Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

As part of a malicious prosecution lawsuit against Chicago, the plaintiffs sought by subpoena to discover documents from the Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office. Lawyers representing the Office, including McClellan, stated that the files no longer existed. A year later, the Presiding Judge ordered the Office to allow the plaintiffs’ lawyers to inspect 181 boxes of documents stored in a warehouse. The documents at issue were quickly found. Plaintiffs moved to sanction McClellan and others for obstructing discovery. After the tort suit ended in the plaintiffs’ acceptance of an offer of judgment, the judge granted the motion and ordered McClellan and the State’s Attorney’s Office to pay fees and costs ($35,522.94) that their misconduct had imposed on the plaintiffs, based on a finding of attorney misconduct under 28 U.S.C. 1927 and the inherent authority of a federal court to punish attorney misconduct in a case before it. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, characterizing the criticisms of McClellan as “apt and accurate” and, because the sanction had been paid, holding that a district court order imposing a sanction on a lawyer for misconduct in a case before the court can be appealed even if the sanction lacks a monetary component. View "Martinez v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Appellants received less than $6,000 in damages from their employers for unpaid overtime wages after eight years of litigation. In this appeal, appellants challenge the district court's fee award as too low, while the employers challenge it as too high. The court concluded that, while appellants’ fee petition originally was untimely, the court’s entry of an amended judgment created “[a] new period for filing” and cured that untimeliness, notwithstanding the fact that the petition was filed before entry of the new judgment. Therefore, appellants satisfied Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2)(B)’s dictates, leaving no ground on which to deny appellants’ fee petition in its entirety for lack of timeliness. On the merits, the court concluded that there is no support in the record for the district court’s finding that appellants failed to promptly provide a damages calculation that could have facilitated early settlement. This clear factual error requires remand. Additionally, because the court cannot ascertain whether or how significantly this mistaken factual finding impacted other aspects of the district court’s fee reasonability assessment, the court vacated the entire decision and remanded. View "Radtke v. Caschetta" on Justia Law

Appellant filed a personal injury suit after she was hurt in a hay bale accident. In this case, the trial court dismissed with prejudice the complaint for personal injuries during jury trial as a sanction for repeated violations of its orders excluding hearsay and opinion testimony. Appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion in granting the terminating sanction and erred when it granted respondents' motions in limine. Because the orders in limine did not have the effect of granting a nonsuit or judgment on the pleadings, the court determined that the abuse of discretion standard of review applies. In this case, the court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it made orders excluding evidence that were tantamount to a nonsuit and when it granted the terminating sanction where appellant could not, and did not, demonstrate her opinions about the appearance of hay bales had any rational basis. The trial court also correctly granted respondents' Motion in Limine No. 4, to exclude hearsay regarding the source of the hay bales. The trial court also correctly excluded appellant's proffered testimony that she saw Todd's delivery person with a delivery "ticket" or receipt identifying Berrington as the source of the hay bale. The trial court also did not abuse its discretion in issuing the terminating sanction. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Osborne v. Todd Farm Serv." on Justia Law

Li is a 78-year-old Chinese-American, with limited English and experience with the legal system. Attorney Yan became a member of the bar in 2008. Ignoring blatant conflicts of interest, beginning in 2007, Yan advised and represented Li in a matter involving a contract in which Yan was the obligor and Li was the assignee. In 2010 Li sued, alleging professional negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, unlawful business practices, breach of contract, and fraud. The court awarded $254,411.06, plus prejudgment interest. Following posttrial proceedings, during which the California Bar began disciplinary proceedings, the judge filed an amended judgment awarding Li $552,412.30, including $149,667.29 in prejudgment interest. After an unsuccessful appeal by Yan, Li’s new attorney began efforts to collect the judgment. During examination of Yan, as a judgment debtor, the court upheld service of a subpoena duces tecum by mail (Yan was unable to be located for personal service) and denied Yan’s claim of privilege with respect to his tax returns. The court of appeal affirmed, stating that “enough is enough” and awarding Li costs. View "Li v. Yan" on Justia Law

The Almanor Lakeside Villas Owners Association sought to impose fines and related fees of $19,979.97 on the Carsons for alleged rule violations related to the Carsons’ use of their properties as short-term vacation rentals. The Carsons cross-complained for breach of contract, private nuisance, and intentional interference with prospective economic advantage. The Carsons had engaged in short-term rental for many years and believed that they were exempt from new regulations and enforcement efforts. The court ruled against the Carsons on their cross-complaint but also rejected many of the fines as unreasonable. The court upheld fines pertaining to the use of Almanor’s boat slips and ordered the Carsons to pay $6,620.00 in damages. The court determined Almanor to be the prevailing party and awarded $101,803.15 in attorney’s fees and costs. The court of appeal affirmed, concluding that the award of attorney’s fees, compared to the “overall relief obtained” by Almanor, was not so disproportionate as to constitute an abuse of discretion. View "Almanor Lakeside Villas Owners Ass'n. v. Carson" on Justia Law

