Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

Burkhart, the CEO of ASC, a private company that operates Indiana nursing homes and long-term care facilities, orchestrated an extensive conspiracy exploiting the company’s operations and business relationships for personal gain. Most of the funds involved in the scheme came from Medicare and Medicaid. After other defendants pled guilty and Burkhart’s brother agreed to testify against him, Burkhart pled guilty to conspiracy to commit mail, wire, and healthcare fraud (18 U.S.C. 1349); conspiracy to violate the AntiKickback Statute (18 U.S.C. 371); and money laundering (18 U.S.C. 1956(a)(1)(B)(i)). With a Guidelines range of 121-151 months, Burkhart was sentenced to 114 months’ imprisonment.Burkhart later filed a habeas action, contending that his defense counsel, Barnes & Thornburg provided constitutionally deficient representation because the firm also represented Health and Hospital Corporation of Marion County, a victim of the fraudulent scheme. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. While the firm labored under an actual conflict of interest, that conflict did not adversely affect Burkhart’s representation. Nothing in the record shows that the firm improperly shaded its advice to induce Burkhart to plead guilty; the advice reflected a reasonable response to the “dire circumstances” facing Burkhart. The evidence of Burkhart’s guilt was overwhelming. View "Burkhart v. United States" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted for robbery and burglary. In 1996, the trial court sentenced him to 35 years to life in prison, with the bulk of that sentence attributable to the “Three Strikes” law. In 2021, the defendant filed a “Petition for Modification of Sentence (Pursuant to P.C. 1170(d)(1).)” based on “charging and sentencing policies” adopted by Los Angeles County District Attorney Gascón. The defendant quoted Penal Code section 1170(d)(1)1 and argued his 1996 sentence could be modified or recalled because “the district attorney’s office considers that only 15 years of the 25 years [he] already served is more than enough” and the court could consider, under the same statutory provision, his good conduct in prison.The trial court denied relief without appointing counsel for the defendant, “as untimely.” The court of appeal dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction, stating that its independent research uncovered published authority—never cited in the opening brief submitted by counsel—holding that a section 1170(d)(1) ruling is a non-appealable order. A defense attorney has an obligation to disclose known authority holding the court has no jurisdiction to decide an appeal when the prosecution does not cite such authority. View "People v. Williams" on Justia Law

Hardwick helped found a law firm, MHS. MHS later sold part of its foreclosure operation. Hardwick received $14-$15 million in compensation. Hardwick lost the money and owed millions in loans, many for gambling debts. When a bank and a casino sued him, Hardwick lied to a different bank in a line-of-credit application. In addition, in 2011-2014, Hardwick siphoned off about $26.5 million from MHS; $19 million came from trust accounts. Hardwick relied heavily on Maurya, who initially worked as an MHS controller. Hardwick promoted Maurya to CFO, giving her broad authority over the trust accounts. At Hardwick’s request, she repeatedly sent money from MHS to Hardwick or his creditors and significantly underreported the distributions. After a 2014 internal audit, Hardwick was convicted of wire fraud, conspiracy to commit wire fraud, and making false statements to a federally insured financial institution and was sentenced to 180 months’ imprisonment—an upward variance from the Guidelines range of 108-135 months. Maurya received a sentence of 84 months. A restitution order required Maurya and Hardwick to pay, jointly and severally, $40,307,431.00.The Eleventh Circuit vacated the restitution order as not supported by the reasoning required by law; affirmed Hardwick’s convictions and sentence; and vacated Maurya’s sentence. The district court violated the Ex Post Facto Clause by applying the 2018 Guidelines, which included a two-level substantial financial hardship enhancement added in 2015, after Maurya’s offense. View "United States v. Maurya" on Justia Law

Booker is on Florida’s death row for first-degree murder. In 2012, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial of federal habeas relief. In 2020, the Capital Habeas Unit of the Office of the Federal Public Defender (CHU) sought permission to represent Booker in state court to exhaust a “Brady” claim so that Booker could pursue the claim in a successive federal habeas petition. The Brady claim focused on the prosecution’s failure to disclose notes that allegedly could have been used to impeach an FBI hair expert. Booker said that he had learned through a FOIA request and a review by a qualified microscopist that there were inconsistencies between the expert’s trial testimony and his notes. The state objected to the appointment of CHU, noting that Booker had a state-law right to counsel through Florida’s Capital Collateral Regional Counsel North (CCRC-N); CCRC-N counsel was appointed to represent Booker in state court. Nonetheless, the district court appointed CHU under 18 U.S.C. 3599 to represent Booker in state courtThe Eleventh Circuit dismissed an appeal. Florida cannot establish standing based on a hypothetical conflict of interest that is not actual or imminent. State courts are empowered to reject appearances by CHU counsel, so the appointment cannot have inflicted an injury on Florida’s sovereignty. View "Booker v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

