Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

If a party is successful and has conferred a significant benefit by prevailing at trial and obtaining a judgment that a construction project violates the zoning laws in existence at the time, as in this case, that party was not precluded from obtaining attorney's fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5 because the losing party gets the zoning laws changed and the project's validity under the changed law has yet to be finally determined. The Court of Appeal held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in fixing the amount of attorney's fees and affirmed the award of attorney's fees. View "La Mirada Avenue Neighborhood Association of Hollywood v. Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Magana was charged with two counts of rape. His trial counsel, Everett, sought a fifth continuance but failed to appear for the motion hearing. Everett then exercised a peremptory challenge against the assigned judge, resulting in its reassignment. Everett unsuccessfully sought to exercise a second peremptory challenge, then moved for recusal, asserting that the judge was biased. Everett voluntarily withdrew that motion. On the second day of trial, Everett moved to appoint an expert to testify that his client’s confession was involuntary. The judge ruled that Everett was not prepared to proceed and was not providing adequate representation and continued the trial. The court then granted the prosecution’s motion to remove Everett as counsel, finding that due to Everett’s conduct, the alleged victim, the prosecution, and Magana had been denied a speedy trial and that it had no faith that Everett would be prepared for trial on a timely basis. The court of appeal denied relief. Everett withdrew his first statement of disqualification; the court correctly found his second statement of disqualification untimely. A trial court has authority to remove defense counsel to ensure that adequate representation is provided, and to prevent substantial impairment of court proceedings. While such authority is to be sparingly exercised, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in this case. View "Magana v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal vacated an arbitration award in favor of a client against a law firm because the award was procured by "undue means" as that term was used in Code of Civil Procedure section 1286.2. As an initial matter, the court held that the law firm did not waive its right to appeal. On the merits, the court held that the trial court erred in confirming the arbitration award that took into consideration claims not made in the arbitration demand and to which the law firm was not given an adequate or meaningful opportunity to respond. View "Baker Marquart LLP v. Kantor" on Justia Law

Investco and its promoters sold LLC memberships to the public. The Department of Business Oversight (DBO) believed those interests constituted “securities” but were sold without Department of Corporations qualification. Prospective investors were told that specific property would be purchased at a favorable price. The 443 investors ($22,725,000) were not told that other LLCs had purchased that property weeks earlier for a substantially lower price for sale to the Investco LLC, profiting Investco and the promoters. DBO filed a civil action. Under a confidential settlement agreement, a special master was appointed to oversee the sale of the properties. DBO sent notices to investors, including Respondents. Respondents filed civil actions; defendants moved to amend the interlocutory judgment to stay actions against them arising out of the settlement's subject matter. DBO joined the defendants’ objections, arguing that the suits would cause “bargain” sales to the detriment of other investors. Respondents filed a “special appearance,” opposing the motion to modify, arguing that they were involuntarily bound by the settlement. The court stayed Respondents’ actions as to the LLCs, but allowed suits against Investco and the promoters, and expanded the duties of the special master. The court of appeal affirmed an award of attorney fees against Investco and DBO. Respondents were successful parties; enforced an important right affecting the public and fraud victims; and provided necessary, non-duplicative, significant benefits, while incurring litigation expenses out of proportion to their personal interests. View "People v. Investco Management & Development LLC" on Justia Law

Shapira sued his former employer, Lifetech, for breach of an employment contract. The parties presented their evidence at a bench trial and rested. Before Shapira submitted his closing argument brief, he requested that the court dismiss the case under Code of Civil Procedure, section 581(e), which provides, “After the actual commencement of trial, the court shall dismiss the complaint . . . with prejudice, if the plaintiff requests a dismissal.” The court denied Shapira’s request. After the parties filed their closing argument briefs, the court entered a judgment in Lifetech’s favor, held that Lifetech was the prevailing party under Civil Code section 1717, and awarded Lifetech costs and $137,000 in attorney fees. Shapira appealed the attorney fees award. The court of appeal reversed. The court should have dismissed the case under section 581(e), so the award of attorney fees was erroneous under Civil Code section 1717(b)(2), which states, “Where an action has been voluntarily dismissed or dismissed pursuant to a settlement of the case, there shall be no prevailing party for purposes of this section.” Section 581(e) provides a right to dismiss a case before the completion of trial. View "Shapira v. Lifetech Resources" on Justia Law

