Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

To help defendants resist child-pornography charges, technology expert and lawyer Boland downloaded images of children from a stock photography website and digitally imposed the children’s faces onto the bodies of adults performing sex acts. Boland’s aim was to show that the defendants may not have known they were viewing child pornography. When the parents of the children involved found out about the images, they sued Boland under 18 U.S.C. 2252A(f) and 2255. Section 2252A(f) provides a civil remedy to “[a]ny person aggrieved” by child pornography, while 2255 provides a civil remedy of at least $150,000 in damages to minor victims who suffer a “personal injury” from various sex crimes. The district court granted summary judgment to the parents and awarded $300,000 in damages. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. If Boland felt compelled to make his point with pornography, he could have used images of adults or virtual children. Instead, he chose an option Congress explicitly forbade: the choice was not protected by the First Amendment. View "Doe v. Boland" on Justia Law

Petitioner filed suit in superior court claiming that she and her son entered into an oral that granted her a life estate in certain property. Petitioner sought to enforce the oral agreement or, in the alternative, recover of a theory of quantum meruit. The superior court granted summary judgment for Defendants. The appeals court remanded for proceedings as to whether Petitioner should recover under a theory of quantum meruit. While the case was pending on remand, Petitioner filed a petition in the county court against the judge assigned to the matter, in both his individual and official capacities, and against the Commonwealth. Petitioner raised a number of claims concerning the judge's rulings and conduct, including an assertion that he had acted in an unlawful and biased manner. The single justice denied the petition without a hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Petitioner's claims of judicial bias and declaratory judgment claims should have been addressed through the ordinary trial and appellate process; (2) the judge was absolutely immune from Petitioner's request for monetary damages; and (3) Petitioner's allegations of conspiracy were insufficient to overcome the judge's absolute immunity. View "Johnson v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed an action against a district court judge, seeking damages for the judge's acts or omissions while presiding over a telephone pretrial conference in a civil action then pending before him. At all relevant times the judge was acting in his official capacity as a district court judge with regard to that case and the pretrial conference. The district court granted the judge's motion to dismiss on the grounds of judicial immunity. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the acts of which Plaintiff complained occurred while the judge was conducting the pretrial conference and were clearly within the authority and responsibility of a district court judge, the judge was immune from suit, and the district court properly dismissed Plaintiff's complaint. View "Hartsoe v. McNeil" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with sex offenses against his wife’s daughter in Henry County. While still married, he had moved in with another woman in Rock Island County and was convicted of aggravated criminal sexual abuse against her nine-year-old daughter. In the Henry County case, the state introduced testimony about the Rock Island crime and the conviction. Defendant was again convicted. In both prosecutions, defendant was represented by the same attorney. On appeal of his Henry County conviction, he alleged that his lawyer had a per se conflict of interest because the Rock Island victim, who also testified at the Henry County trial, had been represented by this attorney in the capacity of guardian ad litem in an unrelated matter. The appellate court remanded for a new trial. The Supreme Court reversed, reinstating the conviction. A per se conflict of interest, requiring automatic reversal, does not require proof of impact on the attorney’s performance. The guardian ad litem involvement with the witness was long over when defendant was tried and the witness, as person, could not be considered an “entity” assisting the prosecution.View "People v. Fields" on Justia Law

Elusta sued tChicago and police officers for excessive force, false arrest, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. He first retained Cerda and De Leon, who conducted discovery and obtained a settlement offer of $100,000. Elusta rejected this offer, apparently because his retainer contained a 40% contingent fee provision. The district court permitted the attorneys to withdraw. Elusta retained Smith and Genson. A jury found in Elusta’s favor on two counts and awarded $40,000. Smith and Genson petitioned for attorney’s fees on behalf of Elusta pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1988. Before the court could rule, Elusta retained new attorneys, Johnson and Gentleman, to litigate the fee issue. They sought direct payment of some of the fees to Elusta, rather than to Smith and Genson. Smith and Genson’s petition languished for nearly 16 months before Cerda and De Leon filed sought fees, asserting an attorney’s lien or a right to recover under quantum meruit. The court granted Smith and Genson’s request for $82,696.50 under section1988. Cerda and De Leon had not perfected an attorneys’ lien, but the court allowed recovery of $15,000 in quantum meruit. The court rejected Elusta’s motion to have 60% of both amounts paid to him directly. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Elusta v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Goldberg, a medical malpractice attorney, appeared before Judge Maloney in several cases. Following complaints that Goldberg concealed assets and retained unearned fees, Maloney ordered Goldberg to pay the estates involved. Goldberg failed to do so. Maloney directed him to show cause why he should not be held in contempt. Following a hearing, Maloney found Goldberg to be in criminal contempt and cited Goldberg for attempting to suborn witnesses, charges that did not appear on the hearing notice. Goldberg received a sentence of 18 months. An Ohio appellate court affirmed. Before the Ohio Supreme Court, Goldberg argued for the first time that he had not received sufficient notice of the charges and ineffective assistance because his attorney failed to raise this notice claim. The Ohio Supreme Court declined further review. In 2004, the district court granted habeas relief on the basis that Goldberg received constitutionally inadequate notice. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that Goldberg had procedurally defaulted on his lack-of-notice claim by failing to raise it in the state court of appeals. On remand, the district court determined that Goldberg had not demonstrated sufficient cause or prejudice to overcome the procedural default, and denied his petition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Goldberg v. Maloney" on Justia Law

