Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

The Idaho Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Idaho State Appellate Public Defender (SAPD) in a case involving the SAPD's statutory duty to arrange for substitute counsel for indigent defendants when a conflict of interest arises. The SAPD filed a direct action against the Fourth Judicial District Court, alleging that the court infringed on the SAPD’s statutory duty to arrange a new attorney for a defendant named Azad Abdullah. The SAPD had identified a conflict of interest in its own office and tried to substitute an attorney from Pennsylvania, but the district court refused the substitution and appointed a new attorney of its own choosing. The Idaho Supreme Court held that the district court had obstructed the SAPD's statutory duty and authority under Idaho Code section 19-5906. The Court ordered the district court's decisions to be vacated, restored the SAPD as attorney of record for the limited purpose of arranging for substitute counsel, and ordered the appointment of a new district judge to preside over Abdullah’s post-conviction proceeding. View "SAPD v. Fourth Judicial District" on Justia Law

In a case heard by the Supreme Court of Minnesota, the defendant, Christian Portillo, was charged with two counts of second-degree criminal sexual conduct. During the trial, the prosecutor elicited testimony from the State’s witnesses regarding evidence that the district court had previously ruled as inadmissible. The defendant's motion for a mistrial was denied by the district court. During the closing-argument rebuttal, the prosecutor told the jury that the defendant no longer held the presumption of innocence based on the evidence presented during the trial. The defendant did not object to this statement. The jury found the defendant guilty of one count of second-degree criminal sexual conduct.The defendant appealed, arguing that he was denied a fair trial due to prosecutorial errors committed by the State. The court of appeals affirmed the district court's decision, concluding that the prosecutor's misstatement of the law did not affect the defendant's substantial rights.Upon review, the Supreme Court of Minnesota reversed the decision of the court of appeals. The Supreme Court found that the prosecutor’s misstatement of the law during the closing-argument rebuttal was a plain error that affected the defendant’s substantial rights. The court held that the defendant is entitled to a new trial as the error must be addressed to ensure the fairness and integrity of the judicial proceedings. View "State of Minnesota vs. Portillo" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the ruling of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, which had denied Adam Carson's motion to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Carson had been convicted of robbing a bank and tampering with a witness, and was sentenced to 20 years in prison. In his motion, Carson argued that his trial attorney had provided ineffective assistance by failing to initiate plea negotiations and by committing several mistakes during the trial. He also claimed that he did not knowingly waive his right to testify. The Court of Appeals held that Carson's ineffective-assistance claims failed because they lacked grounds for prejudice. The court ruled there was no reasonable probability that the outcome of Carson's case would have been different if his attorney had acted differently. The court also held that Carson had not demonstrated that he was deprived of his right to testify, as he did not object on the record to his attorney's statement that he did not want to testify. View "Carson v. United States" on Justia Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld a conviction against Richard Lee David Brown for possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance. Law enforcement found Brown in an apartment during the execution of a search warrant, along with drugs, drug paraphernalia, and a cell phone that Brown admitted was his. Brown appealed his conviction, alleging multiple pre-trial and trial-related errors. However, the court affirmed the conviction, rejecting Brown's claims that he was improperly denied a jury instruction regarding "mere presence," that the court erred in admitting evidence of his prior convictions, and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, among other issues. The court held that the instructions given to the jury were adequate and that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction. The court also found that Brown's claims of ineffective assistance were best left for a post-conviction relief proceeding, such as a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The court concluded that none of the alleged errors either individually or cumulatively warranted reversal of the conviction. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law

