Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

In this case and its companion, LK Operating, LLC v. Collection Grp., LLC, (No. 88846-9) (Wash. July 31, 2014), the central issues on appeal arose from a joint venture agreement regarding a debt collection business. The debt collection business operated according to the terms of the joint venture agreement, as originally proposed, from approximately winter 2005 through summer 2007. This opinion addressed whether the trial court proceedings complied with due process requirements; whether, as a matter of law, the joint venture proposal was entered by an attorney in violation of one or both of former RPCs 1.7 (1995) and 1.8(a) (2000); and, if so, whether the remedy imposed by the trial court and affirmed on appeal is appropriate. The Supreme Court found: (1) the trial court proceedings satisfied the requirements of procedural due process; (2) though on different reasoning from that used by the Court of Appeals, that the undisputed facts established as a matter of law that the joint venture proposal contemplated a business transaction subject to, agreed to, and entered into in violation of former RPC 1.8(a). The Court affirmed that the former RPC 1.8(a) violation rendered the terms of the business transaction unenforceable under the circumstances presented and the remedy imposed was appropriate. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the business transaction was entered in violation of former RPC 1. 7. The Court declined to determine whether the former RPC 1.7 violation would have also justified the remedy imposed. View "LK Operating, LLC v. Collection Grp., LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court found that Chancellor D. Neil Harris abused his contempt powers, failed to recuse himself from contempt proceedings, and prevented those he charged with contempt from presenting any defense. This matter stemmed from Judge Harris' presiding over a 2010 case in which the State hired private process servers to pursue child-support and paternity proceedings. The Judge obtained information that suggested some of the parties had not been properly served with process, and that returns on the summonses were falsified. The Judge instituted contempt proceedings against five process services, the owner of the service company, and two notaries public. The Supreme Court found that appropriate sanctions were: a public reprimand, a $2,500 fine, and a $200 assessment of costs. View "Mississippi Comm'n on Judicial Perf. v. Harris" on Justia Law

The Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board filed a complaint against Attorney Doe based on sexual misconduct allegations by the attorney's client, Jane Doe. The Grievance Commission of the Iowa Supreme Court scheduled a hearing on the matter. Jane's attorney requested a continuance of the scheduled hearing so that she could be present when Jane testified before the Commission. The Commission President quashed Jane's attorney's appearance and denied her request for a continuance, stating that witnesses testifying before the Commission were not entitled to have an attorney present during the proceedings and that that absence of Jane's attorney from the hearing would cause no unfairness to Jane. The Supreme Court reversed the Commission's order, holding that a person called upon to be a witness before the Commission may be represented by counsel for the limited purpose of protecting rights personal to the witness in the proceeding.View "Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Bd. v. Attorney Doe No. 762" on Justia Law

Trusts that owned fifty percent of the common stock of nominal defendant IMS alleged that two of the company's three most senior officers mismanaged the company in breach of their fiduciary duties. Trusts moved to compel IMS to produce the senior officers' work email accounts. The senior officers asserted the attorney-client privilege but did not invoke the work product doctrine. The court concluded that the In re Asia Global Crossing, Ltd. factors weighed in favor of production, absent a statutory override that could alter the common law result. Because IMS conducted its business in Maryland, the federal government and the State of Maryland were the sovereigns whose laws IMS must follow when dealing with its employees' email. The Federal Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. 2510 et seq.; the Federal Store Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. 2701; the Maryland Wiretap Act, Md. Code, Cts. & Jud. Proc. 10-401 to 10-414; and the Maryland Stored Communications Act, Md. Code, Cts. & Jud. Proc. 10-4A-01 to 10-4A-08, did not change the common law privilege analysis. Accordingly, the court granted the motion to compel.View "In re Info. Mgmt. Servs., Inc. Derivative Litigation" on Justia Law

In 2006, a jury convicted Appenzeller on18 felony counts. The trial court sentenced him to an aggregate term of 28 years in prison. The appeals court affirmed in part and remanded for merging of certain offenses and resentencing. The trial court again imposed a sentence of an aggregate term of 28 years in prison. The appeals court affirmed. Appenzeller unsuccessfully sought post-conviction relief based primarily on a claim that he was denied due process and equal protection when there was a break in the chain of custody of the trial transcript in his direct appeal. The alleged break occurred when Appenzeller’s own appellate attorney checked out the transcript to prepare his brief. The Ohio Supreme Court dismissed the petition, finding no violation of court rules or of constitutional rights.View "Appenzeller v. Miller" on Justia Law