Judge DeWeese sentenced Griffeth to prison for sexual battery and later oversaw his supervised release. Mayer supervised the agency responsible for monitoring Griffeth and suspected that his wife, Leech, was having an affair with Griffeth. Plaintiffs alleged that Mayer conspired with other officers and DeWeese to harass Griffeth. Mayer’s marriage ended. Plaintiffs allege that Mayer, who had been drinking, saw Griffeth and Leech in a car, pursued them, and called police to have Griffeth arrested for violating curfew. Mayer’s supervisor ordered that Mayer have no further involvement in Griffeth’s case. Plaintiffs allege that Mayer met with DeWeese and arranged to transfer Griffeth’s case to Mayer’s friend. DeWeese imposed a condition prohibiting Griffeth from contact with Leech or with her minor daughter. Griffeth was accused of associating with Leech and lying about it. Judge DeWeese refused to recuse himself, sentenced Griffeth to six months in community control, and ordered Leech removed from Griffeth’s home. The district court held that DeWeese had not established absolute judicial immunity to a claim concerning removing non-party Leech from her home. The Sixth Circuit reversed. DeWeese’s order requiring compliance with the no-contact condition of supervised release by removing Leech from the house fell within DeWeese’s subject matter jurisdiction over supervised release. View "Leech v. DeWeese" on Justia Law

James Schottel brought this action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging a state court judge, Judge Patrick Young, violated his constitutional rights by conditioning the grant of his motion to withdraw as counsel on the repayment of a $1,600 retainer to the clients. The district court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that because Judge Young's actions were judicial in nature and were not taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction, Judge Young was entitled to judicial immunity for the claims brought against him in this section 1983 action. View "Schottel v. Young" on Justia Law

The Legislative Ethics Commission conducted a hearing regarding fund-raising by Kentucky Senate President Williams, which attorney Berry attended. Following an executive session from which the public, the media, and Berry were excluded, the Commission dismissed. Berry wrote a letter criticizing disposition of the matter and disseminated copies to the media. The Inquiry Commission of the Kentucky Bar Association issued a warning asserting that the letter violated Kentucky Rule of Professional Conduct 8.2(a), which provides that “[a] lawyer shall not make a statement that the lawyer knows to be false or with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity concerning the qualifications or integrity of a judge, adjudicatory officer or public legal officer,” by publicly implying that the Commission did not conduct its review appropriately. The disciplinary complaint against Berry was dismissed. Berry did not appeal because Kentucky does not provide for an appeal of the Commission’s findings. Berry sued, alleging that he wished to engage in further criticism of the investigation but has refrained from such speech because he fears professional discipline. The district court granted the KBA summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed; Rule 8.2(a) is unconstitutional as applied to Berry’s speech.View "Berry v. Schmitt" on Justia Law

Delhall, was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder, unlawful use of a firearm, unlawful discharge of the firearm resulting in death or serious bodily harm, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. At the jury trial the State presented evidence that Delhall murdered the victim because he was, at that time, the only known eyewitness to the murder of another individual (Bennett) with which Delhall’s brother was charged. The jury recommended a death sentence by a vote of eight to four, and the trial court entered an order sentencing Delhall to death. The Florida Supreme Court vacated the sentence, stating that the prosecutor, “by her overzealous and unfair advocacy, appeared to be committed to winning a death recommendation rather than simply seeking justice.” Her improper advocacy continued even after an objection was sustained. In one instance, the judge was forced to step in and specifically admonish her to stop it. Cumulative errors fundamentally tainted the guilt phase, which was especially significant in view of the fact that the jury recommended death by a vote of eight to four, a recommendation that was far from unanimous. View "Delhall v. State of Florida" on Justia Law