Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

Federally-registered lobbyists sued the Secretary of Commerce and U.S. Trade Representative, alleging that federal policy barring registered lobbyists from serving on the Industry Trade Advisory Committees “attaches an unconstitutional condition on the exercise of the First Amendment right to petition [the government],” and “draws an unconstitutional distinction between those who exercise their right to petition the government and those who do not.” The D.C. Circuit remanded after dismissal. Before the district court ruled on remand, the Office of Management and Budget revised the ban to apply only to lobbyists who serve on advisory committees in an individual capacity and the Department of Commerce issued an amended “Request for Nominations for the Industry Trade Advisory Committees.” The parties stipulated to dismissal, with lobbyists stating their intention to seek attorneys’ fees. The court denied that application under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. 2412, reasoning that the remand did not ensure the lobbyists would enjoy a substantive victory, so they were not “prevailing parties.” The D.C. Circuit affirmed, noting that its earlier remand specified that dismissal might still be appropriate depending on the court’s analysis of whether the government’s interest in imposing the lobbyist ban “outweighs any impingement on Appellants’ constitutional rights.” View "Autor v. Pritzker" on Justia Law

In 2004, Nelms retained Katz-Crank, a Michigan lawyer with a practice in cemetery management, to assist in his acquisition of cemeteries and funeral homes in Indiana, Michigan, and Ohio. Trust funds associated with these cemeteries were valued at about $22 million. In 2007 Katz‐Crank learned that Nelms was under investigation by the Indiana Secretary of State for misappropriating cemetery trust assets. Katz‐Crank called Haskett, an investigator in that office, to offer cooperation. Haskett did not return the call. In 2008, Nelms was indicted for embezzling $22 million, pleaded guilty, and agreed to testify against Katz‐Crank. Haskett called some of Katz‐Crank’s clients and stated that Katz‐Crank was under criminal investigation. The Secretary of State and the Marion County prosecutor’s office issued press releases publicizing Katz-Crank’s arrest. A jury acquitted Katz‐Crank. Two years later Katz‐Crank sued Marion County and officials who were involved in her investigation and prosecution, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, for malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, with three federal conspiracy claims and state‐law claims for malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district judge rejected all claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Most of Katz‐Crank’s claims were barred by the Eleventh Amendment or prosecutorial immunity; the rest were properly dismissed for failure to state a plausible claim. View "Katz-Crank v. Haskett" on Justia Law

A fifth-grade student and her mother filed suit against the school district and its employees because the student allegedly experienced retaliation after the mother complained to the school principal about the student's teacher. The district court dismissed the First Amendment retaliation claim without prejudice; plaintiffs failed to meet the filing deadline, and the school district filed a proposed judgment of dismissal; plaintiffs filed their Second Amended Complaint (SAC) the following day; the district court then entered a final judgment dismissing the First Amended Complaint, citing plaintiff's failure to file the SAC within the time allowed; and plaintiffs moved for relief from judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1) based on excusable neglect. The district court found that counsel's neglect was not excusable and the district court, in the meantime, moved for attorney's fees under the California Public Records Act (CPRA), Cal. Gov't Code 6259(d). The district court denied the fees. Plaintiffs appeal both the district court’s judgment of dismissal and the order denying relief from judgment. Defendants cross-appeal a portion of the dismissal order and the order denying attorney’s fees. The court concluded that the district court’s decision cannot be supported by the record and thus it abused its discretion by denying plaintiffs relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)(1). The court also concluded that plaintiffs' CPRA claim was neither indisputably without merit nor prosecuted for an improper motive. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "M.D. v. Newport-Mesa Unified School District" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an evangelical Christian, filed suit against the City, alleging that he was denied his First Amendment right to hand out religious literature at a public festival. The parties entered into a consent decree where the City agreed to pay plaintiff a dollar in nominal damages and where, among other provisions, the City was prohibited from interfering with plaintiff's free speech rights or other individuals at future public events in downtown Ft. Worth. At issue are the attorney's fees. Because a plaintiff is a prevailing party when nominal damages are awarded, and this case does not present the special circumstances in which a prevailing civil rights plaintiff may be denied fees altogether, the court vacated the order denying fees and remanded for an assessment of the reasonableness of the fee request. View "Grisham v. City of Fort Worth" on Justia Law

One sitting judge and two aspiring Kentucky judges challenged the Commonwealth’s Code of Judicial Conduct clauses prohibiting “campaign[ing] as a member of a political organization,” “endors[ing] . . . a candidate for public office,” “mak[ing] a contribution to a political organization,” making any “commitments” with respect to “cases, controversies, or issues” likely to come before the court, making “false” or “misleading” statements. The sitting judge, previously appointed, made statements regarding being “re-elected,” and concerning penalties for heroin use. A candidate for the judiciary referred to himself as a Republic and his opponents as Democrats. The Third plaintiff wanted to publicly participate in Republican Party functions. The district court struck some of these provisions and upheld others. The Sixth Circuit found contributions, leadership, false statements and endorsement clauses valid. The campaigning, speeches, clauses are unconstitutional. The misleading statements prohibition is valid on its face, but may be unconstitutional as applied to one of the plaintiffs. View "Winter v. Wolnitzek" on Justia Law