In this case, defendant Joseph James Tippet was initially charged with first-degree murder for allegedly shooting and killing his father. However, due to a series of discovery violations by the Eleventh Judicial District Attorney's Office, Tippet's charge was reduced to second-degree murder by the district court as a deterrent sanction. The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado was asked to review this decision.The People (prosecution) had a history of neglecting their discovery obligations, leading to multiple discovery violations in Tippet's case and others. Despite several warnings from various judges, the District Attorney's Office continued to neglect its discovery obligations. As a result, Tippet's defense counsel was unable to effectively prepare for his preliminary hearing.The Supreme Court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by reducing Tippet's charge as a sanction for the District Attorney's Office's consistent neglect of its discovery obligations. The court emphasized the importance of the discovery process in advancing the search for truth and protecting the integrity of the truth-finding process. The court affirmed the sanction as a necessary deterrent to encourage the District Attorney's Office to modify its discovery practices. The court also rejected the People's argument that the district court lacked the authority to reduce the charge as a discovery sanction, explaining that the decision to impose sanctions for discovery violations was within the court's discretion.In conclusion, the court discharged the rule to show cause, upholding the district court's decision to reduce Tippet's charge from first-degree murder to second-degree murder as a deterrent sanction for the District Attorney's Office's discovery violations. View "People v. Tippet" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant, Manegabe Chebea Ally, was convicted of first-degree manslaughter for the death of a 16-month-old child. He was sentenced to a 45-year prison term with 20 years suspended. Following his conviction, Ally appealed, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective in several respects. After a series of evidentiary hearings, the habeas court granted him relief, determining that his counsel was indeed ineffective and that the cumulative effect of these deficiencies prejudiced his defense. The habeas court determined that Ally's right to a fair trial was violated.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota, however, reversed the decision of the habeas court. The Supreme Court found that while Ally's counsel's opening statement included an imprecise remark, this mistake did not undermine the adversarial process or deprive Ally of a fair trial. The Court also found that Ally's defense counsel made a reasonably strategic decision to exclude parts of Ally's three interviews with a detective and to not elicit additional testimony from a medical expert. Although the Court acknowledged that the defense counsel's failure to disclose a certain video to the prosecutor deviated from prevailing professional norms, it did not result in significant prejudice to Ally. The Court therefore concluded that Ally did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel at his 2012 trial, and the decision of the habeas court was reversed. View "Ally V. Young" on Justia Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of North Dakota, the appellant Jean-Michael Kisi appealed from orders dismissing in part and denying in part his application for postconviction relief. Kisi contended that he was wrongfully convicted of a non-cognizable offense, accomplice to attempted murder. He further argued that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, the lower court followed improper trial procedures, and the State committed prosecutorial misconduct.The Supreme Court of North Dakota upheld the lower court's decision, affirming that an attempted knowing murder is not a cognizable offense. However, the Court found that the erroneous inclusion of "knowing" in the jury instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, as the evidence presented indicated that the jury convicted Kisi of attempted intentional murder.Kisi's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was also dismissed. The Court held that there was no genuine issue of material fact, and the representation of his counsel did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness. Kisi's claims regarding improper trial procedure and prosecutorial misconduct were summarily dismissed. The Court, therefore, affirmed the lower court's order dismissing in part and denying in part Kisi's application for postconviction relief. View "Kisi v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Nebraska affirmed the convictions and sentences of Trenton R. Esch for first degree murder, use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony, and possession of a deadly weapon by a prohibited person. Esch argued that the jury instructions concerning reasonable doubt and intoxication were in error, and that his counsel was ineffective in failing to object to these instructions. The court found that the instructions, when read as a whole, correctly conveyed the concept of reasonable doubt to the jury and were not misleading. Further, the court ruled that there was no plain error indicative of a probable miscarriage of justice. The court also determined that Esch's counsel was not ineffective in failing to object to the instructions or in his handling of the evidence and arguments related to Esch's intoxication. The court rejected Esch's remaining claims of ineffective assistance of counsel due to an insufficient record. The case centered around Esch's killing of his stepmother, with the primary issue at trial being whether Esch shot her purposely and with deliberate and premeditated malice, or whether he acted impulsively under the influence of alcohol. The jury found Esch guilty of first degree murder. View "State v. Esch" on Justia Law

The trial court appointed the same attorney (counsel) to represent defendant Mark Foley and Raymond Gladden, who had been a codefendant in the underlying criminal trial, at a consolidated evidentiary hearing after both had filed separate petitions for resentencing. Both men were not the actual killer, but both had been convicted of murder on a felony-murder theory. At the hearing, to save the murder convictions, the prosecution was required to prove that defendant’s and Gladden’s individual participation in the underlying felony of kidnapping made them major participants in the kidnapping and that they acted with reckless indifference to human life. The prosecution argued those elements were satisfied for defendant and Gladden. Counsel then argued factors she considered favorable to defendant and also argued factors favorable to Gladden. But the same factors did not favor both, and counsel stated Gladden “certainly [had] the stronger petition.” The court granted Gladden’s petition only. The Court of Appeal reversed the denial of defendant’s petition because the court violated defendant’s constitutional right to conflict-free representation. The case was remanded for a new evidentiary hearing. View "California v. Foley" on Justia Law

Pfister and Evans dealt methamphetamine in Illinois. In 2016, they traveled to Colorado approximately 20 times to buy meth from Wright. After Evans sold several ounces to Heavener, officers searched Heavener’s home and recovered over 50 grams of meth. Heavener knew that Evans got the meth from “Monica” in Colorado.Wright was charged with intent to distribute at least 50 grams of meth and at least 500 grams of a mixture containing meth. She retained Garfinkel. In its opening statement, the government previewed testimony from Evans, Pfister, Heavener, and Deherrera, a Colorado-based middleman. Garfinkle also foreshadowed testimony from Deherrera, referring to him as the government’s witness. During trial, the government alerted the court that Deherrera had stated that Garfinkel had encouraged him to change his testimony. The government referenced Deherrera’s potentially exculpatory testimony but stated that it no longer planned to call him as a witness, noting that if Wright called Deherrera and he testified to being pressured to change his testimony, Garfinkel would have to take the stand to impeach him. Garfinkel denied Deherrera’s allegations. The court questioned Wright, who confirmed she agreed with Garfinkel’s strategy to not call Deherrera, understanding the possibility that Garfinkel was personally motivated. Deherrera did not testify. In closing arguments, Garfinkel described Deherrera’s absence as the missing link—a burden the government had to overcome to convict Wright. Wright was convicted and sentenced to 264 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding no conflict of interest and sufficient evidence of conspiracy. View "United States v. Wright" on Justia Law