Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

The case involves a motor vehicle collision near the entrance to Hickam Air Force Base in Honolulu, where Charles Yuen allegedly rear-ended another car. Military police (MPs) arrived at the scene, identified Yuen as the driver, and conducted field sobriety tests and a preliminary alcohol screening. They then detained Yuen until Honolulu Police Department (HPD) officers arrived, who conducted their own tests and arrested Yuen for operating a vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant (OVUII).The District Court of the First Circuit of the State of Hawai'i adjudicated Yuen guilty of OVUII based on the testimony of HPD officers. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed the conviction, finding that there was substantial evidence to support it. However, the ICA did not find sufficient evidence in the record to establish ineffective assistance of counsel due to the failure to file a motion to suppress evidence based on a violation of the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA).The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai'i reviewed the case and held that Yuen's trial counsel was ineffective for not filing a motion to suppress evidence obtained by the MPs, which could have been considered a violation of the PCA. The court found that this failure constituted ineffective assistance of counsel as it potentially impaired a meritorious defense. The court also agreed with the ICA that there was substantial evidence to support Yuen's conviction. Consequently, the Supreme Court vacated Yuen's OVUII conviction and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "State v. Yuen" on Justia Law

In 2018, Brevan Bringhurst Baugh was charged with two counts of aggravated sexual abuse of a child. The prosecution presented evidence of three instances of alleged abuse, distinguished by location, while the charges were distinguished by date. During closing arguments, the prosecution told the jury they could use any two of the three instances to fulfill the elements of the charged counts. The jury convicted Baugh on one count and acquitted him on the other.Baugh appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals, arguing that the jury might not have unanimously agreed on which instance of abuse supported the conviction. He also claimed his counsel was ineffective for not requesting specific jury instructions on unanimity. The court of appeals agreed, finding that the jury instructions were ambiguous and could have led to a non-unanimous verdict. The court vacated Baugh’s conviction.The Utah Supreme Court reviewed the case on certiorari. The court affirmed the court of appeals' decision, holding that Baugh’s counsel performed deficiently by failing to request more specific unanimity instructions. The court noted that the risk of a non-unanimous verdict was significant due to the way the evidence and charges were presented. The court also found that there was a reasonable probability that the jury would not have convicted Baugh if proper unanimity instructions had been given. Therefore, the court concluded that Baugh’s counsel was ineffective, and the conviction was vacated. View "State v. Baugh" on Justia Law

A Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department deputy entered the curtilage of Harson Chong’s home without a warrant, leading to the discovery of drugs, guns, and money. Chong and Tac Tran, who was present at the home, were subsequently charged with federal drug and gun offenses. They claimed ineffective assistance of counsel because their attorneys did not object to the search on Fourth Amendment grounds.The United States District Court for the Central District of California initially denied their suppression motions, ruling the search justified by the parole-search exception. However, after the Ninth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Grandberry, the district court reversed, finding insufficient probable cause that Tran resided at Chong’s home. Despite this, the court upheld the search based on exigent circumstances. Chong and Tran were convicted, and their convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. They then filed post-conviction motions under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which the district court denied, finding no ineffective assistance of counsel.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the deputy’s entry onto the curtilage without a warrant, consent, or exigency was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The court found Chong’s counsel ineffective for not moving to suppress the evidence, as the search was clearly unlawful. However, Tran lacked standing to challenge the search, as he did not reside at Chong’s home and was merely a visitor. Consequently, the court reversed the district court’s denial of Chong’s § 2255 motion and remanded for relief, but affirmed the denial of Tran’s motion. View "Chong v. United States" on Justia Law

Rendell Russell was convicted in 2022 for malice murder and related crimes after killing Gregory James with a machete. The incident occurred on October 27, 2020, following Russell's breakup with his girlfriend, Kenisha Shepherd. On the night of the crime, Russell entered Shepherd's apartment uninvited, where James, Shepherd's new boyfriend, was staying. Despite being asked to leave, Russell returned with a machete, confronted James, and ultimately attacked him, resulting in James's death from multiple sharp and blunt force injuries.A Cobb County grand jury indicted Russell on several charges, including malice murder, felony murder, and aggravated assault. The trial court bifurcated the firearm possession count. In March 2022, a jury found Russell guilty on all counts. The trial court sentenced him to life without parole for malice murder and additional concurrent and consecutive terms for other charges. Russell's motion for a new trial was denied by the trial court in December 2023, leading to this appeal.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict, rejecting Russell's claim of self-defense. The court found that Russell was the aggressor and that the State had disproved his justification defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Additionally, the court rejected Russell's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, concluding that his trial counsel's decision not to file a pretrial motion for immunity was a reasonable strategic choice. The court determined that there was little chance such a motion would have been successful given the evidence against Russell. View "Russell v. State" on Justia Law

