Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a lawyer in California, filed suit challenging California’s procedures for attorney discipline. Plaintiff alleged that California violated her constitutional rights by not providing her meaningful judicial review in a fee dispute between herself and a client, and that the rules governing the California State Bar’s disciplinary procedures are facially unconstitutional. The court agreed with the State Bar that plaintiff's as-applied challenges are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. However, the court concluded that the State Bar misreads this Court’s statute-of-limitations decision in Action Apartment Ass’n, Inc. v. Santa Monica Rent Control Board, which only applies to facial challenges involving property rights. In this case, plaintiff's facial claims are not time-barred because she filed her claim well within the two-year statute of limitations. On the merits, the court concluded that plaintiff's facial claims based on California’s state constitution fail because they have already been rejected by the Supreme Court of California. The court concluded that, contrary to plaintiff's contentions, People v. Kelly did not overrule In re Rose, which stated that it is fundamental that state courts be left free and unfettered by the federal courts in interpreting their state constitutions. Plaintiff's First Amendment claims are unsupported because the court was aware of no case holding that the First Amendment provides a freestanding right for an individual to have a state court hear her dispute in the absence of some asserted state or federal cause of action, statutory or judge-made. Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment Due Process and Equal Protection claims also fail where California's change in its attorney discipline procedures are not so significant as to create a due process violation. While the regulation of lawyers in California is unlike California’s regulation of any other professionals, plaintiff has not demonstrated that this regulatory scheme violates Equal Protection. California’s decision to regulate lawyers principally via a judicially supervised administrative body attached to the State Bar of California, the organization of all state-licensed lawyers, is rational and so constitutional. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Scheer v. Kelly" on Justia Law

In 2004, Bianchi was elected as McHenry County, Illinois State’s Attorney and embarked on reforms. In 2006, a secretary resigned and took sensitive documents with her. Working with an Assistant State’s Attorney, whom Bianchi had demoted, the secretary delivered the documents to the media and to Bianchi’s opponent in the next election. Bianchi learned of the theft and persuaded a judge to appoint a special prosecutor. The secretary was charged with several felonies and eventually pleaded guilty to computer tampering. Bianchi’s opponent and other political enemies obtained the appointment of another special prosecutor, to investigate Bianchi. A grand jury was convened. Bianchi and three colleagues were indicted on multiple counts of official misconduct. All were acquitted. Bianchi and his colleagues sought damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the court-appointed special prosecutor (Tonigan), the court-appointed assistant special prosecutor (McQueen) and Quest, a firm of private investigators hired by the special prosecutors, and its investigators. They claimed that the defendants fabricated evidence and withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of the Due Process Clause and Fourth Amendment and political retaliation in violation of the First Amendment. Tonigan settled. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal as to McQueen and the investigators, holding that absolute prosecutorial immunity and qualified immunity foreclose the federal constitutional claims. View "Bianchi v. McQueen" on Justia Law

In 2004, Bianchi was elected as McHenry County, Illinois State’s Attorney and embarked on reforms. In 2006, a secretary resigned and took sensitive documents with her. Working with an Assistant State’s Attorney, whom Bianchi had demoted, the secretary delivered the documents to the media and to Bianchi’s opponent in the next election. Bianchi learned of the theft and persuaded a judge to appoint a special prosecutor. The secretary was charged with several felonies and eventually pleaded guilty to computer tampering. Bianchi’s opponent and other political enemies obtained the appointment of another special prosecutor, to investigate Bianchi. A grand jury was convened. Bianchi and three colleagues were indicted on multiple counts of official misconduct. All were acquitted. Bianchi and his colleagues sought damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the court-appointed special prosecutor (Tonigan), the court-appointed assistant special prosecutor (McQueen) and Quest, a firm of private investigators hired by the special prosecutors, and its investigators. They claimed that the defendants fabricated evidence and withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of the Due Process Clause and Fourth Amendment and political retaliation in violation of the First Amendment. Tonigan settled. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal as to McQueen and the investigators, holding that absolute prosecutorial immunity and qualified immunity foreclose the federal constitutional claims. View "Bianchi v. McQueen" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the State Bar, alleging a due process claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Specifically, plaintiff alleged that the State Bar’s rules applied the same standards and procedures for reinstatement for disbarred attorneys to attorneys suspended for more than 90 days, amounted to “defacto disbarment,” and violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. The district court dismissed the complaint as barred by the Eleventh Amendment and then denied plaintiff's motion to alter or amend the judgment. Determining that the court has jurisdiction to hear plaintiff's appeal, the court agreed with the district court's conclusion that the Alabama State Bar is an arm of the state of Alabama and thus enjoys Eleventh Amendment immunity from plaintiff's section 1983 claim. Further, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's FRCP 59(e) motion where, to the extent plaintiff contends his due process claim was a “direct action” under the Fourteenth Amendment, his amended complaint did not allege such a claim, and he could not use his Rule 59(e) motion to do so. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Nichols v. Alabama State Bar" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a member of the Westboro Baptist Church, filed suit in 2006 against Missouri state and state officials after the Missouri General Assembly enacted statewide restrictions on pickets and protests near funerals and funeral processions. In 2014, Missouri appealed the statute at issue while plaintiff's Rule 59(e) motion remained pending in district court. In this appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's adverse judgments on her due process claim as well as the court's award of attorneys' fees. The court vacated the district court's judgment on the due process claim and remanded with instructions to dismiss her claim as moot. In regard to the attorneys' fees, the court concluded that the district court's 2/14th calculation was an abuse of discretion because its arithmetically simplistic fee calculation did not accurately reflect her degree of success of her interrelated claims. Moreover, even if the court accepted the district court's basic mathematical approach, its 2/14th calculation is inaccurate because it did not address whether it counted consent judgments, mooted claims, and dismissed claims as prevailing, neutral, or unsuccessful claims. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's award of attorneys' fees. View "Phelps-Roper v. Koster" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was awarded nominal damages on three of his four as-applied claims in a 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit to invalidate aspects of Laguna Beach's ordinances prohibiting the use of sound-amplification devices on public sidewalks. Plaintiff then moved for attorneys' fees. The district court concluded that plaintiff was a prevailing party under 42 U.S.C. 1983, but denied attorneys' fees pursuant to Farrar v. Hobby. Farrar held that a prevailing party who seeks a large compensatory award but receives only nominal damages may not be entitled to fees. The court affirmed the district court’s order denying fees under California law. However, under federal law, the court held that because plaintiff's lawsuit achieved its future-oriented goals and plaintiff never attempted to secure compensatory damages under section 1983, the Farrar exception does not apply. Consequently, the district court erred by not considering plaintiff's entitlement to fees under the standard framework. The court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Klein v. City of Laguna Beach" on Justia Law

