Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, an ALJ, brought this action alleging that HUD had interfered with his decisional independence and thereby violated the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq. The court concluded that it need not decide whether the district court correctly dismissed plaintiff's claims for lack of standing where the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111, deprived the district court of subject matter jurisdiction over the complaint. View "Mahoney v. Donovan, et al." on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to and was convicted of attempted first degree sexual assault. Throughout the criminal proceedings, Defendant was represented by a Nebraska attorney (Attorney) whose license had been suspended for nonpayment of dues. After learning Attorney's license was suspended but before Attorney was disbarred, Defendant filed a motion for postconviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court denied the motion after (1) declining to apply a per se rule, reasoning that Attorney was qualified when admitted and was suspended solely for nonpayment of dues; and (2) finding Defendant's specific claims were either affirmatively disproved by the record or constituted mere conclusions. The Supreme Court affirmed after declining to adopt a per se determination of ineffectiveness based on the fact that Attorney was suspended for nonpayment of dues at the time he represented Defendant, holding that Defendant failed to establish Attorney provided ineffective assistance based on specific aspects of Attorney's actual performance. View "State v. Vanderpool" on Justia Law

Mendoza drove a truck from North Carolina to Tennessee with Tavera as a passenger. The truck contained construction equipment. A large quantity of methamphetamine was hidden under nails. The truck was stopped after being followed as part of a sting operation. At trial, Tavera, a roofer, testified that he did not know about the drugs and that he thought he was going to Tennessee to view a construction project. Tavera was convicted of participating in a methamphetamine drug conspiracy and sentenced to 186 months of imprisonment. He subsequently learned that days before the trial Mendoza had participated in plea negotiations in which he told Taylor, the prosecution’s trial lawyer, that Tavera had no knowledge of the drug conspiracy. Mendoza later pled guilty and changed his story. Tavera filed an appeal and a year later moved for a new trial in the district court. The district court has not ruled on the motion. The Sixth Circuit vacated the conviction, based on the “Brady” violation, calling the case “not close,” and recommended that the U.S. Attorney’s office conduct an investigation of why the prosecutorial error occurred. View "United States v. Tavera" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from plaintiff's suit against Sheraton, alleging state law claims and invoking subject matter jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1332(a). The district court dismissed plaintiff's first and second complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Sheraton subsequently moved for "just costs" including attorney's fees pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1919 and the district court granted the motion, concluding that plaintiff's second complaint was engineered to re-assert diversity jurisdiction. Plaintiff appealed. The court concluded that section 1919 did not authorize an award of attorney's fees and that, although such fees could be awarded on a non-statutory basis for bad faith in the conduct of litigation, fees were not warranted under the circumstances of this case. Therefore, the court vacated the district court's order and remanded with directions to delete the award of attorney's fees. View "Castillo Grand, LLC v. Sheraton Operating Corp." on Justia Law

K.F.'s (a juvenile) father appealed the termination of his parental rights. On appeal to the Supreme Court, he argued the trial court erred in denying his motion for new counsel since his previous lawyer had a conflict of interest. As justification, father argued that his trial counsel failed to pursue certain strategies he suggested, and that she would not introduce or object to what he felt was important evidence at trial because she had been a foster parent and was therefore sympathetic to the Department for Children and Families (DCF). The trial court did not find these arguments persuasive and denied father's motion to remove father's trial counsel. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that father did not demonstrate that his lawyer rendered ineffective counsel, and accordingly affirmed the trial court's decision. View "In re K.F." on Justia Law

Higher Taste sued the Park district under 42 U.S.C. 1983, requesting a declaration that Resolution 40-05 violated its rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and an injunction barring the resolution's enforcement. The district court granted Higher Taste's motion for a preliminary injunction, expressly ruling that Higher Taste had demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits. The parties later executed a written settlement agreement. Higher Taste then moved for attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. 1988(b), which permitted an award to the "prevailing party" in certain civil rights actions, including those brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court denied the motion. The court reversed and concluded that, because Higher Taste was a prevailing party within the meaning of section 1988, it should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust. On remand, the district court should determine in the first instance whether such special circumstances exist. View "Higher Taste, Inc. v. City of Tacoma" on Justia Law

