Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants, alleging that they had violated the duty of loyalty owed to her under the Rules of Professional Conduct by pursuing her business partner's interests in the underlying dissolution and copyright actions. Plaintiff alleged that she had an implied attorney-client relationship with each defendant based on her status as a 50 percent owner of Purposeful Press, the company she and her business partner created. The trial court denied defendants' special motion to strike pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (the anti-SLAPP). In this case, plaintiff's claims arise out of defendants’ breach of professional obligations they allegedly owed to plaintiff as the result of an implied attorney-client relationship arising out of defendants’ representation of Purposeful Press. The court concluded that defendants failed to establish that plaintiff's claims arise from protected activity and did not address the second step of the anti-SLAPP analysis. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Sprengel v. Zbylut" on Justia Law

Colleen O’Toole is currently a judge and announced her intention to run for election in 2016 to one of the three contested seats on the Supreme Court of Ohio. O’Toole and her judicial campaign committee challenged the constitutionality of several provisions of the Ohio Code of Judicial Conduct, including Rule 4.4(E) and sought a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction only with respect to Rule 4.4(E) which states that: The campaign committee of a judicial candidate may begin soliciting and receiving contributions no earlier than one hundred twenty days before the first Tuesday after the first Monday in May of the year in which the general election is held. If the general election is held in 2012 or any fourth year thereafter, the campaign committee of a judicial candidate may begin soliciting and receiving contributions no earlier than one hundred twenty days before the first Tuesday after the first Monday in March of the year in which the general election is held. The district court denied relief. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that the campaign committee failed to demonstrate likelihood of success on the merits or likelihood of irreparable harm. View "O'Toole v. O'Connor" on Justia Law

The County seeks attorneys' fees from the Government under the Voting Rights Act of 1965's (VRA), 52 U.S.C. 10310(e), fee-shifting provision after the County prevailed in a challenge to the constitutionality of the VRA. The court agreed with the district court that the County is not entitled to attorneys’ fees because its lawsuit did not advance any of the purposes that Congress meant to promote by making fees available. Even though the County has based its argument for fees entirely on Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., the district court considered whether the County might also be entitled to fees under the Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC standard, which would allow a fee award only if the Government’s defense of the coverage formula’s constitutionality was frivolous or without foundation. But since the County has never maintained that it could even theoretically obtain fees under that standard, the court did not resolve whether Christiansburg Garment should sometimes apply in cases like this one. The court concluded that it is enough to resolve this fee dispute by holding that the County is not entitled to fees under the only standard it has urged the court to apply. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of attorneys' fees. View "Shelby County v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Bar Admission Rule 204 allows an attorney to join the Pennsylvania bar by motion, without taking the state bar exam, if the attorney has graduated from an accredited law school, has either passed the bar exam or practiced law for the “major portion” of five of the preceding seven years in a reciprocal state, remains a member in good standing of every bar to which the attorney has been admitted, obtains a favorable moral character determination in Pennsylvania, achieves a sufficient score on the Multistate Professional Responsibility Exam, and has not previously failed the Pennsylvania bar exam. Pennsylvania allows attorneys admitted in any state to apply for pro hac vice admission, limited to a particular case; 38 states and the District of Columbia have reciprocity agreements with Pennsylvania. An organization dedicated to extending reciprocal bar admission to additional states argued that Rule 204 violates the Equal Protection and Privileges or Immunities Clauses, the First Amendment, the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, and the Dormant Commerce Clause. The district court and Third Circuit upheld the rule, which does not classify attorneys based on residency, but rather, their state of bar admission, and it does not erect a barrier to migration. View "Nat'l Ass'n for the Advancement of Multijurisdictional Practice v. Castille" on Justia Law

After obtaining terrorism convictions, then-Assistant U.S. Attorney Convertino came under investigation by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR). An unidentified DOJ source leaked information about that investigation to Ashenfelter, a reporter. The Detroit Free Press published details, including allegations that Convertino withheld Brady materials and threatened a defense lawyer with a baseless criminal investigation. DOJ’s attempts to find the source were unsuccessful. The terrorism convictions were vacated. The defendants’ claims against Convertino under 42 U.S.C. 1983 were dismissed based on prosecutorial and qualified immunity. Convertino was found not guilty of obstruction of justice. Convertino sued DOJ, alleging that the investigation, leak, and disciplinary measures were in retaliation for his testimony before the Senate Finance Committee. Ultimately, a single claim remained--that DOJ violated the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. 552, when its unidentified official leaked confidential information to Ashenfelter. The district court granted the motion to compel production from Ashenfelter. Ashenfelter asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege at two depositions. The district court found that Ashenfelter had a reasonable basis for fearing that answering the questions would entail self-incrimination, sustained the assertion of privilege, and reduced its ruling to two written opinions—one public, and one sealed. Convertino unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration, citing a statement by then-Attorney General Holder that the DOJ “will not prosecute any reporter.” The Sixth Circuit affirmed, upholding the claims of privilege. View "Convertino v. Dep't of Justice" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the District, alleging a violation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C.1400 et seq. After plaintiff prevailed, the district court awarded her $62,225 in attorneys' fees and costs for approximately one hundred hours of work. On appeal, the District argued that the district court abused its discretion when it adopted plaintiff's proposed fee matrix. The court concluded that the district court abused its discretion in relieving plaintiff of her burden of demonstrating the reasonableness of the rates. In this case, plaintiff's proposed fee matrix set the prevailing market rate for her lawyer’s services well beyond the next highest hourly rate used by district courts in IDEA litigation. Accordingly, the court vacated the fee award and remanded. View "Eley v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law

