Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs brought suit against a law firm and its attorneys for their role in executing civil discovery orders. The orders authorized entry into Plaintiffs' home to seize electronic files from Plaintiffs' computer and other electronic devices. Plaintiffs raised several causes of action based largely on the theory that the execution of the civil discovery orders constituted an illegal warrantless search. The district court granted Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed on alternate grounds, holding (1) the judicial proceedings privilege extends to attorneys' conduct in representing their clients; and (2) as applied in this case, the privilege barred all of Plaintiffs' claims. View "Moss v. Parr Waddoups Brown Gee & Loveless" on Justia Law

This case concerned the scope of absolute privilege that grants immunity to litigants and their attorneys from being sued for defamation based on public statements they make about a judicial proceedings either before or after the proceeding is filed. Specifically, the issues before the Supreme Court in this case were: (1) whether pre-litigation statements made by an attorney to prospective clients in the presence of the press regarding a potential mass-tort lawsuit; and (2) whether statements made directly to the press by an attorney or party after such lawsuit was filed, are absolutely privileged, thus barring any lawsuit for defamation. The district court found in the affirmative on these issues and granted summary judgment to the defendants. The Court of Appeals reversed that decision, finding that absolute privilege did not apply to statements made before or after a complaint was filed when the statements were made before the press. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that absolute privilege indeed does apply to pre-litigation statements made by attorneys in the presence of the press if (1) the speaker is seriously and in good faith contemplating a lawsuit at the time the statement was made; (2) the statement is reasonably related to the proposed litigation; (3) the attorney has a client or identifiable prospective clients at the time the statement was made; and (4) the statement is made while the attorney is acting in the capacity of counsel or prospective counsel. View "Helena Chemical Co. v. Uribe" on Justia Law

Petitioner Andrew Mackey was convicted several crimes in California. Retained attorney Le Rue Grim represented Mackey in post-trial and post-conviction proceedings. Grim subsequently filed a timely petition in the United States district court asserting ineffective assistance of counsel. Respondent filed a response to the district court's order to show cause, but Grim did not file a traverse by the due date. Grim then withdrew from the case but failed to notify the court of his intention to withdraw. Consequently, Mackey was unaware that the district court denied his petition and did not have the opportunity to proceed pro se. Mackey then filed a motion to have the district court vacate its judgment and reopen the case. The court denied the motion, determining that it lacked discretion to vacate the judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the district court would possess the discretion to vacate and reenter the judgment in order to allow Mackey the opportunity to appeal if it were to find that Grim effectively abandoned Mackey, causing Mackey to fail to file a timely notice of appeal. Remanded for findings as to whether Grim's action or inaction constituted abandonment. View "Mackey v. Hoffman" on Justia Law

"By all appearances, Defendant Howard Kieffer had a successful nationwide criminal law practice." Defendant managed to gain admission to multiple federal trial and appellate courts across the country where he appeared on behalf of numerous criminal defendants. Defendant never attended law school, sat for a bar exam, nor receive a license to practice law. A North Dakota jury convicted Defendant of mail fraud and for making false statements. The jury found Defendant gained admission to the District of North Dakota by submitting a materially false application to the court, then relied on that admission to gain admission to the District of Minnesota, District of Colorado, and Western District of Missouri. The district court sentenced Defendant to 51 months' imprisonment and ordered him to pay restitution to six victims of his scheme. A jury in Colorado also convicted him of making false statements, wire fraud and contempt of court. The district court sentenced Defendant to 57 months' imprisonment to run consecutively to the 51 month sentence previously imposed on him in North Dakota. The court further ordered him to pay restitution to seven victims of his scheme unaccounted for in North Dakota, and directed him as a special condition of supervised release to obtain the probation office's preapproval of any proposed employment or business ventures. Defendant appealed his most recent convictions and sentence from Colorado, each based on his Sixth Amendment right to have the Government prove, and a jury find, all elements of the charged crimes beyond a reasonable doubt. Further, Defendant presented five challenges to his sentence, three of which bore directly upon the district court’s application of the Sentencing Guidelines. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit found that the record reflected that by the time of Defendant's actual sentencing, the district court had decided to sentence him within the advisory guideline range. The court then proceeded to calculate Defendant’s guideline range incorrectly on the basis of numerous procedural errors, both factual and legal. As a result, the court selected a sentence from the wrong guideline range. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit vacated Defendant's sentence on Counts I and II of the superceding indictment and remanded the case for resentencing. The Court affirmed the district court in all other respects. View "United States v. Kieffer" on Justia Law