In this suit - which was originally filed in state court in California, later removed to federal court in California, and then voluntarily transferred to the district court - the district court denied defendants' motion to dismiss the suit pursuant to California's anti-Strategic Litigation Against Public Participation (anti-SLAPP) rule, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 425.16, on the basis that New York law governed plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim. The court held that the district court's denial of defendants' motion to dismiss under California's anti-SLAPP rule constituted an immediately appealable collateral order because it (1) conclusively determined the disputed issue; (2) resolved an important question that was completely separate from the merits of the action; and (3) would be effectively unreviewable in a later appeal. The court also held that the district court erred in concluding that California's anti-SLAPP rule could not apply to a claim transferred from a California federal court to a New York federal court and governed, under the Erie doctrine, by New York law. Accordingly, the district court's order denying defendants' motion to dismiss pursuant to California's anti-SLAPP rule was vacated, and the cause was remanded to the district court for further proceedings. View "Liberty Synergistics Inc. v. Microflo Ltd." on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for financial crimes. He applied for public defender representation and provided information about his financial status that was collected by court staff on a UDIR form. Defendant's application was granted. Because the State's investigation suggested that defendant owned substantial assets, it issued a trial subpoena to the Morris County Superior Court's custodian of records demanding the production of financial data provided to court staff, including defendant's UDIR form. Although it used a trial subpoena, the State represented that it did not intend to use defendant's UDIR form at his pending trial; instead, it would be used to determine whether the State should separately indict defendant for making intentional false statements to obtain free counsel and to determine whether to apply for the removal of defendant's appointed counsel. The trial court quashed the subpoena on its own motion pursuant to the attorney-client privilege. The trial court denied the State's motion for reconsideration, reaffirming its view that the attorney-client privilege protected disclosure of defendant's financial information. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the attorney-client privilege protected the information sought. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded that the subpoena was properly quashed because defendant was "entitled to the benefit of the long-standing practice embodied in Directive 1-06 - that 'information on the intake form may not be used in grand jury proceedings or at trial.'" View "In re Subpoena Duces Tecum on Custodian of Records" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs prevailed in their action under the Americans with Disabilities Act and sought attorney's fees, costs, and expenses. The district court rendered a fee award, but reduced the requested number of billable hours by 20%, set an hourly rate, and declined to enhance the overall award. The plaintiffs and the defendants both appealed. The court of appeal amended the award for purposes of the lodestar calculation to increase the number of billable hours to the amount requested and the prevailing hourly rate to $265. The court of appeal further enhanced the fee award, finding the case to be "rare" and "exceptional" based upon the results achieved and the protracted and highly-contested litigation. Upon review, the Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s fee award. The Court therefore reversed the ruling of the court of appeal and reinstated the judgment of the district court. View "Covington v. McNeese State University" on Justia Law

During a meeting with staff members of defendants Rutgers University and the University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey (UMDNJ), plaintiff D.D. disclosed private health information that she requested be kept confidential. D.D. later discovered press releases issued by defendants that disclosed her private health information. Plaintiff immediately sent a letter directing defendants to cease and desist from communicating her personal information. Shortly thereafter, plaintiff, accompanied by counsel, met with representatives of defendants, accompanied by counsel. According to plaintiff, based on apologies and assurances made during the meeting, she believed that the matter could be handled privately. Plaintiff’s attorney subsequently asked plaintiff for additional information, which she promptly provided. Although her attorney assured her that he would "take care of everything," he was thereafter unresponsive to her efforts to contact him, which included at least ten telephone calls. Because she was unable to reach him, plaintiff retained new counsel in April 2010. The issue before the Supreme Court in this matter was: (1) whether the inattention of plaintiff’s counsel or her medical conditions constituted the "extraordinary circumstances" needed to excuse an untimely notice of tort claim under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act (TCA); and (2) whether a timely oral notice of tort claim could be permitted under the doctrine of substantial compliance. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that neither attorney inattention nor incompetence constituted an extraordinary circumstance sufficient to excuse failure to comply with the ninety-day filing deadline under the TCA; plaintiff's medical proofs were insufficient to meet the extraordinary circumstances standard; and the doctrine of substantial compliance could not serve to relieve a claimant of the TCA's written-notice requirement. View "D.D. v. Univer. of Med. & Dentistry of New Jersey" on Justia Law