Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

Petitioner appealed the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. Section 2255 motion to vacate his 293-month prison sentence and convictions. Petitioner argued to the district court that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, Petitioner asserted that his attorney told him if he pled guilty to five counts of mail fraud, he would serve no more than 10 years in prison because she had a deal with the government that his sentencing range would be 97–121 months’ imprisonment under the Sentencing Guidelines   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment and found that Petitioner’s attorney did not provide Petitioner with ineffective assistance by telling him she had an agreement with the government about his guideline range. Further, the court concluded that Petitioner’s attorney did provide ineffective assistance by underestimating Petitioner’s guideline range.   The court explained that to show deficient performance, the movant must establish that his attorney’s representation “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” The “petitioner bears the heavy burden of showing that no competent counsel would have taken the action that his counsel did take.” Gissendaner v. Seaboldt, 735 F.3d 1311 (11th Cir. 2013).   Here, the court concluded that there was no clear error in the district court’s finding that Petitioner’s attorney reviewed each provision of the plea agreement with him at some point before the change-of-plea hearing. Further, the court held that the district court did not clearly err in finding that Petitioner’s attorney reviewed the plea agreement with Petitioner before the change-of-plea hearing. View "Michael Riolo v. USA" on Justia Law

Defendant Lamar Stanton was charged with three counts of first-degree sexual abuse and two counts of first-degree sodomy. Because defendant was indigent, the trial court appointed counsel to represent him. Over the course of the trial court proceedings, defendant was represented by several different court-appointed lawyers. Defendant expressed frustration with his last-appointed counsel, Lee-Mandlin, and asked her to move to withdraw. Lee-Mandlin filed two motions to withdraw but told the trial court that she was prepared to represent defendant. The court denied the motions, and, after defendant was evaluated at the state hospital and the trial court determined that he was able to aid and assist in his defense, and the case proceeded to a bench trial. The trial court entered a judgment of conviction and sentence, and defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court had erred by proceeding as if defendant had waived his right to court-appointed counsel. The Court of Appeals affirmed without opinion. The Oregon Supreme Court found three motions had been presented with respect to defendant’s representation, and that the trial court should have addressed the three motions separately because they presented different legal questions. Because the trial court did not expressly address these questions, the Supreme Court surmised the trial court could not have concluded defendant expressly waived his right to court-appointed counsel. Consequently, in the context of the multiple pending motions, the trial court’s question to defendant about whether he wanted Lee-Mandlin to withdraw was too ambiguous for defendant’s answer to constitute an intentional relinquishment of his right to court-appointed counsel. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Oregon v. Stanton" on Justia Law

At issue in this post-conviction case was petitioner Steve Franke’s attempt to prove that his criminal trial counsel provided constitutionally inadequate and ineffective assistance by failing to object that an expert diagnosis of child sexual abuse was inadmissible in the absence of corroborating physical evidence. Although the objection would have been contrary to controlling Court of Appeals precedent at the time of petitioner’s 2001 criminal trial, the Oregon Supreme Court later held that the rules of evidence required exclusion of a diagnosis of sexual abuse if it was not based on physical evidence, effectively overruling the Court of Appeals precedent. To survive summary judgment, petitioner offered evidence that some criminal defense attorneys in 2001 viewed the Court of Appeals precedent as vulnerable, were raising the kind of challenge to sexual abuse diagnoses that ultimately succeeded, and were recommending that practice to other criminal defense attorneys. Petitioner contended the evidence would have allowed him to establish that the exercise of reasonable skill and judgment obligated his attorney to raise a similar objection, or at least that his attorney’s failure to raise the argument was the product of a failure to adequately prepare and familiarize himself with the state of the law. Both the post-conviction court and the Court of Appeals held that petitioner’s claim failed as a matter of law. The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that the argument that ultimately succeeded in Southard was not so obviously correct in 2001 that the exercise of reasonable skill obligated attorneys to raise the argument, and petitioner’s evidence did not permit a different conclusion. But the Supreme Court disagreed that petitioner’s claim could be resolved on summary judgment; the evidence created genuine issues of material fact that, if resolved in petitioner’s favor, could establish the failure by petitioner’s attorney to raise a Southard-type challenge to the sexual abuse diagnosis was the product of an unreasonable failure to investigate and familiarize himself with the state of the law to the extent appropriate to the nature and complexity of the case. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the lower courts' judgments and remanded for further proceedings. View "Jackson v. Franke" on Justia Law

