Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

Ashton Denny, Jr. was convicted of malice murder and other charges after shooting his half-brother, Kevin Rowe, in the back, resulting in Rowe's death. The incident occurred on May 28, 2020, following an argument between Denny and Rowe at their family home in Conyers, Georgia. After the argument, Rowe and other family members left but returned later that night. Rowe stepped outside, followed by Denny, and shortly after, a gunshot was heard. Rowe was found injured, claiming Denny shot him, and Denny fled the scene in his Jeep. Denny was later apprehended when he returned to the scene.A Rockdale County grand jury indicted Denny on charges including malice murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. The jury found Denny guilty on all counts, and he was sentenced to life in prison without parole for malice murder, with additional consecutive sentences for other charges. Denny's motion for a new trial was denied by the trial court.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case, where Denny argued ineffective assistance of counsel. He claimed his trial counsel failed to object to the admission of the murder weapon and other evidence from his Jeep, failed to object to the admission of a door with a bullet hole, and failed to tender a gunshot residue report. The court found that Denny's counsel was not deficient, as objections to the evidence would have been fruitless and the strategic decisions made by counsel were reasonable. The court also determined that Denny did not demonstrate a reasonable probability that the trial outcome would have been different had the gunshot residue report been admitted. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "DENNY v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

Lucianna Nicole Fox was convicted of felony murder and other crimes related to the shooting death of Leroy Midyette. On November 5, 2016, Fox encountered Midyette at a MARTA station. After a confrontation where Midyette did not move his cart out of the way, Fox hit the cart with her vehicle. Midyette followed her car and hit it, prompting Fox to exit her vehicle and shoot him, claiming she felt threatened. Fox was arrested and, during a police interview, stated she shot Midyette because she feared he had a weapon.Fox was indicted by a Fulton County grand jury and found guilty of felony murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. She was sentenced to life with the possibility of parole for felony murder and an additional five years for the firearm charge. Her motion for a new trial was denied by the trial court.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case. Fox argued that her trial counsel was ineffective for not requesting a jury charge on the defense of accident and that the trial court committed plain error in its jury instructions. The court found that her counsel’s decision to focus solely on self-defense was not unreasonable and did not constitute ineffective assistance. The court also determined that any error in the jury instructions did not likely affect the trial's outcome. Consequently, the court affirmed Fox’s convictions, finding no cumulative error that denied her a fair trial. View "FOX v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

Amaury Villa participated in two significant burglaries in 2011, stealing $61 million worth of pharmaceuticals from an Eli Lilly warehouse in Connecticut and $1.5 million worth of cigarettes from a warehouse in Kentucky. He was indicted by federal grand juries in Florida, Connecticut, and Kentucky. Villa pled guilty in the Florida and Connecticut cases, receiving concurrent prison terms of 140 and 98 months, respectively. In January 2016, Kentucky prosecutor Joshua Judd emailed Villa’s attorney, Donald Meier, a proposed plea agreement that did not mention concurrent sentencing. Villa later pled guilty without a plea agreement and was sentenced to 77 months, to be served consecutively.Villa moved to set aside his Kentucky sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in January 2019, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. He later sought to amend his motion to add a claim that Meier failed to inform him of a potential cooperation agreement. The district court initially denied the motion as untimely. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the timeliness of the claim. The district court found the claim timely but denied it on the merits.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The court found that Judd’s January 21 email did not constitute a formal plea offer but was an invitation to negotiate. The court also found that Meier had informed Villa of the January 9 plea offer, which was discussed at Villa’s change-of-plea hearing. The court concluded that Meier’s performance was not deficient and that Villa himself impeded further negotiations by refusing to provide additional information about his co-conspirator. The district court’s judgment denying Villa’s motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence was affirmed. View "Villa v. United States" on Justia Law

