Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

Six years after a San Jose police officer testified falsely against plaintiff during a preliminary hearing, the city agreed to pay plaintiff $150,000 and not to oppose any motion plaintiff might bring for a declaration of factual innocence of the criminal charges brought against him. The parties agreed that plaintiff’s counsel could seek an award of costs incurred and reasonable attorney’s fees under the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Award Act, 42 U.S.C. 1988. Plaintiff sought $1,448,397 in attorney fees and $75,255 in costs, based on “2,419.9 compensable attorney hours … utilizing reasonable hourly billing rates roughly 20% below established market rates[,] i.e[.,] ranging from $425 to $650 per hour,” plus $102,998.75, added for “fees-on-fees work.” Plaintiff also requested a 1.5 multiplier to the lodestar amount “to account for the significant risk counsel has taken in litigating this hotly[ ]contested matter on a wholly contingent basis, with little prospect of settlement until the eve of trial.” The court awarded compensation of $436,807.50, declined to apply the 1.5 multiplier, and awarded costs of $23,935.07. The court of appeals remanded, finding the lower court’s reasoning inadequate. View "Kerkeles v. City of San Jose" on Justia Law

The District and the Police Department appealed from the district court's grant of preliminary injunction restraining enforcement of a “good reason” standard in the D.C. Code provision governing the issuance of licenses for the carrying of concealed weapons, D.C. Law 20-279, 3(b). The court noted that the controlling fact in this case is the identity of the judge who decided it in the district court – The Honorable Senior United States District Judge Frederick J. Scullin, Jr., of the Northern District of New York. Although Judge Scullin served under a properly issued designation, that designation was limited to specific and enumerated cases. The court concluded that the present litigation is not one of those cases. The court concluded that, like the designated judge in Frad v. Kelly, Judge Scullin had a limited designation that did not extend beyond the specifications of that designation. Accordingly, the court vacated the order based on jurisdictional grounds. View "Wrenn v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law

The issue presented in this case was one of first impression: to what extent do the confidentiality provisions of Oregon’s mediation statutes (ORS 36.100 to 36.238) prevent a client from offering evidence of communications made by his attorney and others in a subsequent malpractice action against that attorney? Plaintiff retained defendant, an attorney specializing in employment law, to pursue discrimination and retaliation claims against plaintiff’s former employer. In the course of that representation, defendant filed administrative complaints with the Oregon Bureau of Labor and Industries and thereafter a civil action against the former employer for damages on plaintiff’s behalf. After limited discovery, plaintiff, represented by defendant, and plaintiff’s former employer entered into mediation under the terms and conditions set forth in the mediation statutes. Before meeting with the mediator and plaintiff’s former employer, defendant advised plaintiff about the potential value of his claims and the amount for which he might settle the lawsuit. Plaintiff and his former employer, along with their respective lawyers and the mediator, attended a joint mediation session and attempted to resolve the dispute. However, no resolution was reached. After the session ended, the mediator proposed a settlement package to the parties. In the weeks that followed, defendant provided advice to plaintiff about the proposed settlement. At defendant’s urging, plaintiff accepted the proposed terms and signed a settlement agreement with his former employer. One of the terms to which plaintiff agreed was that the settlement agreement would be confidential. After the parties signed the agreement, defendant continued to counsel plaintiff and provide legal advice regarding the settlement. Some months after the mediation ended, plaintiff concluded that defendant’s legal representation had been deficient and negatively affected the outcome of his case. The trial court granted defendant’s motion to strike certain allegations in plaintiff’s complaint and then dismissed the complaint with prejudice under ORCP 21 A(8) for failure to state a claim. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that ORS 36.220 and 36.222 barred some, but not all, of plaintiff’s allegations, and that the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint with prejudice before a responsive pleading had been filed. The Supreme Court agreed that ORS 36.220 and 36.222 limited the subsequent disclosure of mediation settlement terms and certain communications that occur in the course of or in connection with mediation. The Court disagreed, however, as to the scope of communications that are confidential under those statutes. Furthermore, the Court disagreed with the Court of Appeals as to whether the trial court erred in dismissing plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice because no responsive pleading had been filed. The Court therefore affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded for further proceedings. View "Alfieri v. Solomon" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed a judgment after the trial court's grant of defendants' motion for terminating sanctions. Chase moved for terminating sanctions based on its unsuccessful attempts to depose plaintiff's brother and plaintiff's threats of physical violence. The court held that courts have the inherent authority to dismiss a case as a sanction and the authority should be exercised only in extreme situations, such as where the conduct was clear and deliberate and no lesser sanction would remedy the situation. The court concluded that, based on plaintiff's conduct, this case required a terminating sanction. The court cited plaintiff's failure to pay sanctions, harassing behavior, highly contemptuous statements made to the court, brandishing pepper spray and use of a stun gun. The court rejected plaintiff's arguments and affirmed the judgment. View "Crawford v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Petitioners, a bipartisan group of citizens, requested that a three-judge court be convened to consider their claim that Maryland’s 2011 congressional redistricting plan burdens their First Amendment right of political association. The district court dismissed the action, concluding that no relief could be granted. The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The Court held that 28 U.S.C. 2284 entitles petitioners to make their case before a three-judge court because, under section 2284(a), the present suit is indisputably an action challenging the constitutionality of the apportionment of congressional districts. The Court further held that the subsequent provision of section 2284(b)(1), that the district judge shall commence the process for appointment of a three-judge panel “unless he determines that three judges are not required,” should be read not as a grant of discretion to the district judge to ignore section 2284(a), but as a compatible administrative detail. The Court went on to say that this conclusion is bolstered by section 2284(b)(3)’s explicit command that “[a] single judge shall not . . . enter judgment on the merits.” Finally, the Court held that respondents' alternative argument, that the District Judge should have dismissed petitioners' claim as "constitutionally insubstantial" under Goosby v. Osser, is unpersuasive. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded. View "Shapiro v. McManus" on Justia Law

