Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

Appellant Harrill & Sutter filed a complaint in the circuit court alleging a violation of Arkansas's Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Appellant had previously filed a medical-malpractice action against three physicians, who were employed by the University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences (UAMS). Mariam Hopkins was hired to represent the physicians. Appellant subsequently filed a FOIA request asserting that because Hopkins represented public employees, Hopkins's file was a public record. Hopkins refused to allow Appellant to inspect the file, and Appellant filed the present case. The circuit court found (1) Hopkins, her firm, and the physicians were not the custodians for the FOIA request to UAMS or to the University of Arkansas Board of Trustees; (2) Appellees did not have administrative control of the public records of those entities; (3) the records sought by Appellant were not public records under FOIA and, therefore, were not subject to a FOIA request; and (4) the litigation files and documents sought by the FOIA request were subject to attorney-client privilege and were work-product. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in finding that FOIA did not apply. View "Harrill & Sutter, PLLC v. Farrar" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from a class action that began more than a quarter century ago where Idaho state prisoners at the Idaho State Correctional Institution (ISCI) prevailed on their claims that, inter alia, because of deliberate indifference, without any connection to a legitimate penological purpose, the inmates were subjected to needless pain and suffering on account of inadequate medical and psychiatric care. The district court issued an injunction to remedy the constitutional violations and the injunctions remained in effect in 2008 and 2009 when the facts giving rise to this case occurred. The Portland law firm of Stoel Rives, LLP was appointed to represent the prisoner class. At issue on appeal was whether Stoel Rives was entitled to an attorneys' fee award in the class action under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. 1997e. The court held that, in this case, the judge had discretion to consider whether Stoel Rives's work on a motion to compel conformity to the injunction was "directly and reasonably incurred in enforcing the relief." The district court acted within the bounds of its discretion in awarding fees in a reasonable amount for bringing about that conformity with the injunction. Here, Stoel Rives's work was what one would expect of a lawyer working for a client that could afford its efforts but that was not indifferent to the cost. The firm showed no evidence of milking the case, and the fees were "directly and reasonably incurred." Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Balla v. State of Idaho, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a complaint and moved for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, alleging section 16, article V, of the Iowa Constitution, as implemented by Iowa Code sections 46.2, 46.4-46.10, and 46.14, violated their Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection under the laws. The court concluded that the State Judicial Nominating Commission was a "special limited purpose" entity for its sole function was to select the most qualified candidates for judicial appointments and forward the names of these candidates to the Governor for a final appointment. This narrow function had a disproportionate effect on a definable group of constituents - members of the Iowa Bar - over other voters in the state. Therefore, the election of the attorney members of the Commission was an election of special interest. Applying rational basis review, the court agreed that the district court's Iowa system of election for the Commission's attorney members by and from members of the Iowa Bar was rationally related to Iowa's legitimate interests. Therefore, Iowa's system did not violate plaintiffs' rights under the Equal Protection Clause. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Carlson, et al. v. Justice David Wiggins, et al." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of corruptly endeavoring to obstruct the due administration of justice and one count of knowingly making a materially false statement to a governmental agency. Defendant's convictions stemmed from him falsely representing that he was a licensed attorney. The court held that the evidence adduced at trial supported the jury's verdict; the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to instruct the jury in accordance with defendant's definition of "corruptly"; and assuming the district court erred in applying one or more of the enhancements to defendant's offense level, thereby incorrectly calculating the advisory guidelines range, the Government, as proponent of the sentence, had discharged its burden to show that defendant's substantial rights were not affected by any error because the district court made detailed, alternative findings that it would have sentenced defendant to 65 months of imprisonment, notwithstanding whether any or some of the enhancements were applied to his offense level. View "United States v. Richardson, Jr." on Justia Law

