Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

The trial court entered judgment for Respondent in this breach of contract claim. The Second Appellate District affirmed and also imposed sanctions against Appellant's counsel for filing a frivolous appeal.The Second Appellate District explained "An appeal is frivolous only when it is prosecuted for an improper motive – to harass the respondent or delay the effect of an adverse judgment – or when it indisputably has no merit – when any reasonable attorney would agree that the appeal is totally and completely without merit." The court held that here, the appeal was frivolous because it "indisputably has no merit." The matter was entirely within the discretion of the trial court, and the fact that Appellant's counsel consulted with two other attorneys who believed the claim had merit did not change the court's opinion. View "Champlin/GEI Wind Holdings, LLC v. Avery" on Justia Law

Kinney, an adjudicated vexatious litigant and disbarred former attorney, obtained leave to pursue an appeal from the final judgment in this probate proceeding. Leave was granted not because Kinney made the necessary threshold showing of merit and absence of intent to harass or delay under Code of Civil Procedure section 391.7, but because the vexatious litigant statute has no application to a party who files an appeal in a proceeding he did not initiate.Kinney appealed the Final Distribution and Allowance of Fees Order, apparently claiming that the probate court erred in approving the Special Administrator’s decision not to pay him his $1,000 statutory fee, cancellation of an agreement with a prior administrator of the estate to manage and perform various services relating to a house owned by the estate, and approval of a distribution of $329,684.82 out of the sales proceeds of that house to satisfy indebtedness pursuant to certain judgment liens against that property.The court of appeal affirmed, describing Kinney’s arguments as “incoherent” and a “hodgepodge.” On all but one of the issues presented, Kinney either has no standing to appeal or is barred under the doctrine of claim preclusion; on the remaining claim of error, the probate court acted within its discretion. View "Estate of Kempton" on Justia Law

McCormick sought disability retirement based on symptoms caused by her office environment. The California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS) denied her application. The court of appeal held that CalPERS members are eligible for disability retirement under the Public Employees’ Retirement Law (Gov. Code 20000) when they can no longer perform their usual duties at the location where they are required to work. A CalPERS member need not request an accommodation to become eligible for disability retirement. On remand, McCormick sought "prevailing party" attorneys' fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, which applies when the action has conferred a significant benefit "on the general public or a large class of persons.”The court of appeal reversed the denial of that motion, finding that its prior opinion conferred a significant benefit on the public and that McCormick is otherwise entitled to attorney fees under section 1021.5. The conclusions reached in the earlier decision confer a benefit on a group larger than those CalPERS members who might seek disability retirement in factual circumstances similar to McCormick’s. The opinion emphasized that disability must be judged in light of a member’s actual job location and duties and that members need not seek an accommodation to become eligible. View "McCormick v. California Public Employees’ Retirement System" on Justia Law

When A.F. was 11 years old, she applied for a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against her father, Jeffrey F., who held joint legal custody with her mother, Andrea F. Mother was the original guardian ad litem (GAL), and she retained attorney Edward Castro to represent A.F. Father successfully moved to disqualify Mother as the GAL and Castro as A.F.’s counsel. A.F. appealed the order disqualifying Castro. A new GAL was not appointed. Although A.F. brought the petition on her own behalf, the family court in her parents’ dissolution matter, appointed a “minor’s counsel” to represent her best interests there, in anticipation of changes to the custody and visitation arrangement that could result from the outcome in the DV matter. A.F. retained attorney Aaron Smith, to represent her in the DV matter. The court disqualified Smith for numerous reasons, including that there was a potential conflict of interest from having her maternal grandfather serve as a third-party guarantor. The court also interviewed A.F. and determined she was not competent to retain counsel independently, and it found Smith did not meet the requirements detailed by the California Rules of Court to serve as a “minor’s counsel.” The court appointed counsel in the DV matter, and prohibited Smith from replacing the attorney the court appointed as a “minor’s counsel.” A.F. appealed, contending that the issue of selecting her attorney should have been stayed pending the appeal of the court’s order disqualifying Castro. She also contended it was error to appoint counsel in the DV matter and to disqualify the attorney she chose to represent her there. The Court of Appeal: (1) concluded the court had subject matter jurisdiction to act in the DV matter while the first appeal was pending because her original attorney substituted out of the case; (2) reversed the appointment of a “minor’s counsel,” which was improper in a DV matter where a minor seeks a restraining order under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA); (3) affirmed the order voiding the agreement between A.F. and Smith and removing Smith as her attorney on the basis that A.F. lacked competency to select her attorney independently; (4) reversed the order prohibiting Smith from serving as A.F.’s attorney in the matter because it was an abuse of discretion to completely disqualify him on the basis that the court rejected the fee agreement or that he failed to meet the requirements of Rule 5.242. View "A.F. v. Jeffrey F." on Justia Law