Robert Cooper retained McDonald Carano Wilson LLP (Appellant) to represented him in a personal injury action. Three years into the representation, the district court granted Appellant’s motion to withdraw. Appellant perfected a charging lien for more than $100,000 in attorney fees and costs. Thereafter, Cooper retained another law firm, which obtained a $55,000 settlement for Cooper. The district court concluded that Appellant could not enforce its charging lien because it withdrew before settlement occurred. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in its judgment because Nev. Rev. Stat. 18.015’s language unambiguously allows any counsel that worked on a claim to enforce a charging lien against any affirmative recovery. Remanded for additional findings to determine whether Appellant was entitled to a disbursement and, if it is, the amount of that disbursement. View "Wilson v. Bourassa Law Group, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the company managing the prison he was incarcerated in, and others, for multiple violations of his constitutional rights. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court’s denial of his motion for appointment of counsel to help litigate his civil rights claims against defendants. The district court denied the motion because it had no funding with which to compensate an appointed attorney, and it could find “no attorneys in the area willing or able to take the case pro bono.” Then the district court entered summary judgment against plaintiff. The court vacated and demanded, concluding that federal courts have inherent power to order counsel to accept an uncompensated appointment under the limited factual circumstances here. On remand, the district court must consider whether a compulsory appointment is warranted. View "Naranjo v. Thompson" on Justia Law

Tesco sued NOV for infringement of patents that involve an apparatus and method for handling sections of pipe used for lining a well-bore. NOV filed an answer, counterclaims, a request for attorney’s fees, and motions to compel requesting information about documents to show what occurred during the six months before the on-sale bar date. Ultimately, based on non-production of an original brochure, the court sanctioned Tesco by reversing the burden of proof on validity, setting the burden at a preponderance of evidence. The jury concluded that NOV infringed the relevant claims, found certain of those claims to be not invalid, and found that the brochure was not enabling. During post-trial discovery on the brochure. NOV filed “post-trial summary judgment motions of invalidity” (35 U.S.C. 102(b) and 103) based on what it asserts was disclosed in the brochure. The court granted NOV’s motion for obviousness, relying on an obvious-to-try analysis, set a trial date for the exceptional case counterclaim, and, later, issued an order sua sponte dismissing the case with prejudice under its inherent authority, finding that certain testimony was “contrary to the representations Tesco made to the Court during trial,” stating that the attorneys’ conduct was “entirely out of character ... serious and has had significant and costly ramifications.” The parties, including the attorneys, later entered into a settlement resolving all outstanding issues, and signed releases. The attorneys contend that, despite the settlement, the harm to their reputation from the court’s opinion justified continued jurisdiction. The Federal Circuit dismissed, finding no remaining case or controversy. View "Tesco Corp. v. Nat'l Oilwell Varco, L.P." on Justia Law

The court certified a question to the Alabama Supreme Court and the Alabama Supreme Court subsequently declined to answer the certified question. After reconsideration of the facts and law in this case, the court found that it is unnecessary at this juncture to answer the certified question because there exists a genuine dispute of material fact regarding a preliminary (and dispositive) issue: the nature of the parties’ relationship. The court concluded that the record is presently insufficient to determine whether the parties entered into an attorney-client relationship or a principal-agent relationship when Mississippi Valley hired defendant as an attorney agent. The court will not pass on the certified question regarding whether defendant’s conduct does or does not constitute the provision of legal services, because if the parties never entered into an attorney-client relationship, then defendant’s conduct is irrelevant. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Mississippi Valley Title Ins. Co. v. Thompson" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a law firm, was retained as counsel for a gaming company (“the company”) in a lawsuit against the company’s former employees and an entity they created. Petitioner prepared a second amended complaint adding real parties in interest (collectively, “Himelfarb”) as defendants. The jury rejected the company’s claims against Himelfarb and found for Himelfarb on its counterclaims. The district court eventually determined that the company would be liable for Himelfarb’s attorney fees and costs and determined that Petitioner was jointly and severally liable with the company for those fees and costs pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 7.085. Petitioner subsequently sought a writ of mandamus vacating the portion of the district court’s order making Petitioner jointly and severally liable for Himelfarb’s attorney fees. The Supreme Court granted the petition, holding (1) Nev. R. Civ. P. 11 does not supersede section 7.085 because each represents a distinct, independent mechanism for sanctioning attorney misconduct, and therefore, the award against Petitioner was not improper; but (2) the district court abused its discretion in sanctioning Petitioner under section 7.085 without making adequate findings. View "Watson Rounds v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law