Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

Starski identified himself as a lawyer in a demand letter to a business, claiming that his “client” (Cornett, his mother’s husband) had been injured at the business. The manager was suspicious and contacted authorities, who subsequently staged a pretext call during which Starski identified himself as an attorney. Cornett subsequently stated that he had not been injured at the business, but changed his story again for trial. A search of Starski’s computer uncovered documents revealing that he had been involved in several similar schemes, representing himself as an attorney. He is not a licensed attorney, but described himself as a “freelance paralegal.” After his trial on felony charges of attempted grand theft and conspiracy and a misdemeanor charge of unlawful practice of law (Business and Professions Code section 6126), the judge instructed the jury that section 6126 requires more than simply holding oneself out as an attorney, that “practicing law” entails use of that purported status. Starski and Cornett were convicted. Each was given to probation. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting arguments of insufficient evidence; that the instructions on section 6126 were “overbroad” because they allowed conviction for what a recent U.S. Supreme Court decision made protected free speech; and that the judge erred by refusing to give Starski’s special instruction on a “claim-of-right” defense to the charges of attempting and conspiring to commit grand theft. View "People v. Starski" on Justia Law

On the morning of his client’s trial, defense attorney A. Randall Harris tried to withdraw as counsel. When the judge declined his request, Harris told the judge he was “wrong” for doing so, and he “was not going to participate” in the trial. Harris’s refusal to abide by the court’s order forced a continuance. And the judge held him in direct criminal contempt. Harris appealed, but the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment finding Harris guilty of direct criminal contempt and ordering Harris to pay a $100 fine and $1,200 for the cost of the jury venire. View "Harris v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

The ACLU submitted a request under the California Public Records Act (PRA) to the Los Angeles County Counsel seeking invoices specifying the amounts that the County and been billed by any law firm in connection with several different lawsuits alleging excessive force against jail inmates. The County refused to provide invoices for the lawsuits that were still pending on the basis of attorney-client privilege. The ACLU petitioned for writ of mandate seeking to compel the County to disclose the requested records. The superior court granted the petition, concluding that the County had failed to show that the invoices were attorney-client privileged communications. The County then filed a petition for writ of mandate. The court of appeal granted the petition and vacated the superior court’s order, concluding that the invoices were confidential communications within the meaning of Cal. Evid. Code 952. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the attorney-client privilege does not categorically shield everything in a billing invoice from PRA disclosure, but invoices for work in pending and active legal matters implicate the attorney-client privilege; and (2) therefore, the privilege protects the confidentiality of invoices for work in pending and active legal matters. View "Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County" on Justia Law

Foreman alleged that Rockford police officers came to his restaurant because the man living in an upstairs apartment accused Foreman of cutting off his electricity. Foreman refused to answer questions and was arrested. Prosecutor Leisten charged Foreman with obstructing a police officer. The charge was dismissed. The court ordered Foreman to show cause why claims against Leisten should not be dismissed; the prosecutor would have absolute immunity in her individual capacity and the Eleventh Amendment bars official capacity claims. In a previous case Foreman’s lawyer, Redmond, had raised similar claims against prosecutors that were dismissed, so the court ordered Redmond to show cause why he should not be sanctioned. The court granted Leisten judgment on the pleadings, noting that Foreman had not offered a basis for challenging the existing law of prosecutorial immunity and that the official capacity claim would not fall under the Eleventh Amendment's exception for injunctive relief because Foreman’s complaint did not allege an ongoing constitutional violation. The court censured Redmond, stating that he did not argue for a change in the law until after he was faced with a recommendation of censure. The court dismissed 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims against the officers, concluding that they had probable cause to arrest Foreman. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, citing Supreme Court precedent that state prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity from suits under section 1983 for activities that are “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” View "Foreman v. Wadsworth" on Justia Law

After a bench trial, defendant-appellant Eldon Boisseau was convicted of tax evasion The district court determined that Boisseau, a practicing attorney, willfully evaded paying his taxes by: (1) placing his law practice in the hands of a nominee owner to prevent the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) from seizing his assets; (2) causing his law firm to pay his personal expenses directly given an impending IRS levy, rather than receiving wages; and (3) telling a government revenue officer that he was receiving no compensation from his firm when in fact the firm was paying his personal expenses. On appeal, he challenged the sufficiency of the evidence and argued that the district court wrongly convicted him: (1) without evidence of an affirmative act designed to conceal or mislead; and (2) by concluding that proof satisfying the affirmative act element of tax evasion was sufficient to prove willfulness. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Boisseau" on Justia Law