Petitioners, a bipartisan group of citizens, requested that a three-judge court be convened to consider their claim that Maryland’s 2011 congressional redistricting plan burdens their First Amendment right of political association. The district court dismissed the action, concluding that no relief could be granted. The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The Court held that 28 U.S.C. 2284 entitles petitioners to make their case before a three-judge court because, under section 2284(a), the present suit is indisputably an action challenging the constitutionality of the apportionment of congressional districts. The Court further held that the subsequent provision of section 2284(b)(1), that the district judge shall commence the process for appointment of a three-judge panel “unless he determines that three judges are not required,” should be read not as a grant of discretion to the district judge to ignore section 2284(a), but as a compatible administrative detail. The Court went on to say that this conclusion is bolstered by section 2284(b)(3)’s explicit command that “[a] single judge shall not . . . enter judgment on the merits.” Finally, the Court held that respondents' alternative argument, that the District Judge should have dismissed petitioners' claim as "constitutionally insubstantial" under Goosby v. Osser, is unpersuasive. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded. View "Shapiro v. McManus" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the company managing the prison he was incarcerated in, and others, for multiple violations of his constitutional rights. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court’s denial of his motion for appointment of counsel to help litigate his civil rights claims against defendants. The district court denied the motion because it had no funding with which to compensate an appointed attorney, and it could find “no attorneys in the area willing or able to take the case pro bono.” Then the district court entered summary judgment against plaintiff. The court vacated and demanded, concluding that federal courts have inherent power to order counsel to accept an uncompensated appointment under the limited factual circumstances here. On remand, the district court must consider whether a compulsory appointment is warranted. View "Naranjo v. Thompson" on Justia Law

Over 25 years ago, a representative of a class of homeless persons, filed a lawsuit against the City of Miami under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The parties subsequently entered into a settlement agreement. In this appeal, plaintiff, on behalf of a class, seeks attorney fees for opposing modifications proposed by the City of Miami to such an agreement. The court affirmed the district court's denial of fees given that modification proceedings do not trigger an award of attorneys’ fees under the agreement. In this case, the parties’ agreement limited future attorneys’ fees to enforcement proceedings. View "Peery v. City of Miami" on Justia Law

Jan Goldsmith was the San Diego City Attorney. League of California Cities was an association of 473 California cities and their public officials, which, among other purposes, advocates to protect and restore local control for cities to provide for the public health, safety, and welfare of their residents. Real Party in Interest, San Diegans for Open Government (SDOG), submitted a request under the Public Records Act to the City of San Diego (the City) seeking "[a]ny and all e-mails sent to or from [Jan Goldsmith's personal e-mail account] . . . that pertain in any way to the official business of the City of San Diego." Among other records, the City asserted an exemption to the disclosure of e-mails between a purported legal assistant for the League and attorney members of the League on the grounds they were not public records because they did not concern city business, or were otherwise privileged. SDOG filed a petition for writ of mandate seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the City and Goldsmith to compel disclosure of the e-mails. In a minute order, the trial court directed the City to provide SDOG with a privilege log identifying the documents not produced, along with the legal objection for not producing the documents. After considering the parties' briefing, the trial court declined to perform an in camera review of certain challenged e-mails. The court found the City failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that the e-mails were privileged or exempt under the Act, and ordered the City to produce the e-mails by a certain date. The League filed the instant petition for a peremptory writ of mandate or prohibition in the first instance, or an alternative writ or order to show cause seeking to vacate that part of the court's order requiring disclosure of the e-mails. The Court of Appeal concluded the term "a party," as used in the Act, was not limited to an actual party to the action. Accordingly, the nonparty here had standing to file the instant petition challenging the trial court's order. The Court further concluded the trial court erred by not conducting an in camera review of the documents as requested by the party asserting the documents were exempt from disclosure. Accordingly, we grant the petition and remand the matter for further proceedings. View "League of Cal. Cities v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law