In 1985, a manager was shot to death during a robbery of his restaurant. In the following months, a second manager was murdered and another survived similar robberies. In each restaurant, the robber fired two .38 caliber bullets; all six bullets were recovered. The survivor, Smotherman, described his assailant and picked Hinton’s picture out of a photographic array. The police arrested Hinton and recovered from his house a .38 caliber revolver belonging to his mother, who shared the house. The Alabama Department of Forensic Sciences concluded that the six bullets had all been fired from the Hinton revolver. Hinton was charged with two counts of murder. He was not charged with the Smotherman robbery. The prosecution strategy was to link Hinton to the Smotherman robbery by eyewitness testimony and forensic evidence about the bullets and to persuade the jury that, given the similarity of the crimes, Hinton must have committed the murders. Hinton presented witnesses in support of his alibi that he was at work at the time of the Smotherman robbery. The six bullets and the revolver were the only physical evidence. Hinton’s attorney obtained a grant of $1,000 to hire an expert to challenge that evidence and did not request more funding, nor correct the judge’s mistaken belief that a $1,000 limit applied. Under that mistaken belief, Hinton’s attorney found only one person who was willing to testify: Payne. Hinton’s attorney believed that Payne did not have the necessary expertise. The prosecutor discredited Payne. The jury convicted Hinton; the court imposed a death sentence. In state post-conviction proceedings, Hinton alleged ineffective assistance and produced three highly credible experts, who testified that they could not conclude that any of the bullets had been fired from the Hinton revolver. The state did not submit rebuttal evidence. Following a remand by the state’s highest court, the trial court held that Payne was qualified to testify as a firearms and toolmark expert under the then-applicable standard. The Alabama Supreme Court denied review. The U.S. Supreme Court vacated and remanded, holding that Hinton’s attorney rendered ineffective assistance under its “Strickland” test. It was unreasonable to fail to seek additional funds to hire an expert where that failure was based not on any strategic choice but on a mistaken belief that available funding was limited. View "Hinton v. Alabama" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against a Louisiana state court judge under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1985, alleging a deprivation of civil rights. The judge presided over a custody proceeding between plaintiff and his ex-wife. Plaintiff moved to recuse the judge based on his suspicion that the judge had a social relationship with his ex-wife. The motion was denied. Plaintiff later renewed the recusal motion and the judge issued an order recusing himself, citing his friendship with the ex-wife. Plaintiff then filed this suit seeking monetary damages. Plaintiff alleged that the judge and his ex-wife conspired to make false statements at the first recusal hearing. The court concluded that when the judge testified, he was testifying as a witness in an adversarial proceeding and thus was absolutely immune from section 1983 liability. The court also concluded that the section 1985 claim was inadequately pled because a violation under section 1985 required class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirator's action. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Moffett v. Bryant" on Justia Law

In 2010, Plaintiff, then fifty-eight years old, applied for a job with Defendant. Defendant extended a written offer of employment, which Plaintiff accepted, but before Plaintiff started on the job, Defendant rescinded the offer. Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant alleging, among other claims, that the rescission of the employment offer was a by-product of age discrimination. Defendant removed the case to the federal district court. Thereafter, Plaintiff’s attorneys blundered time and again, which led to the district court issuing an order for Plaintiff to show cause why his case should not be dismissed. After the district court received no response from Plaintiff, it dismissed the case. Plaintiff subsequently filed a motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) asking the court to set aside the judgment due to the neglect of one of Plaintiff’s attorneys. The district court denied the motion. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that, given Plaintiff’s persistent pattern of noncompliance, the district court’s refusal to set aside the order of dismissal was not an abuse of discretion. View "Rivera-Velazquez v. Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants, alleging claims of unlawful sexual harassment and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000 et seq., and the Iowa Civil Rights Act, Iowa Code 216.6. On appeal, defendants challenged the jury verdict in favor of plaintiff, arguing that they were entitled to a new trial. Defendants argued that the district court erred in overruling their objection to improper rebuttal closing argument by plaintiff's counsel, and then abused its discretion in denying defendants' post-trial motion because this argument, while improper, was not sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a new trial. Counsel made emotionally-charged comments at the end of rebuttal closing argument, referencing her own sexual harassment during law school and assurances to the jury that her client testified truthfully about past sexual abuse. The court concluded that the timing and emotional nature of counsel's improper and repeated personal vouching for her client, using direct references to facts not in evidence, combined with the critical importance of plaintiff's credibility to issues of both liability and damages, made the improper comments unfairly prejudicial and required that the court remand for a new trial. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Gilster v. Primebank, et al." on Justia Law

Defendant is a Texas law firm engaged in an advertising campaign to solicit former dental patients from Kool Smiles dental clinics as potential clients. On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's denial of its Texas anti-SLAPP motion brought under the Texas Citizen's Participation Act (TCPA), Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. 27.001-27.011, to dismiss a claim brought by Kool Smiles. The court held that it had jurisdiction to interlocutorily consider the denial of a TCPA anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss; because Kool Smiles waived its argument that the TCPA was a procedural law that conflicted with the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, the court assumed that it did not; and the Supreme Court of Texas would most likely hold that defendant's ads and other client solicitations were exempted from the TCPA's protection because defendant's speech arose from the sale of services where the intended audience was an actual or potential customer. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's anti-SLAPP motion. View "NCDR, L.L.C., et al. v. Mauze & Bagby, P.L.L.C., et al." on Justia Law