Hannon, an attorney, represented Barber in litigation against the victim, Barber’s former domestic partner, Dr. Magno. In December 2006, the parties agreed that Barber would fund a college trust for their children. Barber paid $27,500.32 to Hannon as the trustee of the children’s funds and authorized Hannon to open a bank account. In February 2011, the victim became aware that the children’s funds had been misappropriated. Hannon may have used the money to cover legal fees owed by Barber. Charged with grand theft by embezzlement by a fiduciary (Pen. Code 487(a), 506), Hannon ultimately pled no contest to misdemeanor theft by embezzlement. The trial court placed him on probation for two years, ordered him to perform 240 hours of community service, and ordered him to pay $40,800 in restitution to the victim: $25,000 in attorney’s fees, $15,000 in lost wages, and $800 in mileage. The court of appeal rejected challenges to the restitution award and held that the victim was entitled to file a victim impact statement on appeal, pursuant to the Victims’ Bill of Rights Act of 2008 (Marsy’s Law, Proposition 9 (2008)), but may not raise present legal issues not raised by Hannon or facts not in the record below View "People v. Hannon" on Justia Law

A year after Harrington, a drug dealer, was sentenced, by Judge St. Eve, to 264 months in prison (subsequently reduced to 212 months by a change in the sentencing guidelines) the government asked for his cooperation in its investigation of his attorney Brindley. Brindley was accused of encouraging his clients to lie on the witness stand. Despite Brindley’s acquittal after a bench trial (Judge Leinenweber presiding) the government moved under FRCP 35(b)(2)(C) asking Judge St. Eve to reduce Harrington’s sentence by 25 percent for his substantial assistance. The judge granted only a 14 percent reduction, reasoning that Harrington’s testimony did not convict Brindley; that Harrington “lied to this Court during his trial,” in addition to the underlying drug crime: and that Harrington got the benefit of the doubt during his original sentencing and did not receive enhancements requested by the prosecution. The Seventh Circuit vacated. There is no indication that Harrington lied at Brindley’s trial or had any incentive to see Brindley acquitted and cannot be blamed for Brindley’s acquittal. His previous lies could be the basis of a prosecution for perjury, but there was no such prosecution. The lack of clarity in explaining the ruling requires reconsideration. View "United States v. Harrington" on Justia Law

The information filed by the State charged Serendipity Morales with six counts of unauthorized practice of law. Morales was an inmate at the Marble Valley Regional Correctional Center, and it was alleged she engaged in the unauthorized practice of law by helping fellow inmates in their cases, including performing legal research and drafting motions. In this probable cause review, the issue presented for the Supreme Court's consideration was whether there was probable cause to believe that Morales committed the alleged offenses. The Court concluded that there was not and accordingly dismissed the State’s information without prejudice. View "In re Serendipity Morales" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Stephen Arny, M.D., was convicted of conspiracy to distribute and unlawfully dispense prescription pain medications, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 846. Approximately three months later, but before sentencing, Arny secured new counsel, who later moved for a new trial based on trial counsel’s constitutionally ineffective assistance. The district court granted the motion based on its finding that Arny’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel had been violated by counsel’s misrepresentation that the government had stated that another doctor (Saxman) who had worked with Arny and his co-defendants either had a plea deal or would be indicted soon and that her clinic was searched; counsel’s failure to interview Saxman or call her to testify in order to explain the legitimacy of her treatment plans that Arny continued; and counsel’s failure to investigate or interview any of Arny’s patients. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The affidavits of Saxman and the former patients establish a “reasonable probability that, but for [trial] counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” View "United States v. Arny" on Justia Law

After the government charged him with selling cocaine, Christopher hired a lawyer. Christopher later claimed that, over the course of the representation, the lawyer used cocaine with Christopher more than 20 times, including several times immediately before court hearings. The government had considerable evidence: recordings of 10 phone calls in which he negotiated purchases of the drug and testimony from the leader of the conspiracy and another coconspirator that Christopher had bought the drug for resale. It had already convicted many of Christopher’s co-conspirators based on similar evidence. Three months after being convicted and sentenced to 10 years in prison, without having appealed, Christopher filed a section 2255 motion to vacate, arguing that his attorney’s behaviour caused him to forgo a favorable plea deal, with a sentence of 30-37 months. After a remand for a hearing, the Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of the motion. The trial judge did not clearly err in finding defense counsel “credible” while finding Christopher’s credibility “very much undercut.” The court thought the attorney was prepared and rendered effective counsel; the record permits that conclusion. View "Christopher v. United States" on Justia Law