Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

Jason Dvorin appealed his conviction of conspiracy to commit bank fraud. Dvorin's appeal has been consolidated with the appeal of Mindy Sauter, the attorney who prosecuted defendant during his first trial. Dvorin asserted that the district court erred in: (1) denying his request for an apparent-authority jury instruction; (2) denying his request for a special unanimity jury instruction; (3) overruling his objections under Federal Rules of Evidence 701 and 704 to the government counsels’ and witnesses’ use of the terms “fraud,” “fraudulent check,” or “conspiracy”; (4) excluding extrinsic evidence of and cross-examination regarding the district court’s findings that Chris Derrington, Pavillion Bank's executive vice president, testified falsely in a prior proceeding; (5) declining to award sanctions for prosecutorial discovery misconduct; (6) admitting the testimony of Chase Bank representative Arthemis Lindsay despite the government’s failure to timely designate Lindsay as a possible witness on its witness list; and (7) permitting the government to add a forfeiture count to the second superseding indictment before the second trial and entering a forfeiture judgment at sentencing without having a jury find the facts essential to that judgment. Sauter contends that the district court erroneously found that she violated Brady, Giglio, and Napue and acted “recklessly” by failing to timely disclose Derrington’s plea agreement supplement. The court reversed the district court’s denial of Dvorin’s motion to dismiss the forfeiture account for prosecutorial vindictiveness because the presumption of vindictiveness applied in this case where the government added a forfeiture notice in the second superseding indictment, and the government failed to overcome this presumption. The court affirmed in all other respects. View "United States v. Dvorin" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of charges related to his involvement in prostitution and drug rings. This appeal presents an issue of first impression in this Circuit: whether a defendant’s right to effective assistance of counsel is violated when his counsel sleeps during trial. The court held that a defendant is deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel when counsel sleeps during a substantial portion of the defendant’s trial. In this case, multiple witnesses testified that counsel was asleep during multiple occasions. The court concluded that the fact that counsel was sleeping during defendant's trial amounted to constructive denial of counsel for substantial periods of that trial. Furthermore, the facts of this case are equally -if not more - egregious than the facts presented in cases where other circuits have presumed prejudice. Accordingly, the court vacated the conviction and sentence, directed entry of judgment in favor of defendant on his 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion, and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Ragin" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree and resisting arrest. Robert Fisher, an attorney employed by New York County Defender Services (NYCDS), was assigned to represent defendant. It was later revealed that a different attorney from NYCDS had represented another person, Toi Stephens, who was involved in the incident forming the basis of Defendant’s charges. Based on a potential conflict of interest, the court relieved Fisher as Defendant’s attorney and assigned a new attorney, who represented Defendant at trial. The Appellate Division reversed on the ground that the trial court had abused its discretion in relieving Fisher because Fisher did not represent Stephens, and the relationship between NYCDS and Stephens did not constitute a conflict. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, Supreme Court did not abuse its discretion by relieving Defendant’s assigned counsel and appointing conflict-free counsel to represent him. View "People v. Watson" on Justia Law

Defendant was accused by his step-daughter of sexual molestation when she was between the ages of 10 and 15 years old. A jury convicted defendant of 15 felonies, including rape, forcible lewd acts upon a child, aggravated sexual assault upon a child by oral copulation, aggravated sexual assault upon a child by sexual penetration, dissuading a witness from reporting a crime, and possession of child pornography. The jury acquitted him of one alleged rape (winter break rape). The court of appeal directed the trial court to enter a verdict of acquittal of an alleged June 2007 rape, for lack of substantial evidence, and ordered retrial on the remaining sexual abuse charges on juror misconduct grounds. The convictions for dissuading a witness and possession of child pornography were unaffected. During retrial, although the alleged Winter Break and June 2007 rapes were not charged, evidence of them was admitted to attack and bolster victim's credibility. The jury found defendant guilty of two counts of forcible lewd touching of a child under age 14 and hung on nine other charges. The court of appeal affirmed, upholding the admission of evidence of the uncharged rapes without informing the jury of the prior acquittals. The court found several instances of prosecutorial misconduct, which it referred to the State Bar. View "People v. Poletti," on Justia Law

Knight is a licensed attorney, and the charges against him stem from his representation of a Barber in a bankruptcy proceeding, in 2008-2010. Knight was convicted of conspiracy to commit bankruptcy fraud, 18 U.S.C. 371 and 157; aiding and abetting bankruptcy fraud; aiding and abetting the making of a false statement in relation to a bankruptcy case; and five counts of aiding and abetting money laundering, 18 U.S.C. 1957 and 2. The district court granted Knight a new trial on the conspiracy, bankruptcy fraud, and money laundering counts, granted his motion for judgment of acquittal on the false statement count, and conditionally granted him a new trial on the false statement count in the event of reversal on appeal. The Eighth Circuit reversed the acquittal on the false statement charge, but affirmed the decision to grant Knight a new trial on all counts of conviction, noting evidence that Knight and Barber used the IOLTA to keep Barber's creditors from learning that he had money available and evidence concerning a sham entity that was used to divert money to Barber's own pocket. View "United States v. Knight" on Justia Law

