Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

Tenants sued for breach of contract and bad faith retention of $4,800 from a security deposit; they subsequently moved to compel responses to requests for admission and interrogatories and requested sanctions ($3,060). Orders granting the sanctions were filed on March 20. On April 15, Tenants sought dismissal without prejudice and Landlord sought reconsideration or to set aside the sanctions, asserting that counsel was representing Tenants “pro bono,” so they incurred no legal fees, contrary to Tenants’ attorney’s representation. The clerk entered the dismissal on April 18. On May 6, Tenants filed “objections” to Landlord's motion, arguing that the court had no jurisdiction to reconsider the sanctions because Tenants dismissed their case. On May 28, the trial court granted Landlord’s motion and set aside the sanctions orders. A June 21 order states: “This matter was continued solely for the purpose of addressing the referral of Plaintiff’s counsel to the Bar. The Court determines that ... there was no intentional misrepresentation. The Court will not refer this matter to the Bar.”The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting Tenants’ argument that because they filed a voluntary dismissal, the court lacked jurisdiction to reconsider and set aside the sanctions orders. Disallowing reconsideration when sanctions were based on misrepresentations would violate a reasonable sense of justice and fair play View "Manhan v. Gallagher" on Justia Law

The identity of plaintiff's nontestifying expert is not entitled to absolute work product protection because it is not "a writing" that would reveal his "impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal research or theories." However, if an attorney can show that disclosure of the identity of a nontestifying expert would result in opposing counsel taking undue advantage of the attorney's industry or efforts or impair the attorney's ability to prepare and investigate a case, the identity may be entitled to protection under the qualified work product privilege. In that case, the identity is only discoverable if the party seeking discovery can establish that "denial of discovery will unfairly prejudice the party seeking discovery in preparing that party's claim or defense or will result in an injustice."Plaintiff, an attorney and third-party witness in the underlying action, appeals from an order granting the motion of the California Employment Lawyers Association (CELA) to compel him to provide deposition testimony identifying a nontestifying expert whom plaintiff consulted in prior litigation. In the underlying action, CELA alleges an unknown CELA member (Doe 1) sent plaintiff, a non-member, information received from a members-only email distribution list in violation of a confidentiality agreement.The Court of Appeal concluded that the identity of Doe 1 is entitled to at most qualified attorney work product protection, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding CELA met its burden to demonstrate denial of disclosure would unfairly prejudice CELA in prosecuting the action and only minimally disadvantage plaintiff. The court agreed with CELA that plaintiff has appealed from a nonappealable discovery order, but the court treated plaintiff's appeal as a petition for writ of mandate. Therefore, the court dismissed the appeal and denied the petition. View "Curtis v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's grant of respondents' request for attorney fees under Probate Code section 2640.1, holding that attorney fees are not available where, as here, the matter is resolved without a conservator's appointment. In this case, respondents filed a conservatorship proceeding on their mother's behalf and the case settled before a conservator was appointed. Therefore, the trial court erred in granting respondents' request. View "Brokken v. Brokken" on Justia Law

When an attorney sues a client for breach of a valid and enforceable fee agreement, the amount of recoverable fees must be determined under the terms of the fee agreement, even if the agreed upon fee exceeds what otherwise would constitute a reasonable fee under the familiar lodestar analysis. To be enforceable, the fee agreement cannot be unconscionable. And, as with every contract, the attorney's performance under the fee agreement must be consistent with the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.The Court of Appeal explained that this requires a court adjudicating a fee dispute to determine, among other things, whether the attorney used reasonable care, skill, and diligence in performing his or her contractual obligations. This standard applies in determining the probable validity of an attorney's claim for breach of an enforceable fee agreement under the attachment statutes. In this case, the court affirmed the trial court's finding that the fee agreements here were valid and that plaintiff had established the probable validity of his claims based on his billing statements, correspondence with defendants, and unrebutted evidence showing defendants disputed only a handful of the billing statements. The court concluded that this evidence was sufficient to support the attachment orders under the standard the court articulated. View "Pech v. Morgan" on Justia Law

After plaintiff filed suit against defendant and won a judgment for $133,792.11 plus postjudgment interest, plaintiff sought attorney fees of $271,530, which were later increased to $287,640 in the trial court and now to $292,140 in this court. The trial court awarded $90,000 in attorney fees.The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's award of attorney fees, concluding that the trial court used sound discretion to limit the attorney fees to $90,000. The trial court began with the conventional lodestar calculation and gave good reasons for concluding that 600 plus hours was reasonable. However, the court reversed the trial court's ruling that plaintiff had no basis to collect the $90,000 award from an insurance company called Wesco that had posted a surety bond for defendant. Rather, the court concluded that the liability of the surety is commensurate with the liability of its principal. In this case, by statute, the court concluded that defendant must pay the attorney fees as a matter of costs and so too must Wesco. Accordingly, the court remanded for the trial court to amend the judgment to make surety Wesco liable for the $90,000 fee award as an item of costs. View "Karton v. Ari Design & Construction, Inc." on Justia Law

