Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

Appellants, a criminal defense attorney and two legal investigators, were convicted in 2012 of breaching duties owed to the court by fabricating evidence and suborning perjury during a 2008 trial in which they represented another individual as defendant. In this appeal, appellants raise claims of prosecutorial misconduct. Two appellants raise claims under Brady v. Maryland, for reversal of their convictions based on the Government’s undisputed breach of its obligation to timely turn over exculpatory evidence. The court agreed with Appellant Daaiyah Pasha that but for the Brady deficiency, there is a reasonable probability of a different outcome in her case. Therefore, the court directed a new trial for Daaiyah Pasha, with appropriate remedies to cure the damage caused by the Government’s delayed disclosure. However, the court did not agree with Appellants Charles Daum and Iman Pasha on the challenges they raise, and so the court affirmed their convictions. View "United States v. Pasha" on Justia Law

When Bloodman withdrew as Haynes’s attorney in a criminal case, the judge ordered her to return discovery material “as soon as possible” and emailed the order, instructing her “to turn over to the United States Attorney’s Office any and all discovery material previously provided her by the Government.” After 20 days, she had not returned the material. The judge issued an order to return it within a week, or risk a show-cause order and sanctions. Bloodman, no longer on the electronic filing system, did not receive the email; the clerk mailed her a hard copy. She still had not returned the material 11 days later. The judge emailed her a show-cause order. Bloodman sent the material the next day via overnight mail, though delivery was delayed due to weather. At the show-cause hearing, Bloodman apologized. She claimed not to receive the second order, the only one to set an exact date and to have had medical issues. The judge did not find bad faith or hold her in contempt, but ordered her to pay $250 for the government’s “time and effort and energy.” The Eighth Circuit dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction because Haynes’s criminal case is still pending. View "United States v. Bloodman" on Justia Law

Defendant in this criminal case was represented by an attorney who also represented Defendant’s codefendant. At issue on appeal was whether Defendant’s “waiver of the right to conflict-free trial counsel was invalid.” The district court of appeal reversed Defendant’s conviction, concluding that the trial court failed to conduct a sufficient inquiry when Defendant consented to his attorney representing both him and his codefendant and that the error was not harmless. The State appealed, arguing that a waiver of the right to conflict-free counsel is only required when there is an actual conflict of interest and that an attorney’s representation of two or more codefendants does not necessarily create an actual conflict of interest. The Supreme Court quashed the decision of the district court of appeal and remanded the case with directions that Defendant’s conviction be affirmed, holding (1) some adverse or detrimental effect on the representation is required in order to establish an actual conflict of interest; and (2) because there was no finding of an actual conflict of interest in this case, there was no need for a waiver. View "State v. Alexis" on Justia Law

The Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. 3006A, requires each federal district court to establish a plan to furnish representation to indigent persons charged with federal crimes. In seven different Post-Conviction Review Act cases in various Pennsylvania counties, hearings were initiated to disqualify the Federal Community Defender (FCD) as counsel, based on that organization’s alleged misuse of federal grant funds to appear in state proceedings. FCD acknowledges that it sometimes appears in PCRA proceedings without a federal court order directing it to do so, but claims that it uses federal grant funds only for preparatory work that will be relevant to a federal habeas petition and only if it has received a federal court order appointing it as counsel for federal habeas proceedings or is working to obtain such an appointment. FCD removed the motions under the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. 1442(a)(1), (d)(1). The Commonwealth moved, under 28 U.S.C. 1447(c), to return each to state court, claiming lack of subject matter jurisdiction. FCD argued that the Commonwealth lacked a federal private right of action and that federal law preempted the motions. The district courts split. The Third Circuit held that FCD properly invoked removal jurisdiction and that the Commonwealth’s attempts to disqualify it as counsel proceedings are preempted. View "In Re: Commonwealth's Motion" on Justia Law