Cesar was shot and killed in 2016. Murder charges were filed against Santacruz, Cervantes, Alcantar, and Duran. Vallejo (Duran’s mother) was charged as an accessory after the fact. Judge Colin dismissed that charge against Vallejo in the interest of justice under Penal Code 1385 on February 20, 2020. Judge Colin later recused himself at the request of the prosecution. The case was assigned to Judge Clark, who found Judge Colin’s recusal to have been a concession to retroactive disqualification, and on June 22, 2020, granted the prosecution’s motion to set aside as void all rulings of Judge Colin dating back to January 9, including the February 20 dismissal, thereby reinstating the accessory count against Vallejo.The court of appeal vacated Judge Clark’s ruling, noting that whether the February 20 dismissal was an appropriate exercise of discretion was not before the court. Judge Colin’s order dismissing the charge against Vallejo was a final order terminating the trial court’s authority over her case. The prosecution had a clear remedy to address the trial court’s alleged bias or appearance of bias underlying the dismissal—an appeal under Penal Code 1238,(a)(8), but elected not to appeal. Judge Clark was without jurisdiction to set aside the dismissal. View "Vallejo v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

In 2015, Yost was charged with multiple counts of first-degree murder in connection with the fatal stabbing of his former girlfriend, Randall. After Yost was convicted, he notified the court that he had just learned that his appointed counsel, Rau, had represented Randall in a past case; he requested a new trial. Rau also filed a motion for a new trial but did not reference Yost’s allegations of a conflict of interest. The court denied the motion and sentenced Yost to 75 years’ imprisonment. After conducting a preliminary inquiry on remand, the trial court concluded that the allegations had merit and appointed new counsel, Lookofsky, to investigate. Yost’s amended motion for a new trial alleged that Rau had represented Randall, on two prior occasions in an unrelated case. Yost waived any conflict of interest based on Lookofsky’s prior hiring of Rau on an unrelated civil matter and any conflict-of-interest claims based on the judge’s prior representation of Yost’s family members.The court concluded that there was no per se conflict of interest, which would have required automatic reversal of the conviction, absent a waiver. The Illinois Supreme Court agreed. Illinois now recognizes three per se conflicts of interest: when defense counsel has a contemporaneous association with the victim, the prosecution, or an entity assisting the prosecution; when defense counsel contemporaneously represents a prosecution witness; and when defense counsel was a former prosecutor who was personally involved in the defendant's prosecution. Yost did not claim an actual conflict of interest. View "People v. Yost" on Justia Law