Jared Cortes-Gonzalez entered into a global disposition that required him to plead guilty in four felony cases, including two in which he faced complaints to revoke his probation. The plea agreement indicated that, while the sentences would be within the court’s discretion, the cumulative prison term would not exceed twenty years. Two weeks later, Cortes-Gonzalez filed a “Motion to Consider 35-C,” alleging that his attorney (the “public defender”) had provided ineffective assistance by failing to accurately advise him of the plea agreement’s potential punishment. In April 2021, alternate defense counsel submitted a supplemental Crim. P. 35(c) motion. The prosecution asked the district court to issue an order finding a “waiver of all confidential attorney-client privileges or relationships affected by the pursuit” of the Crim. P. 35(c) ineffective assistance claim. The court granted the motion, and the prosecution served an subpoena duces tecum (“SDT”) on the public defender to compel the production records in her possession related to Cortes-Gonzalez’s four cases. The public defender objected to the SDT. The issue presented to the Colorado Supreme Court in this case related to the attorney-client privilege in the context of ineffective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court held: (1) whenever a defendant alleges ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant automatically waives the attorney-client privilege, as well as any other confidentiality, between counsel and the defendant, but only with respect to the information that is related to the ineffective assistance claim; (2) the procedures set forth in Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(V) in no way modify section 18-1-417, C.R.S. (2021); (3) it is improper for prosecutors to request an order or use a Crim. P. 17 subpoena duces tecum (“SDT”) to attempt to access the confidential information covered by section 18-1-417(1); and (4) the prosecution doesn’t have an inherent right to an in camera review of the allegedly ineffective counsel’s case file - even if the purpose of the review is to ensure that all the information subject to the waiver will be produced. After any in camera review, the court must disclose to the prosecution claim-related information not previously produced. View "In re Colorado v. Cortes- Gonzalez" on Justia Law

Bell, Hernandez, and Rayas, fraudulently promised victims that they could save their homes from foreclosure or lower their mortgage payments. They targeted monolingual Spanish‐speakers. They charged a $5,000-$10,000 "membership fee" and spent the fees on personal expenses. Their fraudulent entity never prevented a foreclosure. More than 60 homeowners joined, losing almost $260,000.Bell, Hernandez, and Rayas were charged with mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341. Although Bell consistently refused legal representation, the district court assigned an experienced stand-by attorney. On the eve of trial, Bell moved to retain Joyce, who was newly admitted to the Illinois bar, had never tried a case, and had met Bell at the Metropolitan Correctional Center days earlier, at the behest of Eliades, co‐defendant Rayas’s counsel. Later, Eliades and Joyce denied that Eliades asked Joyce to visit Bell. Conflict attorneys from the Federal Public Defender’s Office discussed the situation with Bell and Rayas separately and held a conflict hearing for Hernandez. Rayas and Hernandez chose new attorneys. Bell insisted on Joyce, signing a waiver in which he acknowledged his right to conflict‐free counsel and the potential conflicts associated with Joyce.Convicted, Bell was sentenced to 150 months’ imprisonment and ordered to pay $259,211 in restitution. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Bell’s waiver was knowing and voluntary; he has not demonstrated actual or serious potential for conflict that would have obliged the court to disregard his waiver. View "United States v. Bell" on Justia Law

Burkhart, the CEO of ASC, a private company that operates Indiana nursing homes and long-term care facilities, orchestrated an extensive conspiracy exploiting the company’s operations and business relationships for personal gain. Most of the funds involved in the scheme came from Medicare and Medicaid. After other defendants pled guilty and Burkhart’s brother agreed to testify against him, Burkhart pled guilty to conspiracy to commit mail, wire, and healthcare fraud (18 U.S.C. 1349); conspiracy to violate the AntiKickback Statute (18 U.S.C. 371); and money laundering (18 U.S.C. 1956(a)(1)(B)(i)). With a Guidelines range of 121-151 months, Burkhart was sentenced to 114 months’ imprisonment.Burkhart later filed a habeas action, contending that his defense counsel, Barnes & Thornburg provided constitutionally deficient representation because the firm also represented Health and Hospital Corporation of Marion County, a victim of the fraudulent scheme. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. While the firm labored under an actual conflict of interest, that conflict did not adversely affect Burkhart’s representation. Nothing in the record shows that the firm improperly shaded its advice to induce Burkhart to plead guilty; the advice reflected a reasonable response to the “dire circumstances” facing Burkhart. The evidence of Burkhart’s guilt was overwhelming. View "Burkhart v. United States" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted for robbery and burglary. In 1996, the trial court sentenced him to 35 years to life in prison, with the bulk of that sentence attributable to the “Three Strikes” law. In 2021, the defendant filed a “Petition for Modification of Sentence (Pursuant to P.C. 1170(d)(1).)” based on “charging and sentencing policies” adopted by Los Angeles County District Attorney Gascón. The defendant quoted Penal Code section 1170(d)(1)1 and argued his 1996 sentence could be modified or recalled because “the district attorney’s office considers that only 15 years of the 25 years [he] already served is more than enough” and the court could consider, under the same statutory provision, his good conduct in prison.The trial court denied relief without appointing counsel for the defendant, “as untimely.” The court of appeal dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction, stating that its independent research uncovered published authority—never cited in the opening brief submitted by counsel—holding that a section 1170(d)(1) ruling is a non-appealable order. A defense attorney has an obligation to disclose known authority holding the court has no jurisdiction to decide an appeal when the prosecution does not cite such authority. View "People v. Williams" on Justia Law