Attorney Mehta was charged with converting escrow funds and lying to a state court. After a hearing, the Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission recommended disbarment. While the recommendation was pending, the Illinois Supreme Court issued a ruled to show cause why he should not be suspended, rejected Mehta's arguments, and suspended his license. Mehta sued the court and the IARDC under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that the suspension violated his right to due process. The district court dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. In the meantime, Mehta was disbarred. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal, rejecting Mehta's argument that the suspension was not a final order that was subject to the doctrine. Illinois law provides that an interim suspension order is a final judgment in the Rule 774 proceeding in which it is issued. View "Mehta v. Att'y Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was convicted of attempted rape in the first degree, sexual abuse in the first degree, and endangering the welfare of a child. At issue was whether plaintiff, suing his former criminal defense attorney in legal malpractice, could recover nonpecuniary damages. Plaintiff claimed several errors, including that his attorney failed to investigate or present evidence concerning an allegedly meritorious defense, failed to interview certain potential witnesses, and failed to cross-examine the victim regarding discrepancies in her testimony. The court found that such damages were not available in an action for attorney malpractice. Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be reversed. View "Dombrowski v Bulson" on Justia Law

A jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff on its claims of fraud and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing against defendants where defendants' misrepresentations induced plaintiff to settle the asbestos exposure claims of two of plaintiff's employees whom defendants represented in a state-court lawsuit. On appeal, defendants contended that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the instant case under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and alternatively that the case called for Burford v. Sun Oil Co. abstention. Defendants also contended that the trial evidence established their statute-of-limitations and waiver defenses as a matter of law. The court held that defendants misconceived the legal authorities relevant to their jurisdiction, abstention, and waiver arguments. Regarding the statute of limitations issue, the court concluded that a reasonable jury could have found for plaintiff. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Guy, et al." on Justia Law

Officers, responding to an assault in progress, saw defendant, who voluntarily submitted to a pat down. A pistol was found in his coat pocket. Charged possession of a firearm by a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), defendant insisted that the police had planted the gun. His lawyer believed that he could not argue that the firearm was the fruit of an unreasonable search. Following his conviction, defendant brought a collateral proceeding under 28 U.S.C. 2255, claiming ineffective assistance in that his attorney did not move to suppress the firearm as the product of an unreasonable and did not explain to defendant that his testimony at a suppression hearing could not be used at trial as evidence of his guilt. The district court rejected the petition. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Defendant’s insistence that the police planted the gun neither justified nor compelled counsel to refrain from challenging the search that produced the weapon. The court remanded for determination of whether defendant was prejudiced by that failure. View "Gardner v. United States" on Justia Law

Petitioner appealed the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The court granted a certificate of appealability as to whether petitioner's representation was per se ineffective under the Sixth Amendment when, although he had a licensed attorney of record, a disbarred attorney acted as his de facto counsel. The court concluded that if the performance of the licensed attorney passed muster under Strickland v. Washington, the defendant's decision to rely upon other sources did not violate the Sixth Amendment. If the licensed attorney's performance did not pass muster under Strickland, the defendant's rights were protected. Accordingly, the per se ineffectiveness rule did not apply in this case and the court affirmed the judgment. View "Elfgeeh v. United States" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Rodney Brossart appealed a default judgment entered against him in a collection action brought by Plaintiff-Appellee Raymond J. German, Ltd. for legal services allegedly rendered to him. On appeal, Appellant argued the district court erred in granting German a default judgment, and German failed to prove the existence of an attorney-client agreement between itself and Appellant, precluding the default. Upon review, the Supreme Court modified the default and affirmed, concluding the district court did not err in entering a default in favor of German, because Appellant "appeared" under N.D.R.Civ.P. 55(a) and German provided him with notice of the motion for a default judgment under N.D.R.Civ.P. 55(a)(3). Furthermore, the Court held that it was reasonable for the trial court to ask for written proof of the attorney-client relationship prior to entering the default judgment. View "Raymond J. German, Ltd. v. Brossart" on Justia Law