Travaris T. Guy was convicted of attempted first degree murder and second degree murder for the shooting of David Woods Sr. and Sheena Woods. The jury found that Guy acted with the intent to kill but also believed his actions were lawfully justified, which led to an inconsistent verdict. Guy did not raise this issue on direct appeal or in his initial postconviction petition but later filed a successive postconviction petition claiming inconsistent verdicts and ineffective assistance of counsel.The Will County circuit court denied relief on the inconsistent verdict claim but granted a new trial on a separate claim. The appellate court reversed Guy’s attempted first degree murder conviction, holding that the jury instruction misstated the law, the conviction was inconsistent with the second degree murder conviction, and the jury’s finding of self-defense precluded a guilty verdict for attempted first degree murder.The Illinois Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the appellate court’s judgment in part, reversed in part, and remanded to the circuit court to sentence Guy on the lesser-included offense of aggravated battery with a firearm. The court held that a conviction for attempted first degree murder requires proof of intent to kill without lawful justification. The jury instruction was erroneous as it only required intent to kill. The jury’s finding that Guy believed in the need for self-defense was incompatible with the intent required for attempted first degree murder. The court also found that Guy’s attorneys were ineffective for failing to properly raise these issues. View "People v. Guy" on Justia Law

Ronald Vines and his two adult sons attempted to rob a bank at gunpoint. They gathered weapons and other equipment, set up a tarp outside the bank, and waited for the tellers to arrive. One of Vines's sons, wearing a mask and armed with a revolver, forced a teller inside at gunpoint. However, another employee saw them and raised the alarm, causing Vines to signal his son to flee. They were apprehended by the police shortly after.Vines pleaded guilty to attempted armed bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(d) & 2 and brandishing a gun while committing a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) & 2. He did not initially challenge his § 924(c) charge, so he had to do so collaterally under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania denied his motion but granted a certificate of appealability. On appeal, Vines was allowed to argue that his plea lawyer was ineffective for not asserting that attempted armed bank robbery is not a crime of violence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that attempted armed bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d) is a crime of violence because it requires the use of force, violence, or intimidation. The court also found that adding a dangerous weapon to the attempted bank robbery does not make the crime less violent. Therefore, Vines's conviction under § 924(c) was upheld. The court also concluded that Vines's counsel was not ineffective, as the argument that attempted armed bank robbery is not a crime of violence would have been meritless. The Third Circuit affirmed the District Court's order denying Vines's collateral attack. View "USA v. Vines" on Justia Law

Jason Meredith was charged with two counts of capital murder for the shooting deaths of Eric Ogden and Lance Kelloms. The State agreed to waive the death penalty and reduce the charges to first-degree murder in exchange for Meredith's testimony against his co-defendant. Meredith pleaded guilty and received two concurrent life sentences. In 1998, he filed a pro se Rule 37 petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and new evidence. He later filed motions to amend his petition, which were denied by the circuit court.The Saline County Circuit Court denied Meredith's motions to amend his petition and ultimately dismissed his Rule 37 petition. The court found that Meredith failed to act with due diligence in seeking relief and that his petition did not comply with the length and formatting requirements. Additionally, the court concluded that the files and records showed Meredith was not entitled to relief, as he failed to demonstrate that his trial counsel was ineffective.The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the case and affirmed the circuit court's decision. The court held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Meredith's motions to amend his petition, as the extreme passage of time and lack of diligence were considered. The court also affirmed the dismissal of the petition based on noncompliance with formatting requirements and the merits of the petition. The court found that Meredith did not sufficiently allege prejudice from his counsel's advice regarding parole eligibility, as he did not claim he would have insisted on going to trial but for the erroneous advice. View "Meredith v. State" on Justia Law

Michael Williams was convicted of malice murder and other offenses for the fatal shooting of Tomas Gooden at a house party on December 8, 2017. Williams and Gooden argued over a gambling game, leading to Gooden pushing Williams to the floor. Williams then shot Gooden in the head and fled the scene. Gooden's body was found in the garage, and the medical examiner determined the bullet traveled in a downward trajectory. Williams was later found walking along the road and eventually admitted to shooting Gooden, claiming self-defense.A Coweta County grand jury indicted Williams on multiple charges, including malice murder and aggravated assault. Williams was found guilty on all counts by a jury and sentenced to life in prison for malice murder, with additional concurrent and consecutive sentences for other charges. Williams filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied. He then appealed to the Supreme Court of Georgia, specifying that he was not appealing his conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed Williams's claims of plain error in the jury instructions and ineffective assistance of counsel. Williams argued that the trial court failed to instruct the jury that the State bore the burden to disprove his justification defense and that his counsel failed to investigate and introduce evidence of Gooden's violent reputation. The court concluded that although the trial court erred in its jury instructions, Williams did not demonstrate that this error affected the trial's outcome. Additionally, the court found that Williams was not prejudiced by his counsel's performance, as substantial evidence of Gooden's violent character was already presented at trial. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed Williams's convictions. View "WILLIAMS v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