Vivera Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (Vivera) was developing a medical test kit, but had received “negative publicity” from its litigation with a rival company. Vivera hired Sitrick Group, LLC (Sitrick) to manage a public relations campaign. Vivera did not make any payments and Sitrick filed demands for arbitration with Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services (JAMS). Judge Swart was selected to serve as an arbitrator in a separate matter between Sitrick and Legacy Development (the Legacy matter). In that matter, Sitrick was employing the same law firm (but a different lawyer) as was representing it in the arbitration with Vivera. Sitrick filed petitions to confirm the arbitration award. Vivera asked the trial court to vacate the arbitrator’s award due to Judge Swart’s inadequate disclosure of the Legacy matter. The trial court issued an order confirming the arbitrator’s award.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that the California Arbitration Act (the Act) requires arbitrators to disclose, among other things, matters that the Ethics Standards for Neutral Arbitrators in Contractual Arbitration (Ethics Standards) dictate must be disclosed. At issue here is whether the Ethics Standards require a retained arbitrator in a noncommercial case to disclose in one matter that he has been subsequently hired in a second matter by the same party and the same law firm. The court held “no,” at least where the arbitrator has previously informed the parties—without any objection thereto—that no disclosure will be forthcoming in this scenario. Because the arbitrator’s disclosures were proper here, the trial court properly overruled an objection based on inadequate disclosure. View "Sitrick Group v. Vivera Pharmaceuticals" on Justia Law

Defendants appealed an order granting plaintiffs' motion to compel compliance with prior discovery orders and imposing monetary and issue sanctions. The trial court imposed 11 potentially case-dispositive issue sanctions and $37,575 in monetary sanctions against defendants for having “repeatedly disregarded their obligations in Discovery” and having “repeatedly fought the Court Orders that tell them they must comply.” The court-appointed discovery referee, who recommended those sanctions, commented that in his almost 20 years of service as a neutral, mediator, arbitrator, and referee he had never seen “such blatant disregard of discovery and discovery orders.” In their notice of appeal, defendants asserted their appeal included both the monetary sanctions and the issue sanctions. The Court of Appeal found the order imposing monetary sanctions was directly appealable under California Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1(a)(11) and (12). However, the order imposing issue sanctions was not directly appealable. The issue sanctions were not inextricably intertwined with the monetary sanctions. The Court therefore granted plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss the appeal regarding issue sanctions. The Court also found defendants failed to establish the trial court should have found they acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances made the imposition of monetary sanctions unjust. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the award of monetary sanctions and dismissed the appeal in all other respects. View "Deck v. Developers Investment Co., Inc." on Justia Law