In 2012, a Pasadena officer shot and killed an unarmed man, resulting in multiple investigations, including by the Office of Independent Review Group (OIR). The Los Angeles Times made requests under the California Public Records Act (PRA), Gov. Code, 6250, seeking disclosure of the OIR’s 2014 report. Officers sought to enjoin the report’s disclosure. The court of appeal affirmed the denial of the officers' petition in 2015, finding that the report is a public document, and remanded for issuance of a new or modified judgment. The Times then sought attorney fees from the city under the PRA and from the two involved police officers and the Pasadena Police Officers Association, under the private attorney general statute (Code Civ. Proc., 1021.5). The trial court awarded the Times limited fees against the city and declined to award the Times any fees under section 1021.5. The court of appeal affirmed the award of limited fees under the PRA but reversed the order awarding no fees under the private attorney general statute, directing the trial court to award the Times reasonable fees against the officers and/or the Pasadena Police Officers Association. View "Pasadena Police Officers Association v. City of Pasadena" on Justia Law

Birts was charged with several counts of felony domestic violence, with special allegations for use of a deadly weapon, serious felony enhancements, prior strikes and prison priors. Shortly after the trial judge, Buchwald ruled on several pretrial motions, the District Attorney successfully moved to dismiss the case for insufficient evidence. The following day, the case was refiled under a new case number. The prosecutor stated that “[t]he dismissal was based on in limine rulings that were made excluding certain evidence. The refiled case was assigned to Buchwald. The District Attorney successfully moved to disqualify him under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6. The court of appeal vacated, finding that the District Attorney’s peremptory challenge in the refiled case was untimely because the second action was a mere continuation of the first. View "Birts v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

In 2016, the court of appeal held that if the advocacy of an intervenor contributes to a California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) proceeding by assisting CPUC in the making of any order or decision (Pub. Util. Code 1802(i))[3]) that is part of the final resolution of the proceeding, whether or not on the merits, CPUC may determine whether, in its judgment, the intervenor’s contribution was substantial enough to merit a compensation award. The court of appeal vacated CPUC's subsequent award. CPUC's determination of “substantial contribution” to some interim or procedural “order or decision” is not alone, sufficient to justify "awarding every penny" claimed for work in connection with the proceeding as a whole. CPUC needed to show how its findings fit into the statutory requirement that compensable work be traceable to some “order or decision,” which is a measure of whether an intervenor achieved some degree of advocacy success. CPUC retains ample discretion to assess whether a given type of contribution counts as “substantial” in a proceeding. In exercising that discretion, CPUC may recognize that even small victories may have a major impact on the course of a proceeding, but there must still be some objective indication of successful advocacy. The remand decisions did not trace the amounts of fees and costs to specific orders or decisions. View "New Cingular Wireless PCS, LLC v. Public Utilities Commission" on Justia Law

Al-Shaikh, an orthopedic surgeon, moved his Fremont practice and sought approval by the Department of Health Care Services (DHCS), under Medi-Cal regulations. He had been an approved Medi-Cal provider in Fremont for six years. DHCS denied his application, claiming that Al-Shaikh’s fee arrangement with his billing service was unlawful. Al-Shaikh appealed. DHCS agreed the provisions it had cited were inapplicable but cited another state law, incorporating a federal Medicaid regulation. Al-Shaikh filed suit, then relocated his Auburn practice, for which he used the same billing service; the relocation was approved by a different DHCS regional office. Al-Shaikh cited an Office of the Inspector General publication that expressly states his fee arrangement does not violate federal law. DHCS approved the Fremont office after three years. The court dismissed the case as moot. Al-Shaikh moved for fees under Code of Civil Procedure 1028.5, which allows a small business or a licensee that prevails in an action against a state regulatory agency to recover a maximum of $7,500 in fees if the agency acted without substantial justification. The court of appeal directed the superior court to award Al-Shaikh the full amount recoverable under section 1028.5. DHCS has an obligation to be knowledgeable about the law it is charged with implementing and was unable to cite a case or regulatory decision supporting its position; it acted without substantial justification. View "Al-Shaikh v. State Department of Health Care Services" on Justia Law

Judge Persky was appointed to the superior court in 2003 and has been reelected. Dauber and others submitted a “Petition for Recall of Judge Aaron Persky” to the Registrar of Voters (Elections Code 11006, 11020-11022). Judge Persky responded that under the California Constitution, the Secretary of State was the proper official for the recall of state officers and that the petition contained an “incorrect and misleading” demand for an election to choose a successor because a vacancy would be filled by the Governor. An amended recall petition was submitted to the Registrar and approved for circulation. Judge Persky sought a temporary restraining order to compel the Registrar to withdraw its certification and refer the matter to the Secretary of State; to enjoin the petition’s circulation until the Secretary of State certified it; and to enjoin circulation while the petition contained the "misleading" statement. The court of appeal affirmed that the Registrar was the proper official to approve recall petitions for superior court judges and that the Persky recall petition was not misleading. The statutory process for recall of a “local officer” was expressly made applicable to recall of a superior court judge and is not contrary to the state constitution; it does not impermissibly distinguish between appellate courts and superior courts, including their classification as “state” or “local” officers. View "Perksy v. Bushey" on Justia Law