Ronald Norweathers was convicted by a jury and sentenced to 250 months’ imprisonment for possessing and distributing child pornography. He claimed that he was acting under the direction of an FBI agent, Joseph Bonsuk, who misled him into collecting and forwarding child pornography as part of a nonexistent undercover operation. The jury rejected his defense, and his post-trial motions and direct appeal were unsuccessful. Norweathers then moved to vacate his conviction and sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to request certain jury instructions and for not calling a computer forensics expert as a witness. The district court denied his motion without a hearing.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois denied Norweathers’s § 2255 motion, finding that his claims lacked merit. The court concluded that the failure to request an apparent authority or entrapment by estoppel jury instruction was immaterial because Norweathers’s testimony did not establish reasonable reliance on a government agent’s authority. The court also dismissed his claim regarding the computer forensics expert, deeming it insufficiently cogent to suggest constitutional error.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that Norweathers’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims were without merit. It found that his testimony did not support a reasonable reliance on Bonsuk’s authority, making the jury instructions irrelevant. Additionally, the court determined that the decision not to call the computer forensics expert was a strategic choice within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. The court concluded that Norweathers failed to demonstrate a substantial likelihood of a different result had the expert testified, and thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion without an evidentiary hearing. View "Norweathers v USA" on Justia Law

Gary Jordan, the defendant, pled guilty to armed bank robbery and other crimes, receiving a thirty-year prison sentence. After his plea, he discovered that prosecutors had recorded his attorney-client meetings before he entered his plea. Although the prosecutors claimed they did not watch the recordings, Jordan moved to vacate his guilty plea, arguing that the prosecutors' actions rendered his plea unconstitutionally unknowing and involuntary.The United States District Court for the District of Kansas denied Jordan's motion, stating that he could only challenge his guilty plea through an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, as the alleged unconstitutional conduct occurred before the plea. Jordan did not raise a claim of prejudice or ineffective assistance of counsel, relying solely on the structural-error theory from Shillinger v. Haworth. The district court concluded that Jordan could not prevail on this basis.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that under Tollett v. Henderson, a defendant who has pled guilty cannot raise independent claims of constitutional violations that occurred before the plea. Instead, the defendant must show that the plea was not knowing and voluntary due to ineffective assistance of counsel, unless the plea was induced by threats, misrepresentations, or improper prosecutorial promises. The court found that Jordan's challenge failed because he did not pursue an ineffective assistance of counsel claim and relied solely on the now-overruled structural-error rule from Shillinger. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Jordan's motion to vacate his guilty plea. View "United States v. Jordan" on Justia Law

Anthony Brookins was found guilty by a jury in May 2009 of a firearm offense and a drug trafficking charge. He was sentenced to 120 months and 240 months, respectively, to be served concurrently, along with three- and ten-year periods of supervised release. The District Court later reduced his drug trafficking sentence to 180 months. After his release from prison in December 2019, Brookins began his supervised release. In May 2023, his probation officer filed a petition alleging five violations of his supervised release, including charges of simple assault and harassment, positive drug tests for cocaine, and failure to participate in a substance abuse program. A supplemental petition added a sixth violation related to another domestic incident.The United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania held a revocation hearing where Brookins admitted to failing to comply with the substance abuse treatment program (violation number 5). The government withdrew the other five alleged violations. The District Court found Brookins guilty of the Grade C violation and sentenced him to 14 months of imprisonment, followed by supervised release with conditions including participation in an intensive drug treatment program and no contact with the alleged victim of the domestic incidents.Brookins filed a pro se notice of appeal. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. Brookins's appellate counsel filed an inadequate Anders brief, failing to provide a thorough examination of the record or address the specific issues raised by Brookins. The Third Circuit discharged the counsel and directed the Clerk of Court to appoint new counsel for Brookins, emphasizing the need for diligent and thorough representation in compliance with Anders v. California. View "USA v. Brookins" on Justia Law