This appeal concerned a First Amendment challenge to a New York rule requiring attorneys to identify themselves as certified specialists to make a prescribed disclosure statement. At issue was whether Rule 7.4 of the New York Rules of Professional Conduct, N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 22 section 1200.53(c)(1), which required a prescribed disclaimer statement to be made by attorneys who stated that they were certified as a specialist in a particular area of law either violated plaintiff's freedom of speech or was unconstitutionally vague. Because enforcement of two components of the required disclaimer statement would violate the First Amendment and because the absence of standards guiding administrators of Rule 7.4 rendered it unconstitutionally vague as applied to plaintiff, the court reversed with directions to enter judgment for plaintiff. View "Hayes v. State of New York Attorney Grievance Comm." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of criminal contempt of court in violation of 18 U.S.C. 402 for "ghostwriting" eight pleadings for a pro se litigant in a civil lawsuit. Defendant appealed his conviction on four grounds, contending that: (1) he was denied his statutory right to a jury trial; (2) he could not be prosecuted for criminal contempt under section 402 on the basis that he did not comply with Local Rules 10-1 and 10-2; (3) Nevada Revised Statute 7.285 was unconstitutionally vague as applied to him; and (4) he did not violate section 7.285. The court held that the failure to try defendant by jury mandated reversal of his criminal contempt conviction where deprivation of the right to a jury trial constituted a structural error requiring reversal. The court also held that local court rules, including Rule 10-1 and 10-2, did not constitute rules within the meaning of section 402 and thus could not serve as predicates for criminal convictions. Therefore, the court reversed defendant's conviction based on the first two claims and did not reach the remaining claims. View "United States v. Kimsey" on Justia Law

This case concerned California's adoption of an initiative constitutional amendment to prohibit same-sex marriage. At issue was whether the district court abused its discretion by ordering the unsealing of the video recording of the trial, which had purportedly been prepared by the trial judge for his in-chambers use only and was later placed in the record and sealed by him. The order, issued by his successor following his retirement, would permit the broadcast of the recording for all to view. The court concluded that the district court abused its discretion by ordering the unsealing of the recording of the trial notwithstanding the trial judge's commitment to the parties that the recording would not be publicly broadcasted. The district court further abused its discretion by holding that the determinations made by the trial judge regarding the placement of the recording under seal did not bind a different judge presented with a motion to unseal - a conclusion the court regarded as an "implausible" and "illogical" application of the law. Therefore, the court reversed the order of the district court and remanded with instructions to maintain the recording under seal. View "Perry, et al. v. Brown, Jr., et al." on Justia Law

In 2007, plaintiff applied for admission to the Indiana Bar. The Board of Law Examiners requested that he attend hearings to investigate his application and be evaluated by mental health professionals and ultimately denied the application. After exhausting appeals to the Indiana Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court, plaintiff brought suit, claiming that evaluation of his application focused on his religious beliefs (ostensibly Roman Catholic) and violated his constitutional rights. The district court dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and found that the defendants were immune from civil suit. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the gravamen of the claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983 required review of a state court decision and could have been raised in his appeals.View "Brown v. Bowman" on Justia Law

This case arose out of patent infringement litigation. At issue was whether federal courts possess exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over state-based legal malpractice claims that require the application of patent law. The federal patent issue presented here was necessary, disputed, and substantial within the context of the overlying state legal malpractice lawsuit. Additionally, the patent issue could be determined without creating a jurisdictional imbalance between state and federal courts. Therefore, the court concluded that exclusive federal jurisdiction existed in this case. Accordingly, without reaching the merits of the legal malpractice claim, the court reversed the court of appeals' judgment and dismissed this case. View "Minton v. Gunn, et al." on Justia Law

The prosecutor in this case, Assistant U.S. Attorney Jerry R. Albert, accused defendant of having lied to the federal magistrate presiding at an earlier hearing. Without telling the court or defense counsel, the prosecutor presented to court and counsel an altered version of the prior hearing's question and answer and the altered version of such dialogue made it appear as though defendant had contradicted herself on a material point, when she plainly had not. When the prosecutor's misrepresentation was discovered by defense counsel, he moved for a mistrial, which the court swiftly granted. Defendant then moved to dismiss the indictment with prejudice, on double jeopardy grounds, but the district court denied that motion. The court affirmed the district court's denial of the motion where the defense had consented to a mistrial and there was no evidence that the prosecution was attempting to "goad" the defense into making the mistrial request -rather, the evidence revealed that this was a case of a prosecutor crossing the line an an attempt to "win at all costs." In addition, the court took several steps to ensure that the prosecutor's actions were properly investigated and that he was disciplined if the relevant authorities deemed it proper. View "United States v. Lopez-Avila" on Justia Law