Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

Defendant Zirachuen Rivera drove through a DWI checkpoint in Bernalillo County and an officer suspected he had been drinking alcohol. Defendant showed signs of impairment on the standard field sobriety tests and was arrested on suspicion of driving while intoxicated. Defendant’s bench trial began in Metropolitan Court where assistant district attorney Rachel Bayless entered an appearance for both herself and Chris Mills, a purported attorney, on behalf of the State. At the conclusion of trial, Defendant was found guilty of driving while intoxicated. Upon leaving the courtroom, defense counsel overheard Mills telling Bayless that he had decided not to take the New Mexico bar exam. Upon learning that Mills was not a licensed New Mexico attorney, Defendant filed a motion for a mistrial and a new trial. Defendant later attached a certificate from the Chief Clerk of the New Mexico Supreme Court to affirm that Mills was not on the official roll of New Mexico attorneys.In its opinion in this case, the Supreme Court clarified the rules and judicial precedent pertaining to the authorized practice of law in all state courts. The Court held that practice is limited to "duly licensed attorneys who are members of the State Bar or otherwise authorized by this Court’s rules in specific, limited circumstances." Because the Court of Appeals relied on statutory expressions that appeared to permit the unauthorized practice of law in magistrate courts, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals while affirming Defendant's conviction. View "New Mexico v. Rivera" on Justia Law

Petitioners, citizens of Mexico, entered the U.S. unlawfully in 1993 and 1998, respectively. Since 2000, husband has been seeking employment-based permanent residency. An individual who would not ordinarily qualify for lawful permanent residency because he entered without inspection, may apply as the beneficiary of a labor certification application or a visa petition filed on or before April 30, 2001, 8 U.S.C. 1255(i). According to the court, petitioners' former attorney provided incompetent, and at times ethically questionable, representation throughout the visa petition process, missing filing deadlines and sending associates to hearings without adequate information about the case, so that an IJ granted voluntary departure and the BIA affirmed denial of a motion to reopen. The Third Circuit denied review. The Due Process Clause does not guarantee an alien effective assistance of counsel in preparing, filing, and appealing a labor certification application and a visa petition before the start of removal proceedings. By the time removal proceedings began, petitioners had accrued more than one year of unlawful presence and would have been ordered removed regardless of counsel's actions.View "Contreras v. Attorney Gen. of U.S." on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to transporting a minor in interstate commerce for the purpose of prostitution, 18 U.S.C. 2423(a) and was sentenced to 210 months' imprisonment. Appeal was dismissed on the basis of waiver in the plea agreement. Defendant filed a collateral attack within a year, arguing that his attorney had a conflict of interest, because he formerly represented one of defendant's prostitutes in a different case, and furnished ineffective assistance of counsel because he did not obtain a formal waiver of the conflict. The district court denied the petition, concluding that the record did not supply any reason to think that counsel's work on the 2003 prostitution claim would have diminished his ability to represent defendant effectively. A subsequent motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) was accompanied by more factual detail, but was denied. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of the petition and vacated with respect to the 60(b) motion, instructing the district court to dismiss the motion as a successive collateral attack, barred by 28 U.S.C. 2244(b) even though the first ruling was still pending on appeal. View "Phillips v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued defendants under Title VII, alleging claims of racial harassment and constructive discharge. Plaintiff subsequently appealed the district court's dismissal of his complaint based on a finding that plaintiff committed perjury and the district court's grant of defendants' motion for sanctions. Plaintiff argued that a less severe sanction was more appropriate and that the district court should have held an evidentiary hearing to allow plaintiff to explain his conflicting testimony. Plaintiff's counsel, who was separately sanctioned, also appealed the denial of his motion for recusal of the magistrate judge. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in deciding to dismiss plaintiff's complaint with prejudice where plaintiff plainly committed perjury; plaintiff's argument that the district court failed to hold a hearing was meritless where he made no effort to explain why he and his attorney failed to show at the hearing held by the district court to address objections to the magistrate judge's report; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying counsel's motion for recusal where a reasonable person would not question the magistrate judge's impartiality in this case. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Brown v. Oil States Skagit Smatco, et al." on Justia Law

The Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance (Commission) filed a Formal Complaint charging Youth Court Judge Leigh Ann Darby with violating various Canons of the Mississippi Code of Judicial Conduct and with "willful misconduct in office" and "conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice which brings the judicial office into disrepute[.]" Judge Darby held a mother in contempt of court for disobeying her verbal orders pertaining to the house arrest of the mother's fifteen-year-old daughter. The mother brought her complaint against the judge when "she wrongly imposed sanctions against [her] for contempt of court without first affording her the due process rights required in a criminal contempt matter." The judge and the Commission jointly proposed a recommendation that the judge be publicly reprimanded and fined. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Commission's recommendation, and ordered the judge be publicly reprimanded, fined $500 and assessed costs. View "Mississippi Comm'n on Judicial Perm. v. Darby" on Justia Law

Defendants, moved the district court to dismiss plaintiff's complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that Mathew Trainor, a Fulton County Assistant District Attorney, was absolutely immune from plaintiff's claims. The court affirmed the district court to the extent it found Trainor absolutely immune from plaintiff's claim that Trainor violated her constitutional rights by making false statements in support of a material witness order. The court vacated and remanded the rest of the order and judgment because absolute immunity did not immunize prosecutors from liability for making defamatory statements to the press, accessing a person's voicemail without consent, or persuading a party to a conversation to record its contents; and, the district court should consider in the first instance whether Trainor was absolutely immune for continuing to withhold/preserve evidence - plaintiff's cell phone. View "Flagler v. Trainor" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Susan Rose, a Utah lawyer, initiated the underlying federal lawsuit to challenge the constitutionality of state disciplinary proceedings brought against her by the Utah bar. She also sought a preliminary injunction to enjoin those proceedings. The district court denied the injunction, and while this appeal from the injunction decision was pending, it dismissed the underlying action. The Bar moved to dismiss the appeal, claiming it was mooted by the dismissal of the underlying action. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit agreed this appeal was moot, and granted the Bar's motion to dismiss. View "Rose v. Utah State Bar" on Justia Law

The Minnesota Board on Judicial Standards filed a formal complaint against Judge Patricia Karasov, judge of a district court, alleging violations of the Rules of the Code of Judicial Conduct and the Minnesota Constitution. A three-member panel appointed by the Supreme Court (1) found that Judge Karasov failed to reside within her judicial district during her continuance in office and failed to cooperate and be candid and honest with respect to the Board's investigation of her residency status, and (2) recommended that Judge Karasov be censured and suspended from judicial office for ninety days without pay. Both Judge Karasov and the Board appealed. The Supreme Court concluded (1) the Board proved by clear and convincing evidence that Judge Karasov committed judicial misconduct by clear and convincing evidence; (2) Judge Karasov's claim that she was denied due process of law by irregularities in the proceedings lacked merit; and (3) the appropriate judicial discipline was censure and suspension from judicial duties for six months without pay. View "In re Conduct of Judge Karasov" on Justia Law

A federal grand jury issued a subpoena to a law office, commanding production of documents relating to a real estate transaction. The attorney obtained the client's consent and complied. The client changed his mind, notified USAO that the documents were privileged, and moved to quash the subpoena.The district court found that the documents were not privileged. The First Circuit affirmed. The district court acted within its discretion in conducting an in camera review; the client's generalized assertion of privilege did not establish that privilege attached to any particular document. The documents would have been disclosed at closing and the attorney essentially acted as a scrivener and disburser of funds. The request for production did not implicate the privilege against self-incriminating testimony. View "In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Mr. S.)" on Justia Law

This action arose from a complaint filed in 2006 with the Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance against a then Mississippi Supreme Court Justice. The justice was ultimately acquitted of various criminal charges and his wife plead guilty to tax evasion. After the cessation of the criminal prosecution, the prosecuting U.S. Attorney, relative to plaintiff, filed a complaint with the Commission. Accordingly to the justice and his wife, the U.S. Attorney unlawfully attached their tax and other financial records obtained during the criminal investigation to the complaint. Plaintiff served as a member of the Commission and participated in the Commission's investigation of the justice. Although the Commission dismissed the complaint, counsel to the justice and his wife sent plaintiff two letters threatening legal action based on his role in the investigation. Plaintiff responded by filing a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment of immunity from suit for conduct arising out of his duties with the Commission. The justice's wife subsequently filed counterclaims against plaintiff, asserting various federal and state law causes of action arising, in relevant part, from plaintiff's alleged disclosure of the Commission's confidential investigation. The court held that the judgment of the district court, insofar as it denied immunity to plaintiff for his filing of the declaratory relief action, was reversed, and the case remanded to the district court for further proceedings. View "Lampton v. Diaz, Jr., et al." on Justia Law