Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

Re and Leach owned warehouses in Englewood, Florida. After leasing space in Leach’s warehouse, Daughtry told his agent that he did so because Leach stated that a sewer line essential to Re’s warehouse crossed Leach’s property without permission and lacked permits. The agent shared the information who Re, who hired assailants to beat Leach and threaten worse unless he broke the lease. Re was convicted under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951, for using extortion to injure Leach’s business in interstate commerce. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. In a petition under 28 U.S.C. 2255, Re claimed that his lawyers rendered ineffective assistance: trial counsel by stealing from Re and appellate counsel by omitting an argument certain to prevail. The district court denied the petition. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that threatening someone without “obtaining” money, or value, in return, does not meet the Hobbs Act definition. A jury could find that Re’s goal in having Leach beaten was to obtain Daughtry as a tenant to get rental payments. A post-trial crime by a lawyer against his client does not spoil the trial as a matter of law; prejudice must be shown. Re could not establish prejudice. The lawyer who embezzled his funds played only a peripheral role in the trial. View "Re v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the first African-American circuit court judge elected in Phillips County, Arkansas, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the commission and officials during the disciplinary proceedings against him. The district court denied plaintiff's request for a temporary restraining order and stayed proceedings in accordance with the Younger abstention doctrine. The state disciplinary proceedings ended with a decision by the Arkansas Supreme Court. The district court then granted the commission and officials' Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss, finding no justifiable federal controversy. The court concluded that Defendant Stewart, Executive Director of the commission, was entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity as to plaintiff's claims for damages on the first cause of action; plaintiff had no justiciable claim for damages against any defendant in the second cause of action where plaintiff's allegations amounted to nothing more than a state law defamation claim and the district court did not abuse its discretion; and plaintiff's requests for declaratory and injunctive relief were moot. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Simes, II v. Arkansas Judicial D. & D. Comm, et al." on Justia Law

Steidl and Whitlock were convicted of 1987 murders, largely based on testimony by two supposed eyewitnesses. Long after the convictions, an investigation revealed that much of the testimony was perjured and that exculpatory evidence had been withheld. The revelations led to the release of the men and dismissal of all charges. Steidl had spent almost 17 years in prison; Whitlock had spent close to 21 years. They sued. By 2013, both had settled with all defendants. Because the defendants were public officials and public entities, disputes arose over responsibility for defense costs. National Casualty sought a declaratory judgment that it was not liable for the defense of former State’s Attorney, McFatridge, or Edgar County, agreeing to pay their costs under a reservation of rights until the issue was resolved. The Seventh Circuit ruled in favor of National Casualty. In another case McFatridge sought a state court order that the Illinois Attorney General approve his reasonable expenses and fees; the Illinois Supreme Court rejected the claim. In a third case, National Casualty sought a declaratory judgment that another insurer was liable for costs it had advanced. The Seventh Circuit affirmed that the other company is liable. It would be inequitable for that company to benefit from National’s attempt to do the right thing, especially since it did not do the right thing and contribute to the defense costs under a reservation of rights. View "Nat'l Cas. Co. v. White Mountains Reinsurance Co." on Justia Law

Bowers joined Ophthalmology Group as an employee in 1999 and, in 2002, became one of six partners. In November 2009, Bowers tendered a resignation letter to her partners. Although she did not give a date of departure, the partnership agreement required a one-year notice. In March, 2010, the partners voted to expel Bowers from the partnership, stating that her Chapter 7 bankruptcy and creditors’ proceedings and other personal conduct were detrimental to the Partnership.” After exhausting administrative remedies, Bowers filed suit, alleging: gender discrimination under Title VII; wrongful termination in breach of contract or in violation of public policy under Kentucky common law; gender discrimination under Kentucky statutes; retaliation for complaining about gender discrimination under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. and the state law; and misappropriation of name for commercial advantage. Bowers moved to disqualify defendant’s counsel because another attorney at the firm previously represented Bowers in a substantially related matter. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendant because Bowers, as a former partner, was not an “employee” under Title VII and denied the motion to disqualify “as moot.” The Sixth Circuit vacated summary judgment and granted the motion to disqualify.View "Bowers v. Ophthalmology Grp." on Justia Law