Heraclio Osorio-Arellanes was involved in a firefight with U.S. Customs and Border Patrol agents in Arizona, resulting in the death of Agent Brian Terry. Osorio fled to Mexico, where he was later arrested and interrogated by U.S. officials in a Mexico City prison. During this interrogation, he confessed to key elements of the government's case on the advice of a Mexican attorney, Juan Salvador Pimentel. Osorio's confession was later used against him in court.The District Court for the District of Arizona initially suppressed Osorio's confession on Sixth Amendment grounds but later reversed this decision following a government motion for reconsideration. Consequently, the confession was admitted at trial, leading to Osorio's conviction on multiple charges, including first- and second-degree murder, conspiracy to interfere with commerce by robbery, and assault on a federal officer.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that Pimentel's advice during the interrogation was deficient and prejudicial under the framework established in Strickland v. Washington. Specifically, Pimentel erroneously advised Osorio that robbing drug smugglers was not a crime, leading Osorio to confess. The court held that this advice was legally unjustifiable and that there was a reasonable probability that, absent this advice, Osorio would not have been convicted.The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's order reconsidering the suppression of Osorio's confession, vacated his convictions and sentences, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court did not address Osorio's Fifth Amendment claim, as the Sixth Amendment claim was sufficient to decide the case. The dissenting judge would have affirmed the conviction and required Osorio to pursue his ineffective assistance of counsel claim through a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion in the district court. View "United States v. Osorio-Arellanes" on Justia Law

Robert Mason Elliott was charged with multiple federal offenses, including possession of firearms, sexual exploitation of a minor, and plotting to murder the minor and her mother. Elliott retained Attorney Brandon Sample for his defense. Over a year into the representation, Sample discovered a controlled substance hidden in documents meant for Elliott and sought to withdraw from the case. The court, however, denied Sample's motion, emphasizing Elliott's right to counsel of his choice. Elliott later reached a plea agreement and pleaded guilty to five counts.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana initially handled the case. After Sample's motion to withdraw was denied, Elliott continued with Sample as his attorney. Elliott later filed a second motion to determine his mental competency, which the court granted, and he was found competent to stand trial. Elliott eventually entered a plea agreement, pleading guilty to two counts of murder for hire, two counts of witness tampering, and one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition. The court sentenced him to 520 months of imprisonment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. Elliott argued that Sample had a conflict of interest and that the district court violated his Sixth Amendment right by not informing him of this conflict, rendering his guilty plea involuntary. The appellate court held that Elliott's Sixth Amendment claim was not foreclosed by the appellate waiver in his plea agreement. However, the court concluded that even if Sample had a conflict of interest, Elliott could not demonstrate that he was adversely affected by it. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "USA v. Elliott" on Justia Law

James M. Briggs, Jr. was charged with two counts of second-degree assault for attacking two employees at the Lincoln Correctional Center (LCC) on April 21, 2021. The charges were based on allegations that Briggs punched one employee, Parwiz Masoodi, multiple times and kicked another employee, Desaray Kerns, in the face while they were trying to restrain him. Both employees sustained bruising and received emergency medical care.The District Court for Lancaster County held a jury trial in May 2023, where both victims testified, and security footage of the incident was presented. Briggs moved to dismiss the charges at the close of the State’s evidence, arguing insufficient evidence, but the court denied the motion. The jury found Briggs guilty on both counts. At sentencing, the court found Briggs to be a habitual criminal and sentenced him to two consecutive terms of 10 to 12 years’ imprisonment, with a 10-year mandatory minimum for each count.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case. Briggs argued that the jury instructions were incorrect because they did not include "unlawful" as an element of the offense and that his trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to this omission. The court found that the instructions, when read as a whole, correctly stated the law and encompassed all material elements of the charged crime. Therefore, Briggs' counsel was not deficient.Briggs also contended that his counsel was ineffective for not informing the court of amendments to the habitual criminal statute that reduced the mandatory minimum sentence. The court noted that the amendments were not in effect at the time of sentencing, so counsel was not deficient. However, applying the rule from State v. Randolph, the court vacated Briggs' sentences and remanded for resentencing under the amended statute, which mitigated the punishment. The convictions were affirmed, but the sentences were vacated and remanded for resentencing. View "State v. Briggs" on Justia Law

