Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

Robert Cooper retained McDonald Carano Wilson LLP (Appellant) to represented him in a personal injury action. Three years into the representation, the district court granted Appellant’s motion to withdraw. Appellant perfected a charging lien for more than $100,000 in attorney fees and costs. Thereafter, Cooper retained another law firm, which obtained a $55,000 settlement for Cooper. The district court concluded that Appellant could not enforce its charging lien because it withdrew before settlement occurred. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in its judgment because Nev. Rev. Stat. 18.015’s language unambiguously allows any counsel that worked on a claim to enforce a charging lien against any affirmative recovery. Remanded for additional findings to determine whether Appellant was entitled to a disbursement and, if it is, the amount of that disbursement. View "Wilson v. Bourassa Law Group, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the company managing the prison he was incarcerated in, and others, for multiple violations of his constitutional rights. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court’s denial of his motion for appointment of counsel to help litigate his civil rights claims against defendants. The district court denied the motion because it had no funding with which to compensate an appointed attorney, and it could find “no attorneys in the area willing or able to take the case pro bono.” Then the district court entered summary judgment against plaintiff. The court vacated and demanded, concluding that federal courts have inherent power to order counsel to accept an uncompensated appointment under the limited factual circumstances here. On remand, the district court must consider whether a compulsory appointment is warranted. View "Naranjo v. Thompson" on Justia Law

Tesco sued NOV for infringement of patents that involve an apparatus and method for handling sections of pipe used for lining a well-bore. NOV filed an answer, counterclaims, a request for attorney’s fees, and motions to compel requesting information about documents to show what occurred during the six months before the on-sale bar date. Ultimately, based on non-production of an original brochure, the court sanctioned Tesco by reversing the burden of proof on validity, setting the burden at a preponderance of evidence. The jury concluded that NOV infringed the relevant claims, found certain of those claims to be not invalid, and found that the brochure was not enabling. During post-trial discovery on the brochure. NOV filed “post-trial summary judgment motions of invalidity” (35 U.S.C. 102(b) and 103) based on what it asserts was disclosed in the brochure. The court granted NOV’s motion for obviousness, relying on an obvious-to-try analysis, set a trial date for the exceptional case counterclaim, and, later, issued an order sua sponte dismissing the case with prejudice under its inherent authority, finding that certain testimony was “contrary to the representations Tesco made to the Court during trial,” stating that the attorneys’ conduct was “entirely out of character ... serious and has had significant and costly ramifications.” The parties, including the attorneys, later entered into a settlement resolving all outstanding issues, and signed releases. The attorneys contend that, despite the settlement, the harm to their reputation from the court’s opinion justified continued jurisdiction. The Federal Circuit dismissed, finding no remaining case or controversy. View "Tesco Corp. v. Nat'l Oilwell Varco, L.P." on Justia Law

The court certified a question to the Alabama Supreme Court and the Alabama Supreme Court subsequently declined to answer the certified question. After reconsideration of the facts and law in this case, the court found that it is unnecessary at this juncture to answer the certified question because there exists a genuine dispute of material fact regarding a preliminary (and dispositive) issue: the nature of the parties’ relationship. The court concluded that the record is presently insufficient to determine whether the parties entered into an attorney-client relationship or a principal-agent relationship when Mississippi Valley hired defendant as an attorney agent. The court will not pass on the certified question regarding whether defendant’s conduct does or does not constitute the provision of legal services, because if the parties never entered into an attorney-client relationship, then defendant’s conduct is irrelevant. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Mississippi Valley Title Ins. Co. v. Thompson" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a law firm, was retained as counsel for a gaming company (“the company”) in a lawsuit against the company’s former employees and an entity they created. Petitioner prepared a second amended complaint adding real parties in interest (collectively, “Himelfarb”) as defendants. The jury rejected the company’s claims against Himelfarb and found for Himelfarb on its counterclaims. The district court eventually determined that the company would be liable for Himelfarb’s attorney fees and costs and determined that Petitioner was jointly and severally liable with the company for those fees and costs pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 7.085. Petitioner subsequently sought a writ of mandamus vacating the portion of the district court’s order making Petitioner jointly and severally liable for Himelfarb’s attorney fees. The Supreme Court granted the petition, holding (1) Nev. R. Civ. P. 11 does not supersede section 7.085 because each represents a distinct, independent mechanism for sanctioning attorney misconduct, and therefore, the award against Petitioner was not improper; but (2) the district court abused its discretion in sanctioning Petitioner under section 7.085 without making adequate findings. View "Watson Rounds v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