Pending before the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals was a motion by petitioner's federal habeas counsel to withdraw as counsel. Counsel argued that because he also represented petitioner during state habeas proceedings, it would be a conflict of interest for him to now determine whether his conduct was ineffective. Petitioner also requested the appointment of new counsel to investigate whether he has any viable claim under the rule established in the Supreme Court's decisions in "Martinez v. Ryan" and "Trevino v. Thaler." The Fifth Circuit did not read the Supreme Court's narrowly crafted decisions in Martinez or Trevino to require in this case the appointment of additional federal habeas counsel. "[P]etitioner's present lawyer is conflicted only in the sense that every lawyer charged to examine the performance of counsel is conflicted in that task when the performance is his own. That has no bearing on counsel's charge to argue the substantive claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. We do not read the Supreme Court as requiring a second federally appointed lawyer to plow the same ground ably plowed by the first federally appointed lawyer with no suggestion or hint of any shortcoming on his part. By this manner of reason there is no end to the succession of potential appointments, for each previous lawyer might have been ineffective." Construing present counsel's motion to withdraw as a motion for the appointment of supplemental counsel, the Fifth Circuit granted that motion. Because the claims he brought were yet unresolved, the Court denied the motion of present counsel to withdraw. The case was remanded in part back to the district court solely to appoint supplemental counsel, and to consider in the first instance whether petitioner court establish cause for the procedural default of any ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims pursuant to Martinez and Trevino that he might raise, and if so, whether those claims merited relief. View "Speer v. Stephens" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with lewd and lascivious conduct with a child after his girlfriend’s daughter reported molestation. The prosecutor told the defender (Hinman) that the People would accept a settlement offer for a prison term of eight years. Defendant was unwilling to settle, but Hinman continued to attempt to persuade defendant. The prosecutor stated that he was considering refiling the charges to allege penetrative acts, which carried a possible life sentence and provided Hinman with a translation of defendant’s police interrogation, which had been conducted in Spanish. The translation contained additional lines, fabricated by the prosecution: “[DEFENDANT]: I know. I’m just glad she’s not pregnant like her mother.” Hinman informed defendant it included an admission of penetration. Defendant denied making the incriminating statements. Hinman sought to uncover why the incriminating lines were not present in the translation prepared by his office. Days later, Hinman requested “the exact CD reviewed by [the People’s] transcriber/interpreter,” but got no response. Later that day, the proscutor admitted to falsifying the transcript. The trial court dismissed, finding the conduct “egregious, outrageous, and … shocked the conscience.” The court of appeal affirmed, finding that defendant’s constitutional right to counsel was prejudiced by the prosecutor’s misconduct. View "People v. Velasco-Palacios" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with first-degree murder. The district court appointed two attorneys from the Des Moines adult public defender’s office to represent Defendant. When the two attorneys discovered that other attorneys in their office had previously represented three of the State’s witnesses on unrelated matters, the attorneys requested a determination whether a conflict of interest existed requiring their disqualification. After a hearing, the district court concluded that a conflict of interest disqualified all attorneys employed at the public defender’s office from serving as Defendant’s counsel in this case. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the prior representations of the witnesses in unrelated matters by other members of the public defender’s office did not represent an actual conflict or a serious potential conflict that justified disqualification of the attorneys. View "State v. McKinley" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of one count of first-degree statutory sodomy. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by (1) denying his motion to disqualify the entire Newton County Prosecuting Attorney’s Office (NCPAO) due to a conflict of interest, and (2) entering a written judgment reflecting convictions of two counts of first-degree statutory sodomy when, in fact, Defendant was convicted of only one count of that offense. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment as to one count of first-degree statutory sodomy and vacated the judgment as to the second count of first-degree statutory sodomy, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling Defendant’s motion to disqualify the entire NCPAO; and (2) because the written judgment erroneously stated that Defendant was found guilty on two counts of first-degree statutory sodomy, the written judgment must be corrected to reflect what actually occurred. View "State v. Lemasters" on Justia Law

Defendant and others were charged with conspiring to distribute and conspiring to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 846, 841(a). He originally was appointed counsel, but later retained new counsel. Unsatisfied, defendant retained a third attorney, Rozan. Represented by Rozan, defendant pleaded guilty. He was sentenced to 151 months’ imprisonment. The Eighth Circuit upheld the conviction and sentence. The Supreme Court denied certiorari. Defendant then filed a pro se motion to vacate his conviction under 28 U.S.C. 2255, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel at the trial and appellate levels. Defendant argued that Rozan did not disclose that in 2004 and 2005, Rozan was privately reprimanded by the State Bar of Texas; in 2007, he was publicly reprimanded; and in 2009, while representing defendant on appeal, he was suspended from practice in Texas for five years, effective January 1, 2010. The Texas Supreme Court ordered Rozan to provide written notice of his suspension to every client and to every court officer in every court in which Rozan practiced. The Eighth Circuit affirmed denial of relief. It was defendant’s responsibility to investigate the disciplinary past of his attorney; the required notification occurred after defendant’s sentencing, and defendant did not show how he was prejudiced by Rozan’s silence. View "Ghost Bear v. United States" on Justia Law

Almanza was charged with nonforcible lewd or lascivious act on a child under age 14 (Pen. Code, 288(a)), forcible sodomy (286(c)(2)), and forcible lewd or lascivious act on a child under age 14 (288(b)(1)) with respect to his girlfriend’s daughter. At one point the victim stated that she had lied about the molestations because she was angry about having been disciplined. The court was aware, before trial, that the prosecutor threatened to prosecute the defense investigator and insinuated that defense counsel could also be prosecuted, for hiring and revealing the victim’s name to an investigator who was not licensed. After a bench trial, Almanza was found guilty of the lewd-act counts but not guilty of the sodomy counts and was sentenced to 16 years in prison. The court of appeal affirmed, despite finding that the prosecutor precipitated a serious conflict of interest between defendant and defense counsel, that “the trial court did little to try to remedy and that defense counsel could have done more to address.” The court noted the evidence of guilt and cited the California Supreme Court’s statement that prejudice will be presumed only when counsel is representing multiple defendants concurrently and a conflict of interest arises from that circumstance. View "People v. Almanza" on Justia Law