SM, AA and RM are the co-owners of Cannaco Research Corporation (CRC), a licensed manufacturer and distributor of cannabis products. All three individuals served as officers of CRC until February 2021, when AA and RM voted to remove SM from her position. SM sued AA, RM and others, including JA, AA’s husband, in a multicount complaint alleging causes of action for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud and other torts.   AA moved to disqualify SM counsel, Spencer Hosie and Hosie Rice LLP, on the ground SM had impermissibly downloaded from AA’s CRC email account private communications between AA and JA, protected by the spousal communication privilege and provided them to her attorneys, who then used them in an attempt to obtain a receivership for CRC in a parallel proceeding. The trial court granted the motion, finding that SM had not carried her burden of establishing AA had no reasonable expectation her communications with her husband would be private, and ordered the disqualification of Hosie and Hosie Rice.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court held that the evidence before the trial court supported its finding that AA reasonably expected her communications were, and would remain, confidential. And while the court acknowledged disqualification may not be an appropriate remedy when a client simply discusses with his or her lawyer improperly acquired privileged information, counsel’s knowing use of the opposing side’s privileged documents, however obtained, is a ground for disqualification. View "Militello v. VFARM 1509" on Justia Law

Dr. Heidari and Dr. Moradi owned a dental practice. Heidari sued Moradi for breach of contract. Moradi filed a cross-complaint, claiming that Heidari fraudulently misappropriated over $1.7 million. Moradi’s counsel, Kamarei, brought in Heidari’s wife, Padideh. Padideh sued Moradi and his attorney for malicious prosecution after the dismissal of Moradi’s cross-complaint. Moradi and Kamarei asserted the unclean-hands defense based on Padideh’s alleged misconduct in the underlying action—testifying falsely at her deposition.A jury determined that Padideh “ha[d] unclean hands,” barring her recovery. The court of appeal affirmed. A defendant asserting unclean hands in a malicious prosecution action need not demonstrate that absent the misconduct, they would have prevailed in the underlying action. But the misconduct “must relate directly to the transaction concerning which the [malicious-prosecution] complaint is made. It must infect the cause of action involved and affect the equitable relations between the litigants." There was substantial evidence that Padideh showed a lack of candor or even lied in her deposition in the underlying action, and that this had a direct effect on Kamarei and Moradi’s litigation decisions in that action, which was the precipitating action for this malicious prosecution suit. View "Padideh v. Moradi" on Justia Law

This writ proceeding involves a statutory challenge for cause filed against a trial court judge presiding over a wrongful termination lawsuit. The parties are Plaintiff and his former employer, Defendant Bassett Unified School District. Following a multimillion-dollar jury verdict in favor of Plaintiff, the trial judge in this action, Honorable Stephanie Bowick, received a text message from another judge on the court, Honorable Rupert Byrdsong. According to Judge Bowick, Judge Byrdsong had previously informed Judge Bowick that attorneys from his former firm were trying the case. Pointing to Judge Byrdsong’s apparent support for Plaintiff and the resulting verdict in Plaintiff’s favor, the school district sought Judge Bowick’s disqualification, asserting that a person aware of the facts might reasonably entertain a doubt that the judge would be able to be impartial. The disqualification motion was assigned to Orange County Superior Court Judge Maria D. Hernandez. The assigned judge denied the disqualification motion. Defendant sought review by petition for writ of mandate   The Second Appellate District denied the petition. The court held that the disqualification motion was properly denied. The court reasoned that there is no adverse inference arising from Judge Bowick’s final ruling on the evidentiary issue. Further, the court found that the facts Judge Bowick disclosed do not require disqualification. Moreover, the court wrote, the timing of Judge Bowick’s disclosure does not suggest an appearance of bias. View "Bassett Unified School Dist. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

With new counsel, a client sues his former attorneys, alleging they accepted $27,500 in fees from him but did not perform the promised legal services. New counsel engages in communications via email and telephone with the former attorneys’ representative and discusses the possible filing of a State Bar claim. The former attorneys file a cross-complaint against the client and his new counsel for extortion, among other claims. The client and his new counsel file an anti-SLAPP motion, which the trial court granted.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court found that none of the communications presents extortion as a matter of law. The court concluded that cross-defendants made the threshold showing that the cross-complainants’ complaint is based on protected activity and thus subject to the anti-SLAPP statute. The court found that the cross-complainants did not carry their burden of showing a probability of overcoming cross-defendants’ litigation privilege defense. Accordingly, the trial court properly granted the special motions to strike the cross-complaint. View "Geragos v. Abelyan" on Justia Law