The United States filed a petition for a writ of mandamus challenging a district judge’s policy restricting the pro hac vice admission of government attorneys. After the petition was filed, the district judge reversed his previous order denying an attorney in this case pro hac vice admission. The court concluded that the case was not moot and that the controversy remains live where it was reasonably likely that the judge will again deny the pro hac vice applications of attorneys for the United States; while the reversal of the challenged order did not render this controversy moot, it rendered a formal writ of mandamus a superfluous or ineffective remedy here; in this case, the judge acted outside his discretion by failing to provide a valid reason to deny the attorney's application for pro hac vice admission; the judge committed clear error; the first and second Bauman v. U.S. District Court factors weighed in favor of issuing mandamus when the petition was filed, and weigh in favor of offering guidance to the district court; the fact that the judge's order in this case was not an isolated occurrence weighed in favor of granting mandamus relief when the petition was filed; the district court's order raises important problems or issues of first impression and weighed in favor of mandamus relief when the petition was filed and weighs in favor of offering guidance to the district court even though a formal writ is no longer necessary; and issuing a formal writ would have been an appropriate remedy but for the judge’s voluntary cessation. Accordingly, the court denied the petition without prejudice. View "USA V. USDC-NVR" on Justia Law

In a prior litigation, FLIR filed suit against their former employees for, among other things, misappropriation of trade secrets. After the former employees prevailed in the underlying action, they obtained a ruling that the misappropriation of trade secrets claim had been brought against them in bad faith, which resulted in an order that FLIR pay the former employees their attorney fees and costs in an amount exceeding $1.6 million. Thereafter, the former employees brought the instant malicious prosecution action against Latham, the attorneys who had represented FLIR in the underlying action. The trial court granted Latham's motion to strike the complaint under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, the so-called anti-SLAPP statute. The former employees principally contend that the interim adverse judgment rule does not preclude this malicious prosecution action because the trial court’s finding of bad faith after a bench trial in the underlying action negates its prior ruling denying summary judgment. The court concluded that this hindsight approach is inconsistent with a core principle of the interim adverse judgment rule - namely, that an interim ruling on the merits establishes probable cause in the underlying action, even though that ruling is later reversed by the trial court, a jury, or an appellate court. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Parrish v. Latham & Watkins" on Justia Law

In a prior litigation, FLIR filed suit against their former employees for, among other things, misappropriation of trade secrets. After the former employees prevailed in the underlying action, they obtained a ruling that the misappropriation of trade secrets claim had been brought against them in bad faith, which resulted in an order that FLIR pay the former employees their attorney fees and costs in an amount exceeding $1.6 million. Thereafter, the former employees brought the instant malicious prosecution action against Latham, the attorneys who had represented FLIR in the underlying action. The trial court granted Latham's motion to strike the complaint under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, the so-called anti-SLAPP statute. The court reversed, agreeing with the former employees that Code of Civil Procedure section 340.6 is not the appropriate statute of limitations for a malicious prosecution action, and that the former employees have presented sufficient evidence that they otherwise have a probability of prevailing. View "Parrish v. Latham & Watkins" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the attorneys who represented their adversaries in litigation over various financial transactions, alleging that the attorneys engaged in illegal conduct when they solicited and received confidential, privileged, and/or proprietary information from plaintiffs' former attorney and used that information in the litigation against plaintiffs. The trial court granted defendants' motion to strike the complaint under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (the anti-SLAP statute). The court affirmed the trial court's conclusion that the complaint arose from protected First Amendment activity; there was insufficient evidence to show defendants' conduct was illegal as a matter of law; and plaintiffs did not show a probability of prevailing on their claims because the statute of limitations had run and the litigation privilege barred plaintiffs' claims. View "Bergstein v. Stroock & Stroock & Lavan" on Justia Law