Hardwick helped found a law firm, MHS. MHS later sold part of its foreclosure operation. Hardwick received $14-$15 million in compensation. Hardwick lost the money and owed millions in loans, many for gambling debts. When a bank and a casino sued him, Hardwick lied to a different bank in a line-of-credit application. In addition, in 2011-2014, Hardwick siphoned off about $26.5 million from MHS; $19 million came from trust accounts. Hardwick relied heavily on Maurya, who initially worked as an MHS controller. Hardwick promoted Maurya to CFO, giving her broad authority over the trust accounts. At Hardwick’s request, she repeatedly sent money from MHS to Hardwick or his creditors and significantly underreported the distributions. After a 2014 internal audit, Hardwick was convicted of wire fraud, conspiracy to commit wire fraud, and making false statements to a federally insured financial institution and was sentenced to 180 months’ imprisonment—an upward variance from the Guidelines range of 108-135 months. Maurya received a sentence of 84 months. A restitution order required Maurya and Hardwick to pay, jointly and severally, $40,307,431.00.The Eleventh Circuit vacated the restitution order as not supported by the reasoning required by law; affirmed Hardwick’s convictions and sentence; and vacated Maurya’s sentence. The district court violated the Ex Post Facto Clause by applying the 2018 Guidelines, which included a two-level substantial financial hardship enhancement added in 2015, after Maurya’s offense. View "United States v. Maurya" on Justia Law

Booker is on Florida’s death row for first-degree murder. In 2012, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial of federal habeas relief. In 2020, the Capital Habeas Unit of the Office of the Federal Public Defender (CHU) sought permission to represent Booker in state court to exhaust a “Brady” claim so that Booker could pursue the claim in a successive federal habeas petition. The Brady claim focused on the prosecution’s failure to disclose notes that allegedly could have been used to impeach an FBI hair expert. Booker said that he had learned through a FOIA request and a review by a qualified microscopist that there were inconsistencies between the expert’s trial testimony and his notes. The state objected to the appointment of CHU, noting that Booker had a state-law right to counsel through Florida’s Capital Collateral Regional Counsel North (CCRC-N); CCRC-N counsel was appointed to represent Booker in state court. Nonetheless, the district court appointed CHU under 18 U.S.C. 3599 to represent Booker in state courtThe Eleventh Circuit dismissed an appeal. Florida cannot establish standing based on a hypothetical conflict of interest that is not actual or imminent. State courts are empowered to reject appearances by CHU counsel, so the appointment cannot have inflicted an injury on Florida’s sovereignty. View "Booker v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

Cesar was shot and killed in 2016. Murder charges were filed against Santacruz, Cervantes, Alcantar, and Duran. Vallejo (Duran’s mother) was charged as an accessory after the fact. Judge Colin dismissed that charge against Vallejo in the interest of justice under Penal Code 1385 on February 20, 2020. Judge Colin later recused himself at the request of the prosecution. The case was assigned to Judge Clark, who found Judge Colin’s recusal to have been a concession to retroactive disqualification, and on June 22, 2020, granted the prosecution’s motion to set aside as void all rulings of Judge Colin dating back to January 9, including the February 20 dismissal, thereby reinstating the accessory count against Vallejo.The court of appeal vacated Judge Clark’s ruling, noting that whether the February 20 dismissal was an appropriate exercise of discretion was not before the court. Judge Colin’s order dismissing the charge against Vallejo was a final order terminating the trial court’s authority over her case. The prosecution had a clear remedy to address the trial court’s alleged bias or appearance of bias underlying the dismissal—an appeal under Penal Code 1238,(a)(8), but elected not to appeal. Judge Clark was without jurisdiction to set aside the dismissal. View "Vallejo v. Superior Court" on Justia Law