In this case, the plaintiff, Shandor S. Badaruddin, was sanctioned by the Nineteenth Judicial District Court, Lincoln County, for his conduct as defense counsel in a criminal trial involving his client, Kip Hartman, who faced multiple felony charges related to securities and insurance fraud. The trial was conducted under strict time constraints due to the COVID-19 pandemic, and the court allocated equal time for both the prosecution and defense. Badaruddin was accused of mismanaging his allotted time, leading to a mistrial declaration by the District Court.The District Court found that Badaruddin had deliberately delayed the trial, which led to the mistrial. Consequently, the court imposed monetary sanctions amounting to $51,923.61 against Badaruddin for the costs associated with the trial. Badaruddin appealed the sanctions, arguing that he was not given adequate notice of the court's concerns and that his actions were not deliberate but rather a result of the challenging circumstances.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and noted that the U.S. District Court had previously ruled that the mistrial declaration was erroneous. The U.S. District Court found that Badaruddin's actions did not constitute deliberate delay and that his efforts to manage the trial time were competent. The U.S. District Court's ruling was affirmed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which held that Hartman could not be retried due to double jeopardy protections.Given the federal court's findings, the Supreme Court of Montana concluded that there was no basis for the sanctions under § 37-61-421, MCA, as there was no multiplication of proceedings. The court reversed the District Court's sanction order, determining that the costs incurred were not "excess costs" as defined by the statute. View "Badaruddin v. 19th Judicial District" on Justia Law

Stephen Stanko appealed the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition challenging one of his two South Carolina capital convictions and sentences. Stanko argued that his trial counsel, William Diggs, had a conflict of interest due to a pending ineffective assistance claim from a previous trial. Despite this, Stanko insisted on retaining Diggs for his second trial. The trial court held several hearings to ensure Stanko’s waiver of any conflict was knowing and voluntary. Stanko was convicted and sentenced to death. On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed the conviction and sentence, finding Stanko’s waiver valid.In his state post-conviction relief (PCR) petition, Stanko raised claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, arguing that Diggs’s conflict of interest and his performance during the penalty phase were constitutionally deficient. The PCR court rejected these claims, finding that Stanko had knowingly waived any conflict and that Diggs’s performance was within professional norms. Stanko’s petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court of South Carolina was denied.The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina reviewed Stanko’s federal habeas petition and applied the deferential standard of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). The court found that Stanko’s claims were either procedurally barred or meritless under AEDPA’s standards. The court also addressed Stanko’s complaints about docket management decisions, finding no merit in one and lacking jurisdiction over the other. The district court granted summary judgment for the state and denied Stanko a certificate of appealability.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that Stanko’s waiver of conflict-free counsel was valid and that the state court’s decision was not an unreasonable application of federal law. The court also found that Stanko’s ineffective assistance claims related to the penalty phase were procedurally barred and that Martinez v. Ryan did not apply to overcome the default. The court dismissed Stanko’s appeal regarding the district court’s denial of his Rule 59(e) motion for reconsideration, as it lacked jurisdiction without a certificate of appealability. View "Stanko v. Stirling" on Justia Law

The State of South Dakota charged Ronald Lee Neels with multiple sex-related offenses, including rape, sexual contact, and incest, for the sexual abuse of his adopted daughter over a 14-year period. During the trial, the prosecutor made an opening statement that asked the jury to imagine themselves in the victim's position, which is considered a "Golden Rule" argument and is generally condemned. Neels did not object to this statement at the time. Following his conviction, Neels filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel for not objecting to the prosecutor's opening statement.The South Dakota Supreme Court summarily affirmed Neels's conviction on direct appeal, stating that the issues raised were without merit. Neels then filed a state habeas corpus petition, which was denied on the grounds of res judicata, as the court found that the issue of prejudice had already been decided on direct appeal. The South Dakota Supreme Court affirmed this decision, holding that the same standard of prejudice applied in both plain error review and ineffective assistance of counsel claims.Neels subsequently filed a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The district court granted the petition, concluding that Neels suffered prejudice from his attorneys' failure to object to the prosecutor's opening statement, despite acknowledging the overwhelming evidence of Neels's guilt. The court reasoned that the magnitude of the prosecutorial misconduct required vacating the conviction to ensure a fair trial.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that Neels did not suffer Strickland prejudice from his counsel's failure to object to the prosecutor's opening statement, given the overwhelming evidence of his guilt. The court emphasized that the jury instructions and the strength of the evidence against Neels mitigated any potential prejudice from the prosecutor's improper remarks. View "Neels v. Fluke" on Justia Law