasonable basis to suspect that communications with Helfand were in furtherance of the fraudulent scheme. The state met its burden of overcoming the privilege; there was no need to examine Helfand in camera prior before trial testimony. The only attorney-client communications that are subject to disclosure are those related to transactions identified in the indictment.View "People v. Radojcic" on Justia Law

In 2006, a jury convicted Appenzeller on18 felony counts. The trial court sentenced him to an aggregate term of 28 years in prison. The appeals court affirmed in part and remanded for merging of certain offenses and resentencing. The trial court again imposed a sentence of an aggregate term of 28 years in prison. The appeals court affirmed. Appenzeller unsuccessfully sought post-conviction relief based primarily on a claim that he was denied due process and equal protection when there was a break in the chain of custody of the trial transcript in his direct appeal. The alleged break occurred when Appenzeller’s own appellate attorney checked out the transcript to prepare his brief. The Ohio Supreme Court dismissed the petition, finding no violation of court rules or of constitutional rights.View "Appenzeller v. Miller" on Justia Law

In 1985, a manager was shot to death during a robbery of his restaurant. In the following months, a second manager was murdered and another survived similar robberies. In each restaurant, the robber fired two .38 caliber bullets; all six bullets were recovered. The survivor, Smotherman, described his assailant and picked Hinton’s picture out of a photographic array. The police arrested Hinton and recovered from his house a .38 caliber revolver belonging to his mother, who shared the house. The Alabama Department of Forensic Sciences concluded that the six bullets had all been fired from the Hinton revolver. Hinton was charged with two counts of murder. He was not charged with the Smotherman robbery. The prosecution strategy was to link Hinton to the Smotherman robbery by eyewitness testimony and forensic evidence about the bullets and to persuade the jury that, given the similarity of the crimes, Hinton must have committed the murders. Hinton presented witnesses in support of his alibi that he was at work at the time of the Smotherman robbery. The six bullets and the revolver were the only physical evidence. Hinton’s attorney obtained a grant of $1,000 to hire an expert to challenge that evidence and did not request more funding, nor correct the judge’s mistaken belief that a $1,000 limit applied. Under that mistaken belief, Hinton’s attorney found only one person who was willing to testify: Payne. Hinton’s attorney believed that Payne did not have the necessary expertise. The prosecutor discredited Payne. The jury convicted Hinton; the court imposed a death sentence. In state post-conviction proceedings, Hinton alleged ineffective assistance and produced three highly credible experts, who testified that they could not conclude that any of the bullets had been fired from the Hinton revolver. The state did not submit rebuttal evidence. Following a remand by the state’s highest court, the trial court held that Payne was qualified to testify as a firearms and toolmark expert under the then-applicable standard. The Alabama Supreme Court denied review. The U.S. Supreme Court vacated and remanded, holding that Hinton’s attorney rendered ineffective assistance under its “Strickland” test. It was unreasonable to fail to seek additional funds to hire an expert where that failure was based not on any strategic choice but on a mistaken belief that available funding was limited. View "Hinton v. Alabama" on Justia Law

Respondent, civilly committed as a sexually dangerous person, challenged the denial of the motions to extend and reopen the discovery period, motions to withdraw as counsel, and motions to appoint a second expert. The court concluded that, in proceedings that could result in the lifelong incarceration of respondent who has already served his full sentence, respondent was forced to be represented by an attorney asserting multiple conflicts of interest with whom he had not prepared for trial because of their inability to communicate. The district court abused its discretion in requiring counsel to continue representing respondent and the error was not harmless. Therefore, the court vacated the district court's judgment as to the motions to withdraw and remanded for the district court to consider these motions after engaging in the appropriate inquiry regarding the extent of counsel's conflicts. View "United States v. Blackledge" on Justia Law

The United States investigated Jeffrey Epstein's sexual abuse of minors, but failed to confer with the victims before entering a non-prosecution agreement with Epstein. Two victims filed suit under the Crime Victims' Rights Act, 18 U.S.C. 3771, to enforce their rights and sought to discover the correspondence between Epstein's attorneys and the United States regarding the non-prosecution agreement. Epstein and his attorneys intervened to object to that discovery as privileged. The district court overruled the objection and ordered disclosure. Intervenors appealed and the victims moved to dismiss. The court concluded that it had jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal and that the plea negotiations were not privileged from disclosure where Federal Rule of Evidence 410 provided no privilege for plea negotiations, the intervenors waived any work-product privilege, and the court declined to recognize a common-law privilege for plea negotiations. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Doe v. Black" on Justia Law

Appellant acted as counsel in district court for a criminal defendant (“Defendant”) who pleaded guilty to several charges arising out of a carjacking. The day before a disposition hearing was scheduled to take place, Appellant moved for a continuance, stating that she could not attend the scheduled sentencing because it conflicted with the commencement of a trial in another criminal case. The district court denied the motion. The court subsequently fined Appellant a monetary sanction, stating that Appellant had not been “candid with the Court” because she entered her appearance in the second case subsequent to requesting the continuance of Defendant’s sentencing. Appellant sought a vacation of the monetary sanction, asserting that she had been a key participant in the second case for several months. The district court denied relief. The First Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the sanctions order and expunged the sanction, holding that the district court abused its discretion in sanctioning Appellant, as there was no appropriate basis for a finding that Appellant had not been candid with the court. View "In re Plaza-Martinez" on Justia Law

In 1985, a manager was shot to death during a robbery of his restaurant. In the following months, a second manager was murdered and another survived similar robberies. In each restaurant, the robber fired two .38 caliber bullets; all six bullets were recovered. The survivor, Smotherman, described his assailant and picked Hinton’s picture out of a photographic array. The police arrested Hinton and recovered from his house a .38 caliber revolver belonging to his mother, who shared the house. The Alabama Department of Forensic Sciences concluded that the six bullets had all been fired from the Hinton revolver. Hinton was charged with two counts of murder. He was not charged with the Smotherman robbery. The prosecution strategy was to link Hinton to the Smotherman robbery by eyewitness testimony and forensic evidence about the bullets and to persuade the jury that, given the similarity of the crimes, Hinton must have committed the murders. Hinton presented witnesses in support of his alibi that he was at work at the time of the Smotherman robbery. The six bullets and the revolver were the only physical evidence. Hinton’s attorney obtained a grant of $1,000 to hire an expert to challenge that evidence and did not request more funding, nor correct the judge’s mistaken belief that a $1,000 limit applied. Under that mistaken belief, Hinton’s attorney found only one person who was willing to testify: Payne. Hinton’s attorney believed that Payne did not have the necessary expertise. The prosecutor discredited Payne. The jury convicted Hinton; the court imposed a death sentence. In state post-conviction proceedings, Hinton alleged ineffective assistance and produced three highly credible experts, who testified that they could not conclude that any of the bullets had been fired from the Hinton revolver. The state did not submit rebuttal evidence. Following a remand by the state’s highest court, the trial court held that Payne was qualified to testify as a firearms and toolmark expert under the then-applicable standard. The Alabama Supreme Court denied review. The U.S. Supreme Court vacated and remanded, holding that Hinton’s attorney rendered ineffective assistance under its “Strickland” test. It was unreasonable to fail to seek additional funds to hire an expert where that failure was based not on any strategic choice but on a mistaken belief that available funding was limited. View "Hinton v. Alabama" on Justia Law