Sargent began working for the University in 1991 as an environmental health-and-safety technician. Sargent was the campus’s licensed asbestos consultant. Sargent sued, presenting abundant evidence about retaliation after he raised concerns about environmental hazards. A jury found in his favor on claims alleging unlawful retaliation and on a claim under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act (Labor Code 2698, PAGA), which was premised almost entirely on violations of the California Occupational Safety and Health Act (Labor Code 6300, CalOSHA). He was awarded more than $2.9 million in PAGA penalties and more than $7.8 million in attorney fees.The court of appeal affirmed the award of attorney fees but reversed the award of PAGA penalties. Education Code 66606.2 does not bar PAGA claims against the California State University (CSU) system; CSU is not categorically immune from PAGA penalties because it is a public entity. Viable PAGA claims can be asserted against CSU only when the statutes upon which the claims are premised themselves provide for penalties. Here, Sargent brought some viable PAGA claims but ultimately failed to establish CSU’s liability for them because the jury found that he was not personally affected by the underlying statutory violations. View "Sargent v. Board of Trustees of the California State University" on Justia Law

A trial court denied defendant-appellant Anthony Williams’s motion to substitute retained counsel for his appointed counsel. After the jury found Williams guilty of first degree murder, and found true a special allegation, the trial court sentenced him to life without the possibility of parole. On appeal, Williams claimed the trial court violated his constitutional right to counsel by denying his request to be represented by counsel of his choice and that this error requires reversal without regard to prejudice. To this, the Court of Appeal agreed, and reversed the trial court's judgment. View "California v. Williams" on Justia Law

After the San Luis Obispo Local Agency Formation Commission (LAFCO) denied the city and developer's application to annex a parcel of real property to the city, the city and developer filed suit challenging the action. LAFCO prevailed and brought this action to recover attorney fees under an indemnity agreement contained in the annexation application.The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's grant to the city and developer judgment on the pleadings because LAFCO has no authority to require attorney fees. The court explained that Government Code section 56383 does not apply to post-administrative matters, such as the action that generated the fees at issue here. Therefore, LAFCO has given no consideration in exchange for the indemnity agreement. View "San Luis Obispo Local Agency Formation Commission v. City of Pismo Beach" on Justia Law

Guo owned TVGC, which operated a Pleasanton spa. TVGC agreed to sell the business to Mazurova's corporation, LSI. The sale was partially financed through a promissory note. The sales agreement and promissory note contained provisions allowing a party prevailing in a legal action to recover attorney fees. After the sale, a dispute arose regarding Guo’s alleged nondisclosure of outstanding coupons for free spa services and Mazurova’s alleged failure to make payments. A judgment was entered for $161,085.58 against Guo and TVGC, which was affirmed. A subsequent order specifically stated that LSI and Mazurova were deemed the prevailing parties under Code of Civil Procedure Section 1032, “entitled to recover their costs of suit and reasonable attorney fees.” Mazurova and LSI assigned the judgment to Moorpark, which engaged in collection efforts and moved for attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 685.040.The court denied the motion because the underlying judgment did not include an award of attorney’s fees. The court of appeal reversed. The judgment awarded reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing parties, although it did not set a particular amount of fees and no costs bill including such fees was ever filed. The court’s failure to include a specific amount in the judgment does not defeat section 685.040. View "Guo v. Moorpark Recovery Service, LLC" on Justia Law

After plaintiff filed a petition for writ of administrative mandate to overturn Westmont College's determination that he committed sexual assault, the trial court granted plaintiff's petition. Plaintiff then moved for attorney fees, which the trial court denied. Westmont appealed from the judgment, but plaintiff did not appeal from the postjudgment order denying his attorney fee motion. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. After remittitur issued, plaintiff moved for attorney's fees based on the court's decision. The trial court denied the motion.The Court of Appeal held that the trial court applied the wrong standards when it denied plaintiff's attorney fee motion. In this case, the trial court erred when it denied plaintiff's post-appeal motion for attorney fees because his action against Westmont resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest, and his action conferred significant benefits on a large group of people. Furthermore, the trial court abused its discretion by failing to consider whether public enforcement of plaintiff's fair hearing rights was available or adequate. The trial court also failed to consider whether the financial burden hoisted on plaintiff in prosecuting his case outweighed his own personal interests, focusing instead on the "punishment" that would be inflicted on Westmont for exercising its right to appeal. The court also agreed with plaintiff that the trial court erred when it denied his attorney fee motion due to his failure to provide a basis for apportionment between the fees he incurred to advance his private interests and those that advanced the public interest. Therefore, the court vacated the denial order and remanded for further proceedings. View "Doe v. Westmont College" on Justia Law