Appellant C. Tucker Cheadle, as administrator of the estate of Robert F. Obarr, appealed an order denying his motion to disqualify counsel for respondent DP Pham LLC. Pham made three loans to Obarr totaling nearly $3 million, and Obarr secured each loan by granting Pham a lien on a mobilehome park he owned in Westminster (Property). This action arose when Obarr allegedly agreed to sell the Property to two different buyers. In March 2013, Obarr allegedly contracted to sell the Property to S.C.D. Enterprises (SCD). SCD promptly assigned the purchase agreement to Westminster MHP Associates, LP (Westminster), which allegedly opened escrow on the Property with Obarr. According to Westminster, it satisfied all contingencies for the sale within 10 days of opening escrow. In April 2013, Westminster filed suit alleging contract claims against Obarr. Obarr died unexpectedly in August. The trial court appointed Cheadle as a special administrator for Obarr’s estate and in that capacity substituted Cheadle for Obarr as a party to this action. Cheadle then filed a cross-complaint alleging an interpleader claim against both Westminster and Pham concerning the Property. Based on Pham’s loans to Obarr, Cheadle also alleged claims against Pham for usury, intentional misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, money had and received, unjust enrichment, reformation, and violation of the unfair competition law. Cheadle contended disqualification was required because Pham’s counsel improperly obtained copies of privileged communications between Obarr and his attorney, and used those communications to oppose another party’s summary judgment motion in this case. The trial court denied the disqualification motion because it concluded the communications were not privileged. The Court of Appeal reversed. After reviewing copies of the communications, the trial court concluded they were not privileged based on their content. "A court, however, may not review the contents of a communication to determine whether the attorney-client privilege protects that communication. The attorney-client privilege is an absolute privilege that prevents disclosure, no matter how necessary or relevant to the lawsuit. The privilege attaches to all confidential communications between an attorney and a client regardless of whether the information communicated is in fact privileged. Accordingly, it is neither necessary nor appropriate to review a communication to determine whether the attorney-client privilege protects it." View "DP Pham v. Cheadle" on Justia Law

In 2007, Kansas landowners sued, alleging that the government had taken their land without compensation by conversion of a rail corridor to a trail under the National Trail Systems Act, 16 U.S.C. 1247(d). The Claims Court granted the government summary judgment concerning five claims and certified questions to the Kansas Supreme Court concerning the scope of Kansas railroad easements. That court determined that it lacked jurisdiction to accept the certified question. The Claims Court then granted plaintiffs summary judgment plus attorney fees under the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Act, 42 U.S.C. 4654(c), calculated using the lodestar method, where a reasonable number of hours expended is multiplied by the prevailing rate in the relevant community. Based on the “no-interest rule,” historical rates, rather than rates in force at the end of litigation, were to be used. Counsel sought $2,017,987 in fees and $201,924 in costs, based, in part, on rates in effect in Washington D.C. The court reduced the number of hours and applied the St. Louis rate for hours expended until 2010 and Washington D.C. rates for later work. The Federal Circuit denied a request to supplement the record and affirmed, upholding the reductions imposed by the lower court. View "Biery v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the minority shareholder of Omega, filed suit against majority shareholder Kent Constable, his wife Karen, and Omega, alleging direct and derivative claims arising from a dispute over management of Omega and its assets. Counsel represented all defendants in the litigation. The trial court granted plaintiff's motion to disqualify Counsel from representing any of the defendants. The court concluded that the trial court did not err by disqualifying Counsel as to Omega because Counsel concurrently represented defendants in the same action where an actual conflict existed between them, and Kent alone did not have authority to consent to the conflicting representation on Omega's behalf. The court concluded that the trial court erred by disqualifying Counsel as to the Constables where Counsel's continued representation of the Constables poses no threat to Counsel's continuing duty of confidentiality to Omega. Finally, the trial court did not err by concluding defendants did not meet their burden of showing plaintiff waived his right to seek to disqualify Counsel where plaintiff's 16-month delay was not unreasonable because prejudice to defendants was not extreme. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "Ontiveros v. Constable" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the State Bar, alleging a due process claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Specifically, plaintiff alleged that the State Bar’s rules applied the same standards and procedures for reinstatement for disbarred attorneys to attorneys suspended for more than 90 days, amounted to “defacto disbarment,” and violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. The district court dismissed the complaint as barred by the Eleventh Amendment and then denied plaintiff's motion to alter or amend the judgment. Determining that the court has jurisdiction to hear plaintiff's appeal, the court agreed with the district court's conclusion that the Alabama State Bar is an arm of the state of Alabama and thus enjoys Eleventh Amendment immunity from plaintiff's section 1983 claim. Further, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's FRCP 59(e) motion where, to the extent plaintiff contends his due process claim was a “direct action” under the Fourteenth Amendment, his amended complaint did not allege such a claim, and he could not use his Rule 59(e) motion to do so. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Nichols v. Alabama State Bar" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from a dispute regarding a contract the parties entered into, which gave Lewmar the exclusive right to manufacture and sell Steinerʹs patented sailboat winch handle, a device used to control the lines and sails of a sailboat. The parties resolved the dispute when Lewmar made, and Steiner accepted, an offer of judgment under Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. After judgment was entered, Steiner moved for attorneysʹ fees of $383,804 and costs of $41,470. The district court denied attorneysʹ fees but awarded costs of $2,926. The court concluded that Steiner was precluded from seeking fees pursuant to the Agreement in addition to the $175,000 settlement amount because claims under the Agreement were unambiguously included in the Offer; Steiner was not precluded from seeking attorneysʹ fees under the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), Conn. Gen. Stat. 42‐110g(d), because the Offer did not unambiguously encompass claims for attorneysʹ fees under CUTPA; and the court remanded for the district court to clarify whether it considered the claim for attorneys' fees under CUTPA on the merits and if not, to do so. Finally, the court concluded that the district court correctly added costs under the ʺcosts then accruedʺ provision of Rule 68. View "Steiner v. Lewmar, Inc." on Justia Law