This appeal concerned a dispute over attorney's fees related to a settlement of numerous civil rights lawsuits against the City and others. The court held that several important principles bear on the district court's determination of a reasonable fee amount: (1) the court must compute the fee award using an hourly rate that is based on the "prevailing market rates in the relevant community;" (2) when a district court reduces either the number of hours or the lodestar by a certain percentage greater than 10%, it must provide a clear and concise explanation for why it chose the specific percentage to apply; and (3) it was not per se unreasonable for the prevailing party in a civil rights case to be awarded an amount of attorney's fees that exceeds the amount of money recovered by his or her client. In this instance, the court vacated and remanded because the district court did not apply these principles when determining the amount of plaintiffs' attorney's fee award. View "Gonzalez v. City of Maywood" on Justia Law

From 2006 until he was fired in 2011, Chrzanowski was an assistant state’s attorney. In 2011, a special prosecutor began investigating Chrzanowski’s boss, Bianchi. Bianchi allegedly had improperly influenced cases involving his relatives and political allies. Under subpoena, Chrzanowski testified before a grand jury, and later, again under subpoena, he testified at Bianchi’s trial. A few months later, Chrzanowski was interrogated by Bianchi and fired. Chrzanowski believed that the firing was retaliation for his testimony and filed suit, alleging violation of his First Amendment rights and state statutes. The district court dismissed the 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims, finding that First Amendment protections did not apply because the testimony was “pursuant to [his] official duties” and, in the alternative, that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity, because any First Amendment protections were not “clearly established” at the time. The Seventh Circuit reversed. When Chrzanowski spoke out about his supervisors’ potential or actual wrongdoing, he was speaking outside the duties of employment. Providing eyewitness testimony regarding potential wrongdoing was never part of what Chrzanowski was employed to do; his rights were clearly established at all relevant times. Unlike restrictions on speech made pursuant to official duties, punishment for subpoenaed testimony chills civic discourse “in significant and pernicious ways.” View "Chrzanowski v. Bianchi" on Justia Law

Carpenter sued Flint, a councilwoman and the mayor, based on Carpenter’s termination from his position as Director of Transportation, asserting age and political discrimination, breach of contract, wrongful discharge, gross negligence, defamation, and invasion of privacy. Defendants argued that the complaint failed to identify which claims were alleged against which defendants, and that the allegations were “excessively esoteric, compound and argumentative.” Carpenter did not respond by the court’s deadline, and about five weeks later, a stipulated order entered, permitting Carpenter to file an amended complaint by April 21, 2011. Counsel manually filed an amended complaint on May 20, 2011, violating a local rule requiring electronic filing. The clerk accepted the filing, but issued a warning. Carpenter failed to timely respond to a renewed motion to strike. Carpenter responded to a resulting show-cause order, but failed to abide by local rules. Another warning issued. Carpenter’s response to a second show-cause order was noncompliant. The court warned that “future failure to comply … will not be tolerated.” After more than five months without docket activity, the court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Defendants bore some responsibility for delays and the length of delay does not establish the kind of conduct or clear record warranting dismissal; lesser sanctions were appropriate. View "Carpenter v. City of Flint" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an attorney, filed suit against the Judge Advocate General (JAG) of the Navy and others, alleging violation of his constitutional rights in an administrative decision which suspended him from practice before naval courts. The disciplinary proceedings stemmed from plaintiff's filing of an appellate brief containing statements he knew were false and misleading. The court concluded that the district court did not err in holding that the Navy JAG had authority to discipline plaintiff; plaintiff received ample due process and his Fifth Amendment rights were not violated during the proceedings against him; and the record did not support plaintiff's Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 551, 701, and 706, claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claims and denied his request for mandamus review. View "Partington v. Houck, et al." on Justia Law

The parties dispute whether the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. 1997e(d)(2), limited the amount that plaintiff, a prisoner who qualified as a prevailing party who would ordinarily be entitled to an award of attorney's fees, could recover from defendant for attorney's fees incurred in defending his judgment on appeal to 150 percent of the monetary relief awarded to him at trial. The court held that the fee cap in section (d)(2) did not apply to attorney's fees earned in conjunction with an appeal in which prison officials sought unsuccessfully to reverse a verdict obtained by the prisoner before the district court. The court granted plaintiff's motion for attorney's fees on appeal and referred the matter to the Appellate Commissioner to determine the amount of such fees, as well as the amount of reimbursable costs. View "Woods v. Carey" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from the detention and handcuffing of a nine-year-old student during her physical education class. Defendant, a Deputy Sheriff, appealed from the district court's grant of attorney's fees. The court concluded that the district court abused its discretion by awarding attorney's fees to plaintiff where plaintiff achieved a de minimus victory under the Farrar v. Hobby factors. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for entry of judgment in favor of defendant on his claim for attorney's fees. View "Gray v. Bostic" on Justia Law