The State of Louisiana alleged that in July 2015, defendant Walter Johnson, JaQuendas Octave, Jay Lyons, and Casey Johnson took jewelry, cell phones, wallets, money, and credit cards at gunpoint from Roussel’s Antiques on Airline Highway in Gonzales and from the store’s employees. In September 2015, the State charged defendant and the others with four counts of armed robbery committed with the use of a firearm. The State also charged defendant with possession of a firearm by a person convicted of certain felonies. Defendant’s trial was set for June 21, 2017, with a status hearing scheduled for April 17, 2017. However, defendant was not transported to court on April 17. The trial court reset trial for the week of January 22, 2018, and advised the parties that this was a special setting and no further continuances would be granted. For various reasons, such as witness unavailability, scheduling conflicts and other issues, none of which were attributable to the defense, trial was set for September 2019. After argument, the trial court granted defendant's motion to quash, finding the State had flaunted its authority to dismiss and reinstitute to, in effect, grant itself the continuance the trial court had denied, and that the State had done so as a dilatory tactic at defendant’s expense. While acknowledging that the unavailability of a material witness might ordinarily justify granting a continuance, the trial court determined that the witness unavailability was used a pretext and the State was simply unprepared for trial. The court of appeal reversed the trial court's ruling and remanded for further proceedings. The court of appeal found that the trial court had abused its discretion in granting the motion to quash because defendant was not prejudiced by the delay. The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the court of appeal, finding the appellate court erred in determining that the trial court abused its discretion in granting defendant’s motion to quash. "Under the unusual circumstances presented, we can find no abuse of discretion when the record supports the trial court’s determination that the absence of the witness was a pretext and that the State was simply unprepared for trial." View "Louisiana v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Isaac Zafft was fatally shot when a marijuana greenhouse in which he was sleeping was being robbed. In 2014, Nathan Philbrook and Daniel Devencenzi stole marijuana from multiple marijuana farms and greenhouses Philbrook’s wife, Amber N., helped locate on Google Earth. In July, Philbrook invited defendant Finley Fultz to a marijuana theft with him and Devencenzi. Philbrook and defendant drove to California from Nevada in defendant’s truck and Devencenzi followed in his truck. Philbrook entered the greenhouse’s back door, while Devencenzi stayed outside the back door and, according to Philbrook, defendant walked to the front of the greenhouse. Zafft awoke to the sound of Philbrook’s presence and saw the laser sight attached to Philbrook’s AR-15 style handgun. Zafft ran out the front door of the greenhouse where defendant was located. Defendant shot five times, hitting Zafft. The group fled back to Nevada. Upon their return to Nevada, defendant admitted to Amber he delivered the fatal shots, and Philbrook made statements inculpating defendant as the shooter. During the pendency of defendant’s, Devencenzi’s, and Philbrook’s joint criminal prosecution, Devencenzi and Philbrook pled guilty in exchange for reduced sentences. The prosecution failed to inform defendant that those bargains were offered as package deals, contingent on both Devencenzi and Philbrook accepting the plea bargains and fulfilling the bargains’ terms for either to benefit. The prosecution also failed to inform defendant the offers were contingent upon Philbrook and Devencenzi including in a written factual statement that they and defendant participated in a robbery and defendant killed Zafft. When making those bargains, Devencenzi and Philbrook agreed to be interviewed by the prosecution, which the prosecution failed to audio record. Finally, the prosecution continued its investigation of the case against defendant during trial and did not disclose material it intended to use against him until shortly before it was to be offered into evidence. Based on the government’s conduct throughout the investigation and trial, the trial court made several credibility findings rejecting the prosecution’s innocent explanations for the constitutional violations. The trial court then dismissed the case against defendant finding there was no possibility he could receive a fair trial considering the nature of the evidence against him and the violations surrounding his accomplices’ pleas and interviews. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court's finding was made in error: because the record demonstrated the trial court believed a fair trial could be had in the absence of the "Medina" error, it was appropriate to reverse the judgment and remand the matter to the trial court to "again tailor relief to neutralize the taint resulting from the prosecutor’s other misconduct." View "California v. Fultz" on Justia Law

Before pleading guilty, Glover attempted to hire an attorney. The attorney sent thousands of dollars sent by Glover's family to the DEA, believing the funds were drug proceeds. The government seized the funds under 21 U.S.C. 881(a)(6). Glover began filing pro se motions concerning the seized funds. Glover and his second appointed counsel (Ehlies) requested a “Farmer” hearing on the subject of the seized funds. The government acknowledged that a hearing pursuant to Farmer "might be necessary.” Instead of setting such a hearing, the court focused on Glover’s frequent pro se motions and whether Glover wanted to continue to be represented by counsel. The court stated that it would not appoint new counsel and indicated that it would not address the “Farmer” issue unless Glover chose to represent himself.Glover pleaded guilty to two counts of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of a drug containing cocaine, heroin, fentanyl, methamphetamine, and marijuana; and conspiracy to conduct financial transactions involving proceeds of unlawful activity. Before sentencing, Glover filed a pro se motion requesting to withdraw his plea, making numerous allegations of misconduct by Ehlies. The court declined to appoint new counsel, determining that Glover could either proceed pro se (he again declined) or be represented by Ehlies, and denied the motion.The Fourth Circuit vacated. Precedent precluded Glover’s argument that the government wrongly seized untainted assets needed to hire the counsel of his choice but Glover’s attorney had a conflict of interest at his plea withdrawal hearing and substitute counsel should have represented him there. View "United States v. Glover" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit granted counsel's motion to withdraw pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), in defendant's appeal from the district court's final order denying his motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A). Because a defendant has no constitutional or statutory right to assistance of counsel on a compassionate release motion or an appeal from the denial of such a motion, the court held that an attorney seeking to be relieved before it in that context need not file a motion and brief that comply with the requirements of Anders. Instead, counsel's motion to be relieved must adhere to Rule 27 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and Local Rule 27.1 by stating with particularity the grounds for the motion, the relief requested, and the legal argument supporting that request, as well as attaching an affidavit indicating that counsel has advised the defendant of the process for obtaining court-appointed counsel or proceeding pro se. Counsel in this case complied with the requirements of Rule 27. The court also denied the government's motion for summary affirmance of the district court's decision. View "United States v. Fleming" on Justia Law