Indiana Rules for the Admission to the Bar and the Discipline of Attorneys state: “No person who advocates the overthrow of the government of the United States or this state by force, violence or other unconstitutional or illegal means, shall be certified to the Supreme Court of Indiana for admission to the bar of the court and a license to the practice of law.” Plaintiff intends to engage in “revolutionary advocacy,” as by distributing the Charter of Carnaro and Marx and Engels’ Communist Manifesto. He challenged the Rule, without stating that he intends to advocate the overthrow of the government. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of the suit as premature. Plaintiff has not applied for admission to the Indiana bar and lacks standing. The rule will harm him only if he would be admitted to the Indiana bar were the rule to be invalidated: “that is highly unlikely,” given “his tempestuous relations with the Illinois bar authorities,” who deemed him unfit to practice law, citing his failure to acknowledge on his applications his multiple arrests and firings over the previous decade. View "Otrompke v. Skolnik" on Justia Law

NAAMJP filed suit challenging the conditions placed on the privilege of admission to the Bar of the United States District Court for the District of Maryland in Local Rule 701. Among other things, the Rule contains requirements based on the state of licensure and, in some instances, the location of the attorney’s law office. The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss and denied NAAMJP's motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that Rule 701 does not violate the First Amendment where it qualifies as a general applicable licensing provision, prescribing which attorneys may practice in the District Court based on their state of licensure in relation to the location of their principal law office; Rule 701 does not violate the Equal Protection Clause where it does not infringe a fundamental right or disadvantage a suspect class; Rule 701 does not violate the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. 2071, where the Rule does not violate any Acts of Congress or any federal rules of practice and procedure adopted by the Supreme Court pursuant to section 2072; and Rule 701 does not violate the Supremacy Clause where it remains a federal rule prescribed pursuant to federal statute. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "NAAMJP v. Lynch" on Justia Law

In 2008, defendant was charged with attempted rape and was represented by his first attorney. Defendant retained his second attorney, Long, in 2009. Long represented defendant throughout a significant portion of the pre- and post-indictment proceedings, including plea negotiations and a Huntley hearing. In September 2009, defendant fired Long and retained a third attorney, who represented him for the remainder of the prosecution. Defendant was convicted and subsequently made successive CPL 440.10 motions to vacate the conviction based on newly discovered evidence relating to the credibility of witnesses. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction and the denial of both CPL 440 motions. In 2014, defendant moved to vacate his conviction pursuant to CPL 440.10, asserting that attorney Long had simultaneously represented the Albany County District Attorney Soares, that evidence of the conflict was newly discovered, that his conviction was obtained in violation of his right to counsel, that the conviction was based on misrepresentation or fraud by the prosecutor, and that Long had provided ineffective assistance. Four months before defendant retained Long, Long had written a letter in connection with Soares' reelection campaign, asking the Board of Elections asking to examine the machine ballots. In 2011-2012, Long was counsel of record for Soares in a disciplinary proceeding and in Soares' divorce. County Court denied the motion without a hearing. The Appellate Division and New York Court of Appeals affirmed, determining that there was no support for the assertion that there was an actual conflict and that defendant failed to show that any potential conflict had operated on the defense. View "People v Wright" on Justia Law

Williams was convicted of a 1984 murder and sentenced to death. Philadelphia District Attorney Castille approved a request to seek the death penalty. Williams’s conviction and sentence were upheld on direct appeal, state post-conviction review, and federal habeas review. In 2012, Williams filed a successive petition under Pennsylvania’s Post-Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), arguing that the prosecutor had obtained false testimony from his codefendant and suppressed exculpatory evidence. Finding that the prosecutor had committed Brady violations, the court stayed Williams’s execution. The Commonwealth asked the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, whose chief justice was former District Attorney Castille, to vacate the stay. Without explanation, Castille denied Williams’s motion for recusal and request for referral to the full court; Castille joined an opinion vacating PCRA relief and reinstating Williams’s death sentence. Two weeks later, Castille retired. The U.S. Supreme Court vacated, holding that Castille’s participation violated the Due Process Clause. There is an impermissible risk of actual bias when a judge earlier had significant, personal involvement as a prosecutor in a critical decision regarding the defendant’s case. No attorney is more integral to the accusatory process than a prosecutor who participates in a major adversary decision; the decision to pursue the death penalty is a critical choice. Neither the involvement of multiple actors nor the passage of time relieves the former prosecutor of the duty to withdraw. An unconstitutional failure to recuse constitutes structural error, “not amenable” to harmless-error review, regardless of whether the judge’s vote was dispositive. The Court noted that many jurisdictions, including Pennsylvania, have statutes and professional codes that already require recusal under these circumstances. View "Williams v. Pennsylvania" on Justia Law

New Mexico Rule of Professional Conduct 16-308(E) prohibited a prosecutor from subpoenaing a lawyer to present evidence about a past or present client in a grand-jury or other criminal proceeding unless such evidence was “essential” and “there is no other feasible alternative to obtain the information.” In a lawsuit brought against the New Mexico Supreme Court and the state’s Disciplinary Board and Office of Disciplinary Counsel, the United States claimed that the enforcement of this rule against federal prosecutors licensed in New Mexico violated the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court concluded that Rule 16-308(E) was preempted with respect to federal prosecutors practicing before grand juries, but was not preempted outside of the grand-jury context. With this conclusion, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed and affirmed the district court's decision. View "United States v. NM Supreme Court" on Justia Law