In a case alleging that Abbott's baby formula contained a harmful bacteria that caused permanent brain damage to J.M.K., the jury found in favor of Abbott. The district court then ordered defense counsel Ghezzi to show cause why she should not be sanctioned under FRCP 30(d)(2) for obstructing each deposition in which she had participated. Defense counsel was subsequently ordered to produce a discovery training video dealing with the impropriety of form objections, witness coaching, and excessive interruptions and to distribute the video to most of the attorneys in her national law firm, Jones Day. The Eighth Circuit reversed. While the court had authority to impose Rule 30 sanctions, generally sanctions should be imposed within a time frame that has a nexus to the behavior sought to be deterred and no advance notice was given of the unusual nature of the sanction being considered. The court noted that once information about an unusual sanction appears in public, the damage to the subject's career, reputation, and future professional opportunities can be difficult if not impossible to repair. View "Sec. Nat'l Bank of Sioux City v. Jones Day" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an attorney, appealed from the revised judgment entered by the trial court following this court’s reversal with instructions to enter a new judgment in Chodos v. Borman. Plaintiff contended that the trial court erred when it failed to include postjudgment interest in the final judgment, with interest to run on the $1,717,921 from September 19, 2013, the date of the original judgment. Defendant argued that interest should only run from the date of entry of the judgment following remittitur, November 14, 2014. The court held that interest ran on the $1,717,921 judgment from the date of the original judgment - September 19, 2013 - and that plaintiff is entitled to the costs claimed and interest on those costs from that date. Accordingly, the court modified and affirmed the judgment. View "Chodos v. Borman" on Justia Law

In 2013 the Seventh Circuit held unconstitutional a provision of the Indiana Unclaimed Property Act, Ind. Code 32-34-1-1 that stated that “property” is “presumed abandoned if the owner or apparent owner has not communicated in writing with the holder concerning the property or has not otherwise given an indication of interest in the property” within a specified period varying according to the type of property. By filing a valid claim, the owner could reclaim the property up to 25 years after it was delivered to the attorney general, but was entitled only to principal and not to any interest. Several months later, the state amended the Act to provide for payment of interest. The district court dismissed the remand as moot and denied plaintiff attorneys’ fees. The Seventh Circuit reversed, opining that the judge was annoyed at the plaintiff because on remand she asked permission to file an amended complaint to convert the suit to a class action, based on intimations that the state would compensate only the plaintiff. She withdrew that request when the state amended the Act. The state’s concession did not deprive the plaintiff of her status as the prevailing party. The court also opined that the amount sought—$258,462.50 for 375.75 hours—is excessive. View "Cerajeski v. Zoeller" on Justia Law

Smith, a California partnership, hired attorney Moncrief to perform due diligence for its purchase of equipment from Texas Hill in Arizona. Texas Hill was represented by Clark, an Arizona attorney. Moncrief performed a UCC search, called Clark, and left a voicemail. Clark called Moncrief in response and represented that Texas Hill was the sole owner of the equipment. Afterwards Clark sent Moncrief an e-mail, stating: “I have been the attorney for Texas Hill . . . and can state unequivocally that the cooling equipment you are buying is free and clear and is owned by Texas Hill.” Based on Clark’s representations, Moncrief advised Smith to go forward with the purchase. Smith later learned that Texas Hill did not own the equipment when they completed the transaction; New York Community Bank had acquired an interest in the equipment. Smith sued Moncrief for legal malpractice. Moncrief cross-complained against Clark. Clark moved to quash service, arguing that California lacked personal jurisdiction over him. The court granted the motion. Clark’s conduct and his intentional misrepresentations were required to close the sale. Clark personally availed himself of the benefits of California when he reached into California to induce Moncrief’s client to complete the purchase. Moncrief’s claims arise out of Clark’s contacts with California. lark has not demonstrated that exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable. View "Moncrief v. Clark" on Justia Law

Sanctionees Hancock, Musnuff, and Goodyear appealed from the district court's award of sanctions, arguing that the district court abused its discretion in relying upon its inherent power to impose sanctions, and in determining the amount and the nature of the sanctions imposed. The court concluded that Sanctionees’ argument that the district court should have relied on Federal Rule of Civil Produce 37 fails because the district court's inherent power is not limited by overlapping statutes or rules. The court held that it was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to rely on its inherent power to sanction the conduct at issue in this case, and to determine that Rule 37 did not provide the appropriate remedy, especially since the discovery fraud was not discovered until after the case had settled. In this case, it is clear the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Hancock, Musnuff, and Goodyear acted in bad faith in this litigation; the district court acted well within its discretion in awarding all the attorneys’ fees and costs incurred by plaintiffs after Goodyear served its supplemental responses to plaintiffs’ First Request; and the court affirmed the monetary and non-monetary sanctions set forth in the district court’s Order. View "Haeger v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co." on Justia Law