Appellants, a criminal defense attorney and two legal investigators, were convicted in 2012 of breaching duties owed to the court by fabricating evidence and suborning perjury during a 2008 trial in which they represented another individual as defendant. In this appeal, appellants raise claims of prosecutorial misconduct. Two appellants raise claims under Brady v. Maryland, for reversal of their convictions based on the Government’s undisputed breach of its obligation to timely turn over exculpatory evidence. The court agreed with Appellant Daaiyah Pasha that but for the Brady deficiency, there is a reasonable probability of a different outcome in her case. Therefore, the court directed a new trial for Daaiyah Pasha, with appropriate remedies to cure the damage caused by the Government’s delayed disclosure. However, the court did not agree with Appellants Charles Daum and Iman Pasha on the challenges they raise, and so the court affirmed their convictions. View "United States v. Pasha" on Justia Law

When Bloodman withdrew as Haynes’s attorney in a criminal case, the judge ordered her to return discovery material “as soon as possible” and emailed the order, instructing her “to turn over to the United States Attorney’s Office any and all discovery material previously provided her by the Government.” After 20 days, she had not returned the material. The judge issued an order to return it within a week, or risk a show-cause order and sanctions. Bloodman, no longer on the electronic filing system, did not receive the email; the clerk mailed her a hard copy. She still had not returned the material 11 days later. The judge emailed her a show-cause order. Bloodman sent the material the next day via overnight mail, though delivery was delayed due to weather. At the show-cause hearing, Bloodman apologized. She claimed not to receive the second order, the only one to set an exact date and to have had medical issues. The judge did not find bad faith or hold her in contempt, but ordered her to pay $250 for the government’s “time and effort and energy.” The Eighth Circuit dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction because Haynes’s criminal case is still pending. View "United States v. Bloodman" on Justia Law

Defendant in this criminal case was represented by an attorney who also represented Defendant’s codefendant. At issue on appeal was whether Defendant’s “waiver of the right to conflict-free trial counsel was invalid.” The district court of appeal reversed Defendant’s conviction, concluding that the trial court failed to conduct a sufficient inquiry when Defendant consented to his attorney representing both him and his codefendant and that the error was not harmless. The State appealed, arguing that a waiver of the right to conflict-free counsel is only required when there is an actual conflict of interest and that an attorney’s representation of two or more codefendants does not necessarily create an actual conflict of interest. The Supreme Court quashed the decision of the district court of appeal and remanded the case with directions that Defendant’s conviction be affirmed, holding (1) some adverse or detrimental effect on the representation is required in order to establish an actual conflict of interest; and (2) because there was no finding of an actual conflict of interest in this case, there was no need for a waiver. View "State v. Alexis" on Justia Law

The Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. 3006A, requires each federal district court to establish a plan to furnish representation to indigent persons charged with federal crimes. In seven different Post-Conviction Review Act cases in various Pennsylvania counties, hearings were initiated to disqualify the Federal Community Defender (FCD) as counsel, based on that organization’s alleged misuse of federal grant funds to appear in state proceedings. FCD acknowledges that it sometimes appears in PCRA proceedings without a federal court order directing it to do so, but claims that it uses federal grant funds only for preparatory work that will be relevant to a federal habeas petition and only if it has received a federal court order appointing it as counsel for federal habeas proceedings or is working to obtain such an appointment. FCD removed the motions under the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. 1442(a)(1), (d)(1). The Commonwealth moved, under 28 U.S.C. 1447(c), to return each to state court, claiming lack of subject matter jurisdiction. FCD argued that the Commonwealth lacked a federal private right of action and that federal law preempted the motions. The district courts split. The Third Circuit held that FCD properly invoked removal jurisdiction and that the Commonwealth’s attempts to disqualify it as counsel proceedings are preempted. View "In Re: Commonwealth's Motion" on Justia Law

Pending before the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals was a motion by petitioner's federal habeas counsel to withdraw as counsel. Counsel argued that because he also represented petitioner during state habeas proceedings, it would be a conflict of interest for him to now determine whether his conduct was ineffective. Petitioner also requested the appointment of new counsel to investigate whether he has any viable claim under the rule established in the Supreme Court's decisions in "Martinez v. Ryan" and "Trevino v. Thaler." The Fifth Circuit did not read the Supreme Court's narrowly crafted decisions in Martinez or Trevino to require in this case the appointment of additional federal habeas counsel. "[P]etitioner's present lawyer is conflicted only in the sense that every lawyer charged to examine the performance of counsel is conflicted in that task when the performance is his own. That has no bearing on counsel's charge to argue the substantive claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. We do not read the Supreme Court as requiring a second federally appointed lawyer to plow the same ground ably plowed by the first federally appointed lawyer with no suggestion or hint of any shortcoming on his part. By this manner of reason there is no end to the succession of potential appointments, for each previous lawyer might have been ineffective." Construing present counsel's motion to withdraw as a motion for the appointment of supplemental counsel, the Fifth Circuit granted that motion. Because the claims he brought were yet unresolved, the Court denied the motion of present counsel to withdraw. The case was remanded in part back to the district court solely to appoint supplemental counsel, and to consider in the first instance whether petitioner court establish cause for the procedural default of any ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims pursuant to Martinez and Trevino that he might raise, and if so, whether those claims merited relief. View "Speer v. Stephens" on Justia Law